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**NEW TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THE USE OF SOCIAL  
MEDIA, CYBER-TERRORISM, THE ROLE OF OPEN -  
SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE CASES OF RIGHT-  
WING EXTREMISM AND LONE WOLF TERRORISM**

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Η ΚΑΡΑΔΗΜΑ ΣΟΦΙΑ βεβαιώνω ότι το έργο που εκπονήθηκε και παρουσιάζεται στην υποβαλλόμενη διπλωματική εργασία είναι αποκλειστικά ατομικό δικό μου. Όποιες πληροφορίες και υλικό που περιέχονται έχουν αντληθεί από άλλες πηγές, έχουν καταλλήλως αναφερθεί στην παρούσα διπλωματική εργασία. Επιπλέον τελώ εν γνώσει ότι σε περίπτωση διαπίστωσης ότι δεν συντρέχουν όσα βεβαιώνονται από μέρους μου, μου αφαιρείται ανά πάσα στιγμή αμέσως ο τίτλος.



(υπογραφή)

# DEDICATION

*To the lives lost and affected by terrorism...*

## **Abstract**

**Terrorism has existed almost as long as humanity, and has appeared in various forms, creating new and evolving trends, making the definition of terrorism even more difficult to define. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the new trends in terrorism after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as attempting to find the factors that facilitate the emergence and/or recurrence of trends in terrorism, by examining the related Literature, creating case studies and providing supporting evidence from material composed by the terrorist organizations, such as the electronic magazines of ISIS and al-Qaeda. The thesis, at first provides a theoretical framework, that aims to assist in the comprehension of the trends in terrorism under examination. The trends examined seem to have a common thread, technology. At first, the use of social media by terrorists. Terrorists rely on media to pass their message and demands, as well as to attract members and donations, Presently, social media provide a unique opportunity for terrorists to spread their propaganda message and material, radicalize, recruit, and obtain funding, without relying on traditional media to do so. Moreover, terrorists organizations using online capabilities and social media are increasing and becoming more sophisticated, such as in the case of al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, whose (social) media themes, activities and other significant information regarding their actions are presented as case studies. Also, cyber-terrorism, is examined as it is often being referred to and thought to be a trend, even though there seems to be no proof of its occurrence yet, despite the technological advancements and cyber-related skills of terrorists. Moreover, the role of Open-source Intelligence is examined since open sources, could be extremely helpful for states and Intelligence agencies, in the fight against terrorism as well as for terrorists which could freely utilize the often, sensitive information provided in open sources to their advantage. In addition, right-wing extremism, which also takes various forms and although may not be a new trend, seems to be rising, claiming to be reacting to what they perceive as unjust and to be against their beliefs, yet also by causing injustices and brutalities, and also use cyber-based capabilities. Moreover, lone wolf terrorism, is also examined as being a trend, since it is widely used by governments and media, however, it presents certain flaws, and it is too neither clearly defined, nor widely accepted as a term and concept. Lastly, Anders Behring Breivik, is examined as a case study, since his actions, are considered to be right-wing and of counter-jihad ideology and is considered an example of a lone wolf. The thesis comes to the conclusions that not all considered trends are indeed so in reality, however some factors that facilitate trends in terrorism are strategies, methods and tactics, that have been successful in the past, the adaptability terrorist when faced with changes and hurdles. Also, competitiveness between terrorist organizations may cause them to find more innovative approaches to stand out and attract more recruits, donations and media attention, and also technology is a significant factor, since cyberspace has become an important area for terrorist activities, even if they have not fully explored its potential.**

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1. 1 SIGNIFICANCE OF TOPIC

Terrorism is a phenomenon strongly associated with human nature itself and its existence is visible from the beginning of humanity as a tool of extraction of desired objectives. Throughout history terrorism has appeared in multiple forms from various actors and in pursuit of different achievements. However, the multi-faceted nature of this phenomenon, creates obstacles in achieving consensus on the term “*terrorism*”; a term which cannot include every form and tactic used by terrorists in order to easily distinguish it from other forms of political violence or typical crimes. Also, terrorism differs from how it is perceived depending on various aspects such as country, ideology, religion. For example PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) is thought to be a terrorist group by the Turkish government whereas the Kurds believe that their actions aim to achieve national autonomy. The thesis hence, stresses the fluidity and wide spectrum of activities under the terrorist term. Moreover, the thesis aims to examine certain trends that seem to have appeared and/or reappeared after 9/11. The period selected was chosen as it was a defying moment in history, politics and the International system and marked the beginning of changes in all aspects of life and politics and created an unalterable feeling of insecurity, mainly in the West and continues on impacting life and politics today, such as inspiring terrorist attacks, and taken into consideration by policymakers.

The examination of current trends in terrorism are valued as significant since society today is being bombarded with information and images derived from all forms of media on a daily basis and are even available to all on-demand. Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at certain phenomena in terrorism that appear as trends and that are “*trending*”, in order to gain a better understanding of how terrorists act, evolve and exploit means and opportunities presented and also how highly adaptive they are. However, the thesis cannot examine every attack individually, nor could it examine every tactic as a trend. In other words, hijacking was utilized in the 9/11 attacks, and one could believe that it could have become a trend, since it was highly successful and the images produced from that day are imprinted in minds all over the world, and yet,, it is not a trend. There is an explanation to why it is not, since airport and airline security have become very strict following the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, terrorism seems to adapt to such changes and finds other (unexpected) ways to act. The trends chosen to be examined have technology as a common thread, in an attempt to emphasize the significance and the high level of ability and adaptability of terrorists in using provided technology to their advantage.

## **1.2 METHODOLOGY**

The present thesis aims to examine certain new trends in terrorism that have appeared and/or reappeared after the 9/11 attacks. In the past fifteen years there has been an increase in terrorist attacks, evolved tactics and an increase in victims. The thesis utilizes qualitative information derived from research and examination of topic related *Literature* in examining the perceived trends and *primary material* provided by terrorist groups, such as *Inspire* and *Dabiq* online magazines. Furthermore, the thesis attempts to collect information and create *case studies* in order to gain a better understanding of the topics and provide an empirical approach of the facts presented. The present thesis was limited to the examination of material provided by open sources and due to the fact that many official social media accounts of the terrorist organizations have been shut down. Therefore the author of the thesis relied on material which had access of the necessary social media information at the time.

## **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The thesis at hand aims to provide answers to the following research questions:

1. *What are the (new) trends in terrorism in the post 9/11 era?*
2. *What seems to facilitate the emergence and/or recurrence of trends in terrorism?*

## **1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **1.4.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM**

International Relations (IR) Theory, mainly aims at explaining the actions of states and does not focus on explaining non-state actors, and no theory can explain all aspects of international relations either. Terrorism is a complex concept and activity and could not be explained fully by one theory or another and the fact that terrorism as a term is not even agreed upon makes it also makes it difficult and, of course, its complex and ever evolving nature. All that considered, the following will present Constructivism as a framework, that does not, by any means, translate that terrorism must be explained by an IR theory, nor that Constructivism must or does that either. The theory is presented as a theoretical framework to bear in mind and question upon, and could be put to comparison against Realism and other theories, by the reader, and perhaps, one day the IR theory might resume revision to include terrorism more and other factors that play an important role in International

relations

According to Viotti And Kauppi (2013), constructivism, is a theory reacting to realism and liberalism. Realism sees states as the main actors in the international scene that act and compete for power, directed by their security and self interest, in an anarchic environment. Constructivism, believes, that the environment influences the actors and visa versa, and create a version of the world according to ideas and norms developed between them, which later affect international relations and when accepted, create structures that influence state and non-state actors.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, constructivism suggests that the international system does not just exist solidly, it is a rather fluid system consisting of thoughts and ideas, norms, beliefs, arranged by people, which shift, and therefore the international system fluctuates and changes as well.<sup>2</sup>

Constructivism views the world as a social construction, and all social facts are created and everything that exists in society must be agreed upon, by the actors and that is what gives “*meaning to the material 'reality'*”<sup>3</sup>. Meaning that even terrorism is a construction and its meaning varies and shifts. Attacks could be interpreted in a series of ways and finally they become what is agreed they were. Also, ideas, norms, ideologies and identities have impacted policy and counter-terrorism approaches throughout history such as during the Cold War, a battle of ideologies, and the US financial support through the Marshall Plan aiming at preventing the spread of communism throughout Europe. Moreover, the more recent “War on Terror” seems to acknowledge the problem as being ideological and not only military:

*“American foreign policy has witnessed a similarly constructivist turn, as the “war of ideas” has been placed at the center of what the Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review describes as a “long war struggle against Islamist terrorism...against global terrorist organizations that exploit Islam to achieve radical political aims.”<sup>4</sup>*

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<sup>1</sup> Viotti, P.R. & Kauppi, M.V. *International relations and world politics* 5th ed. 2013, Pearson p.39-40

<sup>2</sup> Jackson, R., & Sørensen G., (2013) *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches* Fifth Edition Oxford p.209

<sup>3</sup> Jackson, R. & McDonald, M. (2014). Constructivism, US foreign policy, and counterterrorism. In In Parmar, I., Miller, L. B., Ledwidge, M. (eds.), *Obama and the world: New directions in US foreign policy*. New York: Routledge. Available at link-( accessed August 19 2016) <http://www.kropfpolisci.com/obama.foreign.policy.jackson.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Lynch, M. (2006). Al-Qaeda’s Constructivist Turn. *Terrorism, Homeland Security, Strategy*, Praeger Security International. Available at link -(accessed September 15 2016) <http://www.marclynch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Al-Qaedas-Constructivism.pdf> p.2

Also, Lynch analyzes al-Qaeda's turn toward constructivism and emphasizes the groups ability to adapt according to changes and shift of structures, such as the Internet.<sup>5</sup> Al-Qaeda early on seems to have understood the need to adapt in order to survive, throughout changes such as in leadership, rising of competitive organizations and counter-terrorism policies, security advancements, and the loss of allies.

Providing Constructivism as a theoretical framework, is merely presenting an approach to viewing terrorism from an IR scope. It does not have ample literature supporting it, however the author of this thesis believes that it is an interesting view that the reader may feel is valid in some points throughout the thesis. The military approach of the Global War on Terror has not achieved its objective, since it does not address deeper causes of terrorism, that are mainly ideological, cultural and religious. If terrorism only aimed at achieving material capacity, and terrorists would only act until they were to achieve equality, it would not be necessary to carry out brutalities after that. ISIS has financial resources, manpower and the material capacity and high-tech equipment; yet, that is not their goal. They aim to achieve a Pan-Islamic Caliphate, a territory of like-minded individuals and states, under the Caliphate, with ideology and religion being the key generator of this human flow. Constructivism cannot alone explain terrorism, nor can an ideological crusade aiming to vanish terrorism succeed without military force, such as the realist approach suggests, however, a combination of all theories could help explain and defeat the combination of all terrorism consists of.

#### **1. 4. 2 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

Terrorists need communication to exist and pass their demands; it is not a random act of rage and emotions, but is carefully planned with a specific aim in mind. Strategic communication could be defined as:

*“A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behavior.”<sup>6</sup>*

It is a process far more complex, and as the term suggests, it is more strategic than only communicating a message, as it takes different factors into account and *“it aims to change not only*

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid p.3

<sup>6</sup> Tatham, S.A. (2008) “Strategic Communication: A Primer,” Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Available at link -(accessed September 2 2016) [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94411/2008\\_Dec.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94411/2008_Dec.pdf) p.3

*belief but also behavior*”<sup>7</sup>. It caters to specific audiences and ultimately aims at receiving a specific outcome. Terrorist organizations utilize strategic communication for their survival and expansion. It is necessary for a group to gain support, audience and recruits and has to promote a legitimizing narrative in order to achieve that.<sup>8</sup> Terrorism's existence and continuation relies upon media, communication and strategic communication. A terrorist attack no one would find out about, is unsuccessful and a defeat for the group that carried it out. Also, on the other hand, a successful attack that created a media wave, especially when combined with graphic imagery and extensive analysis by the media, promotes the group, and the more horrific and chaotic the message, the stronger the impact it has, and translates to success for the group that may increase its funding, recruits and for sure its reach to a broader audience to which it previously may have been unknown to. Also, competition exist among terrorist organizations, similar to what exists among states. Groups compete for supremacy, especially if from the same ideology and cannot cooperate (e.g. ISIS -al-Qaeda), donations, popular support and recruits.

Strategic communication is rather important also, when a group has become decentralized and is spread out into branches to continue the application of strategic communication and individuals also seem to take it upon themselves to spread the group's message and promote the cause.<sup>9</sup> However, this also implies that it is not a monopoly, under the auspices of a specific network or state, strategic communication could derive from anyone, anywhere, hence it is uncontrollable.

#### **1. 4. 3. POWER: SOFT, HARD, SMART, CYBER**

Throughout this thesis different forms of power could be indicated. But first, let's briefly present these forms. According to J. Nye (2004), *Hard Power* is basically the capabilities and resources such as population, territory, military and economic strength, used to influence outcomes. However, this form of power though seemingly easy to measure does not always indicate the success of the outcome, since having material resources and military forces is not all that is necessary to achieve an objective, as the US despite having military advantage has lost wars, and was unable to prevent 9/11.<sup>10</sup> Even the Global War on Terror, a military attempt against terrorism is not enough to deal with the issue, at least in the long run. Moreover, technology has provided

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<sup>7</sup> Chowdhury, Fink N., & Barclay, J.(2013) *Mastering the narrative : Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations* , Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Available at link-(accessed June 29 2016) [http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013\\_CT\\_StratComm.pdf](http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf) p.13

<sup>8</sup> Ibid p.13

<sup>9</sup> Ibid p.20

<sup>10</sup> Nye, J.S. JR.(2004) *Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics* PUBLIC AFFAIRS, New York p.3

terrorism with inexpensive ways to cause terror and terrorism. <sup>11</sup>Also, in the thesis it will be apparent that large military forces and military budgets are not able to defeat, easily or briefly, at least, a group such as ISIS, which is able to create an impact by publishing a video of one man beheading another.

*Soft Power*, again according to J. Nye, who coined the term, also described as "*the second face of power*"<sup>12</sup>, is achieving the outcomes desired, by being able to shape the others wants, with co-opt, and attraction, through culture, values, directing them to follow your lead, while making one question their choices and needs that then seem unrealistic to pursue. <sup>13</sup> Throughout the thesis, the reader will see that terrorist organizations utilize and highly rely on soft power to lure recruits to join the cause and even sacrifice their lives. For example ISIS, has created a territory under which it has established administration structures, welfare facilities, such as schools and hospitals, and presents an alternative option for many, for whom they may be no other safe option that will keep them alive. Terrorism, with its complex nature, seems to combine soft and hard power in order to achieve its objectives and continue surviving and expanding. Hence, the response to defeating it must also combine soft and hard power, as well, which Nye notes as *smart power*.<sup>14</sup>

*Cyber Power* on the other hand, "is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyber domain."<sup>15</sup> This concept will be seen useful throughout the thesis, which revolves around the trend of terrorist using cyber-based means. This form of power is rather recent and its possibilities are still unknown, however, with the rapid advancement of technology it is here to stay and terrorists have means of exploiting its possibilities in innovative ways and their actions utilizing these means are growing more and more sophisticated.

#### **1. 4. 4 BRANDING**

Terrorist organizations have developed through time and have become more and more advanced and sophisticated while at the same time adapting to the developments in society, such as by exploiting technology and mastering social media. A new trend that terrorist organizations seem to present is the ability to brand their organization and its activities, as would a enterprise with its products, creating a unique brand that will differentiate them from other terrorist groups. Branding is thus,

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid 22

<sup>12</sup> Ibid p.5

<sup>13</sup> Ibid p.7

<sup>14</sup> Ibid p.32

<sup>15</sup> Nye, J.S. Jr ( 2010) *Cyber Power*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School p.3-4 Available at link-(accessed July 10 2016) <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf>

considered:

*“The process involved in creating a unique name and image for a product in the consumers' mind, mainly through advertising campaigns with a consistent theme. Branding aims to establish a significant and differentiated presence in the market that attracts and retains loyal customers.”<sup>16</sup>*

Terrorist groups such as ISIS, have already tried constructing a brand and images associated with the group and its activities. They have different flags, logos-such as ISIS's black flag-specific clothing-masked face- and export their beliefs and establish a pan-Islamic state under Sharia law.<sup>17</sup> ISIS has created a strong brand which it attempts to promote with every opportunity, it utilizes all the available high-tech means, such as Photoshop and distributes magazines online with high quality and professional graphics and a strong propaganda message.<sup>18</sup> As is evident in the following chapters the group in order to promote its cause and stand out among others of the same ideology. Terrorists organizations compete for funding, recruits, media attention, and allies among other terrorist organizations. Therefore, while adapting to the circumstances, they must brand their group, the way a company in the real world would:

*“One facet of ISIL that we identified as being unique relative to many competing global jihadist organizations affiliated with al-Qa’ida Central is their efforts to establish a unique organizational brand that is separate and unique from the AQ franchise. Al-Qa’ida Central is known for being the core of a major hub of global jihadist organizations, in part due to their reputation and legitimacy following the 9/11 attacks, as well as the public perception of their former leader Bin Laden.”<sup>19</sup>*

Al-Qaeda's affiliates were renamed to seem part of the organization which aids it in appearing cohesive, as a single brand, and larger.<sup>20</sup> This aims to gain support and legitimacy.

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<sup>16</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 25 2016) <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/branding.html>

<sup>17</sup> Hanlon, P. (2015) *ISIS As Brand Movement* Feb 2015, Available at link -(accessed September 18 2016) <https://medium.com/@hanlonpatrick/isis-as-brand-movement-e1637c7e3f62#.4w1ev9rfr>

<sup>18</sup> Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START\\_ISIL%20Branding%20Leadership%20Culture%20and%20Lethal%20Attraction\\_Ligon\\_Nov2014.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ISIL%20Branding%20Leadership%20Culture%20and%20Lethal%20Attraction_Ligon_Nov2014.pdf) Available at link -(accessed September 8 2016) November 2014 p.31

<sup>19</sup> Ibid p.37

<sup>20</sup> Ibid p.37



Currently, ISIS, even though once part of al-Qaeda, competes against it for the leadership of the jihadist terrorist movement. ISIS has adopted many successful techniques used by al-Qaeda and has advanced them. ISIS separating from al-Qaeda Central, aimed at distinguishing itself from the group by promoting itself as a pure ideological version of the jihadist movement, while exploiting the opportunities presented by the dissatisfaction toward Iraq and Syria regimes and thus became the provider of the services that lacked in order to gain public support.<sup>21</sup> It is sophisticated and advanced, to be able to understand the shortcoming of the regimes and comes to fill that gap and offer an alternative.

## 1. 5 KEY TERMS

### 1. 5. 1 *Terrorism*

In order to begin analyzing the new trends in terrorism, the content of some terms which will be frequently used throughout the thesis, must first be clarified. First, *terrorism*, has appeared in multiple forms throughout its existence. In many ways each terrorist group, member and terrorist action is almost unique, since the victims, location, time, personality of the terrorist, means of operation, and different setbacks along the way, all leading to different outcomes, makes it hard for an umbrella term to be ultimately accepted covering every single terrorist form that has occurred and those which will occur. Also, supporting this is the notion that “*one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter*”. The difference, however, is not always so clear, as was the case of Nelson Mandela's actions which perceived by the apartheid as terrorist activities and he was incriminated.<sup>22</sup> In Bossis (1996), the concepts thought to be equivalent to terrorism over the years are summed up, mainly terrorism equivalent to war, as a substitute of warfare, terrorism as equivalent to the guerrilla warfare, as equivalent to political violence, and as equivalent to state violence.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, there is not a widely accepted term regarding terrorism.

*“ The Convention on Combating International Terrorism  
adopted by the OIC in 1999 defines terrorism as 'any act of violence  
or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions*

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid p.49

<sup>22</sup> Ungar, R. (2013) When Conservatives Branded Nelson Mandela A Terrorist, *Forbes* , December 2013, Available at link -(accessed June 26 2016) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2013/12/06/when-conservatives-branded-nelson-mandela-a-terrorist/#6df4f2d471c7>

<sup>23</sup> Bossis, M. (1996) *Greece and Terrorism -National and International Dimensions* (in greek), Ant. Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens Greece, ( Μπόση, Μ. (1996) *Ελλάδα και Τρομοκρατία-Εθνικές και Διεθνείς Διαστάσεις* Εκδόσεις Αντ. Σακκούλας, Αθήνα p. 33-37

*perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States'.*

*The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No 196), adopted in 2005, does not provide a definition of terrorism, but does criminalize public provocation to commit a terrorist offense and recruitment and training for terrorism. The Additional Protocol to the Convention was adopted by the Committee of Ministers in May 2015 and opened for signature in October 2015. The Protocol criminalizes being recruited for terrorism, receiving training for terrorism, traveling to another state for purposes related to terrorism, and providing or collecting funds for such travel. The EU and twelve Member States signed the Protocol on 22 October 2015. The same day, the Presidency of Luxembourg signed the Convention on behalf of the EU.”<sup>24</sup>*

B. Jenkins (1974), described terrorism “*as a campaign of violence designed to inspire fear*”<sup>25</sup>; by its nature the aim of this activity is to terrorize, to instill fear, which then applies pressure and could influence change. Terrorism is not at all random, it is planned in a way aiming at achieving specific objectives for “*terrorism is a means to an end and not an end in itself*”<sup>26</sup> There are numerous definitions of terrorism that could not all be included; however, the Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (2011) Compiled by Alex P. Schmid <sup>27</sup> could provide a valid

<sup>24</sup> Pawlak, P.(2015) Understanding definitions of terrorism EPRS Parliamentary Research Service, Available at link - (accessed July 28 2016) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/571320/EPRS\\_ATA\(2015\)571320\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/571320/EPRS_ATA(2015)571320_EN.pdf) (p. 1)

<sup>25</sup> Jenkins, B. M.(1974) International Terrorism A New kind of Warfare The Rand Cooperation , Santa Monica California A statement submitted to the subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Congress of the United States United States Available at link-( accessed July 10 , 2016) <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf> p.2

<sup>26</sup> Ibid p.3

<sup>27</sup> Schmid, A.P. (2012) The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism, *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM* Volume 6, Issue 2 May 2012 Available at link-( accessed August 10

summary:

*1. Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;*

*2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors;*

*3. The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual-phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in 'disappearances' involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).*

*4. The public (-ized) terrorist victimization initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators;*

*5. At the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety -spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment;*

*6. The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenceless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism;*

*7. The direct victims are not the ultimate target (as in a classical assassination where victim and*

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2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-terrorism-definition/html> p.158-9

*target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims' plight or the terrorists' professed cause;*

*8.Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams);*

*9.While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions;*

*10.The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public;*

*11.The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives;*

*12: Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone but form part of a campaign of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.*

### **1. 5. 2 Trend/Trending**

The thesis attempts to examine new trends in terrorism, regarding the period after 9/11 to the present. Terrorism, (see Historical Overview), has changed throughout the years, regarding its objectives, targets, tactics and motivation. Trends are patterns, that appear to be following a certain direction. Trends could be noticed through all aspects of life, ranging from Economy and Terrorism, to music and fashion. Oxford dictionary provides more variations of the definition, however for the thesis the following should be kept in mind.

(n) A general direction in which something is developing or changing.  
(v) Change or develop in a general direction  
(v) of a topic) be the subject of many posts on a social media website  
or application within a short period of time.<sup>28</sup>

## 1.6 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM

Terrorism derives from the Latin word “terrere” which means “to make tremble”, a form of violence toward anyone who went against the ruler and assisted in the establishment of the Mesopotamian and Assyrian empires. Terrorism has deep roots in history, since humanity understood the coercive nature of terror and its relation to demanding and achieving objectives. The Sicarii, a sect of Jewish Zealots, also used terror against other Jewish people and against Roman rule. The Zealots had both political and religious objectives, they were against the Jewish population that they believed needed to impose pressure regarding their religion and politically they aimed at gaining Independence from Rome.<sup>29</sup> Later, the Assassins, used terror against others Crusaders.<sup>30</sup> Terror was used as a political tool against tyrannic leaders and seems that certain assassinations were accepted and justified;

*“In Greek culture, the tyrant’s assassin is hailed as a hero. Aristotle claims that he who kills the tyrant is a hero because he has eradicated the perpetrator of excess. By contrast, he who kills a thief is no hero because the latter’s crimes are motivated solely by his vital needs. From the outset, Aristotle dissociates tyrannicide from simple crime.”<sup>31</sup>*

Furthermore, the French Revolution is a benchmark in terrorism, since the term terrorism derived from the revolutionary terrorist activities during the French Revolution and the circumstances were thought to justify such actions.<sup>32</sup> Concerning modern terrorism, the anarchist doctrine is thought to have emerged during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, accompanied by the

<sup>28</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 27 2016) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/trend>

<sup>29</sup> Chaliand G., & Blin A., (2007) Zealots and Assassins in *The history of terrorism : from antiquity to al Qaeda* / (ed) Chaliand G., & Blin A., (tr.) Schneider, E., Pulver K., Browner J., Chaliand G., Blin A., University of California Press Available at link -(accessed September 10 2016) [https://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwixl6PkgoXQAhUGWhoKHQbEBMEQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwikileaks.org%2Fgfiles%2Fattach%2F177%2F177597\\_History%2520of%2520Ter.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHjVHKILhkh0NpiCNhEKvpGggeaZw&sig2=9e6SZx74TH7CII7JnvWTRw](https://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwixl6PkgoXQAhUGWhoKHQbEBMEQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwikileaks.org%2Fgfiles%2Fattach%2F177%2F177597_History%2520of%2520Ter.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHjVHKILhkh0NpiCNhEKvpGggeaZw&sig2=9e6SZx74TH7CII7JnvWTRw) p.55-57

<sup>30</sup> Ibid p.61

<sup>31</sup> Ibid p.81

<sup>32</sup> Ibid p.95

rise in revolutionary doctrines and technological advancements of the Industrial Revolutions, an increase in populations, and a clear improvement of the economic situation, both in the United States and in Europe, the circumstances thus created two distinct social classes the proletariat, the workers and the bourgeoisie, that did not engage in manual labor.<sup>33</sup> Also, an important invention that changed the nature of terrorism was the use of dynamite in France during 1892-1894, which also contributed to the expansion and evolution of terrorism.<sup>34</sup> One of the most well known anarchist groups of this period is the Narodnaya Volya, which acted against the Russian state and led to the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, to the group, “*the Russian state was a monster that held more than half of the empire’s territory as its private property.*”<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, World War I (WWI) sparked by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by an organization called Black Hand Society. Also, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was established during WWI, and served as a role-model and source of inspiration for the anti-colonial ambitions post WWII.<sup>36</sup>

During and after the Cold War era, a rise in a plethora of groups such as PLO founded in 1964, revolutionary groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and many fascistic groups on the right, the Japanese Red Army in Japan, various separatist and autonomist groups such as the Front de liberation du Québec (FLQ), Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) as well as organizations in South America Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru, and the Middle Eastern groups such as Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Kurdistan Workers' Party Liberation Front (MLNF) in the Philippines, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, to name a few groups that do not hesitate using terror.<sup>37</sup> Today many of these groups are still active and their seems to be a turn toward religious motivated terrorism, however, it will be examined throughout the thesis.

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<sup>33</sup> Hubac-Occhipinti, O. (2007) Anarchist Terrorists of the Nineteenth Century in *The history of terrorism : from antiquity to al Qaeda* / (ed) Chaliand G., & Blin A., (tr.) Schneider, E., Pulver K., Browner J., Chaliand G., Blin A., University of California Press p.114-5

<sup>34</sup> Ibid p.126

<sup>35</sup> Temon, Y. (2007) Russian Terrorism, 1878–1908 in *The history of terrorism : from antiquity to al Qaeda* (ed) Chaliand G., & Blin A., (tr.) Schneider, E., Pulver K., Browner J., Chaliand G., Blin A., University of California Press p.147

<sup>36</sup> Chaliand, G., & Blin, A. (2007) The “Golden Age” of Terrorism in *The history of terrorism : from antiquity to al Qaeda* / (ed) Chaliand G., & Blin A., (tr.) Schneider, E., Pulver K., Browner J., Chaliand G., Blin A., University of California Press p.184

<sup>37</sup> See Chaliand, G., & Blin, A. (2007) From 1968 to Radical Islam in *The history of terrorism : from antiquity to al Qaeda* (ed) Chaliand G., & Blin A., (tr.) Schneider, E., Pulver K., Browner J., Chaliand G., Blin A., University of California Press p.227-253

## 1.7 THESIS CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The following chapter, *Chapter 2 “Terrorist use of Social Media”*, first presents social media and how their existence has affected life and politics, as well as present and examine the main uses of social media by terrorist organizations and supporters. The nature of terrorism has changed with the appearance of social media, since terrorist organizations do not need to solely rely on traditional media outlets in order to present their message, make their actions widely known and attract recruits and donors. The chapter focuses on functions such as propaganda, radicalization and recruitment.

*Chapter 3* titled “*Case Studies*”, aims at forming case studies of certain Islamic extremist terrorist organizations, specifically of al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab focusing mainly on their use of social media, at different, however, levels of sophistication and activity.

*Chapter 4 “Cyber-terrorism”*, attempts to examine cyber-terrorism which is seemingly widely used; raising, however, some uncertainty as to whether or not cyber-terrorism has actually ever occurred.

*Chapter 5 “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)”*, aims at presenting a form of intelligence which uses information derived from open sources to create intelligence, and also refers to Social Media Intelligence as well, which is a part of OSINT, and specifically utilizes social media. Open sources and social media can seem useful to terrorists, since, they can gather information such as preferences and ideologies of potential recruits, blueprints and maps of vulnerable infrastructure for attacking, collect personal information on targets. However, the state and agencies could also utilize open sources and social media to trace terrorists, money trails, signs of radicalization and recruitment occurring online.

*Chapter 6 “Right-wing Extremism, Lone wolf terrorism and the Case Study of Anders Behring Breivik”*, examines the reoccurring trend of right-wing extremism, that is obvious both in Europe and in the US, and searches whether such groups also utilize cyber-based capabilities, and, if so, how and to what extent. Moreover, the section referring to Lone wolf terrorism, a term widely used by the media and governments also looks at opposing arguments that exist which object to the term and existence of such phenomena. Lastly, Anders Behring Breivik, is examined as a case study, chosen due to the fact that his ideology was right-wing, he is considered and labeled as a “*lone wolf*”, for his use of social media and cyber-based capabilities, also his actions are also considered as counter-jihad.

Finally, *Chapter 7 “Conclusions”*, summarizes the conclusions derived from the examination of the trends in the previous chapters and also, addresses the research questions stated in *Chapter 1*, in order to provide answers and suggestions for future research.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY TERRORISTS

#### 2.1 Introduction to the use of social media by terrorists

Social media have been incorporated into our lives and, in a way, have become an extension of it, since every event, achievement and even insignificant moment is shared for all to view. However, its importance is not restricted to publicizing special and random moments of one's life, social media have transformed the business world and are extensively used for digital marketing, such as “check-ins” which have been a great way for businesses to gain publicity, while they have also helped raise awareness of certain causes, such as the 2014 “Ice Bucket Challenge” a viral charity challenge to raise awareness of ALS<sup>38</sup>, communication has spread to various social media platforms, also social media are vital sources of News and have become an important tool of journalists, since many politicians worldwide use social media, especially Twitter, to publish statements. Furthermore, Facebook Safety Check<sup>39</sup>, assists the user to state their safety when located in an area where a disaster has occurred.

Social media have also assisted in gaining support during election periods through attracting funds and devoted volunteers, as was President Barack Obama's campaign, which put social media to good use, and having since then changed campaigning,<sup>40</sup> as seen during the current Presidential campaigns, during which the candidates widely used social media and promoted the use of hashtags, such as the #ImwithHer hashtag, used when supporting candidate H. Clinton. Also, during the debates, live commentaries do not exist in the way they do during sporting events, yet, on social media there is real-time analysis, comments and reactions by reporters and viewers alike.<sup>41</sup>

The unique significance of social media, could perhaps be the that the virtual activities could have an impact on the real world. Social media are powerful and could instigate change. A perfect example of this power, being the use of social media before and during the Arab Spring. A working paper examining the role of social media during the Arab Spring events that begun when, on December 17, 2010, in the city Sidi Bouzid, a young street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, exasperated from attempting to avoid a small fine, appealing to the police and authorities and being beaten,

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<sup>38</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 20 2016) <http://www.alsa.org/fight-als/ice-bucket-challenge.html?referrer=https://www.google.gr/>

<sup>39</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 25 2016) <https://www.facebook.com/about/safetycheck/>

<sup>40</sup> Chang, V. Obama and the power of social media and technology *The European Business Review* May - June 2010 Available at link-(accessed June 14 2016) <https://people.stanford.edu/jaaker/sites/default/files/tebrmay-june-obama.pdf>

<sup>41</sup> Pfeiffer, D. (2015) How social media is revolutionizing debates, *CNN* September 16, 2015 Available at link - (accessed October 2 2016) <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/15/opinions/pfeiffer-social-media-debates/>



finally self immolated before a local government office <sup>42</sup> sparking protests that soon spread and social media were used for political discussions by young and educated men and women, and along with political organizations used Western news outlets to distribute credible information regarding the revolution that overthrew the governments of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia.<sup>43</sup> One of the contributing factors of the propotion of the events was that the large percentage of the population of these countries were young and were adapted in using high-tech means.<sup>44</sup>

Therefore, social media are a rather strong tool and since they are so widely used and highly effective, it was certain that terrorists too, would join and exploit its benefits. Terrorism's mere existence and continuation relies on publicity and media coverage and what better than having in a way, their own channels of communication and create and distribute their own version of the truth and the cause's narrative. Indeed, Terrorism highly relies on the media for its existence; however, terrorist groups presently do not rely on traditional media and the amount of filtering and censorship that comes with it, but rather are able to take matters in their own hands and present matters from their own perspective. The rapid growth of technology and the creation and widespread use of the World Wide Web <sup>45</sup> has altered all aspects of life tremendously.

