Η επενδυτική πολιτική της ΕΕ μετά την υπογραφή της CETA: το νέο ρυθμιστικό πλαίσιο για τις άμεσες ξένες επενδύσεις
KeywordsCETA ; Deep Trade Agenda ; Ρυθμιστικό/κανονιστικό πλαίσιο ; US BIT Model ; Canadian FIPA Model ; Καναδάς ; Στρατηγική Global Europe ; Στρατηγική Trade for All ; Περιφερισμός ; Περιφερειακές Εμπορικές Συμφωνίες ; ISDS-Investment-State Dispute Settlement ; Εισαγωγή και εξαγωγή ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου ; UNCITRAL ; Αρχή της απαγόρευσης των διακρίσεων ; Αρχή του Πλέον Ευνοούμενου Κράτους ; Δικαίωμα του κράτους να προβεί σε απαλλοτρίωση ; Δόλιες και αβάσιμες προσφυγές ; Άμεσες ξένες επενδύσεις ; Κανονιστική εναρμόνιση ; Εξωτερική διάσταση της επενδυτικής πολιτικής της ΕΕ ; Δίκαιη και ισότιμη μεταχείριση ; Εθνική μεταχείριση
The signing of CETA, the first new generation EU trade agreement, between the EU and Canada, constitutes a milestone in the development of the EU’s external investment policy, and more precisely in its Foreign Direct Investment policy (FDI). For the first time, a trade agreement of this scope included a series of provisions concerning the so-called deep trade issues that aim mainly at regulatory harmonization. The FDI provisions that are included in the agreement (non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, the state’s right to regulate, Investor-State dispute settlement) were very controversial during the negotiation period due to their context and to the manner in which the negotiations took place. Their importance for the international trade in general and for the economic and political future of the EU is substantial. The purpose of this master thesis is to provide answers to three main questions. Firstly, do the investment provisions included in CETA reflect the canadian (or american) regulatory framework (therefore they can be characterized as regulatory “imports”) or do they reflect the EU’s regulatory framework (therefore they can be characterized as European regulatory “exports”)? Secondly, which of the main conceptual models that try to explain EU’s power and influence as a commercial, economic and regulatory actor in the international system (Market Power Europe, the EU as a regulatory empire, the Brussel’s effect, the EU as a Civilian and Normative Power, the EU as an importer of international regulatory framework etc.) can better explain EU’s stance during the CETA negotiations? Thirdly, can CETA help us draw some general conclusions concerning the future of the EU’s external investment policy? The methodology used in this thesis consisted of comparing the provisions included in the major investment models (known as BIT Models), and more precisely those of the USA and Canada, with, firstly, the provisions included in EU commercial and investment agreements with other third countries, secondly, with the German investment model and, thirdly, with a series of official EU texts that highlight the EU’s intentions for the development of a new regulatory frame for investments (Global Europe Agenda, the EU’s Communication “Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy” and the EU’s Concept Paper “Investment in TTIP and beyond-the path to reform. Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court”). The first conclusion we reached is that the provisions included in CETA manage to create a balance between the canadian regulatory frame (as reflected mainly in the Canadian FIPA model) and the regulatory frame that the EU is trying to promote through a series of new generation agreements. The EU managed to “export” its own regulatory frame and intentions in the provisions that were highly controversial among the European Civil Society (transparency, the ability of multinational companies to bring a case to the international investment dispute settlement mechanism, the issue of a state’s right to regulate). On the other hand, in some provisions, and more precisely in those that promote the creation of a more investor-friendly environment, the canadian influence is more pronounced (we can almost characterize them as regulatory “imports”). Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the EU is trying to “manage globalization” and combine two conflicting aims: attract foreign investments and maintain the regulatory influence of the member-states and of the EU as a whole. At the same time we reached the conclusion that many of the conceptual models that are widely used to explain EU’s position as a regulatory, economic and commercial power can explain, to an extent, the final content of CETA’s provisions. The model that seems to be better fitted is that of Young, who considers the EU an important international actor in certain issues and under certain conditions. Finally, we will draw a series of more general conclusions concerning the EU’s position concerning FDI and the future of international trade.