Nash equilibrium locations for a mixed duopoly model under spatial price discrimination with delegation
Κατά Nash σημεία ισορροπίας για ένα μεικτό δυοπωλιακό μοντέλο χωρικού ανταγωνισμού με ανάθεση εκτελεστικής εξουσίας σε διευθυντές
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Keywords
Mixed duopoly ; Delegation ; Consistent conjectures ; Nash equilibriumAbstract
In a duopoly model between a partially privatized and a private firm we
examine The Nash Equilibrium locations under spatial price discrimination with
simultaneous delegation. We, further, calculate the optimal contracts. Both
firms produce a perfectly substitutable good at the same marginal cost while
transportation is proportional to the distance shipped. Contrary to the findings in
literature when there is no delegation we show that the Nash equilibrium under
delegation differs soundly from the socially optimal ocations. Furthermore, we
solve the managers’ location subgame for conjectural consistency and evaluate
the ensuing partial equilibrium.