Αποδολαριοποίηση και τάσεις εναλλακτικής χρηματοδότησης στην Ευρασιατική Οικονομική Ένωση
De-dollarization and alternative financing trends in the Eurasian Economic Union
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Keywords
De-dollarization ; EAEU ; Financial sanctions ; Institutional investment ; Currency diversificationAbstract
This thesis investigates how the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is adapting its financial architecture to geopolitical fragmentation, examined through the three sovereigns that together represent 96.5% of bloc GDP: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic enter the regional analysis wherever data coverage supports comparable treatment. The EAEU offers an instructive setting because it combines high sanctions exposure, commodity dependence, and a formal institutional architecture that permits dedollarization to be studied as an operational process rather than an abstract concept, with its three case-study members spanning the upper, middle, and lower bounds of the bloc's sovereign size distribution under materially different sanctions exposures.
The research adopts a mixed-method design integrating quantitative macro-financial analysis with qualitative institutional and policy review. Macroeconomic indicators from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and EAEU central banks are triangulated against regulatory documentation and capital market data across three sub-periods defined by the sanctions chronology: pre-2014, 2014 to 2021, and 2022 to 2024. Country-level case studies operationalise the comparison through a regime statistics framework and a composite sovereign vulnerability index.
Three principal findings emerge. First, de-dollarization in the EAEU is significant in banking and payments but partial and externally constrained in capital markets and reserves. Second, the composite vulnerability index ranks Russia lowest, Kazakhstan intermediate, and Armenia highest across 2014 to 2024, inverting the intuitive sanctions-proximity ordering and demonstrating that sovereign resilience depends more on the fiscal position constructed before a shock than on the magnitude of the shock itself. Third, the post-2022 capital base comprises pools that do not price risk through market mechanisms an institutional investor could replicate, which explains why issuer-side architectural transformation has not been matched by a deepening of the private commercial investor base. A portfolio construction scorecard and spread duration analysis translate these findings into an actionable institutional allocation framework.