Η ποιότητα των κερδών στις οικονομικές καταστάσεις των ευρωπαϊκών εταιρειών : εμπειρική διερεύνηση της ασύμμετρης συμπεριφοράς του κόστους
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Keywords
Asymmetric cost behaviour ; Operating expenses ; Non-listed firms ; EuropeAbstract
The study of cost behaviour has been of utmost relevance for cost accounting and many types of compliance reporting. With the advent of the concept of cost asymmetry, which has been studied primarily in the context of listed firms in various national settings, such as the U.S. (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003), Brazil (e.g., de Medeiros and de Souza Costa, 2004), Japan (e.g., He et al., 2010), U.K., France, and Germany (e.g., Calleja, et al., 2006), the relevant research has acquired a great deal of significance.
The purpose of the current doctoral research is to investigate the manifestation of the asymmetric cost behaviour of operating expenses among non-listed companies within the setting of the EU-28. Existing limited empirical evidence (Dalla and Perego, 2013; Cheng et al., 2016; Ozkaya et al., 2020) indicates that, on average, non-listed firms exhibit cost anti-stickiness (with the exception of Turkish non-listed firms, which exhibit cost stickiness), whereas listed firms tend to exhibit cost stickiness (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2012; Balakrishnan, & Gruca, 2008; Banker, & Byzalov, 2014).
We employ a data sample of 4,177,625 firm years observations from Amadeus Database for the period 2009-2017 to explore the asymmetric cost behaviour phenomenon at the EU-28 countries pool and country level. Based on the standard log linear and linear econometric approaches for testing the presence of asymmetric cost behaviour, we find that operating expenses tend to exhibit anti-sticky cost behaviour on average.
We postulate that the behavioural grounds of the conscious resource commitment decisions and their association with the level of adjustment costs are the causes for the varied pattern of asymmetric cost behaviour across the organisational settings of listed and non-listed firms. Focusing on the context of listed firms within which managers have central role on the formal or informal organizational decision-making processes for managing the available entrepreneurial economic resources, the deliberate resource commitment decisions are attributed to managers (Banker and Byzalov, 2014). However, in the case of non-listed firms, the available entrepreneurial economic resources are relatively low, and the presence of entrepreneur might reduce the ability of managers to direct resource allocation decisions. Lower resource availability and more intense intra-organizational conflict for the resource allocation decisions (i.e., between owners and managers or other stakeholders) increases the intensity of cost anti-stickiness.
Moreover, the direction and intensity of the asymmetric cost behaviour show increased variability across different national settings. We employ various econometric specifications to examine the presence of asymmetric cost behaviour at the EU-28 pool and country level. In a number of instances throughout the European landscape, operating expenses exhibit lack of asymmetric cost behaviour. Based on the linear model which accounts for a firm's cost structure, operating expenses exhibit cost anti-stickiness in 42% of the 84 country level estimations, cost stickiness behaviour in 6%, and symmetric cost behaviour in 52%.
Seeking for additional empirical evidence concerning the intensity and the direction of cost asymmetry, we also examined the impact of a number of environmental, institutional, and managerial factors. It appears that the association between cost anti-stickiness of operating expenses and a number of underlying factors is more variable in the case of non-listed firms, and in many cases diametrically opposed to that of listed firms, mainly due to idiosyncratic characteristics of non-listed firms.
Specifically, in terms of environmental determinants of cost asymmetry, demand uncertainty increases the intensity of cost anti-stickiness in non-listed firms (lack of cost asymmetry in smaller non-listed firms), whereas in the case of listed firms, demand uncertainty either increases cost stickiness or results in lack of cost asymmetry. In addition, judicial efficiency, competition, regulatory intervention, and shareholder protection legislation do not generate cost asymmetry in non-listed firms, whereas they either enhance or lessen cost stickiness in listed firms. In addition, economic crisis, population, and employment protection legislation increase the cost anti-stickiness of non-listed firms; for listed firms, economic crisis tends to reduce their cost stickiness, population increases their cost asymmetry, and employment protection legislation increases their cost stickiness. Regarding the degree of macroeconomic activity, it lessens the intensity of cost anti-stickiness for non-listed firms (increase the intensity of cost stickiness for listed firms). Also, the availability of skilled staff, community social capital, unemployment rate, per capita income, and legal origin (common vs code law system) either cause lack of asymmetry or decrease cost anti-stickiness for non-listed firms, depending on the size of the firm, whereas for listed firms, these factors decrease cost stickiness, cause lack of asymmetry, and intensify cost stickiness. In terms of the industry-specific effects, non-listed firms tend to exhibit increased cost anti-stickiness or a lack of cost asymmetry, whereas these characteristics either increase or decrease cost stickiness for listed firms.
With regards to the institutional determinants of cost asymmetry examined in the current doctoral research, non-listed firms with higher employee and asset intensity face higher adjustment costs and committed resources respectively and consequently both variables decrease the intensity of cost anti-stickiness, similar to listed firms. In addition, non-listed firms with high organizational capital intensity and access to capital demonstrate enhanced cost anti-stickiness (lack of cost asymmetry in smaller non-listed firms), whilst in the case of listed firms these variables increase cost stickiness. Moreover, non-listed firms with a high level of ownership independence are more likely to show increased intra-organizational conflict and, as a result, cost anti-stickiness.
As regards the examined managerial determinants of cost asymmetry, empire building behaviour seems to be associated with lack of cost asymmetry in non-listed firms, but it tends to increase cost stickiness in listed firms. Furthermore, pessimistic managerial expectations for future sales increase the intensity of cost anti-stickiness (or decrease it in larger non-listed firms) as in the case of listed firms.
This study offers additional international empirical evidence for the asymmetric cost behaviour of operating costs in the context of European non-listed firms, filling the literature gap in the research of the asymmetric cost behaviour of non-listed firms. Due to the paucity of research on cost asymmetry of non-listed firms, the current doctoral research may serve as a foundation for future research and aid the business community in better assessing budgets, evaluating financial statements, making investment decisions, and conducting performance evaluations.
Department
Σχολή Οικονομικών, Επιχειρηματικών και Διεθνών Σπουδών. Τμήμα Οργάνωσης και Διοίκησης ΕπιχειρήσεωνNumber of pages
570Language
GreekCollections
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Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ελλάδα
Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ελλάδα