Αναξιόπιστη επικοινωνία στο πλαίσιο της θεωρίας παιγνίων
KeywordsΘεωρία παιγνίων ; Μη αξιόπιστη επικοινωνία ; Πληροφόρηση ; Παίκτες ; Game theory ; Unreliable communication ; Cheap talk ; Information ; Players
This paper focuses on unreliable communications (cheap talk) in a game in which are asked to make decisions without having full knowledge of the potential winnings of each player in order to chart their strategy. The goal of cheap talk is to gain access to essential information regarding the game. Through the presentation of specific models of cheap talk and examples, it is possible to better understand in mechanics, as well as the ways in which despite the fact that it is unreliable, it is possible to benefit both players. In addition, it's applications are presented in various areas in which one is called upon to make decisions about one's strategy.