Διαδικασία λήψεως αποφάσεων σε συνθήκες κρίσης. Η περίπτωση της Ελλάδας στις κρίσεις με την Τουρκία το 1974, το 1987 και το 1996
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Keywords
Λήψη απόφασης ; Διαχείριση κρίσεων ; Ελλάδα ; Τουρκία ; Decision making ; Crisis management ; Greece ; TurkeyAbstract
The main objective of the present study is to understand and elaborate on how a small state, in this case Greece, is taking decisions to deal with an emerged crisis involving the country’s foreign policy. The above question, formulated as «how a state takes decisions”, examines firstly who is or are the decision makers within the state structure, meaning which is the actual decision making unit - is it the head, a small team deciding together, or other formation - and secondly how do they actually decide and whether any constraints are involved in this process, regarding the range of the available choices, alongside why and how they choose a specific option. It is aimed to understand the country’s behavior in very specific cases, under threat conditions or opportunity, alongside identifying and observing the details of the constraints involved that lead to the state’s behavior.
The analysis is performed based on the neoclassical realism theory and through giving emphasis both on the external stimulus that each state receives from the international system - independent variable, as well as on the state internal, domestic behavioral procedures - intervening variables, it succeeds to deliver a holistic picture and satisfactory explanations to the state behavior and decisions in specific cases and situations.
The cases under observation are the crisis incidents between Greece and Turkey in 1974 with the invasion in Cyprus, in 1987 in the Aegean and in 1996 in Imia. Each crisis situation with its main characteristics, involve a threat to a basic value, a limited response time and an increased war probability, lead to a high challenging situation, that the involved states need to rapidly respond to, take decisions and shape their behavior. Based on the basic hypothesis of the present study, each state that needs to react and decide under such conditions, is constrained as to the available choices, firstly due to the international system structure involved and then due to possible cognitive deficiencies of the involved decision makers, i.e. individuals, small groups and bureaucracy stakeholders.
The dissertation, by taking into account the analysis of all of the above comes to the overall conclusion that the structure of the international system is providing to the states the range of available choices and decisions, and thus sets the overall behavioral framework, beyond which the states are faced with consequences. However, as argued by Waltz, the framework sets the framework, but it can in no way precisely dictate their behavior. However, the specific subsystems in many cases experience cognitive constraints, affecting the quality of decisions, of choices and of the final reaction, which can range from good, very good, optimal or in any case acceptable within the international system structure down to an unacceptable behavior, outside the system limits, with relevant consequences for the involved state.
Regarding the three crisis cases examined, in 1974 the subsystem of the involved country individuals and groups operated under significant cognitive constraints, directly influencing the decision making process. The Greek part misunderstood the existence of an opportunity within the international system, that of the Greece and Cyprus unification. However, this choice was by no means a clear opportunity for Greece, which only overestimated the country’s strengths and therefore did not behave in alliance to the country’s positioning, capabilities and real power within the international system, while at the same time, the country, Greece, miscalculated the reactions of the rival country, Turkey, in this case.
Concerning the Aegean crisis incident in March 1987, the decisions were taken in alignment with the subsystem of intervening variables, the bureaucracy, the involved small groups and the individuals. The message and information about the Turkish threat was clear and unambiguous and at the same time perceived as such by the decision makers. As observed, there were no significant constraints involved in the critical decision making process, either from the part of the bureaucracy operation nor from the small groups or the individuals, who all acted in a coordinated approach, aligned and within the expected structure of the international systemic behavior. Therefore, the choice taken was to deal with the threat by balancing the opponent and by restoring the power balance by using the available resources for internal and external mobilization.
Finally, with regard to the third and last incident studied, that of the Imia crisis in 1996, the case has to do with the existence of a clear threat. However, in this case of crisis the operation of the individual decision-making subsystems is identified as problematic, since there is a significant delay by the involved individuals, the teams and the bureaucracy, to the perception of the obvious threat and hence to the corresponding required response, alongside a lack of coordination and an aligned joint course of action towards the Turkish threat. Despite this, the final behavior is considered acceptable and within the international system limits, but it was certainly not the best choice, as on the one hand the war was avoided, but on the other hand Greece failed to balance the situation and make the opponent, Turkey, withdraw its intentions and step back from its assertive stance.