People are now using the Internet and the currently trending social media to broadcast and *share* <sup>46</sup> their daily lives and experiences. Also, they are becoming to an extent, journalists themselves, since there are often able to witness and broadcast events in real-time.<sup>47</sup> However, as it is evident, all things could have a malicious use as well, and the Internet is no exception. Terrorist organizations have taken advantage of the various uses provided by the Internet and social media. The Internet provides a quick, inexpensive and easy way to reach the public in relatively no time at all, all the while being provided safety through anonymity of its users. <sup>48</sup>

Some scholars, have separated the uses of the Internet as '*instrumental*' use , an example

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<sup>42</sup> Howard, P.N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W., Mazaid, M., (2011)Opening Closed Regimes What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring? . Working Paper The Project on Information Technology and Political Islam Available at link (accessed on September 2 2016) <https://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/Role%20of%20Social%20Media%20During%20the%20Arab%20Spring.pdf> p.8

<sup>43</sup> Ibid p.2-3

<sup>44</sup> Ibid p.5

<sup>45</sup> For a brief History of the World Wide Web Available at link -(accessed July 15 2016) <https://www.w3.org/History.html>

<sup>46</sup> *Share*, an act of sharing online content with specific users on a computer network , to give specific access to online content, as by posting on a social-media website or sending as an email attachment Available at link -(accessed September 4 2016) <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/share?s=t>

<sup>47</sup> *In real time, Informal*. at once; instantaneously.Available at link -(accessed September 4 2016) <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/real-time>

<sup>48</sup> Freiburger, T., & Crane, J.S. (2008) A Systematic Examination of Terrorist Use of the Internet1 . *International Journal of Cyber Criminology* , Vol 2 Issue 1 January 2008 Available at link -(accessed July 20 2016) <http://www.cleanitproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2008-Terrorist-use-of-the-internet.pdf> (p. 310-311)

being cyber-terrorism, which will be analyzed in the following chapter and a ‘communicative’ use, such as propaganda which will be elaborate on, further below.<sup>49</sup> Additionally, terrorists take advantage of a wide range of available information, that may at first glance seem harmless; however combined with mal intention it could prove dangerous or/and even deadly.<sup>50</sup> In addition, terrorist organizations favor the use of such media outlets, since it amplifies their message and assists it to appear larger than it is in reality.<sup>51</sup>

The Internet and social media are very attractive means for terrorist use, as aforementioned, and provide an nearly completely uncensored environment in which to act in. Terrorist activity can be spotted throughout all media platforms varying from chat rooms until the most common, Facebook, YouTube, and mostly Twitter,<sup>52</sup> in order to promote their ideology and acquire recruits and funds, both vital for their existence. But it does not stop there. The terrorists also monitor via social media, possible targets, such as military personnel, through posted sensitive data.<sup>53</sup>

Terrorist organizations have found various uses through the Internet and social media to further assist their ideology and message to reach a wider audience. As stated above, terrorists collect various sensitive information from online sources, even deriving from governmental websites, which contain seemingly innocent personal data and vital infrastructure details and security gaps, which offer a window of opportunity for terrorist activities. This activity is referred to in the literature in various ways such as “*Data mining*”<sup>54</sup>. In *Chapter 5* of the thesis, the role of information and intelligence gathering via *Open Sources*, both by terrorists and government and intelligence services as a counter terrorist practice will be examined further. Also, the Internet and social media, have basically blurred all borders and have created a unified virtual world where geographic boundaries have vanished and communication happens in real -time, facilitating “*communication*”<sup>55</sup> between terrorist members and helping the organization of activities and attacks from afar, easily.

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<sup>49</sup> Rogan, H. (2006) Jihadism online A study of how Al- Qaida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purposes, FORSVARETS FORSKNING SINSTITUTT (FFI) Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Available at link -(accessed June 14 2016) <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/06-00915.pdf> (p. 13)

<sup>50</sup> Ibid p. 30

<sup>51</sup> Ibid p. 32

<sup>52</sup> Weimann, G. (2011) Al Qaeda Has Sent You A Friend Request: Terrorists Using Online Social Networking A paper submitted to the Israeli Communication Association, Available at link -(accessed June 5 2016) <https://sm.asisonline.org/ASIS%20SM%20Documents/Al%20Qaeda%20Has%20Sent%20You%20a%20Friend%20Request%20Terrorists%20Using%20Online%20Social%20Networking.pdf> p.3-4

<sup>53</sup> Rogan, H. (2006 ) p. 30

<sup>54</sup> Rogan, H. (2006) p. 13

<sup>55</sup> Ibid p. 13

## 2. 2 Social Media

Social media are platforms that enable users to communicate instantly, share information and network. It is used relatively and at a low cost while there are various social networking applications available. Prior to social media, chat rooms and forums were widely used and terrorist presence was apparent there also. Certain main characteristics of social media have been outlined as being:

- 1) *Social media services are (currently) Web 2.0 Internet-based applications,*
- 2) *User-generated content is the lifeblood of social media,*
- 3) *Individuals and groups create user-specific profiles for a site or app designed and maintained by a social media service,*
- 4) *Social media services facilitate the development of social networks online by connecting a profile with those of other individuals and/or groups.*<sup>56</sup>

What differentiates social media from traditional media, is first the fact that social media are available for anyone at a low cost and make anything they choose public, contrasting with traditional media which require resources. Yet, both forms of media have the opportunity to reach a global audience. Also, social media are available by anyone with relatively no requirements and cost, social media do not require technical skills and know-how, whereas traditional media are usually owned privately or by the government and requires professional skills for the production. Moreover, production by traditional media requires a certain amount of time, though social media are ready instantaneously; however, industrial media are adapting and are on the road to eliminating this disadvantage. In addition, traditional media is in a more solid form, such as an article, and once it has been made public it cannot easily be modified or extracted, however, social media allows changes and alterations to be made by selections of editing and comments.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Obar, J.A., and Wildman, S. (2015). Social media definition and the governance challenge: An introduction to the special issue. Telecommunications policy, 39(9), 745-750  
Quello Center Working Paper No. 2647377 Available at link-( accessed July 4 2016)  
[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2647377](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2647377)

<sup>57</sup> The Social Media Guys “The Complete Guide to Social Media” Available at link -(accessed September 17 2016)  
<https://rucreativebloggingfa13.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/completeguidetosocialmedia.pdf> p.1

## 2.3 Propaganda

The choice of examining the use of propaganda through social media by terrorists and terrorist organizations, at first, is not random. This thesis supports that it is the main form of use and all others, such as recruitment, radicalization, fund raising, training, rely and depend upon it. The ideology and cause of the terrorists must first be promoted and communicated to the potential recruits and/or supporters and sympathizers. The terrorists are at liberty to advertise what and how they want to present the terrorist organizations, its message, goals and aspirations. Today, social media and audio visual technology assist the promotion of the terrorist image and brand, to appear even more appealing to its targeted audience worldwide.

Below are some definitions to further understand the complex nature of propaganda:

*“Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view”<sup>58</sup>*

*“Information, ideas, opinions, or images, often only giving one part of an argument, that are broadcast, published, or in some other way spread with the intention of influencing people's opinion”<sup>59</sup>*

Stanley Cunningham, has categorized propaganda, as such: *Agitation Propaganda*, which focuses on a specific issue and creates fear, anger, turmoil and utilizes various means such as posters, books, images of burning flags, audio-visual means and even violence and terror attacks to do so. Furthermore, *Integration Propaganda*, is a form of the message which aims on unifying and integrating a group. There is also *White Propaganda*, which is mostly truthful and uses facts though in a prejudiced way, and *Black Propaganda*, which is based on false message aiming to mislead. Moreover, *Disinformation*, is information that is constructed and deliberately planted in order to mislead. Also, *Bureaucratic Propaganda*, uses official statistics and reports in order to appear rational and valid. Other forms are *Counterpropaganda*, which creates a counteractive message to disapprove a previous propaganda by the opposition, and *Hate Propaganda*, which promotes hostile feelings of hate and dislike toward a certain category of the population, based on religion, gender, and/or race. Lastly, *Propaganda of the Deed* are acts that rely on media attention to spread the message of their symbolic actions that aim to generate fear, such actions include the various forms

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<sup>58</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 18 2016) <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/propaganda>

<sup>59</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 18 2016) <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/propaganda>

of terrorism.<sup>60</sup>

Furthermore, terrorists, have created a new virtual reality through social media and produce YouTube Videos, memes, pop and rap music, cartoons and trolling, all aiming at propagandizing and spreading a message. It has become more than obvious that their target audience is the youth, as “*Harvard University professor Joseph Nye has observed, "This generation of terrorists is adept at using technology to increase its 'soft power.' The current global struggle against terrorism is not only about whose army wins, but also whose story wins".*”<sup>61</sup> Terrorists are developing a narrative, an image, a brand, which they can edit and beautify through social media and programs such as Photoshop, feeding off negative views of the West's values and lifestyle, which detours from that of the concept the Islamic Extremists' idea of how Muslims and humanity at whole should act and live according to.

Propaganda is used to “*legitimize the jihadist cause*”<sup>62</sup>, inspire the recruits and as “*psychological warfare to demoralize the enemy*”<sup>63</sup>. Furthermore, propaganda is used to radicalize individuals, recruit supporters and raise funds, in order to carry on their actions. Indeed, terrorists use psychological warfare against the public, by disinformation and disturbing images aiming to instill fear. It has been claimed by al-Qaeda on its websites that the 9/11 attacks caused beside material damage, psychological damage also, and the attacks were highly symbolic, as they represented the attack against US economy, which indeed happened post 9/11.<sup>64</sup>

However, it should be noted that it is not always easy or clear to distinguish and separate, extremist, propaganda and hate speech material.<sup>65</sup> An example of this is the online material of Andrew Behring Breivik, which was considered hateful, yet not illegal hate speech, and to trace its origins, especially through the Internet and social media.

Social media are the perfect means to distribute propaganda since the target age demographic might be easier to pursue and accept new virtual friendships with unknown individuals and share with them their personal information and photographs. The propaganda on social media adapts according to the target group from their profile and adapt their approach

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<sup>60</sup> Cunningham, S. B. (2002), *The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction.*, Westport Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, (Available as a google book at link -Accessed September 5 2016) [https://books.google.gr/booksid=2kCFgv6FzuUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.gr/booksid=2kCFgv6FzuUC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false) p.66-70

<sup>61</sup> Brachman, J., and Forest, J. Exploring the Role of Virtual Camps (p. 3043) Available at link-(accessed July 14 2016) <https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM003039.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> Rogan, H. 2006 p. 25

<sup>63</sup> Ibid p.25

<sup>64</sup> Weimann, G. (2004) *www.terror.net How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet* UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONTENTS SPECIAL REPORT 116 MARCH 2004 Available at link -(accessed June 5 2016) <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf> p.5

<sup>65</sup> Brown, I. & Cowls, J. (2015) *Check the Web Assessing the Ethics and politics of policing the Internet for extremist material.*, Oxford Internet Institute p. 29

strategy accordingly.<sup>66</sup>

## 2.4 Radicalization

The thesis continues with the radicalization process, since propaganda aims to radicalize individuals and once radicalized they are able and more easily recruited. To begin with, two main views could be spotted, one of which, inspired by the modernization theory, sees that radicalization and the roots of terrorism are the lack of financial security, education and democracy, while the other view argues that terrorists are not poor and uneducated, nor are only from countries that lack democracy and its values; on the contrary, at least regarding the Islamic terrorists, it seems that most are from a middle class background and most are highly educated:<sup>67</sup>

*“All terrorists, by definition, are radicals. Yet all radicals do not end up as terrorists. In fact, only a few radicals venture into terrorism. At the same time, it is clear that most terrorists start their individual journey towards extremist violence first by becoming radicalized militants. Since radicalism is often a precursor to terrorism, focusing on radicalism amounts to preventing terrorism at an earlier stage, before it is too late for non-coercive measures. Finally, radicalism, unlike terrorism, has social dimensions. There are radicalized societies where acts of terrorism find some sympathy and degree of support. It is impossible to talk about terrorism as a social phenomenon, however. There are no ‘terrorist’ societies. The relative popularity of certain terrorist networks in the Islamic world can only be explained within the framework of such radicalized societies where extremist violence finds a climate of legitimacy and implicit support. Such radicalized societies are permeated by a deep sense of collective frustration, humiliation, and deprivation relative to expectations. This radicalized social habitat is easily exploited by terrorists.”<sup>68</sup>*

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<sup>66</sup> Weimann, G. (2010) Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube *the Brown Journal of World Affairs* Spring/Summer 2010 volume xvi, issue ii Available at link [https://www.homeworkmarket.com/sites/default/files/qx/15/06/14/06/terror\\_on\\_facebook\\_twitter\\_and\\_youtube.pdf](https://www.homeworkmarket.com/sites/default/files/qx/15/06/14/06/terror_on_facebook_twitter_and_youtube.pdf) p.49

<sup>67</sup> Taşpınar, Ö. (2009) Fighting Radicalism not “Terrorism”: Root Causes of an international Actor Redefined, *SAIS review* vol. XXIX 2 (Summer-Fall 2009) Available at link [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2009/9/summer%20fall%20radicalism%20taspinar/summer\\_fall\\_radicalism\\_taspinar.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2009/9/summer%20fall%20radicalism%20taspinar/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar.pdf) p. 75

<sup>68</sup> Ibid p.77



It occurs by analyzing the literature that radicalization is the heart of terrorism and the goal should be to decrease the appealing aspect of terrorism, to prevent further recruitment and exposure. Also, it supports that the problem especially in the Arab world, is that there are not adequate opportunities for youth, leaving them feeling neglected. A major factor leading to that is globalization, which clearly shows the gaps in opportunities, lifestyles and creates feelings of deprivation, victimization, humiliation, especially among youth, which plays a stronger role due to the contrast with the historical glory days of Islam that was hindered by colonialism.<sup>69</sup> A strong radicalizing factor that is a trend is related to “jihad”:

*“The word ‘jihad’ is often assumed to mean ‘holy war’ but the meaning is more complex than that. The phrase derives from the Arabic for ‘struggle’, and within Islam there are two forms of jihad: the Greater Jihad and the Lesser Jihad. The Greater Jihad refers to an individual’s personal struggle to live a good and charitable life and adhere to God’s commands as understood within Islam. This is a strictly personal and non-violent phenomenon. The Lesser Jihad refers to violent struggle on behalf of Islam. The jihadists then are literally ‘those who struggle’. This term is typically used to describe individuals who have volunteered to fight in the Lesser Jihad, and the expression is used by members of groups such as al-Qaeda to describe themselves. (Mujahideen, meaning ‘holy warriors’, is another expression commonly used to refer to Muslims engaged in the Lesser Jihad)”<sup>70</sup>*

As previously stated not all radicals become terrorists. The Internet is key to facilitating terrorist activities and assists in spreading extremism, though it must be emphasized that not many are autonomously radicalized, many have a pre-existing strong connection with new media and knowledge of such, and relationships with peer groups and the Internet only provides a certain push and easier accessibility to amplify and confirm the already instilled ideology and notions.<sup>71</sup>

Furthermore, it has been noticed that more often than not, jihadists come from a good socioeconomic and educational background and many are married, which are inconsistent findings

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid p. 77-8

<sup>70</sup> Silke, A. (2008) Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization, *European Journal of Criminology*, 2008,5; 99.DOI: 10.1177/1477370807084226 Available at link-(accessed May 27 2016) [http://campus-crimino.ulg.ac.be/claroline/backends/download.php?url=LzAyXy1fZG9jdW1lbnRhdGlvb3R5b3Jpc21lL0hvbHlfV2FycmlvcnMucGRm&cidReset=true&cidReq=C\\_RIM3116](http://campus-crimino.ulg.ac.be/claroline/backends/download.php?url=LzAyXy1fZG9jdW1lbnRhdGlvb3R5b3Jpc21lL0hvbHlfV2FycmlvcnMucGRm&cidReset=true&cidReq=C_RIM3116) p.100

<sup>71</sup> Brown, I., Cowls, J.(2015) Check the Web Assessing the Ethics and politics of policing the Internet for extremist material., Oxford Internet Institute, p.34-35

in comparison with most factors thought to be linked to radicalization.<sup>72</sup> Also, the Islamic identity is of primary importance to Muslims, and is stronger than their ethnic identity, especially among the youth, while it also plays a role in justifying terrorism, jihad and martyrdom and engages its supporters in the idea of a borderless global Salafi movement that contains all Muslims and establishes an Islamic state<sup>73</sup>, presently, known to us as a Caliphate. In addition, it is worth adding another jihadist attempt to attract and radicalize youth :

*“For the past couple of years, news and social media outlets have been trending with stories concerning the phenomenon of ‘jihadi cool’ – the re-branding of Jihadist forms of terrorism into an appealingly ‘hip’ subculture through the use of social media, rap videos, counter culture magazines, clothing and other forms of propaganda aimed at disaffected youth. Of potential sources of radicalization, commentators cite online spaces as a primary concern, noting how sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram function as ‘radicalizing milieus’ within which young people are introduced to pro-jihadist messages, networked to others with similar (reinforcing) views, and, in some cases, actively recruited to join in Islamic terrorist groups . Although much has been written on various aspects of this phenomenon, there is one propagandist device frequently found on social media sites that has generated little attention: the subversion of popular memes to propagate pro-terrorist messages, a device known as political jamming.”*<sup>74</sup>

Also, YouTube videos, images of 'Martyrs' and victims of attacks, create a sense of cause, revolution and resistance, through presenting romantic or hyper- masculine images of the jihadi coolness and political jamming<sup>75</sup> and memes. However, online radicalization is only a part of the whole process, individuals are usually influenced in their daily lives as well, and the Internet and social media act as legitimizing and further promoting their cause.<sup>76</sup>

In conclusion, since a major portion of propaganda and radicalization, and as will be

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<sup>72</sup> Silke, A. (2008) p.107

<sup>73</sup> Ibid p.110

<sup>74</sup> Huey, L. (2015) This is Not Your Mother's Terrorism: Social Media, Online Radicalization and the Practice of Political Jamming , *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Volume 6, Issue 2-May 2015 Available at link (accessed on August 3 2016) <http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.1159/> (p. 1)

<sup>75</sup> Political jamming: “Political jamming entails the deliberate alteration of representations of a logo, photo or meme in order to subvert its meaning for the audience and thus disrupt its political or commercial use (...)” Ibid (p.3)

<sup>76</sup> Ibid (p. 2-3)



examined further below, recruitment and fund raising, happens in the virtual world and mostly through social media, through branding techniques, political jamming, of soft power nature mostly, perhaps the answer to combating its message and mission is with the use of counter messages, memes, videos, political jamming, rap music, cartoons, which would aim at discrediting the terrorist and presenting the negative aspects and side.<sup>77</sup> Also, a way to stop the radicalization process which as mentioned is key to the recruitment and later participation in the terrorist cause, a solution could also be a tailored to the specific, at each time, needs, de-radicalization program:

*“De-radicalization is another process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context. A group undergoing a de-radicalization process does not have to ideologically abide by democratic principles, whether electoral or liberal, and does not have to participate in an electoral process. De-radicalization is primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of armed Islamist movements toward violence, rather than toward democracy. Many de-radicalized groups still uphold misogynist, homophobic, xenophobic and anti-democratic views.”<sup>78</sup>*

## **2. 5 Recruitment**

To begin with, in order to be recruited, one must first be radicalized, and that happens via propaganda. Often, a major and successful attack, such as 9/11 and the more recent in Europe, also aim to inspire and attract new recruits, sympathizers and supporters.<sup>79</sup>

In this day and age, recruitment has become much easier due to the existence of the Internet and the networking happening through social media, however, it is only a step:

*“modern terrorists do not recruit directly online; they use the Net only*

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid (p. 9, 14)

<sup>78</sup> Ashour, O. (2009) *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists Transforming armed Islamist movements*, Routledge, New York Available at link [http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134012299\\_sample\\_524982.pdf](http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134012299_sample_524982.pdf) p.5-6

<sup>79</sup> Fidler, S. (2016) Terror attacks in Europe aim to inspire new recruits, *The wall Street Journal*, March 24 2016 Available at link <http://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-attacks-in-europe-aim-to-inspire-new-recruits-1458863217>

*to identify, profile and select potential candidates for recruitment. Afraid of having their groups infiltrated by security agencies and counter-terrorism forces, they will use the Internet only for the early stages of the recruitment process." 8 Once radicalized, individuals seeking to do more than read or discuss the problem will seek out like-minded individuals in the physical world, often at mosques, school, work or other local environment''<sup>80</sup>*

Most individuals become radicalized in the mosque, which is not usually their initial intention, however many in the West find companionship and form relations there and begin adopting the beliefs of the more extreme members, and radicalization and recruitment seem to occur easier and faster when belonging to a small group rather than not.<sup>81</sup>

There are some factors that are traced to terrorist recruitment, such as marginalization, where many that are immigrants in the West, who are not fully integrated and unjustly treated and underrepresented and are away from friends and family and find comfort and support in like-minded individuals. Also, feelings of injustice are passed directly or indirectly through media and exposure to propaganda could lead to joining the cause. Often, members of terrorist groups join such groups for the reward, they believe is granted, as is the gain of status, and are perceived as courageous and honorable in their society or in the afterlife. Also to many, terrorism is attractive, due to the fact that it provides a sense of excitement and meaningful existence, to many who live a low key life. Although, some terrorist organizations have a more open policy when it comes to recruiting and will welcome almost anyone, while some are more restrictive, and have a trial period and rehearsal mission they wish to have conducted before finally making a decision.<sup>82</sup>

A new trend in recruiting terrorist, that should not be overlooked or taken lightly, is the increase of the recruitment and involvement of females in terrorist organizations and activities. Many Western girls and women are being recruited by terrorist groups and are even traveling, in order to join the activities and in the case of the Islamic State, to migrate there. Women, many could assume, are quite valuable, since they could bare children, the next jihadist generation and they will have a good future, even if their husbands die as martyrs, and maybe -especially- due to it. Most of the European women are being recruited via social media and then, once joined, they also participate in that function, by posting pictures that show the positive side of living in the Caliphate

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<sup>80</sup> Brachman, J., and Forest, J. Exploring the Role of Virtual Camps Available at link-(accessed July 14 2016) <https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM003039.pdf> p.3044

<sup>81</sup> Ibid Silke, (2008) p.111

<sup>82</sup> Silke, (2008) p.112-117

and the amenities and often financial motivation which cover travel and birth expenses are also provided in order to attract.<sup>83</sup>

Also, it occurs from the Literature, that another reason women join the jihadist terrorist groups is that they are aiming for a form of emancipation in the Caliphate, not achieving gender equality but rather a freedom and emancipation from the West, and its social values and lifestyle images,

*“...the women joining ISIS are tempted by the utopia of the Caliphate which seeks to modulate Muslim community. Feeling “estranged and oppressed everywhere” these women wish to change the gender roles within society – not wanting to take the place of the men however, rather their role models are the wives or sisters of the Prophet.”<sup>84</sup>*

The role of women in the group, may not be that of an active combat and suicide missions, as seen in other organizations; however, their role is mostly educating, raising the children in the jihadist ideology and supporting and encouraging their jihadist husbands. Also, as aforementioned, the Internet serves as a recruitment tool, yet sisterhoods in the real world are also formed, which assist the process and provide a sense of belonging to a community and cause. Furthermore, their participation and faith provides them with a place in paradise and their commitment and support to the cause and organization provides them with a position of respect in their community and financial security, if their husband is sacrificed as a martyr.<sup>85</sup>

In addition, though participation of women in terrorist organizations always existed and are quite necessary and essential, yet, before the age of social media, their role, was not noticed, and of course it is also increased nowadays, and has provided new roles they could take on in order to assist, such as recruiting others and spreading propaganda messages.<sup>86</sup> However, not all girls and women are serious about the cause and the protocols that must be followed, such as having their face and body fully covered, only exposing their eyes. In many profile photos and other images, it is clearly not follow and even the tone of their texts and context does not correlate with that of the

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<sup>83</sup> Sherwood, H., Laville. S., Willsher, K., Knight, B., French, M., Gambino, L.,(2014) Schoolgirl jihadis: the female Islamists leaving home to join Isis fighters Hundreds of girls and women are going missing in the West, reappearing in Iraq and Syria to bear children for the Caliphate *The Guardian*, Sep. 29 2014, Available at link -(accessed September 10 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria>

<sup>84</sup> Kneip, K. (2016) Female Jihad – Women in the ISIS *Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal* Vol. 29 March 2016 Available at link-( accessed June 10 2016) [http://www.iapss.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/88\\_Volume-29.pdf](http://www.iapss.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/88_Volume-29.pdf)  
(p. 97)

<sup>85</sup> Ibid (p. 91-2)

<sup>86</sup> Huey, L., & Witmer, E.(2016) #IS\_Fangirl: Exploring a New Role for Women in Terrorism, *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Volume 7, Issue 1–January 2016 Available at link (accessed on August 3 2016) <http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.1211/galley/927/download/> p.2

organization.<sup>87</sup>

## 2.6 Financing

One of the main vital sources for the existence and continuation of a terrorist group and activities is its financing. Without the economic backing, it would be difficult to function and carry on its operation. Both ISIS and al-Qaeda's vision was a self-sustainable Caliphate, which makes financing, ever more important.

Because of the aforementioned, it is not surprising, that terrorists utilize the Internet, engaging in illegal activities, in order to acquire the needed funds. Proficient computer skills come in handy at this point, such as Younis Tsouli, "Irhabi 007", an individual, which laundered money via gambling websites and made transactions by using stolen credit card information. Similarly, charities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are used as fronts, to conduct illegal financial activities, with the assistance of the Internet, to fund terrorist activities.<sup>88</sup>

Additionally, it must be remembered that the Internet and social media are only recently becoming a key tool in terrorism financing. Not long ago, in the al-Qaeda dominated era, the video recordings of attacks, on CDs were sent to donors<sup>89</sup>, as a form of advertisement for future donations and to show that the funds allocated were successfully put in good use. Today, the Internet and social media do the part and are able to reach a broader range of supporters, so the propaganda mentioned above, aims to obtain funds as well as radicalize and recruit. Nonetheless, there are many other ways, and innovative ones at that, which ISIS and al-Qaeda have used to finance their activities, which will be analyzed in the case studies.

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid Huey, L. , Witmer, E. (2016) p.6

<sup>88</sup> Jacobson, M.(2009) Terrorist Financing on the Internet, *CTC SENTINEL* June 2009, Vol 2 Issue 6 at Available at link-( accessed August 17 2016) <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4a438817e3a3c.pdf> p.17-8

<sup>89</sup> Rogan, H. (2006) p. 31

## CHAPTER 3

### CASE STUDIES

#### 3.1 AL-QAEDA

##### 3.1.1 Background Overview

To understand al-Qaeda, one must go back to 1979, a crucial year, in which Iran established the first modern theocracy and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, that caused flows of Muslims wishing to fight defending Islam against foreign invaders and Osama Bin Laden, went to Pakistan to assist the mujaheddin. Al-Qaeda was formed in 1988, under Osama Bin Laden, which along with, cleric Abdullah Azzam, led the Bureau of Services, its pre-al-Qaeda format, which transferred jihadists to Afghanistan in order to fight the USSR forces. However, after the Soviet forces withdrew, the two men decided to maintain the Bureau and supporting jihadists and became al-Qaeda. It was a creation assisted by doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri, which had a training camp for the group's new recruits. Sudan offered bin Laden a base, in return for him having assisted in the internal war with South Sudan, it was an opportunity for Bin Laden since his relationship with Saudi Arabia was deteriorating since the latter had facilitated the US during the Gulf War. As early as in 1992, Bin Laden had called attacks against the United States through a fatwa. Sudan's hospitality and protection toward Bin Laden ended in 1996 after US pressure and Bin Laden found shelter in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban which were then dominant in the area, the hospitality however came with financial cost annually. Al-Qaeda, sought out to conduct terrorist attacks as part of its media and propaganda strategy, mostly against US embassies worldwide.<sup>90</sup> Also, during the period of the Bureau of Services, had published *Jihad Magazine*, in order to inform about the Soviet-Afghani War.<sup>91</sup>

During al-Qaeda's early years, between 1988-1996, Osama Bin Laden was clearly the group's leader, assisted by various councils, but did not enjoy popular support in Sudan and it was not a difficult decision to expel Bin Laden after US demands, since the population did not support him either, nor did it proudly take responsibility of its terrorist actions at this point, all the while still attempting to inspire potential jihadists globally. Also, during this period al-Qaeda enjoyed initially at least, territorial control, funds and skilled personnel at its disposal. Also, it was supported by other organizations, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and started gaining recruits from mosques and schools stationed worldwide that had been useful in the recruitment process during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and maintained training camps and members in Sudan, Afghanistan,

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<sup>90</sup> Mobley, B. W. (2012) *Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence*, Columbia University Press, p.104-106

<sup>91</sup> Ibid p.108

Bosnia, Yemen , even the Philippines.<sup>92</sup>

During its next phase, 1996-2001, al-Qaeda's leadership still revolved around Bin Laden, and its headquarters were stationed in Afghanistan after having been expelled from Sudan. The organization's local support was still low and they developed ties with the Taliban, it was a win-win relationship, of mutual profit since the Taliban provided al-Qaeda with a safe area for their establishments and in return al-Qaeda provided annual funds and fighters, a guerrilla unit, especially formed to assist the Taliban.<sup>93</sup> In this period, global support toward al-Qaeda increased due to successful attacks conducted and the development and expansion of its media strategy, which Bin Laden understood to be crucial in the battle against the West and its influence, especially the US and Jewish population, and in order to attract Muslims.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, Bin Laden even gave interviews to popular global news channels such as BBC, al Jazeera and ABC.<sup>95</sup> The group's media committee played an important role in the creation and distribution of the message. It seems that al-Qaeda gained global support through its successful attacks, yet losing popular support locally due to the responding attacks which affected them,<sup>96</sup> serving as collateral damage. However, the groups increasing publicity and expanding media attention suddenly gained, made room for mistakes and gave away sensitive information about the groups location, health and daily activities.<sup>97</sup> Moreover, the group's training appears much more advanced and sophisticated, including various courses on security, hijacking, intelligence, guerrilla warfare, weaponry, espionage while at the same time, the group's resources increased as well.<sup>98</sup>

In the next phase, 2001-2003, the group relocated from Afghanistan to the Afghan-Pakistani border, after the US Operation Enduring Freedom that was launched after the 9/11 attacks and issued multiple public communications, in audio and visual forms.<sup>99</sup> The organization's media grew to be even more sophisticated during this time, mainly due to the involvement of the Sahab Institute for Media Production, which assisted the cause, providing professionalism and multiple versions in many languages in order to reach a broader audience.<sup>100</sup>

Al-Qaeda's significance, even seemingly decreased due to the existence and popularity of ISIS, could not be overlooked. It inspired others, one of the most effective means of propaganda is a successful terrorist attack, such as 9/11 and even ISIS, which it was once part of AQ has adopted

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid p.109-111

<sup>93</sup> Ibid p.120

<sup>94</sup> Ibid p.123

<sup>95</sup> Ibid p.123

<sup>96</sup> Ibid p.125

<sup>97</sup> Ibid p.146

<sup>98</sup> Ibid p.127

<sup>99</sup> Ibid p.151

<sup>100</sup> Ibid p.152

many of its ideas, strategies, symbols and even its well-known black flag. Also al-Qaeda having consisted of multiple branches, *regional movements* that take on al-Qaeda's name, which provides significance and credibility to unknown groups.<sup>101</sup>

*“While the organization is split into sects such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qa’ida in Syria, al-Qa’ida in Somalia, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, the organization is also indirectly affiliated with at least 18 other terrorist groups and has connections with Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.”<sup>102</sup>*

### 3.2 Ideology<sup>103</sup>

#### 3.2.1 Jihad

Jihad is a term frequently used and heard in the media, and in the minds of many it equals to the calling to kill and attack non-Muslims, and even Muslims that do not join the cause. Its modern-day practice has changed its original meaning and purpose and is now a powerful tool for terrorist activities, given a cloak of legitimacy under which to act, a factor crucial for potential recruits, members and martyrs:

*“The word “jihad” means “struggle” or “striving” (in the way of God) or to work for a noble cause with determination; it does not mean “holy war” (war in Arabic is harb and holy is muqadassa). Unlike its medieval Christian counterpart term, “crusade” (“war for the cross”), however, the term jihad for Muslims has retained its religious and military connotation into modern times. The word jihad has appeared widely in the Western news media following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but the true meaning of this term in the Islamic world (it is sometimes called the “sixth pillar” of the faith) is still not well*

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<sup>101</sup> Danish, A. (2015) Al Qaeda to the Islamic State: A Lesson Failed *Defence and Diplomacy Journal* Vol. 4 No. 2015, Available at link-(accessed July 20 2016) [https://www.academia.edu/27236465/Al\\_Qaeda\\_to\\_Islamic\\_State\\_A\\_Lesson\\_Failed](https://www.academia.edu/27236465/Al_Qaeda_to_Islamic_State_A_Lesson_Failed) p.28

<sup>102</sup> GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2014 The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Available at link -(accessed August 28 2016) [http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014\\_0.pdf](http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf) p.54

<sup>103</sup> **Ideology** The typology of the Ideology of al-Qaeda : Jihad, Salafism and Wahhabism refereed to are also shared by ISIS.

*understood by non-Muslims.*”<sup>104</sup>

In the original Islamic religious texts, the Quran, Hadith interpreted jihad as the fight against the enemies of Islam in its early stages, according to Islamic jurists, which saw jihad in the context of the rivalry between the Islamic ruled territory known as *Dar-al Islam*, against the land under the rule of non-Muslims being *Dar al-harb*, the territory of war, which contained the Jewish and Christian populations and polytheists. Sides thought to be enemies of Islam, this version did not promote the killing of all the opposing, however, it did suggest the establishment of a unity of Muslims, where jihad was not necessary except in the extreme case that the Muslim controlled territory had been threatened and needed Muslims to come to its defense.<sup>105</sup> By now it should be clear that the meaning of jihad is not a uniform term, and is not so simple to comprehend as it may seem as many, use it so freely in daily life, without understanding or at least explaining to the average audience, the complexity of this pre-modern religious terms that have resurfaced or remained until modern times.

