Bargaining models in e-marketplaces
| dc.contributor.advisor | Βολιώτης, Δημήτριος | |
| dc.contributor.author | Μεϊμαρόγλου, Παντελής Γ. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-18T10:33:57Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-03-18T10:33:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-03-18T10:33:57Z | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dione.lib.unipi.gr/xmlui/handle/unipi/5729 | |
| dc.language.iso | el | |
| dc.rights | Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 4.0 Διεθνές | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.el | |
| dc.subject | Bargaining games -- Economics | |
| dc.subject | Game theory | |
| dc.title | Bargaining models in e-marketplaces | |
| dc.type | Master Thesis | |
| europeana.isShownAt | https://dione.lib.unipi.gr/xmlui/handle/unipi/5729 | |
| dc.identifier.call | 331.210 1 ΜΕΙ | |
| dc.description.abstractEN | The scope of this thesis is to examine the different bargaining models that can be used in the continuously-growing sector of e-marketplaces. Based on Faratin scoring functions which used in multi-agents systems, the Rubinstein bargaining model example of multiple games, which adding the discount factor in the bargain process, and the axiomatic approach of Nash, it is created a two dimensional function that can be incorporate in e-marketplaces and support the counterparts of the bargain to decide the better solution for both sides and reach to an agreement as soon as possible. Afterwards by changing the parts of the function they are exported some useful results about the strategy that each player should follow to obtain the most of the bargain. |
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Τμήμα Χρηματοοικονομικής και Τραπεζικής Διοικητικής
Department of Banking & Financial Management
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Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 4.0 Διεθνές
Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 4.0 Διεθνές