Αδιαφάνεια τραπεζών και χειραγώγηση κερδών
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Keywords
Αδιαφάνεια τραπεζών ; Χειραγώγηση κερδών ; Ζημιές απομειώσεως ; Λογιστική αξιοπιστία ; Προβλέψεις ζημιών από δάνεια ; Διαχείριση κερδών ; Εξομάλυνση κερδώνAbstract
The current thesis studies the banks’ opacity and earnings manipulation. According to the existing bibliography, it is established that loan loss provisions are being used for the manipulation of banks’ financial statements. In addition, except profit smoothing via loan loss provisions, we add to our statistic model the opacity variable which is measured by the accounting reliability of the financial statements.
Moreover, our research data concern 64 European Banks for the time period between 1998 – 2017. The analysis is split into three sub periods; the first being before the financial crisis (1998 – 2007), the second being after the financial crisis (2010 – 2017) and the third regarding the whole time period (1998 – 2017). The fundamental variable for measuring profit manipulation is EBTP (Earnings Before Taxes and Provisions) and the opacity variable is defined as DISCLOSURE (number of pages concerning banks’ yearly financial reports).
Finally, our results for the total time period (1998 – 2017) indicate a strong relationship between earnings and provisions, which, in turn, suggests that the sample of the chosen banks did not use loan loss provisions for earnings management. Alongside, the positive relationship among opacity index and provision index, the results show that there are opportunities for earnings manipulation through provisions because of the absence of accounting reliability of the financial statements. In what regards the periods before and after the financial crisis, earnings coefficient is in accordance with the results of the total period. On the contrary, the opacity coefficient in the period before the financial crisis is negative which means that banks could not manipulate their profits through provisions, whereas, in the period post-crisis is statistically insignificant.