Furthermore, another interpretation of jihad derived from Muslim legal philosopher Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1263- 1328), supports that a leader that cannot impose Sharia law in all sections of life, deserves to be overthrown, and permits jihad against any invader of the Islamic controlled land. Also, Muslims not living by the Islamic rule as apostates, yet does not suggest extreme punishment and military action against this category of Muslims, suggesting more mild responses and a degree of tolerance, with the exception of cases in which they conduct brutalities toward unarmed civilians. Furthermore, another version of jihad also existed, derived by the Sufi movement of Islam that supported the doctrine of greater jihad, an internal struggle against the basic bodily instincts, corruption of the soul and that is the reason greater jihad is needed, presenting a more spiritual and personal , inner struggle not a military, hostile battle.<sup>106</sup>

### **3. 2. 2 Wahhabism**

Is part of the salafi ideology, and it supports monotheism (*tawhid* ) and opposes any other religious practice of visiting sites and shrines dedicated to idolized individual, and condemn such acts as *shirk* (*polytheism*), *kufir* (*unbelief in God*), *ridda* (*apostasy*), and *bida'* (*innovations* ). The monotheists must fight the shirk and are known as Wahhabis.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Knapp, M. G. (2003) *The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam Parameters* Spring 2003 Available at link- (accessed September 5 , 2016) <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/03spring/knapp.pdf> p.82

<sup>105</sup> Ibid p. 83

<sup>106</sup> Ibid p.84

<sup>107</sup> Moussalli, M.(2009) *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?* January, 2009 *Conflicts Forum: Beirut - London - Washington* Available at link-(accessed September 14 2016) <http://conflictsforum.org/briefings/Wahhabism-Salafism-and-Islamism.pdf> p.4



### 3. 2. 3 Salafism

The theme of *al-salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors)*, has two ways it could result in, one route leads to a strict traditional political and social path, such as Wahhabism suggests, or it could lead to reforms and steps toward modernity and progress. <sup>108</sup> Also, Salafism supports the strict establishment and application of the traditional Islamic Sharia law, although then trading in democracy and human right for Sharia law, since all the above could not co-exist. <sup>109</sup> This concept is clear from within the propaganda, narratives, messages and actions of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

### 3. 3 Osama Bin Laden<sup>110</sup>

An important factor of al-Qaeda and its success, was its founder and leader Osama Bin Laden, the face of whom is well known since he appeared on multiple occasions in the media throughout the years and is still discussed about today. Bin Laden, was the most wanted terrorist in the world after the 9/11 attacks that changed the world, International relations and terrorism forever. Its successful attacks on American soil with all the symbolism it contained brought al-Qaeda to the spotlight, instantly, and America to its knees:

*“Long before, he had become a hero in much of the Islamic world, as much a myth as a man — what a longtime C.I.A. officer called “the North Star” of global terrorism. He had united disparate militant groups, from Egypt to the Philippines, under the banner of Al Qaeda and his ideal of a border less brotherhood of radical Islam. Terrorism before Bin Laden was often state-sponsored, but he was a terrorist who had sponsored a state.” <sup>111</sup>*

Bin Laden was born into a wealthy family that constructed palaces for the Saudi royal family, he was highly educated and even when given the opportunity to travel, study and work abroad, as many of his siblings did, he never went further than the Middle East, to see the West and what it provided.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, Bin Laden, had built negative feelings toward the West and mostly

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid p. 11

<sup>109</sup> Ibid p.17

<sup>110</sup> It could also been seen in the following spelling *Usamah* , and *Usama* Bin laden as well, however the author of this thesis when referring to the founder of AQ will be using it as Osama, yet when using direct quotes derived from cited work, will transfer it in the spelling of the original text.

<sup>111</sup> Zernike, K., & Kaufman, M.T. (2011) The most wanted face in terrorism May 11 2011 *The New York Times* Available at link -(accessed June 10 2016) [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/02osama-bin-laden-obituary.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/02osama-bin-laden-obituary.html?_r=0)

<sup>112</sup> Ibid Zernike ,K., & Kaufman, M.T. (2011)

against the United States, after experiencing horrific events and images of war and deprivation, which had, to him, a common source, the West, US and Israel, and he made it his life goal to fight against the corruption and injustice produced by the West and its allies. In Bin Laden's *Fatwa* in 1998 stated that the United States invaded and occupied the territory of Islam and exploited its resources while punishing, and mistreating its population, also utilizing the bases to fight against Muslims, while also criticizing the US-Israeli alliance and believing that the brutal acts are in order to favor the Israeli State at the expense of Muslims.<sup>113</sup> The Fatwa called on all Muslims to kill and assist in any way possible, Americans and their allies that had seemingly caused the suffering of so many.<sup>114</sup>

Given the chance to live in a Western life-style, along with Americans, he made a choice to dedicate his life in fighting against them despite his elite financial and social situation, he was respected and praised by his fellow like-minded supporters by giving up his wealth for the cause and fighting in the Afghan-Soviet war and created and led the jihad organization that successfully attacked the US and finally died as a martyr as deserved for his life-long sacrifice.<sup>115</sup> In his face many found a savior and inspiration that lingers even today and could be located in examples such as the Islamic State, thus adopted Bin Laden's main ideas and aspirations and took it a step further, but also, took many steps toward brutality. As did his life, so did his death create an impact, since he created a legacy that many wish to follow in order to have the same conclusion, a martyr death that grants immortality:

*“Even if America has been able to kill Usama, this is not an embarrassment or shame. Do chivalrous men and heroes die in situations other than battles? Everything has an appointed term, but can the Americans, through their media and their agents, their machinery and armies, their intelligence and their various agencies, kill of what Shaykh Usama lived for and was killed for? Far be it! Far be it! Shaykh Usama did not build this organization to die with his death.”*<sup>116</sup>

The US, killed Osama Bin Laden on May 2<sup>nd</sup> 2011<sup>117</sup>, the information of the operation is

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<sup>113</sup> FBIS Report Compilation of Osama bin Laden's Statements from 1994-2004, January 2004 Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans London Al-Quds al-'Arabi in Arabic 23 Feb 98 p 3 Translated Text, Available at link - (accessed September 1 2016) <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf> p. 57

<sup>114</sup> Ibid p.58

<sup>115</sup> Inspire Magazine Issue 6, Summer 2011, Yahya Ibrahim -Letter from the Editor Available at link -(accessed July 5 2016) <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/inspire-magazine-6.pdf>

<sup>116</sup> Inspire Magazine Issue 6, Summer 2011, <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/inspire-magazine-6.pdf> p.8

<sup>117</sup> Brown, A. (2012) Osama Bin Laden's death: How it happened *BBC. Sept. 10 2012* Available at link-(accessed June 18 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13257330>

rather detailed and it is interesting that marking the five year anniversary of the operation leading to Bin Laden's death, the CIA using its social media account on Twitter, twitted in real time the actions that occurred on the day of the operation and even provided a hashtag #UBLRaid, while some users criticized and mocked.<sup>118</sup> The CIA must have wanted to remind the public of a major success, of freeing the world of a terrorist of Bin Laden's caliber, and perhaps trying to provide a sense of closure for many.

### 3. 4 Themes and Media

Ciovacco's (2009) study of al-Qaeda's various material concludes and presents themes frequently found in the organization's media strategy. Ciovacco analyzes the following observations in length, and are presented below as summarized in his article. The logic of the group's themes and media strategy is not random, it has support backing it, such as al-Sahab in al-Qaeda's case.

- “1. Al Qaeda’s top leadership exploits local sensitivities with tailored statements for specific audiences around the world. (Top Al Qaeda leadership refers to Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.)*
- 2. Anniversaries serve as “message projection opportunities” for Al Qaeda’s cause.*
- 3. Al Qaeda’s top leadership emphasizes Koranic and historical justification to provide legitimacy for its actions.*
- 4. Seven platform themes are reinforced in nearly all media releases. In descending order of frequency as observed in media releases, these themes are: call to jihad, clash of civilizations, United States–Israel connection, Muslim unity, United States is weakening, apostate Muslim leaders are betraying Islam, United States is stealing Muslim oil*
- 5. Release timing trends show that the time interval between a geopolitical event of significance and subsequent media release is shorter following an Al Qaeda “loss” than an Al Qaeda “win.” Following geopolitical events that tend to hurt Al Qaeda’s cause (loss), bin Laden and Zawahiri release transmissions sooner than after geopolitical events that tend to favor Al Qaeda’s cause (win).*
- 6. Al Qaeda’s top leadership attempts to prompt local Al Qaeda*

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<sup>118</sup> Sherlock, R. (2016) CIA faces social media backlash for 'live tweeting' Osama bin Laden raid... five years on, May 11 2016 *The Telegraph* Available at link -(accessed September 20 2016)  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/01/cia-live-tweets-osama-bin-laden-raid/>

*affiliates into action by providing specific guidance in their media releases. The efficacy of these “calls to arms” is fairly high with a strong correlation between initial guidance and a resulting attack.*

*7. Al Qaeda’s top leadership attempts to influence American foreign policy with targeted messages directed toward Americans at critical moments in time.*

*8. Video releases are normally of greater significance than audio recordings, although this disparity is decreasing with al-Sahab’s direct posting of videos to the Internet.*

*9. The degree of top Al Qaeda involvement in an attack and the actual results of the attack itself figure prominently in whether bin Laden or Zawahiri ultimately claim responsibility.”<sup>119</sup>*

However al-Qaeda's media strategy is not limited to audio material, videos, online magazines, such as *Inspire* and documents, newspaper interviews, Fatwas and others. It is innovative and even uses cartoons to radicalize children from a young age with cartoons catered toward the age group of the target audience, promoting the theme of martyrdom and against foreign invaders in their land.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the group provides training information in its material such as building a bomb with household products<sup>121</sup>, step by step, and how to shoot in various positions.<sup>122</sup>

The organization has a Twitter account<sup>123</sup> under the name *@alqaeda* which by looking at its tweets, does not seem to be official, however, its tweets are frequent, it has followers and has not been taken down, at least not yet. As its profile picture is Osama Bin Laden, and its location is set at “*All at sea*”, probably referring or/and even mocking the fact that Osama bin Laden's body is known to be disposed at sea, not allowing proper burial to avoid it from becoming a shrine for supporters. Also, under the profile is the following: *Working to expel the infidels from the lands of the Faithful, unite Muslims and create a new Islamic caliphate*. In this sole sentence, even if it is only a fan managed profile, actually summarizes a large part of what al-Qaeda proclaims – fighting infidels and removing them from Dar al-Islam, the real faith, promoting unity among Muslims and the ultimate objective, the establishment of a pan-Islamic Khilafah.

<sup>119</sup> Ciovacco, C. J. (2009) The Contours of Al Qaeda's Media Strategy, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32:10, 853-875, Available at link-(accessed June 17 2016)<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576100903182377?needAccess=true> p. 868-9

<sup>120</sup> Seib, P. J.D (2008) The al-Qaeda Media Machine May-June 2008 *Military Review* Available at link -(accessed September 4 2016) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/seib.pdf> p. 76

<sup>121</sup> *Inspire* Issue 1 Summer 2010, Available at link -(accessed July 6 2016) <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf> p. 33-40

<sup>122</sup> *Inspire* Issue 6. Available at link -(accessed July 5 2016) <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/inspire-magazine-6.pdf> p.37-38

<sup>123</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 2 2016) <https://twitter.com/alqaeda/media>

Al-Qaeda, being a preceding group of ISIS, had to act and survive in an age where media existed however, not as advanced as it is today, facilitating and spreading the cause further. However, the group made the best out of the means available to it and early on understood its valuable role and significance, ISIS may currently be more popular than al-Qaeda, especially due to its social media presence, yet it had a trailblazer, al-Qaeda, to first open and lead the way, providing many of the ideas ISIS uses today. Al-Qaeda's media had to rely on traditional media in order to reach its message to a broader audience, and even though al-Qaeda did release videos, the editing and uploading process was more restrained due to the lower Internet speed of the time, for example and in the era prior to YouTube in the most part;

*“Al-Qaeda news and information, once conveyed to followers via messengers, fax, and the Qatari television network Al-Jazeera, is now promoted by a new, Internet-savvy generation of jihadis. From their very earliest ventures into this sphere that included jihadi websites, forums, and discussion groups, whose members were carefully screened, they have moved onto today’s social media platforms. They use these platforms not only to spread their messages, but, as this report will show, to recruit activists with computer and Internet skills who are actively involved in studying how to hack the websites of government institutions and banks, hijack drones and aircraft, and carry out other cyber crimes.”*<sup>124</sup>

Al-Qaeda, understood the opportunity of using all forms of media available to assist the group's cause, and its successful attempts have inspired other groups to do so as well, however, new media platforms have emerged making communication an even more significant tool for terrorists, since they do not rely on traditional media to pass and perhaps miscommunicate their message, they have the ability to spread their message to a broad audience, easily, inexpensively and almost without being censored and traced, and having supporters assist in amplifying the message through their own social media accounts.

### **3.5 Funding**

One of the most important factors necessary for the creation, existence and maintenance of a terrorist organization is funding. Funding is important to support all functions of the group, such as recruiting, propaganda, facilities, infrastructure and more. Also, terrorist groups, exploit the

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<sup>124</sup> Woolsey, J. R., From Al-Qaeda To The Islamic State, Jihadi Groups Engage In Cyber Jihad – An Introduction MEMRI cyber & Jihad Lab Available at link -(accessed August 30 2016) <http://cjlaboratory.org/cyber-jihad/>

opportunities provided by the Internet to expand their funding goals.

Bin Laden and Azzam, with the Bureau of Services, organized financial support and Osama Bin Laden, coming from a wealthy background, provided funds, in support of the Afghans against the Soviets, and provided construction material from his family's business to build hospitals, roads and other important infrastructure in Pakistan.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, Bin Laden obtained funds from donors from states of the Gulf, charities and NGOs.<sup>126</sup> Also, a concept utilized by all extremist Islamist groups, is that of *zakat*, which is part of the Islamic religion, present for centuries, that requires all Muslims to contribute a small percentage of their income toward aiding the poor, calling on that chord, it makes it easier to ask for donations to charities and other causes aiming to help Muslims.<sup>127</sup> Moreover, attacks are often conducted by terrorist cells, they are usually given an amount to start off with, however, from a point forward they must take care of it themselves. They are though first trained in different illegal yet profitable activities, such as credit card and car theft, forgery, cigarette smuggling and more.<sup>128</sup> Meanwhile, the Internet played a significant role in obtaining funds and donations, through sites such as Azzam.com, chat rooms, mass e-mails.<sup>129</sup>

An interesting part of al-Qaeda's funding through the Internet is related to the actions of one man, Younis Tsouli also known as *Irhabi 007*, meaning *Terrorist 007*, recruited by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after showing talent, knowledge of computers and willingness and support for the group and what it represents. Initially, he uploaded videos to various free hosting sites, however, at some point needed to expand to more advanced sites, that called for funding, and in order to obtain the necessary money to fund these activities, he and his partner, Tariq al-Daour, utilized their aforementioned skills to illegally obtain credit cards and laundered money through online gambling sites, in order to achieve their goal. Nevertheless, they were both arrested.<sup>130</sup> The case of Tsouli, is not only related to terrorism financing, he also was a radicalized youth that lived in the UK, with skills dedicated to assist and promote a terrorist cause. Also, to comprehend the uniqueness and danger the Internet plays in assisting terrorist activities and the anonymity and accessibility it provides, it is supported that Tsouli and Daour, never actually met in person.<sup>131</sup> It is another example of how virtual activities and relations have very realistic and dangerous consequences in the real

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<sup>125</sup> Kiser, S. (2005) Financing Terror An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructure California USA : RAND Corporation, Available at link-( accessed August 2016) [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs\\_dissertations/2005/RAND\\_RGSD185.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD185.pdf) p.64

<sup>126</sup> Ibid p.73

<sup>127</sup> Ibid p. 74

<sup>128</sup> Ibid p.77

<sup>129</sup> Ibid p. 82

<sup>130</sup> Jacobson, M.(2010) Terrorist Financing and the Internet, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:4, 353-363 Available at link-( accessed August 12 , 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10576101003587184> p.355

<sup>131</sup> Corera, G. (2008) 16 January 2008, The world's most wanted cyber-jihadist Available at link-(accessed July 21 2016) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7191248.stm>

world.

### 3.6 Recruitment

In order to comprehend the recruitment process of al-Qaeda, the online manual, *A Course in the Art of Recruiting*<sup>132</sup> provides detailed instructions on how to approach and recruit an individual to join the Jihad. The manual proposes individual da'wa in order to establish a stronger and more personal and secure relationship between the recruiter (da'ee) and the candidate and also clarified some issues concerning the Mujahideen and Islam that may have been distorted by the media and confuse the individual interested, and keep them from joining. In order to recruit successfully, the da'ee must have deep religious knowledge, so that when questions and doubts occur the da'ee must be informed enough in order to respond correctly according to the religion.<sup>133</sup>

The manual, although providing very specific guidelines to successfully conduct individual da'wa, gives a certain amount of creative will and opportunity for innovation to the da'ee :

*“The variety of methods and tools of da'wa We will mention some of them in this program and we will leave the rest for your personal creativity.”*<sup>134</sup>

This may simply seem to be creative freedom given, however, it is not just that; it is basically a calling for producing new methods and developing and evolving recruitment and propaganda techniques and material.

Moreover, the manual suggests the type of individuals to be recruited, secure choices, to join the cause, such as nonreligious Muslims, due to the fact that they are easier to guide in the correct path, especially the youth who are fearless and limitless, and also University and high School students living away from home and are isolated from their friends and family and previous way of life. Moreover, not religious individuals that are too talkative and hence not reliable in keeping secrets, or loners that cannot be integrated in the movement.<sup>135</sup> The profile of potential recruits are given in detail, since recruitment is a dangerous task and a wrong move toward an individual could put the whole group at risk. The moves must be careful and that is mainly why the manual provides explicit steps and even scoreboards with specific criteria, with a point system in order to see in numbers the progress made, so not to be blinded by aspiration.

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<sup>132</sup> Al Qa'idy, A.A.(2010) *A Course in the Art of Recruiting*, Available at link-(accessed June 25 2016 [https://ia800300.us.archive.org/32/items/ACourseInTheArtOfRecruitingRevisedJuly2010/A\\_Course\\_in\\_the\\_Art\\_of\\_Recruiting\\_-\\_Revised\\_July2010.pdf](https://ia800300.us.archive.org/32/items/ACourseInTheArtOfRecruitingRevisedJuly2010/A_Course_in_the_Art_of_Recruiting_-_Revised_July2010.pdf)

<sup>133</sup> Ibid p.8-9

<sup>134</sup> Ibid p.10

<sup>135</sup> Ibid p.10-13



The Da'wa recruitment process develops through various stages from finding an appropriate Mujahid that has the adequate characteristics of interest, commitment, trustworthiness, Islamic morals and engaging in religious activities such as daily prayers, fasting and visiting the mosque. Also, it emphasizes giving special attention to individuals that are near the recruiter not only in regards to location but also, personally and socially, meaning someone in their trusting family and friend circle and even age group might be a good starting point. Also, beside spiritual guidance, teaching and inspiration, it also suggests to give the potential recruit a gift. The following stage suggests a closer approach and relation established where Islamic topics are beginning to be mentioned more and attempts of clearing the individual of their negative characteristics begin and are told about Martyrdom, the advantages of Paradise and the punishments of Hell and that Jihad is a vessel toward becoming pure for the Day of Judgment. <sup>136</sup>

Moreover, the manual, proposes specific audio-visual material, such as tapes, lectures, *video clips about the miracles of martyrs and their photos*. <sup>137</sup> However, not all material are appropriate at all times, particular phases and emotional stages of the potential recruit must be taken into account when being presented the material. The manual has a special note reminding of that.

*“A very important note: In general, don't show the candidate any jihadivideos, audios, etc. except when his iman (faith) is at a high level, and when he is in a state of tranquility in order to have the best effect on him and on his heart. And don't let him listen to anything (i.e. videos or audios) when he is bothered or sad because it will be of no benefit for him.”*<sup>138</sup>

### **3. 7 Propaganda**

In order for any terrorist group to recruit, they must produce propaganda in order to attract and inspire recruits to join. A new trend known as “Jihadi cool”, which utilizes pop culture and means such as video games, and as the Global Islamic Media Front's ‘Night of Bush Capturing.’ were one hunts down and shoots former US Pr. G.W. Bush. Additionally, materials used are comics, hip hop and rap music aiming at attracting young Muslims to join. However, forums and social media still play a significant role and direct the access to more radical and fanatic material online; yet, from the audience reached by the propaganda material only a small percentage will join and commit to the

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid p.13-23

<sup>137</sup> Ibid p.28

<sup>138</sup> Ibid p.29



cause.<sup>139</sup> As aforementioned, the group's propaganda adapts according to the target audiences; for example when aiming to radicalize and recruit Muslim youth, the means to do so must adapt accordingly as well as to cater to the needs and trends occurring, such as video games and social media, despite it being strange, considering that the group preaches against such Western innovations. Another source of propaganda used by al-Qaeda, as well as by other terrorist groups, that are also often featured in the group's magazine are poems, a form that is historically embedded in the culture of the Arabian Peninsula and has a wide reach and is often turned into anthems (nashid/ nasheed). Even Osama Bin Laden composed poems, understanding both its impact and value.<sup>140</sup> Al-Qaeda's, al Neda Web site, the goal of which is to recruit contains anti-American and anti-Western themes, as well as the notion that the West is against Islam and the proper response is violence and jihad.<sup>141</sup> Also, the success of the 9/11 attacks serves the purpose of propaganda and recruitment on behalf of al-Qaeda:<sup>142</sup>

*“The 13-volume Encyclopedia of Jihad and one volume Jihad Manual have been loaded onto the World Wide Web, transferred onto discs and CD-ROMs, and e-mailed to jihadists and would-be jihadists. As review text with which to brush up on one’s skills, a training manual to impart information and instruction to others, or even as a recruitment vehicle, al Qaeda’s abiding faith in the power of communication, whether through propaganda or instructional treatises, has ensured a steady flow of information to its far-flung sympathizers and supporters. Finally, bin Laden has likely prepared for his own death and in turn has formulated a succession plan of his own, not necessarily with regard to who will replace him as leader but in order to ensure the continuation of the movement and revolution that he set in motion. On several occasions, for example, bin Laden has spoken of his own martyrdom and openly welcomed it.”<sup>143</sup>*

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<sup>139</sup> Dornbierer, A. (2011) How al-Qaeda Recruits Online , *The Diplomat* Sep.13, 2011 Available at link-(accessed July 23 2016) <http://thediplomat.com/2011/09/how-al-qaeda-recruits-online> p.1-2

<sup>140</sup> Kendall, E. (2014) Yemen’s al-Qa’ida and Poetry as a Weapon of Jihad November 19, 2014 Available at link- (accessed July 15 , 2016) [https://www.academia.edu/10175119/Yemens\\_al-Qaida\\_and\\_Poetry\\_as\\_a\\_Weapon\\_of\\_Jihad?auto=download](https://www.academia.edu/10175119/Yemens_al-Qaida_and_Poetry_as_a_Weapon_of_Jihad?auto=download) p.247

<sup>141</sup> Hoffman, B. (2003) AL QAEDA, TRENDS IN TERRORISM AND FUTURE POTENTIALITIES: AN ASSESSMENT The RAND Corporation, Washington, Available at link (accessed on July 15 2016 ) D.C. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P8078.pdf> p,10

<sup>142</sup> Ibid p.11

<sup>143</sup> Ibid p.13

Al-Qaeda's propaganda is carefully planned , targeted and devoted to its ideals and highly adaptable to new trends and occurring events. It must be admitted that the group does not only preach, it actually leads by example. Osama Bin Laden could not have ever gotten involved in fighting against what he thought was unjust and lived a long and comfortable life; however, he dedicated his fortune to the cause and his life, knowing that he would also become a martyr and be eternally remembered and admired as one. Perhaps these acts played a role in the success of the group's propaganda and recruitment.

### **3. 8 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) <sup>144</sup>**

Weapons of Mass Destruction, are created to result in mass casualties and are dangerous under anyone's command, especially in the hands of those with terrorist intentions. Of course, even states that have WMD are not clear of suspicion; yet, it is more unlikely for them to use them, since they have to have some legitimacy given to them by the public opinion in their state and also, seemingly respect the treaties in not doing so, at least not light-heartedly. However terrorists usually do not have the support needed and do not mind being condemned for such actions by the International Community, which they do not feel exists, belong to or wish to do so. In other words, WMD are indeed dangerous under the control of state actors, however, even more so in the hands of non-state actors such as terrorists.

Terrorist groups have shown over the years interest in obtaining WMD, al-Qaeda being one of them. Al-Qaeda has used WMD materials from as early as 1993, using cyanide gas and later on aiming to obtain uranium in order to create an “Improvised Nuclear Device” (IND)<sup>145</sup> and other attempts on obtaining and creating WMD: <sup>146</sup>

*“...Osama bin Ladin has signaled a specific purpose for using WMD*

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<sup>144</sup> *WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)* : Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are defined in US law (18 USC §2332a) as:

- Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, including the following: a bomb; grenade; rocket having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than four ounces; missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce; mine; or device similar to any of the previously described devices;
- Any weapons that is designed or intend to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;
- Any weapon involving a disease organism;
- Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

WMD is often referred to by the collection of modalities that make up the set of weapons: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive. These are weapons that have a relatively large-scale impact on people, property, and/or infrastructure Available at link -(accessed July 25 2016 ) <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/wmd>

<sup>145</sup> Mowatt-Larssen, R. (2010) Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School , Cambridge MA Available at link-(accessed September 14 2016) <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf> p.11

<sup>146</sup> For the Timeline of al-Qaeda's attempts to obtaining, creating and using WMD could be seen beginning from 1988-2003 Ibid p. 11-28

*in al Qaeda's quest to destroy the global status quo, and to create conditions more conducive to the overthrow of apostate regimes throughout the Islamic world. His argument is essentially that even weapons of mass destruction—which are outlawed under Islam—are a justifiable means of countering US hegemony.”*<sup>147</sup>

Also, al-Qaeda having succeeded in its 9/11 attacks, in order to create another harmful yet elaborate attack visually such as a nuclear mushroom cloud would be, is awaiting its chance to create or steal or somehow obtain such material and devices and made a small step in doing so, by using anthrax after 9/11.<sup>148</sup>

If al-Qaeda wanted to launch a deadly attack using WMD it could, however the question is why has it not been done during the fifteen years after the attacks of 9/11. The literature suggests various reasons for the group not choosing to do so,<sup>149</sup> however the mere fact that they could but have not -yet- is in itself terrorizing, alarming and must be prepared for if such event does occur.

### **3. 9 Role of Women**

There are various roles a woman could obtain within al-Qaeda, however no woman has succeeded yet to reaching the highest ranks within the organization known as *al Sulba (The Solid Foundation)*.<sup>150</sup> Women are needed to breed the future generation of fighters,<sup>151</sup> that will be already in an environment already radicalized, recruited and burdened with the obligation of joining the group. However women are not only useful for carrying a child establishing the future of the organization, the “*revolutionary womb*” as Bloom M. describes it, but even by exploiting the ability to have a child in order to hide explosives, as if it was a pregnancy, an “*exploding womb*”.<sup>152</sup> Women taking advantage of their gender, and instead of creating life are destroying many.

Moreover, women are able to radicalize, recruit, propagandize and seduce via the Internet. However, this opportunity often is used by women to create their own personality through the web, hiding their gender or even pretend to be male.<sup>153</sup> The Internet provides anonymity and anyone could be whomever they wish for any purpose. Also, women serve certain propaganda purposes, aiming at inspiring male recruits to join the cause. The group and specifically Sayyid Imam al-

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid p.5

<sup>148</sup> Ibid p.6

<sup>149</sup> Ibid p. 7-9

<sup>150</sup> Bloom, M. (2013). In defense of honor: women and terrorist recruitment on the internet.’ *Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, 4(1), 150-195 Available at link-(accessed September 16 2016) <http://www.jpcs.in/upload/311356232BLOOM.pdf> p.151

<sup>151</sup> Ibid p.154

<sup>152</sup> Ibid p.154-5

<sup>153</sup> Ibid p.156

Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl), points out the men nowadays lack masculinity and courage and rather women take on the obligation they should have.<sup>154</sup> Also, emphasizing that men must join the fight in order to defend the honor of the women who are mistreated otherwise,<sup>155</sup> However, not all in al-Qaeda shared the same idea of what role women should play within the organization. Azzam believed that women cannot participate in jihad, meaning directly through combat.<sup>156</sup> However, it seems despite the contrasting opinions, al-Qaeda sees the value of women participating in the group and launched an e-magazine *As-Shamikha*<sup>157</sup> (The Mighty One), which is purely aimed at women readers, providing material ranging from how is it to be married to a martyr, being a female fighter to beauty tips.<sup>158</sup>

Al-Qaeda, although seemingly not taking the lead on the terrorist scene, is still active and dangerous, and must not be overlooked even though it is keeping a lower profile than ISIS, for now. It must not be forgotten that al-Qaeda utilized media strategically in a way, now adopted and improved by ISIS and other groups. Perhaps, the competition between terrorist groups supporting radical Islam and jihad, may produce more trends in terrorism and their communication.

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid p.160

<sup>155</sup> Ibid p.162

<sup>156</sup> Ibid p. 171

<sup>157</sup> Al-Shamikha Magazine <http://www.archive.org/stream/AlshamikhaMagazine/AlshamikhaM#page/n29/mode/2up>

<sup>158</sup> Anti-Defamation League(ADL) (2011) *As-Shamikha Magazine: Inside Al Qaeda's Women of Jihad*, March 18, 2011, Available at link -(accessed September 5 2016) [http://archive.adl.org/main\\_terrorism/as\\_shamikha.html](http://archive.adl.org/main_terrorism/as_shamikha.html)

### 3.10 ISIS

As this thesis has shown throughout, terrorism is an ever evolving phenomenon as is humanity, through history. Some factors could be predicted, and others cannot, things that now are part of everyday life, were once discovered or/and invented by someone who saw a need for it. Even brutal inhuman acts of terrorism have causes and due to the human factor involved, it is to an extent unpredictable and it might be an optimistic thought, yet unknown, if it could ever disappear. ISIS, is an interesting case of a terrorist organization with an extraordinary number of foreign fighters, territory under its rule, administration, strong symbolism, a fascinating propaganda machine highly based on Internet functions and excellent use of social media; yet, a closer look seems necessary in order to better comprehend the self-styled Islamic State, and the trends that come alongside it that are changing the world in many ways and most probably will affect how terrorist groups will act in the future.

#### 3.10.1 Background Overview

In order to understand the uniqueness of the Islamic State, what it represents, its ideology, symbols and (social) media strategy, its evolution from being a branch of al-Qaeda to a world-famous organization that rules territory and aspires to attack all Muslims to join and move there, should be looked at.

The Islamic State was at first part of al-Qaeda, known as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia or al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004, with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as its leader, who was influenced by Abdullah Azzam who was also Osama bin Laden's ideological mentor and indoctrinated in him the salafism and conducted anti-American campaigns and strategies to harm the US forces and its allies.<sup>159</sup> Moreover Zarqawi conducted attacks against the Shi'ite population, which were criticized for its brutality even by al-Qaeda, and Osama Bin Laden himself and by his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, mostly due to the fact that the attacks were against innocent Shi'ite Muslims and their religious temples and cultural heritage and such actions would extract support from al-Qaeda.<sup>160</sup>

In 2006 al-Zarqawi was killed by a US aerial strike and Abu Ayyub al-Masri took his place as leader.<sup>161</sup> Later in October of 2006, a network branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was established called Islamic State of Iraq, with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as head and along with other branch groups, launched many terrorist activities against the US and Shi'ite population while at the same time

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<sup>159</sup> Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (The), (2014) ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, November 2014 Available at [link-accessed August 10 2016](http://www.crethiplethi.com/files/cp_0115.pdf) [http://www.crethiplethi.com/files/cp\\_0115.pdf](http://www.crethiplethi.com/files/cp_0115.pdf) p.22

<sup>160</sup> Ibid p.23

<sup>161</sup> Ibid p.25

beginning to establish an alternative administration of the Sunni population, however its power faded away between, mostly due to US military actions assisted by Sunni tribes, that were cooperating due to financial motives provided by the USA.<sup>162</sup> A major success came when Iraqi security forces, along with American forces, killed both Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri and the leadership came into the hands of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.<sup>163</sup>

The US withdrew from Iraq in 2011 enabling ISI to go back to its previous anti-Shi'ite atrocities and Iraqi government while hoping to spark a civil war between the Sunni and Shi'ite populations.<sup>162</sup> ISI sent jihadists to fight Assad in Syria, also ISI established the Al-Nursa Front, its leader being Abu Muhammad al-Julani and took over the management of the Syrian branch, however in the process of becoming more independent it started parting ways with ISI, in an attempt to stop that from occurring, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi unified al-Nursa Front and renamed it the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria [al-Sham] (ISIS), however al-Julani (al-Nursa Front) did not agree and he aligned with al-Qaeda and causing an even greater separation and rivalry between them and competition for which is the true jihadi organization.<sup>164</sup> And as of 2014, it was self-proclaimed as Islamic State (IS).

Since then ISIS expands and loses territory dependently, and its propaganda and strategy adapts accordingly to its needs for each situation -expanding or losing territory and support- and creates its own narrative for what and how it wishes to share or hide information;

*“The Islamic State has an extensive history of building relations with the tribes within its borders in an effort to strengthen the ranks of the Muslims, unite them under one imam, and work together towards the establishment of the prophetic Khilafah. Its practice of attending tribal forums, addressing the concerns of the tribal leaders and accepting their bay’ah is regularly met with success.”<sup>165</sup>*

### **3. 11 Propaganda**

Propaganda is used by ISIS to serve various objectives, it seems necessary for the group to distribute their own version of reality in order to appear attractive toward potential supporters, recruits, financial donors, also in order to gain media attention and install fear in its enemies. ISIS's propaganda is well-planned and executed and seems to be at a professional level as it appears sophisticated and rather successful. ISIS exploits all available means in order to achieve its goals and is no stranger to technology, despite their idea of an ideal Sharia ruled society, social media and

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid p.26-27

<sup>163</sup> Ibid p.27

<sup>164</sup> Ibid p.32-33

<sup>165</sup> Dabiq Issue 1 p.12-13

Internet based activities and means ( eg *Dabiq*, online magazine) are key to its propaganda and success. Under the wide umbrella of the organization's propaganda are various themes which assist in gaining support, recruits and funding.

ISIS aims to present an appealing leadership image through its propaganda message. It emphasizes the fact that it was able to create a functioning Caliphate, under Sharia, strict religious law hence presenting it self as being authentic, and as the only true Islamic state, appears to be more unified than other like-minded groups such as al-Qaeda.<sup>166</sup> The group's propaganda is not random, it responds to certain goals it aims to achieve; to lure and attract recruits, ISIS tries to present a message of the Islamic State, developing, strengthening and expanding, and having more potential than other groups such as al-Qaeda in doing so, hence the propaganda message produced, must be rather strong and convincing for an individual to be persuaded to join.<sup>167</sup> In order to pass this “winner's message” successfully across to the target audience, the group must present their successes, although it is often exaggerated, both on the battlefield and of the Islamic State's administration. The group creates the desired message which is distributed by various outlets and facilitated by social media supporters which further expand the propaganda message; yet, besides successes, the group also utilizes violence, brutalities, beheadings, and terror attacks conducted, to demonstrate power and a winner's profile.<sup>168</sup> It is not surprising that the group, being able to take charge of its image and message it wishes to pass to its audiences, both friendly and enemy, especially by using social media, they would choose to emphasize the positive aspects and successes in order to gain support in both physical and financial forms.

