Borda vs Condorcet
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Abstract
This thesis investigates the application of Borda and Condorcet Methods within regimes for financial and macroeconomic decision making, to provide a comprehensive review of their theoretical foundations, mechanics and relevance. The methods for aggregation of diverse preferences in complex decision environments take advantage of social choice theory to provide structured frameworks. When building consensus and requiring balanced representation, the Borda Count is the rule of choice given its inclusiveness and broad preference capturing ability. By contrast, the Condorcet method places special emphasis on majority rule and robust decision making and is therefore best suited to scenarios where clear public or stakeholder support is critical — for example, national referenda and policy reforms. The strengths and weaknesses of each method are disclosed, with inclusion as a strength in the Borda Count and vulnerability to strategic voting, as well as majority support as a feature of the Condorcet method and the prevalence of the Condorcet Paradox. These results also highlight the role of context in choosing which method of decision making is best suited, with the Borda Count better suited in diverse and complex stakeholder environments and the Condorcet method best fitting those requiring strong majority backing. Study limitations include that the study rests on theoretical frameworks and that there is no empirical validation, limiting the generalization of findings. Further research is suggested to empirically test these methods empirically in real world deployments, examine how they may be integrated with other advanced technologies, and model reasonable hybrid methods that have characteristics of both. This study further confirms the significance of social choice theory for dealing with the complex questions of financial and macroeconomic decision making by advancing our understanding of preference aggregation.