Μία επισκόπηση στα επαναλαμβανόμενα παίγνια, με έμφαση στα παίγνια επικαλυπτόμενων γενεών

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Keywords
Επικαλυπτόμενες γενεές ; Επαναλαμβανόμενα παίγνια ; Εθιμικό θεώρημα ; Στρατηγική τιμωρίας ; Υποπαιγνιακά τέλεια ισορροπία κατά NashAbstract
The present paper deals with a survey on theoretical models of repeated games and specifically with the repeated games on overlapping generations. In more detail, the appropriate background of study is created from presenting, on the first part of this paper, the structure, and the important elements of the statical games. In the second part of this paper, takes place a survey on the structure of repeated games, which will be distinguished, according to their duration, in the infinitely repeated games and the finitely repeated games. Also, we will study intensively those games that can be distinguished in repeated games of complete information and the repeated games with incomplete information.On the third part, will be described the theoretical models studied by three important researchers regarding the repeated games with overlapping generations, which is also the main subject of this paper. Studying intensively the surveys of Salant (1991), Kandori (1992) and Gossner (1996) we come to conclusions as regards to the operation of these games, especially because of the insertion of the punishment strategy on players who do not follow the cooperation mode.To conclude, on the fourth and last part of this paper, examples of repeated games with overlapping generations are described, in order to gain a clearer view about the punishment operation on players who deviate from the cooperation.Emphasis will be given on the variety of the punishment strategy according to the time that the deviation occurs.