Moreover, since the group has a large role on what message and image is exported to the world, beside underling the group's successes it also, attempts to devalue negative news and information about the group's losses and failures of reaching global audiences, by any means necessary and moreover aims at discrediting other rival terrorist groups, in order to present itself as superior.<sup>169</sup>

Also, ISIS's propaganda is against political Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, since one of the group's main ideologies, Salafism, is against democracy, seen as shirk (polytheism), where a man is above God, and hence cannot be acceptable and even attempts to create disunity among its jihadist rivalries, creating an even bigger gap between them.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Gartenstein, D.R., Barr, N., Moreng, B.(2016) The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) March 2016 Available at link -(accessed June 20 2016) <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf> p.15

<sup>167</sup> Ibid p.15

<sup>168</sup> Ibid p.16

<sup>169</sup> Ibid p.17

<sup>170</sup> Ibid p.19



Furthermore, ISIS, aims to present the Caliphate as a utopia, a place that provides a life and services, neglected to be provided by the government, a rather tempting option for many, especially between those devastated.<sup>171</sup> The Caliphate has created a self-declared state that provides education, healthcare and services and a life to people who may not have anything left in their lives, due to war and this may be their only chance of survival. Moreover, ISIS's propaganda provides a sense of adventure and unity; an attractive aspect for many potential recruits to join, and also, reminds all Muslims of their duty to join.<sup>172</sup> Beside the terrorist attacks conducted by ISIS, it has also destroyed cultural heritage, which assists at attracting recruits, impose their power on local populations.<sup>173</sup> The destruction of heritage is shown proudly in ISIS propaganda material.

Moreover, themes presented in the Islamic State's propaganda, according to Winter (2015)<sup>174</sup> are *brutality*, such as in the material presenting decapitations, *mercy*, which are opposites, however it is often necessary in order to gain support, since it presents a choice; if you stand up and go against ISIS they could kill you, yet if you submit to their orders, they are also capable of showing mercy. Also, *victimhood* is a popular theme as well, and one of the ways to do so is by presenting images of attacks and victims, leaving out the brutal actions on their behalf that led to a deadly response. Moreover ISIS is often presented as a *war machine*, emphasizing on military successes, weaponry aiming at installing fear in its enemies. Also, *belonging* is a strong theme, promoting a feeling of belonging and community. Moreover, *Utopia*, is also a theme widely used by ISIS in its propaganda and presents an image of a state that provides social welfare services.

### 3.12 Enemies of ISIS

However, it is not easy to try to prevail against relative groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has put much effort in presenting al-Qaeda as the enemy and the IS as the pure version of jihad.<sup>175</sup> IS does not only see the enemy of their cause in the West, but even in al-Qaeda, which it was once part of and “Inspired”<sup>176</sup> many of their strategies they use today.

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<sup>171</sup> Ibid p.21

<sup>172</sup> Ibid 22-24

<sup>173</sup> Smith, C., Burke H., De Leiu. C., & Jackson G. (2015) The Islamic State's symbolic war: Da'esh's socially mediated terrorism as a threat to cultural heritage *Journal of Social Archaeology* 0(0) 1–26 Department of Archaeology, Flinders University, Australia 2015 Available at link -(accessed July 19 2016) [https://www.academia.edu/19939440/The\\_Islamic\\_State\\_s\\_symbolic\\_war\\_Da\\_esh\\_s\\_socially\\_mediated\\_terrorism\\_as\\_a\\_threat\\_to\\_cultural\\_heritage](https://www.academia.edu/19939440/The_Islamic_State_s_symbolic_war_Da_esh_s_socially_mediated_terrorism_as_a_threat_to_cultural_heritage) p.11

<sup>174</sup> Winter, C. (2015) Islamic State Propaganda: Key Elements of the Group's Messaging Publication: *Terrorism Monitor* Volume: 13 Issue: 12 June 12, 2015 Available at link -(accessed August 8 2016) <https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-state-propaganda-key-elements-of-the-groups-messaging/>

<sup>175</sup> Brynjar, L. (2015) Understanding Jihadi Proto-States *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 9, Issue 4* August 2015 Available at link-(accessed August 27 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441/872> (p.37)

<sup>176</sup> *Inspire* is al-Qeda's e-magazine



The goal and obsession of the Islamic State to over-shine al-Qaeda, seems to be successful, since they have achieved the goal of creating a “Caliphate”, and since both groups aspired to do so, yet one actually did, and has already maintained it for two years, it helps attracting donors and recruits, which allows it to continue its existence.<sup>177</sup> Competition exists among terrorists organizations, for leadership, recruits, funding and donations and attention, hence groups must act accordingly in order to surpass the other. ISIS, self-declared a state, seems to be a better choice for funds and recruits to be directed at, since they are constructing what al-Qaeda only preached and hoped it would, a Pan-Islamic Caliphate, however, ISIS's brutality goes a step too far, which may be a factor that many do not agree with and hence, choosing not to join. Moreover, ISIS also believes the US, Israel and the West and all the liberal and democratic values they represent to be its enemies. Additionally, ISIS has adopted the concept of takfir and is hostile against Shi'ite populations.<sup>178</sup> Takfir is the accusation of unbelief, in a case which a Muslim is no longer a believer of the Prophet and of monotheism, and neglects prayers, conducts sins which the individual thinks are permissible; ISIS perceives the Shi'a population as unbelievers along with whomever follows a religion aside of Islam.<sup>179</sup> ISIS sees enemies all around, yet still believes that recruits and future inhabitants of the self-styled Islamic State, are among the infidels, and will either join jihad and fight in their homeland or travel to the Caliphate to serve their duty there.

### 3.13 Apocalyptic & Eschatological Themes

The group's messaging contains eschatological and apocalyptic themes, being a strong tool at its disposal and an appealing factor for its audiences. ISIS also uses the apocalyptic message as a justification for its brutal actions;<sup>180</sup>

*“As for the name of the magazine, then it is taken from the area named Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. This place was mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will*

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<sup>177</sup> Khatib, L. (2015) The Islamic State's Strategy lasting and expanding Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Available at link-(accessed July 19 2016) [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/islamic\\_state\\_strategy.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/islamic_state_strategy.pdf) p.3

<sup>178</sup> Ibid p.42

<sup>179</sup> Landau-Tasserou, E. (2016) A Self-Profile of the Islamic State: The Creedal Document, *Inquiry & Analysis* #1253 The Middle East Media Research Institute June 1, 2016, USA. Available at link-(accessed September 10 2016) [http://www.memri.org/pdf/MEMRI\\_IA\\_A\\_Self-Profile\\_of\\_the\\_Islamic\\_State-The\\_Creedal\\_Document2.pdf](http://www.memri.org/pdf/MEMRI_IA_A_Self-Profile_of_the_Islamic_State-The_Creedal_Document2.pdf) p.7

<sup>180</sup> Fromson, J., & Simon, S. (2015) ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse Now, *Survival*, 57:3, 7-56 Available at link -(accessed August 20 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046222> p.31

*take place near Dabiq.*"<sup>181</sup>

The brutality and the broadness of the Islamic State is at a new level and even terrorist groups of al-Qaeda's reputation and caliber could not accept it, however the Islamic State seems not to be willing to soften in order to gain such groups as allies, whichever group pledges alliance to the Islamic State, probably has to align with their believes and not the other way around.

*"Then one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive them. One third will be killed; they will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah. Then they will conquer Constantinople."* <sup>182</sup>

### **3. 14 A State?**

The Islamic State's main goal was to create a Caliphate under Sharia law, by using indiscriminate violence for defying it. The group's aspiration is to expand their territorial rule to other areas. However, the Islamic State cannot be recognized as a state, even if it gains support and a certain amount of legitimacy from a portion of the population, since the State has been created in a way, as an alternative to the failed states in the region. A state is considered failed, when it could no longer protect its citizens, its governance is becoming powerless and it no longer holds the monopoly of legitimate use of force, basically the administration and law enforcement bodies are disfunctioning and could no longer fulfill their protective, within the state and externally, and organizational duties, that directly affect its population such as services, health and educational operations. Such vulnerability though, creates the space and the excuse for other state and non-state actors, to fill the gap, taking matters in their own hands illegitimately, but in reality mostly extending the already existing instability and chaos with terror and violence, while disrupting the world order; often causing lawlessness, international terrorist attacks, migration and refugee flows, ethnic cleansing, human right violations and other significant international issues <sup>183</sup>.

Furthermore, even if the so called Caliphate seems to be the empirical example of the aspirations of salafi jihadist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, although the Islamic State made it a reality, its legitimacy is not overall accepted since it did not implement all the requirements for it to have occurred and be legitimate by its religion's perspective. It is thought to lack a general Muslim consent (ijma), between its multiple fractions, nor was it created according and upon deliberation with religious establishments in Muslim states; the existing conditions for the occurrence of the caliphate were not in place, yet the Islamic State justified its decision, by supporting that since key

<sup>181</sup> Dabiq Issue 1 p.4

<sup>182</sup> Dabiq, Issue 1 p.4

<sup>183</sup> Kobi, M.A (2016) State Is Born: What Lies behind the Establishment of the Islamic State. In: *The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?* Schweitzer, Y., & Einav, O. (Eds)(2016) Tel Aviv :Institute for National Security Studies Available at link-(accessed June 28 2016) <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/IslamicStateENG5.pdf> p. 18-21

elements, such as the rule of parts of Iraq and Syria were achieved, it would be sinful -not to- go ahead in creating a Caliphate. <sup>184</sup>

In order to gain territory for its so called State, ISIS, engages in certain strategies such as a shock doctrine described in stages of initially shocking and terrorizing the population of the selected territory they took over, by sending in this way, a message to potential future enemies also, by using means of propaganda assisted by Internet rumors to cause psychological warfare in order to restrict beforehand any attempts of resistance from the population, and later on, they attempt to provide security and protection to the same population they terrorized previously, and establish an organizational structure guided by the Salafi version of the traditional Islamic Law, known as Sharia. Also, if necessary the Islamic State is always ready to use, small battle groups, snipers and even suicide bombers in order to achieve their goal of expanding. <sup>185</sup>

Terrorist organizations have gained control of territory before, by the Taliban and al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, it was not a trend invented by ISIS. The Islamic State's uniqueness lies perhaps in the paradox of its choices; on the one hand ruling under Sharia Law, which is implemented in harsh ways; punishments, mistreating minorities, while on the other hand, spreading their ideology through cyberspace. The uprising of jihadi proto-states has been noticed, especially in unstable regions. <sup>186</sup> Terrorist organizations taking control of territory, populations, facilities and resources, the fact that ISIS is -naming it a State-, in its title, could perhaps be seen as a new trend and the success of the Islamic State, may inspire more such territorial expansion appetites by terrorist groups in the near future. Below, it is clear that the aspiration of a State is deeply rooted:

*“ Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani said: “The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to rise.” <sup>187</sup>*

In Dabiq a frequent theme is reminding Muslims of their mistreatment from the West and the

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<sup>184</sup> Winter, O.(2016) The Islamic Caliphate: A Controversial Consensus In: *The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?* Schweitzer Y., & Einav O., (Eds)(2016) Institute for National Security Studies Tel Aviv Available at link-(accessed June 28 2016) <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/IslamicStateENG5.pdf> p. 30

<sup>185</sup> Siboni, A. The Military Power of the Islamic State In: *The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?* Schweitzer Y., & Einav O., (Eds) (2016) Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies Available at link-(accessed June 28 2016) <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/IslamicStateENG5.pdf> p.66

<sup>186</sup> Brynjar, L. (2015) Understanding Jihadi Proto-States *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM* Volume 9, Issue 4 August 2015 Available at link-(accessed August 27 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441/872> p.35-6

<sup>187</sup> Dabiq Issue 1 p.9

opportunity provided by the Caliphate to take their rightful place in life. Also, the Islamic State made serious attempts in trying to separate its Caliphate from the world financial system and capitalism of the West by producing its own currency. It does not only claim to be a state in its name, it actually has made various attempts in aiming to appear as such:

*In an effort to disentangle the Ummah from the corrupt, interest-based global financial system, the Islamic State recently announced the minting of new currency based on the intrinsic values of gold, silver, and copper. This initiative is a significant step towards shifting the Ummah away from the usage of currencies that are no longer backed by any precious metals, and whose values are constantly manipulated by the central banks of their respective nations.*<sup>188</sup>

In addition, the concept of *Remaining and Expanding* is vital and present in the Islamic State's propaganda and takes up multiple pages in the Fifth Issue of Dabiq magazine.

*On the 17th of Muharram 1436, the world heard announcements from the mujāhidīn of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Sinai, Libya, and Algeria, pronouncing their bay'āt to the Khalīfah of the Muslims, Abū Bakr al-Husaynī al-Baghdādī (hafidhahullāh).*<sup>189</sup>

Furthermore, the Islamic State, in order attract recruits to join, often chooses to present an image of taking care of orphans and the elderly by establishing facilities, clean streets, providing healthcare, restoring electricity and meals in the month of the Ramadan<sup>190</sup>. However, it also wishes to present an image of destroying sinful evils such as cigarettes and drugs.<sup>191</sup>

### 3. 15 Recruitment

Also, an appealing factor of the Islamic State is the policing, educational, courts services it provides, all regulated under Sharia Law.<sup>192</sup> It may appear strange that the provision of services that are taken for granted in the West and provided by the central government is a motive for living under

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<sup>188</sup> Dabiq Issue 5, p. 18

<sup>189</sup> Dabiq issue 5 p. 22-33

<sup>190</sup> Dabiq issue 9 p. 24-29, Issue 4 p.28, Issue 2 p.35

<sup>191</sup> Dabiq Issue 5 p. 17, pictures of ISIS burning drugs and cigarettes found in a PKK compound

<sup>192</sup> Khatib, L. (2015) The Islamic State's Strategy lasting and expanding Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Available at link-(accessed July 19 2016) [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/islamic\\_state\\_strategy.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/islamic_state_strategy.pdf) p.7

jihadist extremists and strict Sharia law. However, in this particular case it is understood that the population, exhausted by civil war, that ISIS has taken advantage of often do not have an alternative and their mere existence is at stake.<sup>193</sup> Moreover, another motive that attracts recruits is financial. The Islamic States gives salaries for joining and foreign recruits that are skilled and could assist the advance of the State are of even higher value.<sup>194</sup>

The Islamic State uses propaganda to promote the narrative they choose to show regarding the State and its objective, used also as a military tactic by the group. Social media helps the Islamic State present the achievements of their Caliphate, such as schools and development projects, along with using it as a tool of psychological warfare creating and spreading fear. Also, the the terrorist group promotes itself according to what is occurring locally.<sup>195</sup> The Islamic State wants to promote its own side of the story avoiding the rising of other competitive narratives and also is not strongly concerned about the ideology within, used mainly to attract donors and justify its actions.<sup>196</sup> Also, information provided by informants, claim that the Islamic State's tactic was to control all vital infrastructures in an area, even by obtaining food and jobs, in order to pressure the population into joining.<sup>197</sup>

Furthermore, another motive provided by the Islamic State to attract recruits, mostly young men, facing unemployment and financial difficulties and trying to create a future and get married, the Islamic State offers them anything they lack, yet desire, such as money, housing, opportunity to wed and even extra money to purchase slave girls. Also, even though these motives mentioned are not related to religion, yet, some recruits genuinely wish to be educated on their religion and Sharia Law, which many were deprived under Assad's rule.<sup>198</sup> Additionally, a motive to act in brutal manner is induces by drugs; claims that drugs are given to attackers before suicide attacks.<sup>199</sup>

*“Amirul-Mu’minin said: “Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state.*

*Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis.*

*The earth is Allah’s. {Indeed, the earth belongs to Allah. He causes to inherit it whom He wills of His servants. And the [best] outcome is for*

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid p. 8

<sup>194</sup> Ibid p. 9

<sup>195</sup> Ibid p.11

<sup>196</sup> Ibid p.14

<sup>197</sup> Speckhard, A., & and Yayla A.S. (2015) Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM* Volume 9, Issue 6 December 2015 Available at link -(accessed August 30 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/475/934> p.99

<sup>198</sup> Ibid p.102

<sup>199</sup> Ibid p.106

*the righteous} [Al-A'raf: 128].*

*The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.”*<sup>200</sup>

In propaganda material such as Dabiq Magazine, the obligational aspect of joining the cause is emphasized and repeated often, reminding that all Muslims should relocate to the Caliphate where housing is provided, and even if unable to do so, they must assist in other ways from their current location, such as pledging loyalty to the Caliphate and sharing promotional material of the group and its cause it online.<sup>201</sup> In addition, they attempt to provide support and faith that the journey, which is a concern of many thinking of joining will be successful and worthwhile;

*“So do not say to yourself, “I will never succeed in my hijrah.” Most of those who have tried, have successfully reached the Khilāfah. Among them are those who traveled by land, sometimes on foot, from country to country, crossing border after border, and Allah brought them safely to the Khilāfah.*

*Do not say to yourself, “I might get arrested.” That fear is unsure and the obligation of hijrah is certain. It is not correct to nullify what is certain with what is unsure (as has been stated by Shaykh ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām in some of his speeches and writings). If you fear arrest, then do what is within your capabilities to avoid detection, by not informing anyone of your intention.*

*Do not worry about money or accommodations for yourself and your family. There are plenty of homes and resources to cover you and your family.*

*Keep in mind that the Khilāfah is a state whose inhabitants and soldiers are human beings. They are not infallible angels. You may see things that need improvement and that are being improved.”*<sup>202</sup>

Propaganda mainly aims at attracting recruits, supporters and funds, and varies from showing brutal images, to softer images, aiming at appealing mostly to the West; also makes use of all audiovisual means to do so, from video and texts to music, showing images of brutalities

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<sup>200</sup> Dabiq Issue 1 p.11

<sup>201</sup> Dabiq Issue 2, p.3-4

<sup>202</sup> Ibid p.33

conducted by the enemy, in an effort to create hostility towards them, while also adapts to its audiences by taking a multilingual approach.<sup>203</sup> Any terrorist group's existence and continuation of existence relies on having support and recruits. The need to attract support is even more significant when there are other terrorist groups of similar ideology which also require and work in order to obtain support, hence propaganda in this case could make all the difference. ISIS, being a self-declared Caliphate, seems to be a tempting choice for potential recruits, perhaps because the Caliphate exists for ISIS, yet for al-Qaeda, its only an aspiration, a goal to be achieved in the future.

The recruits of the IS, are diverse, since the requirements of maintaining a Caliphate are many, from soldiers and martyrs till individuals with technical skills. Some joining are forced to do so, others find motives in the financial perks and services above mentioned, and even for revenge and the feeling of adventure.<sup>204</sup> For any reason an individual may join ISIS's cause, the propaganda has to be relateable to attract all the individuals needed by the IS. ISIS's propaganda must be on the right track, since it has rapidly increased its recruits during the past few years.

*“In fact, between 2014 and the beginning of 2015, the number of foreign fighters who joined IS increased from 12,000 to 27,000. By 2016, this number had reached 36,000, a direct result of the highly sophisticated recruitment practices employed by IS.”<sup>205</sup>*

The group's success in luring recruits could be traced back to its sophisticated use of social media platforms.

### **3. 16 Use of Cyberspace and (Social) Media**

ISIS's media use is at a never-before seen level compare to other terrorist groups; it is professional, sophisticated and exploits all forms of media in order to attract supporters and terrorize its opponents. The group has media centers such as the al-Hayat Media Center, the al-Furqan, al-I'tisaam and Ajnad Media Foundations, and the A'maq News Agency, which assist the group in its media activities, producing audiovisual propaganda, publishing the group's magazine Dabiq, and assists in presenting one of the group's most impactful choice of terrorist activities the beheading, aim at gaining media attention.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Gates, S., & Podder, S. (2015) Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 9, Issue 4 August 2015 Available at link -(accessed May 20 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/446/html> p.109

<sup>204</sup> Ibid p.109

<sup>205</sup> Freedman, I. (2016) *Jihad! Understanding the Threat of the Islamic State to America*, The Center for Security Policy Washington, DC 2016 p.67

<sup>206</sup> Williams, L. (2016), ISLAMIC STATE PROPAGANDA AND THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA Lowy Institute for International Policy Available at link -(accessed July 20 2016) [https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media\\_0\\_0.pdf](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0_0.pdf) p.3



Moreover, ISIS uses marketing techniques to attract recruits and sympathizers by distributing videos that contain persecution, utopianism and brutality themes and also use to their advantage the negative feelings of hate and anger of Sunnis living abroad and thus utilize images of brutalities conducted against Muslims and specifically young children by the West and also images of life in the Caliphate and promote the sense of identity and religious obligation of Sunni Muslims to join.<sup>207</sup>

The use of Internet-based technologies by terrorist groups are not a new trend, yet to the extent of ISIS -is- unique. Al-Qaeda valued the functions the internet provided, and groups such as al-Shabaab also understood its advantages and used English on Twitter since 2011.<sup>208</sup> The use of such platforms has created a term “Cyber Jihad” used frequently in daily life;

*“The term “cyber jihad” refers to use of 21st century technological tools and cyberspace (the environment in which communication between computer networks occurs) in order to promote the notion of a violent jihad against those classified by its followers as enemies of Islam”*<sup>209</sup>

Indeed, one of the main reasons ISIS is a unique terrorist group is its use of cyber space and social media like no other state or non-state actor before. Means, simple to operate, created initially to facilitate communication are weapons in the hands of ISIS. Even though they are against the West and the Western lifestyle, and wish to rule their Pan-Islamic Caliphate under the strict and traditional Sharia law, ISIS still does not hesitate to use high-tech Western inventions, such as the Internet and social media, in order to advance their objectives.

In addition, the Islamic State's activities on social media, are rather advanced and well-planned, in order to promote their message on social media platforms they spread their message while using popular hashtags that are trending, such as Scotland's referendum.<sup>210</sup> The Islamic State's use of social media gives the impression of large amount of support due to the recurrence of

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid p.4

<sup>208</sup> Hoffman, A. (2016)The Islamic State's Use of Social Media: Terrorism's Siren Song in the Digital Age In: Schweitzer Y.,& Einav O., (eds.) (2016) The Islamic State: How Viable Is It?. Tel Aviv : The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS),Available at link-(accessed June 28 2016) <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/IslamicStateENG5.pdf> p.99

<sup>209</sup> Hoffman, A., & Schweitzer, Y. (2015), Cyber Jihad in the Service of the Islamic State (ISIS) *Strategic Assessment* Volume 18 No. 1 April 2015 Available at link (accessed on July 7 2016 ) [http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan18\\_1ENG%20\(5\)\\_Hoffman-Schweitzer.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan18_1ENG%20(5)_Hoffman-Schweitzer.pdf) p.71-2

<sup>210</sup> Veilleuz -Laepag, (2016) Retweeting the Caliphate: the role of soft-sympathizers in the Islamic State's Social Media Strategy , *Turkish Journal of Security Studies* Vol:18 Issue: 1 Available at link -(accessed September 2 2016)<https://www.pa.edu.tr/Project%5CFiles%5CStatic%5CEgitimBirimleri%5CGBE%5CGuvenlikCalismalariDergi%5C1%5C18-1.pdf> p.54



the messages. However there have been attempts to counter the Islamic State's narrative on social media with for example the #BurnISISFlagChallenge that resembled the ALS #IceBucketChallenge that was trending at the time.<sup>211</sup> Also, in many Issues of Dabiq magazine, such as Issue 11, it provides readers with hashtags to use on Twitter, and often in multiple languages<sup>212</sup>.

ISIS widely uses social media to spread their propaganda messages and use various social media platforms to do so, such as Facebook, Twitter, Ask.fm, Pinterest, YouTube, WordPress, Kik, WhatsApp, and Tumblr <sup>213</sup>, however, in order to survive, the group switches social media often since its content and accounts are removed, as in 2014 ISIS used VKontakte (VK), a Russian social media website, even though Twitter seems to be its preferable social media platform.<sup>214</sup> Furthermore, ISIS assists other terrorist groups in the media department; which it excels in, when a group joins ISIS's network, it may be an incentive to join. Boko Haram showed improvement of its media quality after pledging alliance to ISIS. Moreover, ISIS, attempted to achieve a broader reach of its social media propaganda with the application launched in 2014, called “Dawn of the Good Tidings”, however it was taken down soon after. <sup>215</sup>Also, propaganda of all forms distributed by ISIS, uses multiple languages perfectly, advanced media and editing skills and professional productions have been suggested to be an indication of the creators of the propaganda material to have most likely received a foreign education.<sup>216</sup>

### 3. 16. 1 Fighting ISIS on Social Media

Terrorists groups rely on media attention and when foreign media repeat their messages it assists them in amplifying their messages, ISIS-related stories are widely read and searched, and audiences are surrounded by such images and information.<sup>217</sup> Unintentionally, Western media assist ISIS's goals, and the audiences are allured by the group's activities and seem to be interested in learning more regarding them, hence the media needs ISIS material to feed that interest instilled in the audience.<sup>218</sup> Foreign media when constantly repeating ISIS-related themes and images, basically

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid p. 65

<sup>212</sup> Dabiq Issue 11 p. 3

<sup>213</sup> Freedman, I. (2016) *Jihad! Understanding the Threat of the Islamic State to America*, The Center for Security Policy Washington, DC p.70

<sup>214</sup> Tianlu, Q., Jeng Yang, C., Chan, B., & Hao C.C. (2016) *Terrorism of the Islamic State: Social Media Strategies* The Wilberforce Society Cambridge, UK February 2016, Available at link -(accessed June 10 2016)

<http://thewilberforcesociety.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Wilberforce-Society-Social-Media-IS-Paper.pdf>

p.7

<sup>215</sup> Greene, K. J. (2015) "ISIS: Trends in Terrorist Media and Propaganda" *International Studies Capstone Research Papers, Paper 3*. Cedarville University 2015 Available at link -(accessed May 30 2016)

[http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=international\\_studies\\_capstones](http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=international_studies_capstones)

p.16

<sup>216</sup> Ibid p.41

<sup>217</sup> Williams, L. (2016) p.6

<sup>218</sup> Williams, L. (2016) p.6

assist in promoting its message, providing the group with power, since media attention is the main goal for terrorists and facilitate their existence. Media, present these terrorists incidents to inform the public, however when the audience are overexposed to such images on media and social media, beside from it being overwhelming, it could also either radicalize and recruit some individuals and generate hatred and Islamophobia and fear in others; all being goals of ISIS.

Foreign media and governments must fight ISIS messaging deriving from all media sources, traditional and via cyberspace. ISIS as did al-Qaeda, present an image of “Jihadi cool”, a concept seemingly contrasting traditional Islam and the Sharia rule attempted by ISIS. “Jihadi cool” aims to appeal to the newer generation, easier lured by pop culture, rap songs, social media, graphic videos, and less by religion which requires effort; as studying the Quran and fasting.<sup>219</sup> Terrorists groups, and ISIS in this case, have adapted to the likes and trends of the new generations and reform there approach accordingly; however it should be stopped way it may be achieved could be by using the same means as ISIS.

Attempts must be made to discredit ISIS, which could be attempted through various forms such as anti-ISIS cartoons. Iran had created an anti-ISIS cartoon competition and received over a thousand submissions from all over the world.<sup>220</sup> Moreover, an anti-ISIS anime cartoon, a girl named ISISChan has also been created in order to fight ISIS propaganda, by using a “Google bomb”, that led anyone searching ISIS on the search engine ISIS-Chan would appear instead, however the overflowing amount of images related to ISIS and its brutalities did not allow the cartoon to achieve the desired affects.<sup>221</sup> Other attempts against ISIS using social media are to name a few #BurnISISFlagChallenge, which begun due to the beheadings of two Lebanese soldiers by ISIS, begun a virtual challenge and went viral.<sup>222</sup> And many more such as the #Muslimapologies<sup>223</sup>, #NotInMyName<sup>224</sup>, hashtag campaigns.

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<sup>219</sup> Temple-Raston, D. (2010) "Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters' Latest Weapon" National Public Radio March 26, 2010 Heard on Morning Edition Available at link-(accessed September 23 2016) <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382>

<sup>220</sup> Melvin, D. (2015) Iran hosts anti-ISIS cartoon competition, *CNN* June 1, 2015 Available at link-(accessed September 21 2016) <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/31/middleeast/iran-cartoon-competition/>

<sup>221</sup> Pagliery, J. (2015) Anime nerds trying to “Google Bomb” ISIS. July 23 2015 *CNN Money* Available at link-(accessed July 30 2016) <http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/23/technology/isis-chan/>

<sup>222</sup> Newman, M. (2014) #Burn ISIS Flag Challenge goes viral September 7 2014, *Times of Israel*, Available at link-(accessed August 13 2016) <http://www.timesofisrael.com/burnisisflagchallenge-goes-viral/>

<sup>223</sup> Kuruvilla, C. (2014) How Jennifer Williams, A Tattooed, Blonde Muslim From Texas Became An ISIS Twitter Star October 3 2014 *Huffington Post* Available at link-(accessed August 21 2016) [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/03/jennifer-williams-isis-twitter\\_n\\_5930122.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/03/jennifer-williams-isis-twitter_n_5930122.html)

<sup>224</sup> "Not in my Name" Official Website Available at link -(accessed August 3 2016 <http://isisnotinmyname.com/>

### 3. 17 Role of Women

Women seem to have an important role in the Islamic State, not mainly for fighting positions though, they could be part of the morality police ( Hisbah), marry fighters, a motive which attracts male youth to join. Moreover, women are needed in the Caliphate, for breeding children and taking care of their husbands but also, they could assist in certain professions; as doctors, teachers, nurses and recruiters. However, even though the Islamic State presents a strict version of Islam and women's position within, it allows traveling to the Caliphate, even without male permission.<sup>225</sup>

### 3. 18 Funding

In order for terrorist organization to continue their activities they must have adequate funds supporting them. This simple and obvious fact may perhaps even be one way to tackle such extreme activities, and preventing them from growing and becoming a State-like hybrid such as the Islamic State. The Caliphate collects the adequate funds necessary to continue its actions through a number of ways. To begin, profit comes to the organization when they expand and take over territory, since it includes everything along with it, such as resources, banks, property, vehicles and other valuable assets in Iraq and Syria are now under the Caliphate's control. Furthermore, the Islamic State conducts illegal trading of antiquities and artifacts and profits by it by imposing taxation on smugglers and by facilitating trade and excavation and not hesitating to destroy and sell cultural heritage that belong to the areas under its command for financial gain. Also, another source of its funds derives from donations.<sup>226</sup>

Furthermore, ISIS, itself has claimed one of its financial sources is human trafficking, mostly of women and children and promoting and guiding fighters to buy female slaves.<sup>227</sup> Also, ISIS controls gas and oil revenues of the areas it controls, denying its profits from the population, in addition to ISIS taking control of agricultural machinery, crops and controlling prices of the goods.<sup>228</sup>

ISIS is a unique terrorist organization, which seems to have taken successful tactics, which they have developed and are being used to their advantage while also also passing the know-how to

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<sup>225</sup> Abdulrahim, R. (2014) Islamic State recruiting women to 'have kids and cook' *LA Times*. September 21, 2014. Available at link-(accessed August 21 2016)

<http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-isis-female-recruits-20140920-story.html>

<sup>226</sup> De Oliveira, I. S. (2015) The Challenges of fighting terrorism financing: Following the Daesh money trail In: Giusto H., (ed.) *Daesh and the terrorist threat: from the Middle East to Europe*. Italy: FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies Available at link-(accessed May 28 2016) <http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/00d1937d-9556-4527-a5e9-f0f94d30a46b/volume-completopdf.pdf> p.89-91

<sup>227</sup> FATF (2015), Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), FATF, Available at link -(accessed September 7 2016) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf> p.13

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p.13-15

its allies. Also, the group seems to adapt to changes; from changing social media platforms, to creating appropriate media messages depending on what image it wants to export to the global audiences and what it wishes to keep away from the spotlight. Also, it conveniently follows the strict version of Islam it preaches, since it widely uses Western modern inventions, such as social media, and makes exceptions for women not needing male permission to join the Caliphate. ISIS is unique also, for establishing a state-like territory, administration and services that challenges the main government and becomes a attractive choice for recruits. It is hard to predict ISIS's next moves and its future, however, it will be challenging to defeat since its Caliphate is also a virtual entity, and thus difficult to demolish.

### 3. 19 BOKO HARAM

#### 3.19. 1 Background Overview

Boko Haram is a terrorist group in Nigeria of Sunni Islamists supporting a system of governance under Sharia law, inspired by Wahhabi and Salafi ideology and oppose western education and is openly against the government and Christians living in Nigeria.<sup>229</sup> Furthermore, Boko Haram, was one of the deadliest terrorist group, even though it is not thought of as such, since the Islamic State takes up most of the media spotlight. However, it exists long before the Islamic State and its actions are brutal; as according to the Global Terrorism Index of 2014:

*“Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in 2014, killing 6,644 people. The group is also known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād and more recently Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). The name Boko Haram can be translated as 'Western education is forbidden.'”*<sup>230</sup>

The group was at first non-violent, consisting of young radicals that prayed at the mosque in Maiduguri. However, the group in 2002 stated the city and the mosque as corrupted and declared that they begun hijra and were moving from Maidiguri to Kanama, with the group's leader Mohamed Ali who called upon Muslims to join life under the real Islamic Law. Yet, in 2003 the group got involved in a dispute with the police forces, that led to most of the members of the group dead and Mohamed Ali's death as well. Despite the losses, the group gained a reputation and a moniker, “Nigerian Taliban” and attracted attention to their activities The remaining members of the group returned to Maidiguri and established their own mosque, with the leader now being Mohammed Yusuf while in the meantime the group was spreading into other states. Moreover, the group then created alternative services such as religious police and assisted citizens with their needs. The groups members consisted mostly of refugees fleeing from war in neighboring countries and unemployed youth.<sup>231</sup>

In the following years the group became even more aggressive and ordered the assassination of Sheikh Ja'Far Mahmoud Adam, who had previously criticized the group. Also, it engaged in more deadly interactions with the police, and killed innocent unarmed Christians and Muslims,as

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Global Terrorism Index 2014 The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP ) The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Available at link -(accessed August 28 2016) [http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014\\_0.pdf](http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf) p.53

<sup>230</sup> Global Terrorism Index 2015 The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Available at link -(accessed August 28 2016) <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf> p,41

<sup>231</sup> Walker, A. (2012 )What is Boko Haram? Washington, DC : the United States Institute of Peace (Special Report 308 June 2012) Available at link-(accessed August 21 2016) <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf> p.3

well as the group had threatened police and government on video. Finally, the police gained control of Maiduguri and resorted to executions, many members and supporters of the group, including Yusuf.<sup>232</sup> The group however continued carrying out series of attacks against police, government and unarmed citizens, in churches, markets, restaurants and schools.<sup>233</sup>

### 3. 20 Propaganda and Themes

The group supports a strict Sharia interpretation of Islam, and does not accept democracy and elections.<sup>234</sup> Also they are against the current educational system since they believe it was imposed by the colonists and took the place of the Islamic educational system which they aim to resurface, while they justify their actions by believing that they are the Saved Sect and it is their mission to bring and pass these changes,<sup>235</sup> and reject those employed by the government<sup>236</sup>.

