Η παρουσίαση της υψηλής στρατηγικής της Σπάρτης στον Κορινθιακό Πόλεμο υπό το πρίσμα της θεωρίας του Κλαούζεβιτς
Presentation of Sparta's grand strategy in the Corinthian War in the light of Clausewitz's theory

View/ Open
Keywords
Υψηλή στρατηγική ; Κορινθιακός Πόλεμος ; Σπάρτη ; ΚλαούζεβιτςAbstract
This paper examines the high strategy of Sparta during the Corinthian War (395–386 BC) in the light of Carl von Clausewitz's theory. It focuses on the analysis of Sparta's strategic goals, the methods adopted to achieve them, and the challenges that arose from the geopolitical dynamics of the period. In 404 BC, the Spartans leveled the Long Walls between Athens and Piraeus, proving that they had won an unexpected and complete victory over the Athenians, ending the 27-year Peloponnesian War. The Greek world saw the rigid, militaristic Peloponnesians as liberators from the brutal oppression of the world's first democracy. Athens abandoned its ancestral values, faced its allies with contempt and followed an arrogant, erratic path of aggressive imperialism that its limited resources could not support. In less than ten years, Sparta would again be at war with Athens with its most powerful former allies in the Peloponnesian War, Corinth and Thebes. The actions of Sparta before and during the Corinthian War squandered the goodwill of the Greek world, irreparably weakened the state and sowed the seeds of its subsequent collapse as a great Mediterranean power.
The study leverages key concepts of Clausewitz's theory, such as the perception of war as a continuation of politics, the importance of balance between state, army, and people, and the concept of decisive strike. Through this theoretical framework, the relationship between Sparta's military strategy and its political goals is explored, as well as how it was influenced by the Persian involvement and the actions of its opponents.
The paper concludes with a critical evaluation of Sparta's strategy, examining its short-term effectiveness in the Corinthian War and its long-term implications for city-state power. At the same time, the timeless value of Clausewitz's theory for the understanding of strategic thinking is highlighted, even in the context of ancient conflicts.


