Το λήμμα του Myerson
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Keywords
Πράκτορας ; Κυρίαρχη στρατηγική ; Αποτίμηση ; Δημοπρασία ; Συμβατότητα κινήτρων ; ΜηχανισμόςAbstract
This master’s thesis is an bibliographic work which studies Myerson’s lemma,
the cornerstone of mechanism design, focusing on its applications in auction
theory providing a numerical example as well. The issue is considered important
becauseit provides the necessary conditions to construct a direct mechanism that
is feasible and compatible with dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC).
The methodology includes several fundamental concepts from game theory and
mechanism design, which are also an integral part of the formulation, rigorous
proof, and application of the lemma in auctions.
Myerson’s first notable finding is that for every monotone allocation rule there
exists one and only one payment rule that makes the mechanism compatible with
dominant strategy incentives. The second finding ensures a rational, transparent,
andfair allocation of resources in auctions (e.g., in second-price auctions), and the
lemma is restricted to single-parameter environments. The thesis concludes that
the lemmaprovides a clear way to design optimal auctions where each participant
has an incentive to be truthful, with applications to digital auctions (e.g., auctions
for online advertising).
Postgraduate Studies Programme
Χρηματοοικονομική και Τραπεζική με ειδίκευση στη Χρηματοοικονομική και Τραπεζική ΔιοικητικήDepartment
Σχολή Χρηματοοικονομικής και Στατιστικής. Τμήμα Χρηματοοικονομικής και Τραπεζικής ΔιοικητικήςNumber of pages
62Language
Greek
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as
Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ελλάδα
Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ελλάδα