Boko Haram, showed that it did not only aim at attacking local targets, mainly police and private, random citizens and government; in 2011, it detonated a bomb outside the UN headquarters in Abuja, an International Organization with high security and a strong symbolic significance. The group became more sophisticated and understood the need to upgrade its media outreach as well. The group utilized the Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum (AMEF), affiliated with al-Qaeda, and provided information on the group from there, shared their problems and aspirations and gained advice from AMEF members on how to upgrade their propaganda and increase their finances, assisted Boko Haram in providing trainers from al-Qaeda and encouraged traveling to Nigeria to join the cause in Nigeria.<sup>237</sup>

*Like other large terrorist groups, Boko Haram shows concern over the way it is depicted in the media. The group has specific journalists which they contact directly to claim responsibility for various attacks. They regularly release videos online, including in response to the international 'Bring Back Our Girls' campaign which was started in*

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid p.4

<sup>233</sup> Ibid p.5-6

<sup>234</sup> Murtadā, A. (2013) Boko Harā m Movement in Nigeria: Beginnings, Principles and Activities. translation by 'AbdulHaq ibn Kofi ibn Kwesi al-Ashantī, Published:SalafiManhaj 2013Available at link-(accessed September 5 2016) <https://www.scribd.com/document/171859091/SalafiManhaj-Boko-Haram-Movement-in-Nigeria-Beginnings-Principles-and-Activities-Dr-Ahmad-Murtada> p. 16

<sup>235</sup> Ibid p.17

<sup>236</sup> Ibid p.18

<sup>237</sup> SITE Staff (2011) Boko Haram Representative Solicits Guidance and Assistance on Jihadist Forums, *SITE Intelligence Group* September 2011, Available at link-(accessed August 21 2016) <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/1145-boko-haram-representative-solicits-guidance-and-assistance-on-jihadist-forums>

*protest of the school girls kidnapped in Chibok.*<sup>238</sup>

Boko Haram, and its new media outlet for Boko Haram al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Link) and a Twitter account, and led to assistance in communications from ISIS and Boko Haram soon followed in Boko Haram pledging alliance to IS.<sup>239</sup>

### **3. 21 Recruitment, Funding and the role of Women**

The group has allegedly abducted children and forced captives to fight, while others were threatened. However, some join, since the alternative is not much better while others are magnetized by the opportunity to learn more and serve their religion. Moreover, an incentive is financial, since with the country facing chronic poverty and unemployment, the group provided small loans and if it could not be repaid the group would force them to join. Also the group is known to both recruit unemployed and wealthy individuals as well.<sup>240</sup> The group has various sources of funds, such as selling goods, benefiting from assisting businesses, while also using children as beggars, who also take on the role of spies for the group as well as extortion and smuggling support from donors. Moreover, it has ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and works with them on trafficking narcotics.<sup>241</sup> Boko Haram is a group that engages in brutalities, and it even went to turn captive women into suicide bombers as women are an easy vessel to carry out such attacks, since carrying them under clothes do not immediately trigger suspicion.<sup>242</sup> Similarly, Boko Haram has carried out multiple kidnappings, many of which of women, the more known being the kidnapping of 276 girls from Chibok Nigeria, in April 2014, where they were attending school, which led to a long lasting social media campaign requesting the return of the girls, the majority of which are still missing.<sup>243</sup> The demand expanded its reach rapidly through social media utilizing the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls, an example of hashtag activism, and brought it the global media spotlight, that otherwise may not have been widely know, which may or may not have brought change. However, it does push a subject to the agenda and gives an opportunity to be heard.<sup>244</sup>

<sup>238</sup> Global Terrorism Index 2014 The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) p.53

<sup>239</sup> Zelin, A. Y. (2015) The Clairvoyant: Boko Haram's Media and The Islamic State Connection? *Jihadology* January 27, 2015 Available at link-(accessed August 21 2016) <http://jihadology.net/2015/01/27/the-clairvoyant-boko-harams-media-and-the-islamic-state-connection/>

<sup>240</sup> Alfred, C. (2016) Why People Join Nigeria's Boko Haram April 16, 2016 *Huffington Post*, Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/boko-haram-recruitment-tactics\\_us\\_571265afe4b06f35cb6fc595](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/boko-haram-recruitment-tactics_us_571265afe4b06f35cb6fc595)

<sup>241</sup> GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2014 The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) p.53

<sup>242</sup> Searcey, D. (2016), Boko Haram Turns Female Captives Into Terrorists , April 7 2016, *The New York Times* Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/world/africa/boko-haram-suicide-bombers.html>

<sup>243</sup> Carter Olson, C. (2016) #BringBackOurGirls: digital communities supporting real-world change and influencing mainstream media agendas, *Feminist Media Studies*, 16:5, 772-787, Available at link-(accessed August 20 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14680777.2016.1154887?needAccess=true> p.772

<sup>244</sup> Ibid p. 775-6



### 3. 22 AL-SHABAAB <sup>245</sup>

#### 3.22.1 Background Overview

Al-Shabaab, is a terrorist group based in East Africa and shares the Islamic, Jihadist, Salafi Ideology <sup>246</sup> as the other groups of the case studies. The group came to existence, through the challenges occurring in Somalia during the 1990s, when a civil war begun after the fall of Mahammed Siad Barre's dictator rule and the difficulty to form a new government, and when social reforms were necessary and led to the organization of the society into clans. Of course, some Islamic tribunals in Mogadishu, that became the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and were aiming to fill the governmental gap created.<sup>247</sup> Later on, the ICU was defeated against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with the support of Somali clans along with Ethiopian forces. After Ethiopia's invasion of Mogadishu, an opportunity arose for al-Shabaab, under Abu Zabair, by enforcing Sharia Law and by using guerilla operations, it gained territory in Somalia, of vital importance for the group. In 2012 the group pledged alliance to al-Qaeda, and preached jihad in the region of the horn of Africa.<sup>248</sup>

Even though al-Shabaab is closely associated to al-Qaeda, it is not under the same status as other groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in Iraq or others. The relationship between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab is based on various factors. To begin with, they share the same goals of establishing a Caliphate unifying the Muslim Ummah; also, the two groups share a common background, as many of the top leaders of both groups fought in the Afghan-Soviet war, and might have had contact with Osama Bin Laden. Furthermore, the two groups provided protection and assistance to one another at times of need and have demonstrated the mutual cooperation in various public messages from both sides and al-Shabaab declares its efforts as being part of the larger efforts conducted by al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda, by association provides credibility to

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<sup>245</sup> TERRORISM RESEARCH & ANALYSIS CONSORTIUM Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-shabaab>

*“Al Shabaab, also known as Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab, The Party of Youth, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM), Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) also spelled Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM), Hezb al-Shabaab, al-Shabaab al-Islaam, al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, al-Shabaab al-Jihaad, Hisb'ul Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab, Shabaab, Movement of Warrior Youth, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, The Youth, Unity of Islamic Youth, Youth Wing, al Shabab, As-Sahāb, Muhajiroon brigade (Division made up of Foreign Fighters), al Shebab is an active group formed c. 2004”.*

<sup>246</sup> Mapping Militant Organizations Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61>

<sup>247</sup> Sasso, A. (2015) The origins and Affiliations of Islamic Terrorism in Africa In: Giusto (ed.) (2015) *Daesh and the terrorist threat: from the Middle East to Europe Italy*:FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies Available at link-(accessed May 28 2016) <http://www.fepeurope.eu/assets/00d1937d-9556-4527-a5e9-f0f94d30a46b/volume-completopdf.pdf> p.43-44

<sup>248</sup> Ibid p.44



the group, which assists in recruitment process as well.<sup>249</sup>

### 3.23 Propaganda, Themes and Media

Propaganda is essential for terrorist groups and the expansion of their message. The group used propaganda in order to report successes, also, to de-legitimise the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and increase their own, by providing necessities and services that the TFG neglects to grant, however, the alternative solution suggested by al-Shabaab, involves ruling under Sharia. Moreover, propaganda also justifies its attacks as necessary, in order to respond to attacks received, especially from African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and also often portray a superior image against AMISOM.<sup>250</sup> A common thread in terrorist groups arising and exploiting for propaganda purposes, is the existence of unstable governments that create a power gap that such groups take as an opportunity to fill.

Al-Shabaab, also has a media branch, and created a twitter account “HSM<sup>251</sup> Press Office” (@HSMPress)<sup>252</sup> and releases its own statements and acts as a creator and distributor of news in order to make certain that the news distributed contains the narrative and information that responds to their objectives. By making other media sources seem manipulative, in order they seem as a genuine source of information on the while gaining credibility of the news they spread they first resort in verifying the facts beforehand and cater to their target audience by writing most of their tweets in English. The themes found in the groups messaging are constructed in order to appeal to public opinion, by using an ideology called “*Clash Paradigm*” meaning that the West is not actually fighting military forces in the Middle Eastern region, but battling Islam itself and its an obligation of Muslims do resist and defend it. HSM Press Office also, builds an image of the West being

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<sup>249</sup> Harnisch, C. (2010) The terror threat from Somalia, The Internationalization of al-Shabaab, A report by the Critical threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2010 Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016)[http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf\\_upload/analysis/CTP\\_Terror\\_Threat\\_From\\_Somalia\\_Shabaab\\_Internationalization.pdf](http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf) p.19

<sup>250</sup> Curran, C. (2011) Global Ambitions: An Analysis of al Shabaab's Evolving Rhetoric, February 17, 2011, Critical Threats, Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/global-ambitions-analysis-al-shabaabs-evolving-rhetoric-february-17-2011>

<sup>251</sup> HSM : the acronym stands for Harakat Al-Shabab Al Mujahideen

<sup>252</sup> The account, last checked September 2016, has been suspended by Twitter <http://twitter.com/#!/HSMPress> According to Anti-Defamation League (2010) "Al Shabaab Launches Apparent Twitter Campaign".. December 20, 2011 about described the account : "A user claiming to be the Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen [Mujahideen Youth Movement] Press Office and operating out of Somalia launched the account of posts with a traditional Islamic preface. The user's profile picture is one of Al Shabaab's battle flags, and describes the group as "an Islamic movement that governs South & Cen. Somalia & part of the global struggle towards the revival of Islamic Khilaafa."Although the identity of the user cannot be confirmed, recent English-language statements from Al Shabaab, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, posted in online jihadist forums have directed traffic to the account and African and Western officials have stated they believe the account is linked to the group."Anti-Defamation League(ADL) (2010) "Al Shabaab Launches Apparent Twitter Campaign".. December 20, 2011 Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) <http://www.adl.org/combatting-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/shabaab-launches-twitter.html?referrer=https://en.wikipedia.org/>

immoral, while also reminding of its colonial past. Moreover, HSM Office promotes and justifies using violent forms of resistance, such as martyrdom and suicide bombing and glorifies the sacrificed individuals on Twitter.<sup>253</sup> It seems to be an organization with few or no boundaries, it aims to keep other competing messages away from the population and promoting their own version of truth, creating and installing anti-Western feelings toward the West and against any other option of rule (e.g. TFG) and assistance and presence no matter the origin (e.g. AMISOM ) and does not hesitate to justify and promote brutal means in order to achieve the aspired objectives.

The group has experience using technology and directed its members not to use smart phones, for their communication is not fully safe, and may be hindered. They are particularly strict, also when it comes to Somali citizens; their communication is also under bans, beside smartphones previously mentioned, the Internet through mobile phones was also targeted, even presenting it as morally corrupt for the Muslims of Somalia, watching TV as well. However, the group managed a radio station Radio Andalus, while it uses visual messaging, videos produced by al-Kataib Foundation that such contrasting images of the group in order to gain maximum support. One the one hand the group is shown to participate in charity work and one the other hand threatening and conducting brutalities. Again, catering to the target audience each time, it produces its messages in English, Arabic and Swahili as well and attempts through its Twitter account to fight the African Unions forces in Somalia.<sup>254</sup>

Even though the group uses all the media sources they could access, from radio stations to social media, and exploiting their abilities in order to promote their message and counter any opposing narratives, it denies the population uncensored access, in an attempt to restrict their freedom of expression and information on what goes on locally toward the outside and information concerning the rest of the world from entering, at least without the proper filtration from the group initially. Also, by using English frequently in their messaging, and not restricting it by using only Swahili and Arabic, and restraining full access to the Internet and other information sources, and by trying to monopolize the news broadcasting from other media beside their own, comes to show that their audience is not solely focused on the local population, but aims at attracting foreign audience and support as well.

However, the brutal and acts of al-Shabaab and strictness toward the West and its corrupt, in their perception, life-style, and intense use of high-tech means and material, have caused criticism toward why they do not act what they preach. In fact, it is a question that fits all the terrorist groups

<sup>253</sup> Pearlman, L. (2012) Tweeting to Win: Al-Shabaab's Strategic Use of Microblogging *The Yale Review of International Studies*, NOVEMBER 2012 Available at link -(accessed August 1 2016) <http://yris.yira.org/essays/837>

<sup>254</sup> Hodg, N. (2014) How Somalia's al-Shabab militants hone their image, *BBC Monitoring* 6 June 2014 Available at link-(accessed July 17 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27633367>

aiming at establishing Sharia Law by using Western inventions, such as social media, and techniques, for:

*“It is an odd, almost downright hypocritical move from brutal militants in one of world’s most broken-down countries, where millions of people do not have enough food to eat, let alone a laptop. The Shabab have vehemently rejected Western practices — banning Western music, movies, haircuts and bras, and even blocking Western aid for famine victims, all in the name of their brand of puritanical Islam — only to embrace Twitter, one of the icons of a modern, networked society.”*<sup>255</sup>

That is not the only antithesis in the groups narratives it wishes to promote through the media. It adapts its message according to what it aspires to achieve each time. That is because, the group faces a threat from foreign invaders while at the very same time, it tries to maintain an image of control over its territory.<sup>256</sup> In order to sum up all the themes covered by al-Shabaab and what they are directed to achieve in order to promote the group's goal. The existence of all might be the key of success of the group.

*“Taken as a whole and in order of importance, the overarching message from al-Shabaab as distilled from its Twitter campaign is the following: Somalia is a key battleground in the conflict between the West and Islam (**narrative**). Al-Shabaab has the capacity to successfully guard against belligerent forces (**operational capacity**), but there is a campaign of misinformation being promoted by the Western media to discredit the group (**competing voices**). Al-Shabaab is a united and coherent organization with the best interests of Somali Muslims in mind (**group integrity and cohesion**) while it makes sacrifices in order to achieve an Islamic state governed by Shariah (**religious authority**). In this quest, the group has support from Somali Muslims (**relevance**) and has the strategic knowledge to win this battle*

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<sup>255</sup> Gettleman, J. (2011) Somalia’s Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a Weapon, *The New York Times* December 14, 2011 Available at link-(accessed July 17 2016) [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-a-weapon.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-a-weapon.html?_r=0)

<sup>256</sup> Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., Maher, S., & Sheehan, J. (2012) *Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy*, London: ICSR, King's College London. Available at link -(accessed July 15 2016) [http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ICSR-Lights-Camera-Jihad-Report\\_Nov2012\\_ForWeb-2.pdf](http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ICSR-Lights-Camera-Jihad-Report_Nov2012_ForWeb-2.pdf) p.34

*(strategic authority).*<sup>257</sup>

Al-Shabaab made an effort to become a global terrorist organization, even though it could have selected to only fight against TFG and AMISOM in its homeland. However, it made the correct moves and associated itself with the leader of the Jihadist movement, al-Qaeda, in order to gain support, prestige and legitimacy. Also, it rapidly understood the importance of social media, and attempted to muffle competing news outlets and counter-narratives, while doing its best to promote its anti-Western feelings and inspire others to follow them in creating a Caliphate in the region, their basic goal.

### 3. 24 Recruitment

In order for a terrorist group to survive and continue its actions it requires recruits to fight for them. The group aims at attracting and recruiting young Muslims living abroad and willing or actually being persuaded into doing so by creating media to fulfill that purpose. However, on two fronts, on a local level meaning against the governmental structure (since it could be an interim government, dictatorship and other forms, as seen from the political history of the region) and in the global jihad front along with al-Qaeda, aiming at the establishing of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate. The group gains a lot of support through its association with al-Qaeda, and the statements of the latter to emphasize the significance of Somalia in jihad.<sup>258</sup>

The glory of jihad and the feeling of patriotism may apply for recruiting young and brave Muslims abroad. However, according to Dr. Meleagrou-Hitchens A. for recruits from the Kenyan region are mostly motivated by financial gains that could be vital for their existence and a powerful incentive to join the cause and by basically being guilted into it by presenting it as an obligation of their religion.<sup>259</sup> Yet, many recruiters who had been interviewed did not stay in the group, since they were not granted the financial profits promised and/or realized that the brutalities being conducted by the group in the name of Islam, did not represent what the religion is truly about.<sup>260</sup> Moreover, al-Shabaab is often wrongfully overlooked as a immediate threat outside the African region;

*“Some argue that al-Shabaab is only a Somali problem and the group*

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<sup>257</sup> Ibid .39

<sup>258</sup> Harnisch, C. (2010) The terror threat from Somalia, The Internationalization of al-Shabaab, A report by the Critical threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2010 Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) [http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf\\_upload/analysis/CTP\\_Terror\\_Threat\\_From\\_Somalia\\_Shabaab\\_Internationalization.pdf](http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf) p.29

<sup>259</sup> Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2012) Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalisation in Kenya ,*ICSR Insight* 19/11/2012 Available at link -(accessed July 30 2016) <http://icsr.info/2012/11/icsr-insight-al-shabaab-recruitment-and-radicalisation-in-kenya/>

<sup>260</sup> Ibid

*will never strike outside the Horn of Africa region. That kind of thinking is a glaring example of what the 9/11 commission called a failure of imagination. With al-Shabaab's large cadre of American Jihadist and unquestionable ties to al-Qaeda, particularly its alliance with AQAP, we must face the reality that al-Shabaab is a growing threat to our homeland. Our investigation into this threat has led to some alarming findings, notably that al-Shabaab has successfully recruited and radicalized more than 40 Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians who joined the terror group inside Somali. Of those, at least 15 Americans and 3 Canadians are believed to have been killed fighting with al-Shabaab. Not al-Qaeda nor any of its affiliates have come close to drawing so many Muslim Americans and Westerners to jihad.*<sup>261</sup>

*There is an enormous amount of travel by Somali Americans between U.S. cities and East Africa, and most of this travel is legitimate. Yet senior U.S. counter-terror officials have told the committee they are very concerned about individuals they have not identified who have fallen in with al-Shabaab during trips to Somalia, who then would return to the United States undetected.*<sup>262</sup>

Al-Shabaab has already achieved in attracting young educated recruits from the West and aims to continue doing so and adapts accordingly, and addresses its target audience recruitment material in English, Swedish and Swahili as well.<sup>263</sup>

### **3.25 Funding**

In order for a terrorist group to maintain its existence, presence, activities and recruits that are motivated by financial profit, it must be able to obtain adequate funding. Al-Shabaab possibly gains funds from foreign jihadist associated with al-Qaeda and by Somali diaspora, living abroad,

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<sup>261</sup> House of Representatives, U.S. Committee on Homeland Security (2011)AL-SHABAAB: RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION WITHIN THE MUSLIM AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND Wednesday, July 27, 2011, COMPILATION OF HEARINGS ON ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION —VOLUME I HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 10, JUNE 15, and JULY 27, 2011 Serial No. 112-9, Washington, DC.Available at link-(accessed July 17 2016) <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72541/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72541.pdf> p.278

<sup>262</sup> Ibid p.279

<sup>263</sup> Moshiri, N. (2011) Al-Shabab starts tweeting, *Al Jazeera*, 14 December 2011Available at link-(accessed July 25 2016) <http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2011/12/90816.html>

including in the US. Also, Eritrea, Djibouti, Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been accused of supporting al-Shabaab, either financially or materially. It gained profit from taxes from the territory under its rule.<sup>264</sup>

### 3.26 #WESTGATE

Social media's significance is growing and seems to be present and utilized in devastating events, catastrophes such as in the Haiti earthquake<sup>265</sup>, however also in situations as the Westgate Mall terrorist attack. As mentioned above, al-Shabaab widely made use of media and social media to expand its message and promote its cause, while the group gained worldwide publicity during an attack, in which Twitter played a large part in. On September 21<sup>st</sup> 2013, an unidentified number of armed men<sup>266</sup> entered Westgate shopping Mall, located in Nairobi, Kenya. The siege lasted four days and resulted in 71 casualties (including the alleged attackers) and injured 175. Al-Shabaab, took responsibility for the attack through a Twitter account, yet, it used multiple accounts throughout the duration of the attack. Often when a group faces defeats and loses it recedes to activities to compensate and regain prestige, confidence, funds, recruits, coverage, and all in all sense of control of what was lost. Not long before the Westgate attack, the group had faced territorial losses of vital cities, Baiboda and Kismayo<sup>267</sup>.

The event took great dimension and twitter was overflowing with related hashtags:

*“Hashtags Through content analysis, four categories of hashtags used during the crisis were identified, referring to: 1) geographical locations – e.g., #WestGate, #WestGateMall, #Kenya, #Nairobi. These hashtags existed and were used on Twitter prior to the attack; 2) terror/violent attacks– e.g., #WestGateAttack, #WestGateSiege, #WestGateMallAttack and #WestGate Shootout. Kenyan government officials, organizations and first responders used #WestGateAttack only; 3) social support, resilience and cohesiveness– e.g., #WeAreOne*

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<sup>264</sup> Mapping Militant Organizations Available at link-(accessed August 30 2016) <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/6>

<sup>265</sup> Bunz, M. (2010) In Haiti earthquake coverage, social media gives victim a voice. *The guardian*. January 14, 2010 Available at link-(accessed July 17 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/jan/14/socialnetworking-haiti>

<sup>266</sup> Anzalone, C. (2013) The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy *CTC Sentinel* Vol. 6 Issue 10, October 2013 Available at link-(accessed July 28 2016) <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss10.pdf> p.2

<sup>267</sup> Ibid p.1



and #United WeStand. The latter, though used by the public was absent from all official tweets; and, 4) organizations – e.g., #RedCross and #AlShabaab. During the first days of the attack, numerous complaints were posted on Twitter stating that there were too many hashtags for the event or alternatively posting a list of hashtags, such as “One incident, many hashtags” or “So many different hashtags for today’s tragedy #Westgate #WestgateMall #WestgateAttack #WestgateShootOut #WestGateMallShootOut”. Different variations were used inconsistently and interchangeably by the public, the media, and NGOs. On September 24 the PSCU Kenya Digital tweeted that all of the social media managers had held a synchronization meeting—“This morning we held a WhatsApp meeting with all bloggers running the @InteriorKE @PoliceKE @kdfinfo @NDOCKenya our voice is #WithOneAccord”, following which all responders consistently used the #WithOneAccord hashtag. Moreover, while the fourth category of hashtags was present in many tweets, government officials preferred to use the “@” handle to mention the different organizations and individuals in their messages.”<sup>268</sup>

However, the group still attempts to feed on the success of the event, and turned it into another form of media, for propaganda purposes. Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Production, shared on Twitter, in February 2015, a documentary-style video of over an hour long, of the Westgate Mall attack: “The Westgate Siege - Retributive Justice,” or their version of it, since they justify their actions as being caused in response to Kenya's invasion in Somalia in 2011; once again catering to its target audience, and providing it in Arabic and English.<sup>269</sup>

The attack although was against a Mall, considered to be a “soft” target, such as a restaurant or hotel, caused casualties of people of different ages, between 8-78 years old, and 13 nationalities, and supposedly made a distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims, sparing the latter, and the group achieved making its name known worldwide.<sup>270</sup>

<sup>268</sup> Simon, T., Goldberg, A., Aharonson-Daniel, L., Leykin, D., Adini, B. (2014) Twitter in the Cross Fire—The Use of Social Media in the Westgate Mall Terror Attack in Kenya. PLoS ONE 9(8): e104136. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104136 Available at link -(accessed September 10 2016) <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0104136.PDF> p.3-4

<sup>269</sup> SITE Staff, (2015) Shabaab Releases Video on Westgate Mall Raid, Names Western Malls as Targets for Lone Wolf Attacks, Saturday, 21 February 2015, Available at link -(accessed September 10 2016) <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/entry/363-shabaab-releases-video-on-westgate-mall-raid-names-western-malls-as-targets-for-lone-wolf-attacks>

<sup>270</sup> New York City Police Department (2013), Analysis of al-Shabaab's Attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, (Information current as of November 1, 2013) Available at link-(accessed September 10 2016)

## CHAPTER 4

### CYBER-TERRORISM

#### 4.1 Introduction to cyber-terrorism

After the 9/11 attacks on American soil, a cyber attack did not seem so unimaginable, as it presented a superpower supersized by an asymmetric attack and fears of a cyber-threat, were increasing.<sup>271</sup> This chapter will attempt to examine cyber-terrorism, as a new trend in terrorism, since it is often referred to by the public and mass media. The rise of the Internet, the development of technology and cyber capabilities have further increased the fear and focus on cyber-terrorism, which could be seen in the figures below which show the rapid increase of cyber-terrorism related articles, before and after the 9/11 attacks, from US and UK newspapers.

Figure 1: *Cyber-terrorism in US newspapers before and after 11 September 2001*<sup>272</sup>

Newspaper	Pre-11 September 2001*	Post-11 September 2001**	Total
	(N)	(N)	(N)
<i>The Washington Post</i>	19	41	60
<i>The New York Times</i>	15	30	45
<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>	10	5	15
<i>Miami Herald</i>	4	7	11
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	5	3	8

\* From first recorded mention in June 1996 to 10 September 2001 (i.e., 63 months)

\*\* 11 September 2001 to August 2004 (i.e., 36 months)

N = Number of articles mentioning the search words

Source: Compiled from Lexis-Nexis archives using the search words 'cyberterrorism' and 'cyber terrorism'.

<https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/894158/westgate-report-for-shield-website.pdf> p.4

<sup>271</sup> Conway, M. (2008) Media, Fear and the Hyperreal: The Construction of Cyberterrorism as the Ultimate Threat to Critical Infrastructures, Centre for International Studies School of Law and Government Dublin City University Working paper 5 Available at link-(accessed June 10 2016) <http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008-5.pdf> p.3

<sup>272</sup> Conway, M. (2007) Terrorist Use of the Internet and the Challenges of Governing Cyberspace In: *Power and Security in the Information Age Investigating the Role of the State in Cyberspace* (Eds) Dunn Cavelty, M., Mauer V., & Krishna-Hensel S.F.(2007), UK: Ashgate Publishing Company p.99



Figure 2: *Cyber-terrorism in UK newspapers before and after 11 September 2001*<sup>273</sup>

<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Pre-11 September 2001*</b>	<b>Post-11 September 2001**</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>(N)</b>	<b>(N)</b>	<b>(N)</b>
<i>Financial Times</i>	16	20	36
<i>Guardian</i>	11	20	31
<i>Times</i>	10	8	18
<i>Independent</i>	7	10	17
<i>Mirror</i>	3	10	13

\* From first recorded mention in June 1996 to 10 September 2001(i.e., 63 months)

\*\* 11 September 2001 to August 2004 (i.e., 36 months)

N = Number of articles mentioning the search words

Source: Compiled from Lexis-Nexis archives using the search words 'cyberterrorism' and 'cyber terrorism'


However, it seems that the term has perhaps often been misused and overly used and as so, requires some caution before using it freely, as according to Weimann:

*“...it has been especially common when dealing with computers to coin new words simply by placing the words “cyber,” “computer,” or “information” before another word. Thus, an entire arsenal of words—cybercrime, cyberwar, infowar, netwar, cyber-terrorism, cyber harassment, virtual-warfare, digital terrorism, cybertactics, computer warfare, information warfare, cyberattack, cyberwar, and cyber break-ins—is used to describe what some military and political strategists describe as the “new terrorism” of these times.”*<sup>274</sup>

<sup>273</sup> Ibid p.99

<sup>274</sup> Weimann, G. (2005) Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28: 129-149, Available at link -(accessed June 5 2016) <https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/Docs/State%20Security/Cyberterrorism%20-%20sum%20of%20all%20fears.pdf> p.135

Figure 3: Percentage of responders familiar with each term that reported using it <sup>275</sup>



As seen above, there are many terms related to cyber-based activities, most people seem to prefer using the term cyber crime, which sounds more ordinary and includes different activities and others, such as cyber jihad are being avoided, since it is thought to be “misleading and nonsensical” and “possibly racist”, pointing out that non-Muslim groups and states may commit acts of cyber-terrorism.<sup>276</sup> In addition, as with the term terrorism, cyber-terrorism is also, and perhaps even more so, hard to define, since it contains an additional element which by its nature causes fear of the unknown and its fast evolution and difficulty to keep up with, that is the use of technology, and more specifically, the Internet to conduct its operations.

“The term ‘cyber-terrorism’ unites two significant modern fears: fear of technology and fear of terrorism”, the combination of these two elements creates a hybrid threat, which causes additional fear, even if there is no imminent attack. Also some are afraid of the advance of technology which will be able to rule humanity.<sup>277</sup>

<sup>275</sup> Jarvis, L., McDonald, S. (2014) Locating Cyberterrorism: How Terrorism Researchers Use and View the Cyber Lexicon, *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM* Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2014, Available at link- (accessed July 10, 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/viewFile/337/672> p.57

<sup>276</sup> Ibid p.57

<sup>277</sup> Conway, M. (2008) Media, Fear and the Hyperreal: The Construction of Cyberterrorism as the Ultimate Threat to Critical Infrastructures Working Papers in International Studies Centre for International Studies Dublin City University School of Law and Government Dublin City University Working paper 5 of 2008 at <http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008-5.pdf> ( p.8)

## 4.2 Definitions

### 4.2.1 Cyberspace

In order to better comprehend cyber-terrorism, a deeper understanding of the unique and ever-changing nature of cyberspace is needed, in which all cyber related activities take place. Most aspects of life today, from schools, to restaurants, companies and hospitals, have a cyber version, almost everything that exists in the real world, exists in one way or another in cyberspace, whether it is a real-time video connection of certain animals of the San Diego Zoo<sup>278</sup>, street cameras in New York City<sup>279</sup>, sites, hashtags, pages of everything under the rainbow, to avatars of ourselves. Cyberspace, is an entire universe. As such *“Cyberspace refers to the fusion of all communication networks, databases and information sources into a global virtual system”*.<sup>280</sup>

It is not difficult to comprehend that cyberspace is constantly shifting and evolving, it keeps on developing on a daily basis, along with all humanity, which created it and the activities therein are only increasing and becoming more and more sophisticated and advanced than before. *“Cyberspace is not a static domain, but a dynamic construct that is still rapidly expanding. In sharp contrast to land, sea, air and space, cyberspace is not part of nature; it is human-made and therefore shaped by human behaviour.”*<sup>281</sup>

However, this complex human-made system, should not be thought of as a creation separate from the states in the International system, but rather an extension of it, in which national interests, ambitions, ideologies collide, yet also where cooperation is established and security achieved.<sup>282</sup>

### 4.2.2 Cyber-terrorism

According to a definition by Denning D.E. (2000):

*“Cyber-terrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance*

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<sup>278</sup> <http://kids.sandiegozoo.org/animal-cams-videos>

<sup>279</sup> <http://www.earthcam.com/network/?country=us&page=NY>

<sup>280</sup> Liaropoulos, A. N. (2011) Cyber-Security and the Law of War: The Legal and Ethical Aspects of Cyber-Conflict, Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG), Working Paper #07  
[http://www.gpsg.org.uk/docs/GPSG\\_Working\\_Paper\\_07.pdf](http://www.gpsg.org.uk/docs/GPSG_Working_Paper_07.pdf) p.2

<sup>281</sup> Liaropoulos, A. N. (2014) On Cyber-terrorism: Redefining Terror in Cyberspace *POLITIKA* Annual Journal 2014  
[https://www.academia.edu/10294157/On\\_Cyber-terrorism\\_Redefining\\_Terror\\_in\\_Cyberspace\\_Politika\\_Annual\\_Journal\\_2014](https://www.academia.edu/10294157/On_Cyber-terrorism_Redefining_Terror_in_Cyberspace_Politika_Annual_Journal_2014) p.44

<sup>282</sup> Liaropoulos, A.N. (2014) Cyberspace, Sovereignty and International Order, *International Relations and Security Network*, 30 January 2014. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/188212/ISN\\_176144\\_en.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/188212/ISN_176144_en.pdf)

*of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyber-terrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyber-terrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.*<sup>283</sup>

Even though cyber-terrorism is a rather new concept, it does contain some traditional elements of terrorism such as its premeditated and pre-designed nature, as it is not a random act, a lot of thought has been put into it and technological preparation is required and is backed by political motivations and goals and aims to harm, affect or at least generate fear towards civilians.

Besides the difficulty in defining the term cyber-terrorism, the term and concept as a whole is not fully agreed upon. Many are very skeptical of the existence and possibility of a cyber-attack occurring. It is rather confusing, since cyber-based activities are often mistaken or mislabeled as cyber-terrorism. However, when terrorists use technology to gain information that will assist a terror attack, meaning using technology to commit a traditional attack or the use of non-technological means in order to attack a cyber system, but only when an attack derives from a cyber-means and also aims at a cyber target.<sup>284</sup> When terrorists utilize cyber-capabilities in order to achieve their objectives, such as distributing propaganda, recruiting online and even collecting data on potential targets, is not cyber-terrorism.

There seems to be benefits of using cyber-terrorism, such as its inexpensive nature, as technological means are very inexpensive and easy to obtain, not to mention they do not raise suspicion, also, they provide anonymity, which is not easily found by traditional terrorism since cyberspace lacks certain hurdles found in the real world, and provides online identities. Meanwhile, it provides terrorists with a broader selection of a target audience since the majority of all of life's functions revolve around technology and highly depend on it. Also, cyber-terrorism, may be a more attractive method since it does not require physical proximity of the attacker to the target, and hence

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<sup>283</sup> Denning, D. (2000) Cyberterrorism. Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives. Georgetown University May 23, 2000 Available at link-(accessed July 12 2016) <http://www.stealth-iss.com/documents/pdf/CYBERTERRORISM.pdf> p.1

<sup>284</sup> Che, E. (2007) Securing a Network society cyber-terrorism, international cooperation and transnational surveillance research paper No. 113 September 2007 RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS) Available at link-(accessed August 10 2016) <http://rieas.gr/images/RIEAS113ELIOTCHE.pdf> p.8

could spare the terrorist's life and also, could be able to affect a larger population compare to other forms of terrorism, thus creating a greater media impact of the event..<sup>285</sup> Yet, the desire of martyrdom, which provides the martyr and the martyr's family with an elevated status and benefits, and the promise after-life rewards for the sacrifice made, might be an inhibiting factor in choosing such form a of terrorism.

