Το δικαίωμα στη λήθη σύμφωνα με τον Κανονισμό 2016/679 και την ενωσιακή νομολογία
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Δικαίωμα στη λήθηAbstract
Intertwined as it is with technology, the right to be forgotten constitutes one of the most
important personal data protection tools, both in the EU and across the world. Furthermore,
even though this tool is not available to legal persons, as they do not fall under the legal scope
of personal data, the right to be forgotten also holds a crucial role in the business world, given
the close relationship often existing between legal and natural persons.
As a result of its very nature and of the extent of the personal data that fall under its theoretical
protective scope, the right to be forgotten is capable of significant differentiation in each
country it is being applied. The treatment of special categories of personal data, such as data
relating to criminal charges and prosecutions, can be named as a clear example of this reality.
For this reason, theoretical investigations of the right to be forgotten ought to be carried out,
either to some extent or in total, comparatively.
The right to be forgotten is a dynamic one. Case law continually modifies it, by specializing its
range, its scope of application and the general conditions for it to be exercised. The right to
be forgotten is exercised in so unusual a setting, as to create novel conditions for its
evaluation. Being the first recipients of requests pertaining to this specific right, search engines
are called upon to act as quasi-courts of first instance. In this role, they develop their own
''case law’’, albeit one that suffers from significant deficits when it comes to publicity and legal
certainty, among other factors.
Finally, although personal data by definition concern natural persons only, two needs can be
said to be diagnosed in the legal space of data protection. On the one hand, the need to define
what constitutes data worthy of protection when it comes to legal persons. On the other hand,
to establish a corresponding mechanism of ''forgetting'' said data, for legal persons. And this,
because the differences that today exist between natural and legal persons cannot be said to
justify the exclusion of the latter from a protection mechanism which is today considered
technologically imperative.