Προβλήματα αντιπροσώπευσης και θεωρία της επιχείρησης : χρηματοδότηση επενδύσεων σε καθεστώς ασύμμετρης πληροφόρησης
The negotiations in the context of social structures extend across the range of relations, both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic level. The importance to reach agreements (contracts) in environments of asymmetric information, with a view to optimize the individual and social welfare is becoming necessary for the analysis of the behavior of economic units. In this study, interest converge in the description of a reference framework in which research is based, targeting to the analysis of optimal contracts arising in the context of negotiations. Analysis is focused -in accordance with the abovementioned description- in the financial institutions industry on the economic behavior during financial contracting. In particular, the case examined is that of financial institutions granting loans in order to finance investments. Emphasis is given on the rationale where adverse selection appears on the basis of the Principal Agent model.