Cyber-terrorism is thought to be a new trend and an appealing choice, due to the fact that it seems to be more inexpensive than traditional methods, while the Internet provides a sense of anonymity, allowing the attacker access to an unlimited range of possible targets from all over the world. Furthermore, cyber-terrorism could be conducted from a safe distance, with no physical contact ever required neither with the targets nor with the rest of the members of the terrorist group. Cyber-attacks have occurred, but were not conducted by terrorists <sup>286</sup> The use of information technology, although, might be a good way to communicate the message in a less lethal way, while still maintaining the support that otherwise would possibly be lost due to disagreement with the violence and casualties. But as it is well known violence gets more attention and a more immediate response. <sup>287</sup>

It should be reminded that the use of the Internet and social media by terrorist groups in order to assist some functions that otherwise would be done only in the real world and would be more difficult but not by any means impossible without the use of technology. However,

*“Terrorist use of information technology to formulate plans, spread propaganda, support terrorist recruiting, raise funds, and communicate is not regarded as cyberterrorism within this definition. Cyberterrorism is when the destructive nature of the “act” itself is carried out via computers or other cyber/electronic means through techniques such as infected e-mail attachments. Delivery of the terrorist’s message via the Internet does not constitute a cyberterrorism event.”<sup>288</sup>*

Yet, it has been supported that although the Internet provides anonymity, it is not to the

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<sup>285</sup> Weimann, G. (2005) Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28:129–149, 2005 Taylor & Francis Inc. Available at link -(accessed June 5 2016) <https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/Docs/State%20Security/Cyberterrorism%20-%20sum%20of%20all%20fears.pdf> p.137

<sup>286</sup> Weimann, G. (2004) Cyberterrorism How Real Is the Threat?, SPECIAL REPORT 119 December 2004 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Washington, DC Available at link -(accessed June 5 2016) <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf> (p.6,8 )

<sup>287</sup> Tucker, D. (2000) The Future of Armed Resistance: Cyberterror? Mass Destruction? (Conference Report) Monterey, CA: The Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, 2000 Available at link-(accessed May 25 2016) [http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ctiw/files/substate\\_conflict\\_dynamics.pdf](http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ctiw/files/substate_conflict_dynamics.pdf) (p. 10)

<sup>288</sup> Garrison, L., & Grand, M. (eds.) (2001) *HIGHLIGHTS NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CENTER* Issue 6-01 June 15, 2001 Available at link -(accessed July 14 2016) <http://www.iwar.org.uk/infocon/nipc-highlights/2001/highlight-01-06.pdf> (p.2)

extent one may expect, since communications are not completely safe, since terrorist activities that are computer-based leave traces behind, which then are processed by the Intelligence community.<sup>289</sup>

Moreover, Brenner S.(2007), describes in what way terrorist could perhaps use cyber capabilities to discourage the population and, hence, degrade the state in its eyes.<sup>290</sup> To begin, solely from a theoretical standpoint alone, computer technology could act as a *Weapon of Mass Destruction*, yet, it is not possible in reality, since it could not cause as much physical damage, as the caliber of the 9/11 attacks. However, if directed in a way to cause an explosion of a nuclear power plant, certainly is able to cause significant physical damage, while the terrorists claim responsibility and the state appears weak and impotent. Although it is a possible terrorism scenario, it could not be a cyber-terrorism scenario, since the computer serves the sole purpose of a detonator.

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Furthermore, another possibility, which is not only limited theoretically, but could apply to reality, in which computer-based technology serves as a *Weapon of Mass Distraction*, is used to yield the psychology of the civilian population, again aiming to undermine governmental authority, and when a terrorist attack were to occur and citizens worldwide would be eager to obtain any information available, they would basically come across misleading and false information on imaginary attacks, which would amplify the terror, create more insecurity and disturbing feelings than the actual events which occurred and create doubts and unrest toward the government if such claims actually did occur and were being covered up or did not occur.<sup>292</sup>

Finally, computer technology used as a *Weapon of Mass Disruption*, which aims to undermine the populations faith in more than one vital infrastructure and services, creating an uneasy feeling of the system being compromised, aiming at causing mainly physiological damage.<sup>293</sup> The second scenario, regarding computer technology used as a *Weapon of Mass Distraction*, is not hard to conceive, especially with the existence of social media, such a narrative is easily spread, and could be taken to the point of “the boy who cried wolf”, where it is impossible to distinguish a real event from a false alarm anymore.

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<sup>289</sup> Liaropoulos, A.N. (2014) On Cyber-terrorism: Redefining Terror in Cyberspace. *POLITIKA Annual Journal 2014* Available at link-(accessed July 10 2016) [https://www.academia.edu/10294157/On\\_Cyber-terrorism\\_Redefining\\_Terror\\_in\\_Cyberspace\\_Politika\\_Annual\\_Journal\\_2014](https://www.academia.edu/10294157/On_Cyber-terrorism_Redefining_Terror_in_Cyberspace_Politika_Annual_Journal_2014) p.47

<sup>290</sup> Brenner, S.W. (2007) At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* Volume 97 Issue 2 Winter Article 2 <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7260&context=jclc> p.389

<sup>291</sup> Ibid p.390-391

<sup>292</sup> Ibid p.391-392

<sup>293</sup> Ibid p.393



### 4.3 Challenging the Cyber-terrorism “trend”

James A. Lewis (2002) argues that computer networks vulnerabilities being a threat to national security are rather overstated, since it is actually well-protected and supports the fact that a physical attack is still more harmful than a cyber-attack.<sup>294</sup> In addition, he also claims that cyber attacks most likely are single attacks, since once it has occurred the actions in order to secure the breach is immediate and therefore the cyber attacker then must find new ways and vulnerabilities in order to attack again, and also, does not produce unmanageable physical damage that cannot be overhauled and would be necessary to attack multiple targets for along time in order to create fear, be noticed and gain the desired objectives.<sup>295</sup> Also, according to Conway:

*“According to newspaper reports, sending pornographic e-mails to minors, posting offensive content on the internet, defacing web pages, using a computer to cause US\$400 worth of damage, stealing credit card information, posting credit card numbers on the internet, and clandestinely redirecting internet traffic from one site to another all constitute instances of cyberterrorism.”*<sup>296</sup>

Moreover, most threats first perceived as cyber-terrorism, are quickly disproved and the responsibility of which is traced back to ordinary problems such as the weather and natural disasters and not a high-tech attack, and hence are referred to by Conway as *cyber-error*, instead of cyber-terror.<sup>297</sup> Weimann, also supports that cyber-terrorism, has become popular by journalists and politicians, and speculate various unrealistic and life-threatening scenarios, despite the predictions, no such event has occurred.<sup>298</sup> The fear and focus regarding the potential of cyber-terrorism was enhanced by the 9/11 attacks and the Bush Presidency even appointed Richard Clarke as a special advisor on cyberspace security.<sup>299</sup>

As seen at the beginning of this chapter, there are many cyber-related terms, which cause confusion and are time and again being misused by the media.<sup>300</sup> Moreover, it has been supported,

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<sup>294</sup> Lewis, J.A. (2002) Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, December 2002), <http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/128T41.pdf> p.2

<sup>295</sup> Ibid p.3

<sup>296</sup> As cited in Conway, M. (2008) Working Papers in International Studies Centre for International Studies Dublin City University Media, Fear and the Hyperreal: The Construction of Cyberterrorism as the Ultimate Threat to Critical Infrastructures Maura Conway School of Law and Government Dublin City University Working paper 5 of 2008 <http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008-5.pdf> p.23

<sup>297</sup> Ibid p.15

<sup>298</sup> Weimann, G. (2005) Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28: 129-149, at <https://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/Docs/State%20Security/Cyberterrorism%20-%20sum%20of%20all%20fears.pdf> p.130

<sup>299</sup> Ibid p.133

<sup>300</sup> Liaropoulos, A. N. (2014) On Cyber-terrorism: Redefining Terror in Cyberspace *POLITIKA* Annual Journal 2014 [https://www.academia.edu/10294157/On\\_Cyber-terrorism\\_Redefining\\_Terror\\_in\\_Cyberspace\\_Politika\\_Annual\\_Journal\\_2014](https://www.academia.edu/10294157/On_Cyber-terrorism_Redefining_Terror_in_Cyberspace_Politika_Annual_Journal_2014) p.42

that despite the fact that vulnerabilities in infrastructures exist, they have yet to be exploited and explored by cyber-terrorists, which might not even acquire the necessary abilities and capabilities in order to carry out such an attack, which has not yet taken place, however, the possibility of it happening in the near future cannot be excluded.<sup>301</sup>

From all mentioned above, it seems that cyber-terrorism is not a new trend in terrorism as most believe, but is more of a possible future trend. The public and media, have created the notion of cyber-terrorism as an immediate threat by mistaking it on a daily basis with other Internet based activities such as cyber-crime, hacktivism and cyber-vigilantism. However, are they partially correct? Are these illegal activities a step away from cyber-terrorism and could become so at any minute?

#### **4. 4 Hacktivism**

Hacktivism is a combination of hacking and activism and usually refers to hacking activities for a political cause, such as virtual sit-ins, e-protests, blockades, of a peaceful nature. However, they are also known to use viruses and worms, that reminds us of what is believed to be done also by cyber-terrorists, meaning that since they both use similar techniques it is hard to distinguish one act from another, if such should occur.<sup>302</sup> Additionally, one must keep in mind that cyber-terrorist must first be hackers and perhaps hacktivists and if they do not achieve their political goals with such means, they might engage in more drastic approach, such as cyber-terrorism. Furthermore, regardless the political goals hacktivists might be acting upon, that might seem noble and attract supporters for the cause, it still is illegal to hack systems and personal information, and could lead to serious financial damage and also cause tension between states.

Of course, not all hackers use their skills for what they believe to be the greater good, many sell their expertise. There have been such examples, as are the Hanover Hackers in 1986, who sold illegally-obtained information from various defense contractors and even NASA, and attempted to sell the information to KGB, and, also, a similar case occurred during the Gulf War, Dutch hackers accessed US armed forces' systems and were attempting to sell it to Iraq, but finally did not succeed in doing so. Also, the possibility of terrorist groups hiring hackers is not something to be overlooked.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Ibid p.46

<sup>302</sup> Denning, D. (2001) *Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: the Internet As a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy* In: Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt D. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. Available at link -(accessed August 3 2016) [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1382.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html) p.263

<sup>303</sup> Conway, M. *Cyberterrorism: Hype and Reality*, Dublin City University, 2007 Available at link -(accessed June 10 2016) [http://doras.dcu.ie/501/1/cybert\\_hype\\_reality\\_2007.pdf](http://doras.dcu.ie/501/1/cybert_hype_reality_2007.pdf) (p.9)



The first case of hacktivism is believed to have taken place in 1989 when a computer worm was used in order to attack NASA's systems, supporting anti-nuclear activities.<sup>304</sup> Others believe it to have begun from the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT), organized virtual sit-ins and launched a FloodNet, a software tool based on Electronic Civil Disobedience (ECD) in order to crash Mexican government Web sites to protest against the mistreatment of indigenous peoples in Chiapas and support the actions of the Zapatista rebels in Mexico.<sup>305</sup> Although hacktivists do not see themselves as harmful, and their actions may not result to human cost, they often produce large financial damage. However, they see their actions as being disruptive and not destructive.<sup>306</sup>

Another well-known hacktivist initiative is that of the Cult of the Dead Cow, which was founded in 1984, and supported the free flow of information, in avoidance of state censorship, a branch deriving from it known as Hactivismo also supports human rights and limitations to state censorship and seeks to promote the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, applied to the Internet as well. Also, another famous attack, in 2007, was conducted by Russian state-sponsored hackers against Estonia, which qualifies as the *largest DDoS attacks in history*.<sup>307</sup> The following pie, shows the distribution of cyber-attacks and supports the above earlier claims of no cyber-terrorism attacks occurring, but rather them being related to other forms of cyber-based activities.

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
<sup>304</sup> Ibid (p. 11)

<sup>305</sup> Lane, J. (2003) Digital Zapatistas TDR: The Drama Review Volume 47, Number 2 (T 178), Summer 2003 pp. 129-144 Available at link-(accessed July 5 2016) <http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ucsd/DigitalZapatistas.pdf> (p. 132)

<sup>306</sup> Conway, M. (2007) Cyberterrorism: Hype and Reality, Dublin City University, 2007 Available at link -(accessed June 10 2016) [http://doras.dcu.ie/501/1/cybert\\_hype\\_reality\\_2007.pdf](http://doras.dcu.ie/501/1/cybert_hype_reality_2007.pdf) p.13

<sup>307</sup> McCormick, T. (2013) Hacktivism: A short History How self-absorbed computer nerds became a powerful force for freedom. *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2013 Available at link-(accessed July 17 2016) <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/hacktivism-a-short-history/>

Figure 4: Motivations Behind Attacks June 2016<sup>308</sup>



#### 4.5 Cyber Crime

Cyber-crime is often mistaken or mislabeled as cyber-terrorism causing confusion and continuing the cycle of the mistake in definition. Cyber-crimes do happen daily, from when an individual loses their credit-card, to when somebody hacks your social media profile. Even though this form of computer-based activity does not cause human losses it could, and does, result in significant financial damage, and with most states relying on cyber-based activities for their commercial relations and productivity, it could cause stock markets to collapse resulting in serious issues worldwide.

*“ The U.S. economy, including the rapidly expanding area of E-commerce, is increasingly threatened by cyber economic crime. In fact, most economic crimes today have a cyber version. This is, in large part, because cyber crimes offer criminals more opportunities with larger payoffs and fewer risks. Web sites can be spoofed and hijacked. Payment systems can be compromised, and theft of electronic fund transfers or laundering of money occur at lightning speeds. Serious electronic crimes and victimization of the public have caused consumer confidence to waver.”<sup>309</sup>*

Cyber crimes have become relatively easy due to the anonymity characteristic of the Internet, the easily by passed security and the borderless and limitless targets due to globalization

<sup>308</sup> Image retrieved from <http://www.hackmageddon.com/2016/07/25/16-30-june-2016-cyber-attacks-statistics/>

<sup>309</sup> Oates, B. (2001) Cyber Crime: How Technology Makes it Easy and What to do About it, Information Systems Management, 18:3, 92-96 Available at link-( accessed July 15 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1201/1078/43196.18.3.20010601/31295.12> (p. 92)

and technology. The potential targets could vary from a simple consumer, to a large company, even a government itself. The scenarios are literally limitless and as such could not all be predicted and preventable. *Part of the problem is that cybercrime is much harder to detect than crime in the actual world.* <sup>310</sup> However, even if the existence of cyber crimes is considered almost routine, it causes difficulty and fog<sup>311</sup>, when and if cyber-terrorism does occur, and must be identified and separated as such.

#### 4.6 Anonymous

A good example of hacktivism is the group Anonymous, which supports the uncensored flow of information and its non-restriction by the state, as outlined in their basic principles:

*“ Anonymous says that it is based on three principles: 1) The media should not be attacked; 2) critical infrastructure should not be attacked; and 3) one should work for justice and freedom. Activists have their own interpretations of these basic values of freedom and justice. The overall principles are very loose, unlike a political party’s programme that is much more formalized. This looseness is also characteristic of social movements, but Anonymous differs from them by keeping a high level of anonymity of its activists and practices.”* <sup>312</sup>

The group has a virtual and physical presence at protests has relatively loose entrance policies, and support that Anonymous is an idea and that anyone could be part of the cause. It could be everyone and anyone. <sup>313</sup> This concept however could cause some dangers as well, due to the fact that an individual could potentially participate in a violent act and attempt to justify it under the protection of the Anonymous' cause. Furthermore, even though Anonymous is not a cyber-terrorist group, it does focus significantly on symbolism and projection and communication of their political and/or social message. Even the way they wish to present themselves and the name they have chosen is not at random:

*“The employment of symbolic means of expression is particularly*

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<sup>310</sup> Tedeschi, B. (2003), E-Commerce Report; Crime is soaring in cyberspace, but many companies keep it quiet. *The New York Times*, January 27 2013, Available at link-(accessed October 5 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/technology/27ECOM.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>311</sup> The mention of fog, in order to remind us of the “fog of war” concept, coined by Carl von Clausewitz, when referring to the difficulties of distinguishing noise and relevant information while in war.

<sup>312</sup> Fuchs, C. (2013). “The Anonymous Movement in the Context of Liberalism and Socialism.” *A Journal For and About Social Movements* 5(2): 345-376. , Available at link -(accessed July 10 2016) <http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/Interface.pdf> (p.347)

<sup>313</sup> Ibid (p. 348)

*important for Anonymous. When Anonymous activists join or organize street protests, they wear Guy Fawkes masks. Guy Fawkes was involved in the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, in which activists tried to bomb the British House of Lords. The Fawkes mask became popular in Alan Moore's comic "V for Vendetta", in which the revolutionary V struggles against a fascist regime. The use of the masks is a media strategy itself because it aims at directing the media and the public's attention on Anonymous. Given the importance of symbolic expression for Anonymous as well as videos that are created in a crafty manner and often an expression of artistic creativity are important means of expression for Anonymous. They contain political messages, announcements of campaigns, statements about broader goals, etc., and are spread on user-generated content platforms like YouTube or Vimeo."*<sup>314</sup>

Anonymous is a group that has also played a strong role in recent social movements such as the Arab Spring uprisings with Operation Tunisia and Operation Egypt and helped distribute videos and online materials while conceal their identities Operation Iran later on during the elections<sup>315</sup> while also assisting and being involved in the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations.<sup>316</sup> However, Anonymous beside being a hacktivist group, also falls within another category, that of cyber (or online) vigilantism. Johnston L. supports the following to be the elements that are needed for an act to qualify as vigilantism, that is:

1. It requires a certain amount of planning

*"For vigilantism to occur the participating agent must engage in some form of preparatory activity—such as the surveillance of an intended victim or the observation of a particular location. (It is not without significance that the Latin derivation of vigilantism, 'vigil', means 'awake or observant'). This would suggest that some of the cases reported recently in the media as instances of vigilantism should be treated with caution"*

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid (p. 349)

<sup>315</sup> Ryan, Y. (2011) Anonymous and the Arab uprisings , *Al Jazeera*, May 19 2011, Available at link-(accessed October 5 2016) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/201151917634659824.html>

<sup>316</sup> For more visit Kazmi, A. (2011) How Anonymous emerged to Occupy Wall Street, *The guardian*, September 27 2011, *The guardian* Available at link-(accessed September 12 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/sep/27/occupy-wall-street-anonymous>

2. It must be conducted by private agents

For example police officers that are off duty may conduct their own investigations as private citizens, acting as vigilantes, when taking revenge for their victims

3. By autonomous citizens

Without the involvement of state authorities or private companies either.

4. It also involves force or the threat of it at least,

5. It seems to act as a response to crime and injustices, and seeks to cure and correct it.

6. Its end is to provide security to those deprived of it.<sup>317</sup>

Anonymous has for now used its cyber-abilities to begin a “war” against ISIS and have attempted and mostly succeeded to take down multiple ISIS social media accounts and has launched with ChostSec one of its divisions, a cyber campaign against ISIS called OpISIS and is trying to limit and take down other related websites.<sup>318</sup> Anonymous have taken the resistance to the virtual level and are trying to do what is possible from there,

*“ While Russia, French and US bombers are targeting Islamic State (formerly ISIS/ISIL) positions from the sky, Anonymous are carrying out their very own devastating campaign against the terrorist organization. They are using computer code rather than high-powered weapons and say the hacktivist group has built tools that “might be better than any world government's tools to combat ISIS online.”<sup>319</sup>*

However, even if Anonymous has the best of intentions of freeing information, restrict governmental surveillance and is helping the War on Terror, in the way the could, it is not actually up to them to do so without the appropriate orders. Of course, social media could not regulate and monitor every account established and social media mostly are alerted of suspicious accounts and activities by its own users flagging such activities, but on the other hand, these accounts and the data within them could be utilized by Intelligence agencies and governments in order to gather data and help trace their activities and networks. This will be examined further in the following chapter. Though if open source data could be used to trace, locate and trace perpetrators, that means that they could also use the open information provided to assist their terrorist activities.

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<sup>317</sup> As cited in Smallridge J., Wagner, P., & Crowl, J. N. (2016) Understanding Cyber-Vigilantism: A Conceptual Framework, *Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology* January/February, 2016, Vol. 8(1): 57-70 .Available at link -(accessed July 24 2016) <http://www.jtpcrim.org/2016February/Smallridge.pdf> p.58-9

<sup>318</sup> Russia Today, Anonymous declares cyber war on ISIS Twitter users, April 11 2015, *Russia Today*, Available at link-(accessed September 23 2016) <https://www.rt.com/news/248845-anonymous-opisis-warring-terrorism/>

<sup>319</sup> Russia Today, You're a virus, we're the cure?: Anonymous takes down 20,000 ISIS Twitter accounts November 20 2015, *Russia Today*, Available at link-(accessed September 23 2016) <https://www.rt.com/news/322792-anonymous-isis-accounts-attacks/>

To conclude, cyber-terrorism is a term that, despite not widely agreed upon, since even its “terrorism” component is difficult to define. Moreover, although this form of terrorism seems to have some benefits, however no such event has ever been recorded, at least officially, if such an event has happened and has not been acknowledged as so, though highly impossible, would raise a question if it was indeed terror since it did not fulfill the criteria of it being labeled as such, mainly installing fear. There are various cyber-related activities that are often used interchangeably by governments and media alike. From all the above, it does not seem that cyber-terrorism is a trend, yet it could not be excluded as a possibility in the very near future.

## Chapter 5

### THE ROLE OF OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)

#### 5.1 Introduction regarding the role of OSINT

The following Chapter examines the role of Open-Source Intelligence in counter-terrorism. Its capabilities are exploited by terrorist groups, such as maps, blueprints of vulnerable infrastructure, information on possible targets. However, the process of the information provided by Open-Source Intelligence(OSINT) could be rather helpful for countering terrorism. Also, Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) will also be examined, since it is an important part of OSINT and could be highly valuable for Intelligence agencies, since social media are widely used and sometimes recklessly used by terrorists, forgetting the digital trail left behind.

The role of OSINT and SOCMINT are of interest if one keeps in mind the published kill-list, full of sensitive information of American military personnel, such as photos, names and addresses, derived from social media.<sup>320</sup> Underlining how terrorist utilize available information to assist their cause. Furthermore, open sources could and should be further utilized by police forces and intelligence agencies in order to counter terrorists. One example, is the US bombing of ISIS headquarters by utilizing information provided by a selfie taken from in front of the establishments.<sup>321</sup>

In the post 9/11 era, the attention on protecting information became even more important, and because the Intelligence Community failed in preventing such a major attack on American soil, it was perhaps even more significant and vital to take precautions and limit information that may assist the enemy. It was noticed after the attacks, that perhaps there was an increased amount of unclassified, yet possibly harmful material on websites such as the one of the Department of Defense, also it was found that al-Qaeda believed and had stated in a manual that eighty percent of information on the enemy could be retrieved through public open sources.<sup>322</sup> Material is often provided in order for a government to achieve transparency and, thus, legitimacy, instead of solely presenting a secretive, “don't ask questions” approach; however, information could be of high value to the enemy and could lead to dangerous and deadly consequences. Moreover, terrorists could also

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<sup>320</sup> Bleier, E., & Brennen, C. (2015) A hundred American soldiers named on ISIS 'kill list' - but servicemen say they are 'unfazed' by extremists' threats, *Daily Mail*, March 23 2015 Available at link-(accessed September 12 2016) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3007128/Soldiers-names-addresses-photos-published-ISIS-s-kill-list-say-unfazed-threat.html>

<sup>321</sup> Castillo, W. (2015) Air Force intel uses ISIS 'moron' post to track fighters, *CNN*, June 5 2015 Available at link-(accessed September 12 2016) <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/05/politics/air-force-isis-moron-twitter/>

<sup>322</sup> Conway, M. (2007) Terrorist Use of the Internet and the Challenges of Governing Cyberspace In: *Power and Security in the Information Age Investigating the Role of the State in Cyberspace* (Eds) Dunn Cavelty, M., Mauer v., & Krishna-Hensel S.F.(2007), UK: Ashgate Publishing Company p.114



utilize the information to learn about anti-terrorism measures,<sup>323</sup> and therefore, be able to prepare, train, travel and communicate, in ways to avoid detection. Basically, the information is provided in order to verify to the population that the matter is taken seriously and measures are being established, yet, that same need to explain every move, actually defeats the purpose of its creation of the measures at hand since it basically becomes useless, due to the fact that terrorists are given the opportunity to adapt accordingly. Moreover, it has also been supported that an amount of secrecy is needed for the Intelligence process, however, Intelligence also needs public support and acceptance and often declassify certain material in order to justify actions taken according to that information, a valid example provided is the fact that the US and UK revealed intelligence that would provide a better understanding and validate the decision to go to war, after the events of 9/11.<sup>324</sup>

Furthermore, there are various manuals available online which provide detailed information on manufacturing weapons and explosives, but to be able to create such material requires funds, technical knowledge and skills to be successful, yet if an individual has the adequate financial backing and technical know-how, he or she will not need the information provided by the online material. Therefore even if the Internet is swiped of all such material openly accessed does not guarantee safety.<sup>325</sup> Moreover, material that has been provided online and downloaded by even a few individuals, it is only a matter of time until it could be re-uploaded or even if not it could be used personally by those who have obtained the material prior to it being taken down.

The use of Intelligence to combat terrorism is not as simple as it may seem. It is difficult to protect citizens' rights and freedoms while, at the same time, protecting them from terrorist threats. The issue mostly comes up in democratic societies, however in such extreme and extraordinary situations, it may be necessary to sacrifice some rights for the safety and freedom of others, which will otherwise be damaged by terrorism.<sup>326</sup>

So the dilemma that occurs is if one rather the violations of their privacy and other as such, come from those trying to protect them or would they rather it come (and it will most likely come) from terrorist activities that could also threaten their mere existence. This may remind one of the *Social Contract* theories, where people had to give up certain freedoms to the state in exchange for

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<sup>323</sup> Ibid p.116

<sup>324</sup> Liaropoulos, A.N. (2006) A (R)evolution in Intelligence affairs? In search of a new paradigm, research Paper No. 100 Athens: RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS) June 2006 Available at link -(accessed on July 15 2016) <http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieaspaper100.pdf> p.11-12

<sup>325</sup> Conway, M. (2007) Terrorist Use of the Internet and the Challenges of Governing Cyberspace In: *Power and Security in the Information Age Investigating the Role of the State in Cyberspace* (Eds) Dunn Cavelty, M., Mauer v., & Krishna-Hensel S.F.(2007), UK: Ashgate Publishing Company p.120

<sup>326</sup> Taylor, R.W. (1987) Terrorism and Intelligence, *Defense Analysis* Vol. 3. No. 2, 1987 Available at link-( accessed May 25 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07430178708405292?needAccess=true> p.166-7



the protection of others, more vital for their existence and co-existence<sup>327</sup>. Everything has a price, more significantly even, safety and freedom.

In order to better comprehend the role and contribution of OSINT, the Intelligence cycle should first be mentioned. The following are the five stages:

1. *Planning and Direction,*
2. *Collection*
3. *Processing and Exploitation*
4. *Analysis and Production,*
5. *Dissemination* <sup>328</sup>

## 5.2 Open -Source Intelligence (OSINT)

A definition of Open Source Intelligence, provided by NATO:

*“Open Source Intelligence, or OSINT, is unclassified information that has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled and disseminated to a select audience in order to address a specific question. It provides a very robust foundation for other intelligence disciplines. When applied in a systematic fashion, OSINT products can reduce the demands on classified intelligence collection resources by limiting requests for information only to those questions that cannot be answered by open sources. Open information sources are not the exclusive domain of intelligence staffs. Intelligence should never seek to limit access to open sources.”* <sup>329</sup>

This definition presents OSINT as unclassified information, once processed are suppose to be directed to a specific consumer to assist in finding an answer question and though assists other forms of intelligence, however limiting the need to resort to unclassified resources. Basically, if OSINT is used correctly and widely by Intelligence, there will not be much that cannot be answered and covered by open sources.

Steele R. provides four distinct categories of open information and intelligence.

<sup>327</sup> Αγγελίδης, Μ., Γκιούρας, Α. (μτφ. - εισ.-επιμ.), (2005) *Θεωρίες της Πολιτικής και του Κράτους. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel.* Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Σαββάλας

<sup>328</sup> Intelligence guide for first responders, Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. Available at link- (accessed July 10, 2016) [https://www.nctc.gov/docs/ITACG\\_Guide\\_for\\_First\\_Responders\\_2011.pdf](https://www.nctc.gov/docs/ITACG_Guide_for_First_Responders_2011.pdf) (p.10-11)

<sup>329</sup> NATO (2001) Open Source Intelligence Handbook November 2001, p.V Available at link-(accessed July 15 2016) [http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file\\_archive/030201/ca5fb66734f540fbb4f8f6ef759b258c/NATO%20OSINT%20Handbook%20v1.2%20-%20Jan%202002.pdf](http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/030201/ca5fb66734f540fbb4f8f6ef759b258c/NATO%20OSINT%20Handbook%20v1.2%20-%20Jan%202002.pdf)

“ • *Open Source Data (OSD)*. Data is the raw print, broadcast, oral debriefing or other form of information from a primary source. It can be a photograph, a tape recording, a commercial satellite image, or a personal letter from an individual.

• *Open Source Information (OSIF)*. OSIF is comprised of data that can be put together, generally by an editorial process that provides some filtering and validation as well as presentation management. OSIF is generic information that is usually widely disseminated. Newspapers, books, broadcast, and general daily reports are part of the OSIF world.

• *Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)*. OSINT is information that has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated to a select audience, generally the commander and their immediate staff, in order to address a specific question. OSINT, in other words, applies the proven process of intelligence to the broad diversity of open sources of information, and creates intelligence.

• *Validated OSINT (OSINT-V)*. OSINT-V5 is OSINT to which a very high degree of certainty can be attributed. It can be produced by an all-source intelligence professional, with access to classified intelligence sources, whether working for a nation or for a coalition staff. It can also come from an assured open source to which no question can be raised concerning its validity (images of an aircraft arriving at an airport that are broadcast over the media).<sup>330</sup>

Moreover the official CIA website places high value on OSINT :

*“Information does not have to be secret to be valuable. Whether in the blogs we browse, the broadcasts we watch, or the specialized journals we read, there is an endless supply of information that contributes to*

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<sup>330</sup> Steele, R.D. (2007) Open source intelligence In: Johnson L.K., (Ed.)(2007) *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* Oxon: Routledge p.131-132

*our understanding of the world. The Intelligence Community generally refers to this information as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). OSINT plays an essential role in giving the national security community as a whole insight and context at a relatively low cost .”<sup>331</sup>*

Apparently, even the CIA has comprehended the high value and low cost of the information derived from open sources, which consists of an endless amount of data available. Still, for the information to be of any value at all it must be first processed and analyzed and most importantly carefully selected out of a pool of useless information, as: <sup>332</sup>

*OSINT is drawn from publicly available material, including:*

- The Internet*
- Traditional mass media (e.g. television, radio, newspapers, magazines)*
- Specialized journals, conference proceedings, and think tank studies*
- Photos*
- Geospatial information (e.g. maps and commercial imagery products)<sup>333</sup>*

Although most are not familiar with OSINT and have traditional spies in mind, the role of open sources exists for quite a while and is taken very seriously. The use of OSINT is utilized by the Open Source Center (OSC), since 2005 and is part of the CIA, similarly, there is also a British edition of a similar organization, however it does not belong to British Intelligence. The BBC Monitoring, dates back all the way to 1939, and as seen above, NATO as well as the United Nations.<sup>334</sup> It must be noted that, OSINT may not be a new discovery, however, due to the development of technology and the fixation of today's society, on sharing information, it has developed and become far more serviceable than in the past, and is gaining more and more acceptance, in addition to it showing an increase in academic interest and literature.

Also, OSINT's value seems to have been becoming of increasing value, it cannot however

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<sup>331</sup> Available at link-(accessed July 14 2016) <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html>

<sup>332</sup> Minas, H. (2010) Can Open Source Intelligence Emerge as an Indispensable discipline for the Intelligence Community in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? Research paper No. 139 RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS), January 2010. Available at link-(accessed July 14 2016) <http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas139.pdf> (p.8)

<sup>333</sup> Available at link-(accessed July 14 2016) <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html>

<sup>334</sup> Minas, H. (2010) (p.16-18, 28)

replace traditional means and must be thought as contributing and completing potential gaps in information. According to Steele, R. D. (2007):

*“OSINT is not a substitute for satellites, spies, or existing organic military and civilian intelligence capabilities. It is, however, a foundation – a very strong foundation – for planning and executing coalition operations across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance to total war. OSINT provides strategic historical and cultural insights; it provides operationally helpful information about infrastructure and current conditions; and it provides tactically vital commercial geospatial information that is not available from national capabilities. In coalition operations, OSINT is both the foundation for civil–military cooperation, and the framework for classified bilateral intelligence-sharing”*<sup>335</sup>

The existence of an enormous amount of information being produced every second worldwide, it is hard to distinguish the relative information in an ocean of unrelated information. In order to fill that necessity gap, different solutions were developed, such as the 'Counterterrorism Research (CTR) Lab which assist the filtering and analysis parts, and consists of a tool known as iMiner, which is a terrorism information base; CrimeFighter which contains tools for combating terrorist activities and EwaS, which is an early warning system.<sup>336</sup>

Even within the EU, OSINT seems to be of value and importance. The EUROSINT Forum, which is a non-profit organization that seeks to promote better communication and co-operation, assist in promoting EU policies regarding OSINT in various areas, aiming in creating and promoting a positive image of the use of OSINT in the EU and hopes in creating new projects and partnerships.<sup>337</sup> Also it hopes to create a European “*intelligence ecology*”.<sup>338</sup> It seems that OSINT has been gaining more and more attention and interest from important international actors, such as NATO, the CIA and the EU and will continue doing so in the near future.

The important role of OSINT is increasing due to the fact that it provides an all-source intelligence picture, meaning a well-rounded, multi-leveled approach of an issue. However not

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<sup>335</sup> Steele, R.D. (2007) Open source intelligence In: Johnson, L.K. (Ed.)(2007) *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* Oxon: Routledge p.130

<sup>336</sup> Hayes, B. Spying in a see through world: the “Open Source” intelligence industry, *Statewatch* Available at link (accessed on July 8 2016) <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-119-open-source-intell-industry.pdf> (p.5)

<sup>337</sup> EUROSINT FORUM Available at link (accessed on July 12 2016) <https://www.eurosint.eu/about>

<sup>338</sup> EUROSINT FORUM Available at link (accessed on July 12 2016) <https://www.eurosint.eu/action-plan>

everything found in open sources is valid and not all could be trusted in providing secure and non-misleading intelligence, which could result to devastating consequences and lost opportunities. Some of the indicators of reliability that should be looked out for are mentioned. To begin, all information must be checked and cross-examined regarding the source's *accuracy*, based on other sources when being compared, also, the information must have *credibility* and *authority*, meaning it having a valid identity and contact information not just a random e-mail, not knowing the individual. Moreover, the *influence* of the source plays role in identifying its importance, since if the source is cited and mentioned elsewhere in other related sources, it provides a better sense of its value. Another indicator is the use of a free host-site in contrast to an official web-site, the latter of course provides a greater sense of security, however the visitor-count of a website could also be an indicator of the influence and importance of the source, although it could often be misleading. Additionally, the currency of a source is also, an indicator since if it only contains antiquated information, it is probably not reliable.<sup>339</sup>

However, even OSINT has its strengths and weaknesses. It is valued mostly for the fact that it provides all-source intelligence. Initially, there is a rapid flow of available open-source information and its speedy collection and transformation into intelligence, and it contains multiple approaches of an issue makes it an inviting choice.<sup>340</sup> Also, OSINT, is thought that it should be the first source when it comes to intelligence collection, since it could reduce the need to resort to classified information, and is much more inexpensive in comparison.<sup>341</sup> Yet, there are also negative aspects regarding OSINT, as stated above, often the amount of irrelevant information is so increased that it makes the selection process extremely difficult and timely and the case of examining the accuracy of the facts and information is troublesome.<sup>342</sup> Besides, one could not exclude the possibility of the existence of propaganda and planted information that, will eventually be discovered but may cause a delay that could be crucial in some cases.

Terrorism, is a unique human act, out of the ordinary behavior, and due to that element it could easily catch individuals, states -and- Intelligence agencies off guard, yet on the other hand, exactly because terrorist acts are a part of human behavior, even if it is not typical and accepted, it creates patterns and indicators for its prediction and tracking and also, as in the case of everything human, it makes mistakes, and that is something to be looked out for and could be facilitated by OSINT, as the earlier example of locating terrorist headquarters through a selfie, which was a mistake, that was fortunately utilized properly by the Intelligence Community.

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<sup>339</sup> NATO (2001) p.24-25

<sup>340</sup> Minas, H. (2010) p. 32

<sup>341</sup> NATO (2001) p.39

<sup>342</sup> Minas, H. (2010) p. 35

However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, seem to be an Intelligence failure that still haunts many. The 9/11 attacks could have been avoided since it has been reported that intelligence existed but did not reach the appropriate officials.<sup>343</sup> Meaning that the mere existence of information is not enough if collaboration, spread and know-how of the actions needed do not harmoniously come together. OSINT and SOCMINT, which will be examined below, since they are becoming increasingly important due to technology developments and society's need to share and learn, must train personnel accordingly, since a lot of information of crucial importance contains information and terrorist activity indications good be overlooked.

In addition, according to Liaropoulos (2006), the Information Revolution has affected intelligence and has shown that it is more susceptible to attacks against information infrastructure and the problem posed by the increased reliance on private sector use of intelligence which undermines national intelligence.<sup>344</sup> OSINT, such as satellite imagery, providing maps and images and the Internet facilitate communication and coordination, assist terrorist in achieving their objectives, and even if the government is conducting counter-terrorism plans, terrorists may often have knowledge of them through the use of information provided by open sources.<sup>345</sup> A large amount of information published are open sources, perhaps to create a sense of transparency and accountability of where and what tax-payers money is used for; however, any information that may seem innocent at first glance , such as a school's blueprints could be crucial for a terrorist's plan and the success of an attack.

### **5.3 Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)**

An even newer trend from OSINT, is the existence of Social Media Intelligence. The information uploaded voluntarily from the users themselves, is enormous and could be a source of important information about possible future events being planned or ongoing events, occurring in real-time, and any information concerning the situation is of value and crucial importance. Also information regarding suspicious individuals as well as their interactions may be of use or informative of potential targets. For all the aforementioned reasons, it is clear why SOCMINT is becoming invaluable and useful in countering terrorism.

Social media are an important tool of Intelligence, as it provides a mean of communication between the military services, governments and Intelligence agencies with citizens in order to be able to provide their version of information to the public. However, they also receive valuable

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<sup>343</sup> Ibid p.45

<sup>344</sup> Liaropoulos, A.N. (2006) A (R)evolution in Intelligence affairs? In search of a new paradigm, research Paper No. 100 Athens: RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS) June 2006 Available at link -(accessed on July 15 2016)<http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieaspaper100.pdf> . p.8

<sup>345</sup> Minas, H. (2010) p. 31

information also by citizen use of social media.<sup>346</sup> Nevertheless, if this is true for any ordinary citizen, government, military and intelligence service, the same applies for terrorists as well. Terrorists also can provide true or falsified information through social media and/or follow updates of accounts belonging to the aforementioned authorities. Social media is becoming an extremely significant source of intelligence; yet its reach and how it is later put to use cannot be monitored.

SOCMINT is a part of OSINT, though it does not only consist of open sources but also of classified and personal information that is subject to other regulations in order for it to be collected and used for intelligence purposes and must be treated appropriately, and also could further questions regarding reliability of the provided information.<sup>347</sup> It is clear that, as technology develops and humans progress through the ages, it results in new trends in terrorism thus the Intelligence Community must be innovative as well, in order to respond in accordance to the new threats trending,<sup>348</sup> OSINT and SOCMINT seem to be persuasive examples of that.

SOCMINT seems to be able to contribute to public safety, however, the use of the information on social media platforms for intelligence needs, cannot happen without legitimacy and acceptance from the public which provides the information. It must be clear to the providers, the purpose of such retrieval and must be guided by laws and regulations, protecting the procedures and data. Also, in order to base operations on intelligence derived from social media, the data must be reliable and since it consists of a large amount of information the processing must be rapid so as to respond to each situation at hand.<sup>349</sup>

It is understandable that SOCMINT could provide paramount intelligence that no other intelligence source could achieve; yet, in order for the public to not feel violated and surveillanced u SOCMINT must be widely accepted and understood since it is used for the safety and security of the lives of the public, while utilizing personal information from their lives. Still, even this source of Intelligence -also- could not deal with the difficulties that come along with the existence of an enormous extent of data, a very limited amount of which will be useful, processed and converted into Intelligence.<sup>350</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> Liaropoulos, A. N., (2013) The Challenges of Social Media Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence*, vol.1 no.1 ( January 2013) Available at link ( accessed July 4 2016) [https://www.academia.edu/3800630/The\\_Challenges\\_of\\_Social\\_Media\\_Intelligence\\_for\\_the\\_Intelligence\\_Community\\_Journal\\_of\\_Mediterranean\\_and\\_Balkan\\_Intelligence\\_vol.1\\_no.1\\_2013](https://www.academia.edu/3800630/The_Challenges_of_Social_Media_Intelligence_for_the_Intelligence_Community_Journal_of_Mediterranean_and_Balkan_Intelligence_vol.1_no.1_2013) p.10

<sup>347</sup> Antonius, N. & Rich, L. (2013) Discovering collection and analysis techniques for social media to improve public safety, *The International Technology Management Review*, Vol. 3, No.1,42-53, Atlantis Press Available at link- (accessed July 12 2016) [http://www.atlantis-press.com/php/download\\_paper.php?id=6264](http://www.atlantis-press.com/php/download_paper.php?id=6264) (p.45)

<sup>348</sup> Ivan, A.L. Iov, C.A. Lutai, R.C., Grad, M.N., SOCIAL MEDIA INTELLIGENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS, *CES Working Papers – Volume VII, Issue 2A*, Available at link -(accessed July 20 2016) [http://ceswp.uaic.ro/articles/CESWP2015\\_VII2A\\_IVA.pdf](http://ceswp.uaic.ro/articles/CESWP2015_VII2A_IVA.pdf) (p.506)

<sup>349</sup> Omand, D., Bartlett, J. Miller, C. (2012), *#INTELLIGENCE*,. UK: Demos Available at link -(accessed July 16 2016) [http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Intelligence\\_-\\_web.pdf?1335197327](http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Intelligence_-_web.pdf?1335197327) (p.11)

<sup>350</sup> Antonius N. & Rich L., (p.46)

As with OSINT, SOCMINT also plays an expanding role in counter-terrorism efforts. Since citizens tend to share most details of their daily lives, it seems sensible and rather necessary that Intelligence trends are reshaped accordingly for the information derived from social media must be carefully looked at, since at first or inexperienced glance the data might seem irrelevant but could contain critical information and leads. SOCMINT is increasing its role in countering terrorism and could give insight that could not be provided by any other source. The exclusive feature of SOCMINT, is the fact that information arises in real-time, and is continuously being renewed and could be cross-referenced with other information provided by other users world-wide, known as citizen journalism,<sup>351</sup> before traditional media is even notified of an event.

In order to utilize social media -available information for counter-terrorism goals, certain tool are necessary for the distinction of the retrieval of relevant information in a timely matter. To begin, some of the tools/methods are:

- *“ Natural language processing – a branch of artificial intelligence involving the computational analysis (often using machine learning methods) of ‘natural’ language as it is found on social media.*
- *Event detection – the statistical detection analysis of social media streams to identify offline ‘events’, whether natural, political, cultural, commercial or emergency to provide situational awareness, especially in dynamic and rapidly developing contexts. In counter-terrorism work, this is likely to be particularly valuable in the aftermath of a major terrorist incident (see case study, below).*
- *Data mining and predictive analytics – the statistical analysis or ‘mining’ of unprecedentedly large (‘big data’) data sets, including social media and other ‘big’ or open data sets (such as Census data, crime, health, environmental and transport data), to find the dynamics, interactions, feedback loops and causal connections between them*
- *Social network analysis– the application of a suite of mathematical techniques to find the structure and topography of the*

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<sup>351</sup> For more on citizen journalism visit, DeMers, J. 92013) How Social Media Is Supporting a Fundamental Shift in Journalism, *Huffington Post* 5/8/2013, Available at link-(accessed July 15 2016) [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jayson-demers/how-social-media-is-suppo\\_b\\_3239076.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jayson-demers/how-social-media-is-suppo_b_3239076.html)



*social networks found on social media. These networks are then subjected to analysis, which can identify a range of implications and conclusions (including predictive ones) on the basis of the characteristics of the network structure and type.*

- *Manual analysis/‘netnography’ – drawn from qualitative sociology and ethnography, this is a broad collection of manual approaches to collecting and analysing data concerning social media data. It often aims for depth over breadth in order to reveal and untangle the hidden, obscured, overlooked or contingent social significances, meanings and subjectivities experienced by individuals on social media.*
- *Solicited/‘crowd sourced’ insight – insight garnered from the emerging technique, practised by a number of public and private agencies, to use social media to ask citizens or social media users for information directly.”<sup>352</sup>*

Social media were created in order to facilitate communication and networking world-wide, revolutionizing technology, relationships, advertisement, commerce and furthering globalization to a never seen before extent. Yet, along with its positive contribution, social media have been used for criminal purposes such as terrorism and, even, for networking, cyber-bullying, stalking and hiring of hit men.<sup>353</sup>

Indicators of radicalization, obsession and aggression could be located from information shared on social media platforms, and could be used preemptively to avoid terrorist attacks. Often, an individual could come into contact with a third individual and could share their planning and targets with them, such intelligence known as leakage, should not be neglected. To an extent, other individuals fixate over specific targets which they often feel is the source of evil and is responsible for their sorrows and problems. Also, another existing indicator which should be looked out for on

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<sup>352</sup> Bartlett, J., Reynolds, L. (2015) State of Art 2015 a literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counterterrorism , UK: Demos, September 17 2015, Available at link- (accessed on July 10 2016) [http://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/State\\_of\\_the\\_Arts\\_2015.pdf](http://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf) p.25-6

<sup>353</sup> Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012) Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 27, No. 6, 801-823, December 2012, Available at link -(accessed June 25 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684527.2012.716965?needAccess=true> p.803

social media is the identification with a warrior, attacker, role model or with an entire group, such as the cases of the so-called lone wolves still see themselves as belonging to the main terrorist group that inspire them and aim at taking that role in the real world.<sup>354</sup>

Moreover, as mentioned above, many indicators could be found in textual analysis of social media posts. Immediate translation tools found on the Internet, such as Google Translate could help translate any post to an extent, in order to distinguish dangerous and relevant content rapidly. Despite a percentage of possible error, it could assist manual translation which takes more time, which is a luxury under a threat of a potential terrorist attack. Also, other systems do exist which could identify websites containing extremist ideology.<sup>355</sup>

In addition, geolocational information could be found from the texts of tweets and Facebook posts, since some words are often only known and used locally and could disclose the location of a suspicious individual as well as specific mentions that are not found everywhere, thus narrowing the search, such as the existence of ferries or trams.<sup>356</sup> Also, worth mentioning is the information and insight provided while using social media -during- an ongoing terrorist event, which could provide important details. Some recent examples could assist in realizing the ever increasing use of social media during extreme situations, both from victims and perpetrators alike;

*“ (...) the 2014 Sydney hostage crises, the 2014 shootings at parliament hill, Ottawa, and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings. The Sydney hostage crisis, in which Iranian-born Man Haron Monis held 18 people hostage in a café for 16 hours, was notable for the way in which the gunman used the hostages as social media go-betweens. In the event, the hostages used Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to communicate demands including Monis’ desire to speak to Prime Minister Tony Abbott and for an Islamic State flag to be delivered to the café. Police involved in the operation in turn were able to glean valuable information from these channels that may have helped shape their rescue strategy. Following the incident, many came out in support of Muslim communities in Australia on social media, fearing a*

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<sup>354</sup> Cohen, K., Johansson F., Kaati L., Mork J.C. (2014) Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:246–256, Available at link -(accessed June 10 2016) <https://counterideology2.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/linguistic-marker-for-violence-in-social-media.pdf> p.248-250

<sup>355</sup> Ibid p.250-251

<sup>356</sup> Han, B., Cook P., Baldwin T. (2012) Geolocation Prediction in Social Media Data by Finding Location Indicative Words, In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Computational Linguistics (COLING 2012), Mumbai, India, pp. 1045-1062 Available at link -(accessed July 25 2016) <http://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/paulcook/Hanetal2012b.pdf> p.1050

*backlash as a result of the hostage crisis.*”<sup>357</sup>

In this day and age, most politicians, governments and the military communicate with citizens via social media and it eliminates two existing hurdles, distance and time <sup>358</sup>, both of critical importance, especially concerning avoiding a terrorist attack. Many officials first make statements through their social media accounts and, most commonly via Twitter; terrorist activities such as propaganda, recruitment, fund raising, radicalization, planning and training is happening through social media platforms daily, it is clear that SOCMINT and of source OSINT are significant sources of intelligence. Many historical events of our century are and will be closely related and relied upon the existence and expansion of social media, such as the Arab Spring uprisings. SOCMINT could provide real-time, speedy information very inexpensively. It is a very useful source of intelligence in order to combat terrorism which is actively present online, meaning it is truly borderless, making the use of traditional sources even more difficult to locate and eliminate. The capabilities of OSINT are endless for both the terrorists and the SOCMINT Community in combating it.

From all the above, it is safe to conclude that the role of OSINT is increasing and is thought to be of high value, complementing, supporting other forms of Intelligence. It is understandable that it is difficult to obtain any type of information aiming to process it into becoming useful intelligence, the open and widely available and perhaps publicly known information must first be collected. When researching anyone and anything presently, we first resort to openly accessible sources, and utilize other forms as well. OSINT, may seem simplistic and unimportant since it may be thought that if anything were of significance it would not be easily accessible and available. However that is where one would be mistaken, since according to Mercado “*Too many people still mistake secrets for intelligence*”<sup>359</sup>. Any and all information could be of value if there is an issue needing to be addressed and if selected carefully out of a wide range of unnecessary information and processed in such matter, becoming intelligence and given to the appropriate consumer to take the appropriate actions.

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<sup>357</sup> Bartlett, J., Reynolds L. (2015) p. 44

<sup>358</sup> Liaropoulos, A. N. (2013) The Challenges of Social Media Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence*, vol.1 no.1 ( January 2013) Available at link ( accessed July 4 2016) [https://www.academia.edu/3800630/The\\_Challenges\\_of\\_Social\\_Media\\_Intelligence\\_for\\_the\\_Intelligence\\_Community\\_Journal\\_of\\_Mediterranean\\_and\\_Balkan\\_Intelligence\\_vol.1\\_no.1\\_2013](https://www.academia.edu/3800630/The_Challenges_of_Social_Media_Intelligence_for_the_Intelligence_Community_Journal_of_Mediterranean_and_Balkan_Intelligence_vol.1_no.1_2013) p.10

<sup>359</sup> Mercado, S. (2004) ‘Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age’, *CIA Studies in Intelligence*, 48, 3 2004 Available at link-(accessed August 2 2016) <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no3/pdf/v48i3a05p.pdf> p.50

OSINT and SOCMIT are of unique nature and their importance to governments and Intelligence agencies and could be very useful in the fight against terrorism, since as seen in previous chapters, terrorists are highly active in cyberspace. Moreover, a fact that should not be neglected is that the same sources available to any citizen are also available to terrorists, and the difference between them is their intentions. Information gains importance depending on what it is going to be used for, and terrorists will not hesitate to exploit all information available to their advantage, as is information derived from open sources and especially social media, without any restriction or illegal aspect, making the process easier and undetectable.

## CHAPTER 6

### RIGHT-WING EXTEMISM, LONE WOLF TERRORISM AND THE CASE STUDY OF ANDERS BEHRING BREIVIK

#### 6.1 Right-wing Extremism<sup>360</sup>

Regarding terrorism, the focus today, is on Islamic extremist terrorism, and the activities deriving from the extreme right are mostly neglected and not focused upon, perhaps, since they do not appear as organized and as part of large International terrorist organizations, as is ISIS and al-Qaeda, but mostly in smaller groups, and solo members. However, eight-wing extremist ideologies could be found supported by extreme right-wing political parties, found in many European Parliaments, today,as:

*“Throughout the last decade, Europe has seen a major surge of electoral successes for nationalist and far-right parties. Currently, 39 European countries have nationalist and extreme right-wing parties represented in their parliaments (excluding Turkey and Russia). While in many cases these parties have gained only minor influence or nominal representation, they have seen major—and unexpected—successes in a number of other countries, including France (National Front), Sweden (Sweden Democrats), Greece (Golden Dawn), Poland (Law and Justice), the Netherlands (Party for Freedom), and Denmark (Danish People’s Party). It is especially noteworthy that far-right parties seem to have gained strong support as a result of the ongoing refugee crisis as well as Islamist-motivated terrorist attacks. These external events directed against a specific country have been shown to increase electoral support for extreme right-wing parties and may be linked to peaks of right-wing terrorism and violence.”<sup>361</sup>*

Right-wing extremism is not new, however it has resurfaced as a trend in recent years. This form of extremism is particularly difficult to define, since it consists of a large range of ideologies

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Interchangeable terms found in the literature are Right-wing, far right, extreme right, radical right, extremism/terrorism.

<sup>361</sup> Koehl, D. (2016) Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future *PRISM* Volume 6, no. 2 July 18, 2016 Available at link-(accessed September 10 2016) [http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism\\_6-2/Koehler.pdf?ver=2016-07-05-104619-213](http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-2/Koehler.pdf?ver=2016-07-05-104619-213) p.87

and activities, such as, but not limited to, anti-semitism, anti-abortion, anti-globalization, anti-Muslim, neo-nazism, neo-fascism, anti-communism, anti-government, homophobic, anti-immigrant, and xenophobic ideologies. Right-wing extremism has its roots in the far past, however, it is still present and is a contemporary trend and issue, and has led to terrorist activities. Right-wing extremist groups, are basically against governments, minority groups, and is conservative in its ideologies. However, violence acts committed from such groups are often just labeled hate-crimes and not terrorism.<sup>362</sup>

This form of extremism and terrorism has become an issue again most likely due to the increasing immigrant flows from the Middle East and Africa towards Europe, and post 9/11 era has placed Muslims under the microscope. Also, the financial crisis in the world economy has led to high unemployment rates and financial difficulties, which cause aggression and a great opportunity to find a scapegoat to take the fall for all the struggles. Before World War II, the German population was isolated, punished, their pride was bruised, and were facing the economic impact of the Great Depression, financial burdens and sanctions of WWI, and blamed the Jewish population, with in its majority held high skill jobs, as responsible for their situation, leading to the consequences that are well-known to all. Nazism, fed on the aggression and feeling of lost pride and provided a solution in the format of a messiah figure to purify the Nation, who would expand it and re-establish its previous world status. This ideology lives on today in the form of neo-nazism.

Extreme-right terrorist groups have been categorized into groups, by Sprinzak E. (1995). To begin, Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, are labeled as *Revolutionary Terrorism*, has used violence and state terrorism and managing to gain power in their states and aim to transform society according to their world view, ideologies and values.<sup>363</sup> Another category is *Reactive Terrorism*, is a resort to terrorism if a group has either lost power and aim at regaining it or have not lost it yet, are afraid it will occur soon, and act accordingly to prevent it from happening. Also, *Vigilante Terrorism* is another category, in which it is perceived that the government is incompetent in protecting them, and are taking matters in their own hands, not wishing to overturn the government and alter the status quo, they believe that the laws are not rightfully applied and aim to enforce them.<sup>364</sup> Moreover, another category, *Racist Terrorism*, displays a common characteristic among terrorist groups is some form of racism and sense of superiority in comparison to other groups, such groups are the Ku Klux Klan. *Millenarian Terrorism*, is resorted by religious groups that believe that the end of the world is near and resort to terrorist activities not for their spiritual reasons but

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<sup>362</sup> Ibid p.89

<sup>363</sup> Sprinzak, E. (1995) Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 7:1, 17-43, Available at link -(accessed September 2 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546559508427284?needAccess=true> p.23

<sup>364</sup> Ibid p.29

specific leaders.<sup>365</sup> Last category, according to Sprinzak, is *Youth Counterculture Terrorism*, its consists of youth groups, such as Skinheads, and engage in racial violence against minorities, while music plays a great role in their messaging, propaganda and recruitment.<sup>366</sup>

Some major terrorist events have occurred by right wing extremism, such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the two incidents proceeding it, that of Ruby Ridge Idaho and Waco, Texas. The Oklahoma City bombing, occurred in April of 1995, at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, and led to 168 casualties. The attackers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, claimed that the attack was revenge for the presumed abuse of power that occurred during the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents and had ties to right-wing organizations.<sup>367</sup> Other attacks, are the Bologna train station bombing in 1980 and the Italicus Express bombing in 1974, both carried out by neo-fascist groups as well as the Oktoberfest terrorist attack in Munich in 1980.

A current basis of right-wing extremism is Islamophobia, which is prejudice against Muslims, that resurfaced after 9/11; however, it has existed long before that. Indeed, currently hate crimes against Muslims are “*roughly five times higher than the pre-9/11 rate*”<sup>368</sup>. The statistic graph below, presents the rise in attacks against American Muslims post 9/11, noted as hate crimes, which according to the FBI :

*“A hate crime is a traditional offense like murder, arson, or vandalism with an added element of bias. For the purposes of collecting statistics, the FBI has defined a hate crime as a “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.” Hate itself is not a crime—and the FBI is mindful of protecting freedom of speech and other civil*

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid p.33

<sup>366</sup> Ibid p.35

<sup>367</sup> Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START,) (2010) U.S. Polls: Public Opinion and Right-Wing Extremism Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security April 2010 Available at link -(accessed August 20 2016) [https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local\\_attachments/Surveys%20-%20Right-Wing%20Extremism%20Final%20Report.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/Surveys%20-%20Right-Wing%20Extremism%20Final%20Report.pdf) p.13

<sup>368</sup> Ingraham, C. (2015) Anti-Muslim hate crimes are still five times more common today than before 9/11 February 11, 2015. *The Washington Post* Available at link -(accessed August 28 2016) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/11/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-are-still-five-times-more-common-today-than-before-911/> The following graph (*Figure 5*), is also retrieved from this article. However the article also states regarding the graph “*These figures are almost certainly an under count, given that participation in the program is voluntary, and some state and local police departments do a better job of tracking this data than others. Overall, anti-Muslim crimes now make up about 13 percent of religiously-motivated hate crimes, and 2 percent of all hate crimes in general.*” The article is therefore, suggesting that the data provided is still an understatement to reality, however it makes the point of the increase of such activities nowadays.



liberties.”<sup>369</sup>


The difference between hate crimes and terrorism is principally that hate crimes focus on the target of the attack, and terrorism on the motive, which is to cause fear, pressure, intimidation and influence changes. Terrorism, includes the following:

“ (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”<sup>370</sup>

Figure 5: 9/11 Changed things for America Muslims, Hate crime incidents against Muslims by year

## 9/11 changed things for American Muslims

Hate crime incidents against Muslims, by year



WASHINGTONPOST.COM/WONKBLOG

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Statistics

The negative perception of Muslims, could also be traced back to how the media presents them. Media is a factor that forms public opinion and when promoting negative images of Muslims,

<sup>369</sup> Available at link -(accessed August 24 2016) <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes>

<sup>370</sup> Available at link -(accessed September 14 2016 ) <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism>



it promotes hatred and Islamophobia that does not easily change, once established.

*“A study published in the Journal of Communication in December 2014 found that “Viewers of national television news see far more images of Muslims as domestic terrorists and Latinos as immigrant lawbreakers than is actually the case in statistics.” The study’s author “found that among those described as domestic terrorists in the news reports, 81 percent were identifiable as Muslims.”*<sup>371</sup>

Islamophobia, also was evident during the current US Presidential campaign, the Republican Presidential nominee, Donald Trump, stated that he would implement a database for Muslims and provide special ID cards stating their religion. The incident became a hashtag on social media, #MuslimID, and attracted scrutiny and comparison to Nazi tactics of labeling.<sup>372 373</sup>

Right-wing extremism, is also strongly present on the Internet. The Internet, as mentioned in previous chapters, provides ample space for extremism to be cultivated, sheltered and expanded, since it is an inexpensive and easily accessed, with a wide reach and all that under the protective cloak of anonymity. The Internet is rather dangerous since it is difficult, if not impossible to monitor all the material uploaded on to the Internet and also, monitor the number of individuals exposed, since perhaps the number of accesses could be calculated, yet the number affected and how it will influence them cannot. Also, the impact of being exposed to such material is important, since the same material could cause, no feelings and actions, cause extremist and radical feeling and ideologies, or cause the group or individual to act upon such feeling. It is unknown, often, until it is too late, which of these three scenarios is the case.

The Internet provides access and a sense of community of like-minded individuals, along with, technical instructions and guidance for committing criminal activities and targets, even how to fight with minorities.<sup>374</sup> The Internet could also provide material with detailed plans on how to create various types of bombs, using household material and items.<sup>375</sup> This poses a unique danger,

<sup>371</sup> Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) *Confronting Fear: Islamophobia and its Impact in the U.S.* 2013-2015, Available at link-(accessed August 10 2016) <http://www.islamophobia.org/images/ConfrontingFear/Final-Report.pdf> p.45

<sup>372</sup> Matharu, H. (2015) Doctors, veterans and students tweet Donald Trump photos of their 'Muslim IDs' following his calls for a database, *Independent* 24 November 2015 Available at link-(accessed September 10 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/doctors-veterans-and-students-tweet-donald-trump-photos-of-their-muslim-ids-following-his-call-for-a6746236.html>

<sup>373</sup> In the Nazi concentration camps, they would label the groups, with triangles, red triangle would be for Communists, Purple triangles for Jehovah's Witnesses, Pink for Homosexuals, Black triangle for the Black population, Brown for the Roma population and the Star of David for the Jewish population.

<sup>374</sup> Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2013) *The consequences of right-wing extremism on the Internet*, New York, Available at link -(accessed August 27 2016) <http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/The-Consequences-of-Right-Wing-Extremism-on-the-Internet.pdf> p.3

<sup>375</sup> Ibid p.5

since if the items needed to create deadly weapons could be found in a ordinary home on any given day, that creates even more difficulties for security agencies to detect such threats, since the purchase of dangerous material is not specially purchased for the cause, yet found, in order to raise red flags and suspicion.

On the Internet, literally anything could be found, even specific hit lists and detailed information on government officials and other targets of extreme-right groups, such as personnel involved in abortions. However, the Internet also provides the opportunity for right-wing extremists to organize and promote social events, such as Hate Rock concerts.<sup>376</sup>

Also, such groups, have noticed the remarkable capabilities of the Internet, regarding, fund-raising. They exploit the opportunity to raise adequate financial resources by engaging in online commerce, such as selling T-shirts and CDs, product promotion, scams, donations, promotional material and organizing events,<sup>377</sup> all necessary to fund their needs in weaponry.

## 6.2 LONE WOLF TERRORISM

Lone wolf terrorism is not a new term and occurrence, however, it has become a trend, at least according to the media and governments. The term is used daily and attacks which later on are taken responsibility of by terrorist organizations, are still considered lone wolf terrorism. The author of this thesis does not accept the concept and term, as being a form of terrorism. However, it is widely used by the media, governments, and the literature and is considered to be by them a trend, hence below some information of what lone wolf terrorism is provided, in order to better understand the opposition to the use of this term. As such, lone wolf terrorism:

*“Sometimes also called freelance terrorism, leaderless resistance, solo-actor terrorism, or even, in the case of violent takfiri Islamism, personal jihad, these diverse terms center on the key feature of this kind of terrorism: a single actor undertaking ideological terrorism (especially political and/or religious) against non-military targets without external direction or coordination”.*<sup>378</sup>

Lone wolf terrorism, is said to have existed, since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, were anarchists who acted alone, and were later on it was associated with White supremacists.<sup>379</sup> As in all cases of

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<sup>376</sup> Ibid p.6

<sup>377</sup> Ibid p.10-15

<sup>378</sup> Feldman, M. (2013) Comparative Lone Wolf Terrorism: Toward a Heuristic Definition, *Democracy and Security*, 9:3, 270-286, Available at link -(accessed June 20 2016)  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17419166.2013.792252?needAccess=true> p.271

<sup>379</sup> Spaaij, R. (2010) The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:9, 854-870, p.857

terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, seems to adapt and come from all ideologies and directions, Islamic, right and left wing, white supremacy, anti-abortion activism and/or separatism.<sup>380</sup> Lone wolves, are usually individuals, who act alone, without direct orders, from a group; however, since their actions are based upon a certain ideology they are always on behalf of some a group, and/or of a pre-existing ideology.

The news, refers to most terror attacks as lone wolf attacks, hence limiting the activities seemingly conducted by terrorist groups and perhaps not to alert and panic the public. Also, all attacks considered lone wolf acts, are not purely that, and should not be labeled as such. According to Raffaello Pantucci, their a differences, from act to act and from actor to actor. Furthermore, Pantucci, provides a typology of lone Islamic terrorists, however, it only refers to a certain type of ideology supporting lone wolf terrorism, it may provide an insight to the issue and variations of lone wolves.

### ***Loner***

Pantucci, describes the Loner category, as individuals, who act under the cover of extreme Islamic ideology, who however, have not formed connections with extremists, even though, they might have been exposed to extremist material widely found, did not get an order to conduct such activities.<sup>381</sup>

### ***Lone Wolf***

A lone wolf is considered as being an individual that conducted a violent act alone, however did engage in some form of communication with extremists, perhaps via Internet, while an unknown amount of direction and coordination may have occurred.<sup>382</sup>

### ***Lone Wolf Pack***

This category may contradict the original characteristic of the term, that is the lone aspect, as it consists of more than one individual, a group, which acts without having formal connections to an organization.<sup>383</sup>

### ***Lone Attackers***

This category, is composed of individuals that act alone, yet are clearly linked to a terrorist organizations, and are directed and supported by the organization ideologically and materially.<sup>384</sup>

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<sup>380</sup> Ibid p.861

<sup>381</sup> Pantucci, R. (2011)A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists , *Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence*, UK: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence(ICSR) Available at link -(accessed July 28 2016)[http://informationcollective.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/1302002992ICSRPaper\\_ATypologyofLoneWolves\\_Pantucci.pdf](http://informationcollective.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf) p.14

<sup>382</sup> Ibid p.19-20

<sup>383</sup> Ibid p.24-25

<sup>384</sup> Ibid p.29-30

In order for an individual to choose to conduct terrorist activities he/she must first be radicalized, and specifically self-radicalized. Usually, an individual is radicalized by political or religious ideologies, however, that is not always the case, as sometimes an individual acts upon personal beliefs and agendas wishing to promote. In all lone wolf terrorist cases, the individual seeks the material themselves in order to become radicalized and the Internet facilitates such preferences.<sup>385</sup> However, it is interesting that in this case an individual feels the need to search for a cause and material in order to justify and inspire actions and to find the know-how for such operations. Basically, it shows that the urge exists and the individual searches for a purpose toward which to act. Thus, it requires more effort on the individual's part, since the actions may or may not have adequate assistance, and more will power, since the individual does not need to be misdirected, persuaded and recruited, processes that often require a long period of time. Self-radicalization, is self-sought and self-motivated, since even if exposed and surrounded by extremist material, it does always radicalize, and even if it does it still does not mean that the individual will conduct terrorist activities. Yet the groups providing such material do play a role in the actions.

Moreover, lone wolf terrorism could occur on one occasion or as a series of events, distinguishing the lone wolf as either *Chaos* or *Serial* lone wolf terrorist, usually when a single attack is chosen it is of large impact and often conducting suicide, such as the attacks on 9/11.<sup>386</sup> Furthermore, lone wolves could also be *risk-averse*, meaning that the individual conducts low level acts, sporadically over a long period of time, while pursuing other forms of activism in the meantime *risk-seeking* lone wolves, which, is of higher risk and of higher value and importance.<sup>387</sup>

The target population of lone wolf activities is a strong indication of the origin ideology of the lone wolf. Lone wolves, usually target civilians, many from ethnic and religious minorities and immigrants, as lone wolves are usually religiously inspired, right-wing, or school shooters.<sup>388</sup> However, often lone wolves decide upon a target based on symbolic significance, as in the instance from the Literature of one of Breivik's attacks, on the *island of Utøya—which translates into English as “listen”*.<sup>389</sup>

The Internet disrupts the ability of a lone wolf to be absolutely isolated. However, many lone wolves find inspiration, technical assistance and guidance online and often manifest their intentions

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<sup>385</sup> Bates, R. A. (2012) "Dancing With Wolves: Today's Lone Wolf Terrorists," *The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology*: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 1. Available at link-(accessed August 17 2016) <http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=jpps> p.2-4

<sup>386</sup> Ibid p.5

<sup>387</sup> Ibid p.7

<sup>388</sup> Ellis C., Pantucci R., de Roy van Zuijdewijn J., Bakker E., Smith M., Gomis B., Palombi S. (2016) Research Notes Analysing the Processes of Lone-Actor Terrorism: Research Findings. *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM* Volume 10, Issue 2. April 2016 Available at link -(accessed September 5 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/499/987> p.34

<sup>389</sup> Feldman, M. (2013) p.272

prior to an attack.<sup>390</sup> Cyberspace and all the platforms beyond providing and facilitating communication, seems to be used for absorbing knowledge provided by downloading and exploiting manuals, blueprints and other available material.<sup>391</sup>

It is not new nor a surprising fact that terrorist organizations are more organized, prepared, trained, well-funded and could lead to a successful attack if compared to a lone wolf individual, preparing an operation alone with guidance and training from open source material found online.<sup>392</sup> However, even if such organized terrorist units exist, lone wolves still exist as well, often being able to do harm and even succeed where terrorists have not been able to, such as the case of the Orlando shooting being a successful attack on American soil, and the Nice attack on July 14<sup>th</sup> 2016. To what extent these attacks are actually “lone wolf” attacks or not, since many claims have been made such as the fact that the wife of the attacker knowing of the plans, to that the shooter of the Orlando attack, was himself homosexual and did it for personal reasons, however the FBI, did not find any evidence supporting that.<sup>393</sup> If an individual has mentioned their terrorist intentions to anyone, the individual is no longer alone, since if it were a murder, and someone were made aware of such planning and intentions, the individual had a responsibility to report the information, and by not doing so, that could have led to prevent the murder or terrorist attack accordingly, is considered an accomplice and is also guilty and should face justice.

*“A study at Pennsylvania State University found that in 64% of cases, family and friends were aware of an individual’s intent to engage in a terrorism-related activity because the offender verbally told them.”<sup>394</sup>*

Literature indicates that often terrorists take responsibility for their actions even if they did not order them directly, since, it provides an opportunity to prevail over other competing organizations, funding and recruits and also an opportunity for power projection as well. Also, a successful attack brings global media attention and moreover, the literature supports that terrorist groups not only decide on taking responsibility based solely on the success of the attack, they often take responsibility for low or no casualty attacks, depending on what they wish to achieve.

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<sup>390</sup> Ellis C., Pantucci R., de Roy van Zuijdewijn J., Bakker E., Smith M., Gomis B., Palombi S. (2016) p.36-7

<sup>391</sup> Ibid p.37

<sup>392</sup> Pinar Alakoc, B. (2015), Competing to Kill: Terrorist Organizations Versus Lone Wolf Terrorists, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Available at link -(accessed September 7 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2015.1050489?needAccess=true> p.3

<sup>393</sup> Hennessy-Fiske, M. (2016) FBI investigators say they have found no evidence that Orlando shooter had gay lovers, June 23 2016, *Los Angeles Times*, Available at link-(accessed September 7 2016) <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-orlando-gay-fbi-20160623-snap-story.html>

<sup>394</sup> Burke, J. (2016) Islamist terror has evolved toward lone actors – and it's brutally effective, *The Guardian*, 15 June 2016, Available at link-(accessed September 15 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/15/islam-jihad-terrorism-orlando-shooting-paris-attack>

However, it is also stated that sometimes, groups do not want to take responsibility for successful and deadly attacks, depending on their objectives, for example if they fear a brutal response.<sup>395</sup> Moreover, to emphasize the wideness and confusion of the term lone wolf, Pinar Alakoc B. (2015), in his study labels all the unclaimed attacks as lone wolf.<sup>396</sup>

### 6.3 DOUBTING THE LONE WOLF

Yet, another opinion found in the literature worth mentioning is that the concept of lone wolves, is indeed flawed and may not exist at all. The opposing claims are added, indeed to present that terrorism and lone wolf terrorism and cyber terrorism, in a previous chapter are complex that they seem and should not be used freely. They are complicated terms, consisting of many categories, variations, tactics and belong to all terrorist groups methods along the spectrum, which is not always easy to define. Media rushes to label an attack, as a lone wolf attack, however, it is clear that even those supporting the existence of the lone wolf concept describe multiple variations and typologies, and there are others that do not support the concept.

The term in question, is not fully agreed upon and is rather fluid in what it consists of, since it does not always refer to a lone actor, but also, to a small group. Therefore, are a few lone wolves still alone? Also, all so-called lone wolves acting in accordance to an ideology in mind, which corresponds to a existing terrorist group(s). Moreover, often these lone wolf attacks are claimed by terrorist organizations, so even if the attacker did not belong to the group officially it does become part of the organizations activities and perhaps successes. Furthermore, connections between these so called lone wolves and terrorist organizations were found, and they were in some degree communicating, or at least being inspired, trained by existing members or self-radicalized by material provide by these organizations. In addition, many organizations call upon attackers worldwide to carry out either specific attacks, providing targets, instruction on locations, security and weapon tactics and bomb construction and manuals, therefore directing attacks either directly or indirectly. Frequently, these attacks are indeed labeled as lone wolf attacks so as to not panic the public and leading it to believe it was a single event from a single person, in an attempt to reduce panic. However, it also gives the impression of the being so invisible and undetectable, hence unstoppable, justifying the state's inability to eliminate them.<sup>397</sup>

Moreover, even on the side which does not embrace the existence of lone wolves, there is still no consensus, since, there are different variations objecting to the misuse of the term,

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<sup>395</sup> Pinar Alakoc, B. (2015) p.5

<sup>396</sup> Ibid p.6

<sup>397</sup> Tures, J.A. (2015) The Myth of the Lone Wolf Terrorist 11/14/2015, *Huffington Post*. Available at link-(accessed September 27 2016) [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-tures/the-myth-of-the-lone-wolf\\_b\\_8563886.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-tures/the-myth-of-the-lone-wolf_b_8563886.html)



emphasizing further, the claim that these terms are very complex and not widely agreed upon despite being widely used and are considered umbrella terms. For instance, Nabila Ramdani, claims that the term lone wolf is usually associated with Islamic terrorism, she calls them "*micro-terrorists*" – sick men "*whose affiliation with Islam seems based mostly on a twisted attempt to justify their barbarity.*"<sup>398</sup> Also:

*"Former FBI agent Ali Soufan (now of the Soufan Group) finds the term misleading for another reason. Since so many of the reputed "lone wolves" are "individuals with well-known patterns of violent extremist or criminal behavior and connections" Soufan believes we should instead call them "known wolves." But not everyone designated a "lone wolf" is known to law enforcement. Some fall into a category Anne Speckhard calls "clean-skin terrorists" whose lack of criminal records make them hard to detect."*<sup>399</sup>

It is difficult to find a consensus on a term such as lone wolf terrorism, and to be able to clearly define what it does and does not consist of and imply, for terrorism itself is such a wide concept, taking on multiple forms and adapting and resurfacing trends from the past and creating new ones. It is obvious that the term is overused and used a labeled for most incidents occurring while, on the other hand, even those that disagree could not agree upon what aspect they disagree on nor are able to come up with another more valid term, if necessary. Nevertheless, what is certain is that no individual conducts a terrorist attack without some sort of ideological concept whether or not belongs to an established terrorist group. Also, terrorist groups invite individuals to conduct terrorist attacks, therefore, as such, there is some degree of coordination, and manuals and directions for weapons, locations, targets and even specific dates are available from open sources. Moreover, for an individual to find such callings and instructions from a terrorist group, they are either searching for it, meaning they have some sort of empathy and connection to the ideology or for the group, whether or not the individual is recruited and/or an official member, but he or she may feel as if they already belong (eg Ummah). In conclusion, whether one supports the existence or not, lone wolf terrorism is considered a trend in media, on a daily basis.

Additionally, it has also been supported in a recent article by Zoli C., that the term lone wolf is confusing and a more valid categorization is necessary as it promotes the thought of it being just a form of "low-tech terrorism", appears less organized, unsophisticated and utilizes daily,

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<sup>398</sup> Caschetta, A.J. (2016) Flaws in the 'Lone Wolf' Analysis, *New English Review*, August 2016 Available at link-(accessed September 22 2016) [http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/fm/184480/sec\\_id/184480](http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/fm/184480/sec_id/184480)

<sup>399</sup> Ibid

inexpensive and easily obtained material, yet produce a strong message. Moreover, terrorist attacks that may appear to be random and disconnected from organizations, are usually not the case, as some form of networking and support is provided. Also, terrorist organizations often approach and recruit individuals that have no prior criminal record and have shown interest in carrying out an attack, since that way it may not raise the suspicion of the Intelligence agencies. However they also depend on individuals that are “*participants of convenience*”, such as criminals, young isolated individuals and even mentally unstable. Furthermore, individuals conducting these attacks more often than not announce their motivation either before an attack, during, as seen recently facilitated by social media, or right after, by declaring allegiance to a certain organization. The article also emphasizes the persistent claims of the attacks as results of everyday problems in an individual's personal or professional life and “grievances” lead to terrorist attacks, however, this choice has a reverse effect, it amplifies the terrorist's message further and decrease the faith in the state's security.<sup>400</sup> In brief, the article suggests that the term lone-wolf terrorism is not valid and suggests “low-tech terrorism” instead, maintaining the fact that it appears more disorganized and unsophisticated than terrorist group attacks, however, not neglecting the existing forms of connection and support between them, and recruiting them for the purpose of conducting such attacks, since they are ideal candidates because they are not in the security databases or they belong to a vulnerable category easily exploited. Moreover, most so called lone wolf attacks are usually announced at some point and claim to be conducted in the name or ideology of an existing group. Also, the article claims that the term lone wolf is used by the media and authorities in order to make these attacks seem random and unrelated to international terrorist organizations, perhaps to avoid chaos, and prefer to blame the occurrence on daily problems and suggests that case facts and not blindly labeling everything as lone wolf terrorism (which the article suggests does not exist and proposes “low tech-terrorism” instead).

*“In order to identify such behavior at an early stage, it is essential to shift from unhelpful, media-friendly concepts to empirically based frameworks: to “low-tech” not “lone-wolf” terrorism; to case facts and fact patterns involved in individual and cross-case acts of terrorism; to the obvious symbols and conventions of message-driven forms of political violence; and to the ideological frameworks and logistics networks that fuel terrorist activities.”*<sup>401</sup>

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<sup>400</sup> Zoli, C. (2016) Lone-Wolf or Low-Tech Terrorism? Emergent Patterns of Global Terrorism in Recent French and European Attacks, *Lawfare*, August 17, 2016 Available at link-(accessed September 29 2016) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/lone-wolf-or-low-tech-terrorism-emergent-patterns-global-terrorism-recent-french-and-european>

<sup>401</sup> Ibid Zoli, C. (2016)



Academic literature and material supporting the non-existence of the term “lone wolf terrorism” is hard to come by, as it is widely used and considered a trend by the media, however this chapter attempted to present both sides of the argument. The author of this thesis leans toward accepting the claims of the non existing nature of the term and concept of lone wolf terrorism, and summarizes the following supporting that, and awaits for future research supporting it to be conducted by academics of the field in the near future, in order to fill the gap in the literature.

According to the research and topics examined in this thesis, the following are a few thoughts/conclusions supporting the approach of the term “lone wolf” terrorism, even though trending, not to exist :

- The so called “lone wolf” attacks have been called upon to be carried out from anyone, anywhere, anyhow. Anyone could join utilizing any means available to do so.
- Organizations have been provided hit-lists, specific locations, dates, security measures to avoid, directions, DIY (do it yourself) manuals of weapons, bombs, how to hold a gun properly spiritual guidance and motivation, most of which easily obtained by anyone through open sources
- Various forms of support and communication mainly through social media have been claimed
- Many have stated their support online through social media
- Even if an individual is not a formal member, they may already feel part of the community and cause (e.g. Ummah)
- Many have previously confided their intended actions in others, either like-minded individuals, or friend and family, clearly not being alone, since their knowledge if their mere intentions could have assisted the attack or have prevented it if reported, therefore the individual is not alone
- The term is overused by the media, perhaps cause it is rather difficult even for professionals on terrorism to even define terrorism, yet alone to clearly label an act as anything moments after it has occurred, the term has become an umbrella term that even -as is-, is often disproved when more information comes to light
- Also, governments and authorities use the term, falsely, perhaps to avoid creating chaos before they have more concrete information on the incident and to justify the fact that they could not prevent it since its unpredictable nature, that supposedly does not link back to an organization is unable to be detected and prevented, and rather suggest it was random acts, of individuals whom face problems in their daily lives and/or have mental issues.

## 6.4 CASE STUDY ANDERS BEHRING BREIVIK

The case study of Anders Behring Breivik, was chosen, due to the fact that it fits within various categories, that are trending. To begin, his actions are considered right-wing extremist terror attacks, has been labeled by the media as lone wolf attacks, even though the author of this thesis does not agree with the existence of the term lone wolf terrorist. Also, the terrorist attacks carried out by Breivik are considered counter-jihad, meaning it was anti-Islam and anti-immigrant based and also, due to Breivik's use of the Internet and social media. Breivik attacked government buildings in Oslo, Norway by setting of a car bomb on July 22<sup>nd</sup> 2009, which left behind eight casualties.

Then, on the same day, he traveled to a near island, Utøya Island, and carried out a mass shooting, at a youth camp for the children of the Labor Party, disguised as a police officer, an indication that may suggest to what extent these attacks were pre-meditated and well-planned, and killed 69 people. Violence by extremists have become more frequent and are found in Northern European states, which may not face the financial difficulties faced by the southern European states, and yet have a long history of extremism, now resurfacing and trending. Breivik seems to have attempted to take it upon himself to show the way of purifying Europe from immigrants and Muslims and publishing a form of Instruction manual that is long term but supposedly necessary for Europe, Norway and its people.

The immigration flows toward Europe have increased during the last few years and, include Norway as a destination. Norway faces an increasing amount of immigrants, the majority of whom are Muslims which has created suspicion and skepticism toward this minority from its society, and feel that their values are threatened by the newcomers.<sup>402</sup> Organizations, political parties and individuals, feed on the anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic feelings and exploit them to gain popularity an political base, basically, the existence of such minorities in the West, and specifically in this case in Norway, are the life-line of right-wing extremist groups, providing them with the opportunity to gain power and influence politics. Some anti-Islamic organizations are the Human Rights Service (HRS) think-tank, the Norwegian Defense League (NDL) an the Stop Isolationism of Norway (SIAN), some of which Breivik was involved with as well as being a member of the Progress Party at some point, but not during the attacks.<sup>403</sup>

Breivik was deeply affected and consumed by anti-Islamic feeling a fact that is rather clear in the multi-paged material he distributed it by email, prior to the attacks, his so-called *Manifesto*,

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
<sup>402</sup> Berntzen, L.E., & Sandberg, S. (2014) The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:5, 759-779, Available at link-(accessed July 18 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2013.767245?needAccess=true> p.761

<sup>403</sup> Ibid p.762

2083–A *European Declaration of Independence*, consisting of three books. “ *Book 1: What you need to know, our falsified history and other forms of cultural Marxist/multiculturalism propaganda, Boo2: Europe Burning and Book 3: A Declaration of pre-emptive War.*”<sup>404</sup>

In the graph below, the evolution of Breivik's ideology could be witnessed. He became more violent and his belief of democratic and non-violent solutions toward the achievement of his objectives. Also, the pages of each book appears to have increased along with his aggression, with each book being larger than the previous one.

Figure 6 : *Page number intervals and themes in the Breivik's Books* <sup>405</sup>



Breivik's Manifesto, was written in English and contained material derived from multiple sources as well as being seemingly influenced by online sources, with one of the main themes being that of an anti-Islamic movement. <sup>406</sup> Breivik fears that multiculturalism and Islamism will be imposed and dominate Norway and its population and thus proposes for immigration to stop, since they could not assimilate easily in society and therefore are a threat to society. <sup>407</sup>

Moreover, in order to gain support and justify such ideas and actions, as well as to provide motivation for participation, it stated to: “*Fight for What Is Yours!*”<sup>408</sup>. It is a rather strong calling

<sup>404</sup> Ibid p.762

<sup>405</sup> Ibid p.769

<sup>406</sup> Ibid p.763

<sup>407</sup> Ibid p. 765

<sup>408</sup> Ibid p.766

that provides a sense of duty and obligation. It is a calling on emotion to cause action, it is meant to inspire, motivate and act as justification. Furthermore, Breivik emphasizes Christianity, in order to create a counter-identity to that of Islam, and establish some sense of unity and common cause.<sup>409</sup>

Throughout his Manifesto, Breivik supports various solutions to prevent the Islamization of Europe and Norway. Some of the proposed solutions are non-violent and others are rather violent, such as coups, assassinations and terrorist attacks, in order to re-establish a strong and mono-cultured Europe.<sup>410</sup> Breivik, is seen in the literature available, as a main example of lone wolf terrorism, despite the questioning of that term by the author of this thesis. Breivik claims to have been part of a secret community and even if it is untrue<sup>411</sup>, he still was under the impression and felt as if he was. As the so called Islamist “lone wolves”, even if not directly recruited they feel part of the Ummah and respond to the calling and the directions provided. They both act on behalf of a certain group and/or ideology whether they have a membership status or not, the gains of martyrdom exist either way. Therefore, it could be supported that:

*“Breivik sees himself as a crusader warrior fighting for Christendom. He claims to be a member of a secret society that was “re-founded” in April 2002 in London under the name Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici (the poor fellow-soldiers of Christ and the Temple of Solomon, PCCTS) or more succinctly the Knights Templar or, as he continuously refers to himself, a “Justiciar Knight.” In this medieval light, Breivik’s concerns are focused around the growing Islamization of Europe and the ‘cultural Marxism’ that is allowing Europe to let itself get taken over by Islam.”<sup>412</sup>*

Furthermore, the Internet played a significant role in Breivik's ideological and operational development and aided him in the successful conduct of both attacks. Breivik visited right-wing and anti-Muslim forums and engaged in communication with other like-minded individuals and provided guidance towards them and even attempted meeting a blogger he was inspired by, Fjordman and was also in contact with Serbian conservatives that made an impact on Breivik and

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<sup>409</sup> Ibid p.767

<sup>410</sup> Ibid p.768

<sup>411</sup> Mudde, C. (2012) Norway's atrocity: a story of non-impact. *Open Democracy*, April 2012, Available at link- (accessed August 4 2016) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/cas-mudde/norways-atrocity-story-of-non-impact>

<sup>412</sup> Pantucci, R. (2011) What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik? *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM*, Vol 5 Issue 5-6 Available at link -(accessed August 2 2016) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/what-we-have-learned/332> p.30

attempted to meet them too.<sup>413</sup> Nowadays, anyone could find a large amount of material that caters and responds to the seekers' needs and ideologies, there is material to cover the ideological spectrum and issues, of course, an individual must be searching for something in order to find something as well, and also, even if the material searched for is found, it does not always lead to violent acts.

*“Counter-Jihadists have been particularly active on the Internet, where Breivik came across their message at interconnected anti-Muslim online journals, news-hubs, and blogs, primarily Gates of Vienna, Brussels Journal, Jihad Watch, and Front Page Magazine. Breivik was especially impressed by Robert Spencer, Pamela Geller, Andrew Bostom, Bruce Bawer, Serge Trifkovic, and Baron Bodissey from the U.S., and Geert Wilders, Bat Ye’or, and “Fjordman” (Peder Nøstvold Jensen) from Europe.”<sup>414</sup>*

Also, Breivik, utilized the Internet to obtain information on traveling and websites such as eBay, in order to purchase materials needed to carry out his activities and facilitated his funding through e-commerce. In addition to purchasing material and funding his activities, Breivik also used social media and trained by extensively playing video games, once again an indicator of its well-planned activities, as;

*“He uses Facebook<sup>415</sup> as a tool to locate ideological fellow travelers or potential supporters and spends considerable time ‘email farming’ by ‘befriending’ individuals whom he believes hold views similar to his and then once they have accepted, collecting their email addresses off their profiles. He creates two profiles to do this from and apparently uses up his daily allowance of 50 friend requests regularly in trying to gather this data. Presumably, he also does this through identifying*

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<sup>413</sup> Ibid p.36

<sup>414</sup> Gardell, M. (2014) Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:1, 129-155, Available at link -(accessed July 14 2016) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.849930?needAccess=true> p.134

<sup>415</sup> Breivik's Facebook account has been taken down, however his profile information and interests, wall activities and picture gallery could be found here: Public intelligence, (2011) Mirror of Utøya Gunman Anders Behring Breivik's Facebook Page and Photo Gallery, *Public intelligence* July 22, 2011, Available at link-(accessed July 25 2016) <https://publicintelligence.net/mirror-of-ut%C3%B8ya-gunman-anders-behring-breiviks-facebook-page-and-photo-gallery/>

*individuals from his regular visits to far right or anti-Muslim websites and forums. Finally, the Internet also appears to play a key role in his downtime. Breivik regularly admits to enjoying playing computer games, and in particular demonstrates a fixation with multiplayer role-playing fantasy games. At one point he admits that this was practically his entire occupation for a whole year.* <sup>416</sup>

Breivik's Manifesto and terrorists actions, although horrific, indeed required detailed and long-term planning and personal sacrifices in order to achieve his objectives. In order to save up money to fund his activities he moved back in with his mother and distanced himself from friends and relatives, to maintain secrecy and also, leased a farmhouse, in order to purchase fertilizer for his bomb without raising suspicion; technical knowledge for creating such a bomb took a lot of time and effort and his large-length Manifesto, promoting Christianity and opposing cultural Marxism, Islam and immigrants was a large task. <sup>417</sup> Breivik composed his Manifesto for it to be distributed, it was clearly stated within and was one of his goals.

In addition, Breivik is evidently against the European Union, Marxism and Islam and supported that he had created a movement inspired by the Knights of Templar, in 2002, along with others individuals who share similar ideologies. <sup>418</sup> Also, he had a specific timeline planned for his crusaders to carry out his goal of clearing Europe and Norway from multiculturalism, Islam and immigrants. Crusaders would be trained and in defense of Christianity would fight against cultural Marxism and Muslims in Europe. The war would consist of three long-term phases, beginning in 1999-2030, during which Europe would awaken and be at civil war against Muslim immigrants with small scale attacks, shock attacks, that will not be widely accepted and understood however. In the next phase from 2030-2070, the attacks would develop into guerrilla warfare and coups against European governments and during the last phase 2070-2083, the civil war between Europeans and Muslim immigrants will lead up to killing or removing all Muslims from Europe. <sup>419</sup>

Given these points, Breivik aimed at creating an army that would fight against foreigners and their cultural and religious values and defend Christianity, he believed they could not be trusted

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<sup>416</sup> Pantucci, R. (2011) What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik? *PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM*, Vol 5 Issue 5-6 Available at link <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/what-we-have-learned/332> p.36 (accessed August 2 2016)

<sup>417</sup> Hashim, A.S. (2011) Terrorism as an Instrument of Cultural Warfare: the meaning of Anders Breivik International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore V o l u m e 3 I s s u e 8 , August 2011, Available at link - (accessed august 9 2016) <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-August11.pdf> p.4

<sup>418</sup> Ibid p.5

<sup>419</sup> Ibid p.6

and provided a timeline which the crusaders should follow. The timeline which begins from 1999 and aims to be fully completed in 2083, is an indication of how deep the roots of Islam are within Europe and its demolish will take time and its final product will never be seen and enjoyed by Breivik himself, however, it is for the future and next generations of a more pure and mono-cultural Europe, Breivik imagined. Also, Breivik, was not under the impression that this calling would be accepted and embraced easily by the public, for he understood that it will be scrutinized by many, not understood, however a small price, in the light of Europe someday being freed of Marxism, Islam. For the situation in Norway and Europe, the multiculturalism that has become, from the immigrants and Muslims, feminism is also to blame, according to Breivik. He believed that Europe had grown to be soft against immigrants and others and their priorities toward their family are not in order;

*“Feminists, Breivik argues, caused European women to neglect their reproductive and domestic duties to the point that the “indigenous people” now stand at the brink of extinction. Feminists favor multiculturalism, care for refugees, the poor and disabled, and have feminized Western men who know how to change diapers but have lost their ability to fight.”<sup>420</sup>*

Despite the fact that Breivik used the Internet and social media and was actively present on right wing extremist forums, he did not seem to have communicated his intentions of attacking, before the distribution of the Manifesto a few hours prior to the attacks.<sup>421</sup> Breivik most likely made that choice in order to avoid being suspected and since he conceived the idea and was planning to execute it himself and not aiming to recruit and confide I someone to obtain support. Moreover, Breivik's interests pre-existed but were further cultivated by counter-jihad bloggers, such as Fjordman, which promoted the concept of stopping Muslim immigration flows and the Islamic impact on the West.<sup>422</sup>

Lastly, Breivik seems to dedicate a large part of his Manifesto material, providing information and instructions on operations, preparations and technical instructions on bomb making, of various types, and even studied al-Qaeda's similar manuals on “do it yourself” bombs, and also, was innovative himself in producing a new type of bomb by diluted fertilizer, by taking under consideration the restrictions on concentrations in fertilizers imposed due to the fertilizer bomb used by the Oklahoma City bombing.<sup>423</sup> Also, Breivik used his attacks to promote his

<sup>420</sup> Ibid Gardell, M. (2014) p.140

<sup>421</sup>Ravndal, J.A. Anders Behring Breivik's use of the Internet and social media *Journal EXIT Deutschland* August 2 2013, Availabl at link-(accessed September 4 2016) <http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/28/44> p.174

<sup>422</sup> Ibid p.175

<sup>423</sup> Ibid 179

propaganda as well as him creating new Twitter and Facebook accounts right before carrying out the attacks.<sup>424</sup>

All things considered, Breivik is a right-wing terrorist who carried out attacks that were highly facilitated by the Internet. The sources quoted in the Manifesto were derived from the Internet and he is said to have briefly posted a video presenting it online<sup>425</sup>. Moreover, his funding and purchases of material for his attacks were carried out online. Also, he communicated with like-minded individuals on forums and aimed at promoting his Manifesto, his own propaganda, inspired by other online material of similar counter-jihad ideology, by sending it via email to such individuals and by attracting more attention towards it with the attacks. Finally, Breivik invented a new type of bomb, from diluted fertilizer since he took into account the restrictions after the Oklahoma attacks, he surpassed a hurdle and created something new that may one day be used frequently and become itself a trend in terrorism.

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<sup>424</sup> Ibid 180-1

<sup>425</sup> Public IntelligenceUtøya Gunman Anders Behring Breivik Video Manifesto “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence” *Public Intelligence* . July 23, 2011 Available at link-(accessed August 5 2016)  
<https://publicintelligence.net/utoya-gunman-anders-behring-breivik-video-manifesto/>



## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS

The thesis attempted to present and examine recent trends in terrorism in the post 9/11 era. The trends at hand shared a common thread of using technology and specifically cyber-based capabilities and means to further their objectives. Terrorism has existed through the ages in different forms in order to achieve their desired goals. Each chapter seems to be further connected, *Chapter 2*, regarding the use of social media by terrorists such as propaganda, radicalization, recruitment, financing the application of which could be seen in the examination of the terrorist groups ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab in *Chapter 3*.

Moreover, the material and activities of terrorists online and on social media, could be valuable sources in the attempt to trace and detect terrorist activities and could become significant Intelligence in the fight against them, also on the other hand, terrorists as well could put such information derived from open sources and mainly social media to use, in order to promote their own aims, as examined in *Chapter 5*. Also, as mentioned all cyber related terms are nonetheless confusing and have been used interchangeably, wrongfully and overly used by media and governments, often resorting to labeling multiple activities even various terrorist uses of social media as cyber-terrorism, despite the fact that it might not be the case, for that reason *Chapter 4* examines cyber-terrorism. *Chapter 6*, might not seem related, however despite the fact of also being considered as trends Right-wing extremism, “lone wolves” and Anders Breivik also utilize technology and social media in many ways and it seemed fit and fair to also present non-Islamic-extremist related terrorism, and counter-jihad motivated.

#### 7.1 Addressing the research questions

The research questions the thesis aimed to provide answers , as stated in *Chapter 1* are:

1. *What are the (new) trends in terrorism in the post 9/11 era?*
  
2. *What seems to facilitate the emergence and/or recurrence of trends in terrorism?*

### ***1. What are the (new) trends in terrorism in the post 9/11 era?***

The thesis at hand aimed to present and examine certain forms of terrorist activities in the post 9/11 era and are considered a trend or trending. To begin, the first trend is the use of social media by terrorists. Terrorist have always aimed to attract attention which then acts to promote their motives and requests, later terrorism relied on (traditional) media attention to attract recruits and donors, promote their message, however nowadays, terrorists use social media to do all that, and hence are able to reach a wider audience uncensored, not need to rely on other media outlets to publicize their actions, possibly altering some aspects of it.

Also, social media, and all the related hashtags, comments, material gives the illusion of a group's strength disproportionately to reality. All terrorist groups appear to have understood the remarkable and unique characteristics and opportunities provided by social media, it is easily accessible, available at a minimal cost, having at the same time the ability to reach a global audience with barely any restrictions, social media may have certain security policies to safeguard users from terrorist material and activities, but it relies on user reporting, meaning that it must first been seen by a user and perhaps even affected an individual already, yet there is no way to safely assess how many users it reached before reported and how it affected the individual in question. The requirement of searching through data and sorting out the inappropriate users and material beforehand is not possible, since it would defy the nature of social media which could be used instantaneously without being checked prior to signing up for an account or posting. The terrorist groups of ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, all use social media for propaganda, radicalization, recruitment and financing purposes. Therefor, it should be considered that this trend, meaning the use of social media by terrorist groups is verified, and is still trending.

Moreover, cyber-terrorism is considered a trend since it is a term used widely by the media and governments, and the attention increased after the 9/11 attacks. The term has been loosely used by the governments and media, in cases that although are cyber-based, are not actually cyber-terrorism. There are many cyber-related terms and activities which cause harm and/or damage however it is difficult to label these activities as cyber-terrorism. The criteria for an activity to be considered cyber-terrorism, it must be an attack from and against information technology, while aiming to generate fear and achieve their goals. Although it is a rather surprising fact that although much has been heard and written about cyber-terrorism, it has never actually occurred. Many cyber-activities exist, such as cyber-crime, cyber-espionage, hacktivism, and many others that if not harmful by their nature could easily become.

The combination of “cyber” and “terrorism” is hard to define precisely, especially due to the disunity of the latter. In conclusion, after the examination of cyber-terrorism and its closely related terms easily mistaken for, it could be concluded that although initially cyber-terrorism appears as being a trend, it actually never has occurred to date, however it may possibly be a future trend. The word relies upon cyber-capabilities for almost all interactions, and that relationship will only increase in the future, making information technology an attractive threat. New generations born in an ever evolving high-tech era, may prefer to take action through cyber terrorist activities activities.

Furthermore the role of OSINT was considered to be a trend since even though it is not a new concept it has become more valuable, due to the mass data on the Internet and the terrorist presence and activities therein and also SOMINT, which is a form of OSINT that utilizes information from social media, for Intelligence purposes. Open sources and social media are significant sources for Intelligence, since they could be used alongside other forms of intelligence to create a well rounded picture of a situation and provide safer responses to issues. However, information derived from open sources and social media, though may be helpful for governments and intelligence agencies in the war against terrorism, terrorist could also, utilize the information provided to learn more about their enemy, and adapt accordingly. The 9/11 attacks, increased the feelings of insecurity and it was thought that perhaps there was an oversharing of information, which seemed innocent at the time however could have been or be in the future rather helpful for terrorists.

Moreover, right-wing extremism, is also a trend, however its existence is not new, but should be considered a trend since it is on the rise. The reason it is, is do to deeply rooted feelings of hate and discrimination, which takes various forms, anti-abortion, anti-communism, anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism ,to just name a few. Anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism seem to be taking the lead however. Anti-semitism and anti-Islamism are not new, but rather deeply rooted. After the events of 9/11 and nowadays with the migration flows from the Middle East and Northern Africa have caused Islamophobia in Europe, and are Muslims are being targeted and seem to be scapegoats and blame them for many of the problems Europe faces. However, even though many of the terrorist organizations today carry out terrorist attacks in the name of Islam, it does not represent all Muslims nor is it the true version of Islam. Terrorists conduct brutal acts even against other Muslims and are justifying their actions under religion.

Another considered as a trend is lone wolf terrorism, since many attacks however are labeled so. A lone wolf terrorist is considered to have acted alone without assistance and direct directions to conduct the attack. The media quickly seems to label an attack as one of a lone wolf, without first gathering enough information. It is not always obvious if an attacker is linked to a terrorist

organization or not. More often than not, an attack considered initially as a lone wolf attack, is later discovered that the attacker had actually been in contact or even recruited by a terrorist organization. Often traces on the Internet of the connection are discovered since the Internet and social media are highly utilized by terrorists to radicalize, inspire, train, propagandize, recruit, but also, the attacker could have been in contact with someone in the physical world. Also, terrorist groups have called for lone wolf attacks anywhere and with any means possible, providing potential targets, dates, locations, and even instructions to create weapons and explosives. One might support that it is not directed to a specific individual, and the individual may not be an official member of the group however the groups call upon the *Ummah* to act, any truthful Muslim, so if an individual feels part of that community, even if not a member of the group.

Also, the attacker usually conducts the attack with specific motives and ideology in mind which is supported by an established terrorist group and also many times these so called lone wolf attacks are taken responsibility for by terrorist groups. Moreover, the so called lone wolves seem to have notified someone in their environment of their planned attacks, meaning that they are in a way also accomplices, therefore again, not alone. Lone wolf terrorism is also used by governments as well in order to justify the fact that the attack could not have been easily detected, hence not been able to be prevented. Also, they use the term to make the attacker seem either mentally unstable or in order to avoid chaos, since it sounds better that an attack was committed by an unstable individual and was a random single event than to admit that an international terrorist organization orchestrated the attack. To conclude, lone wolf terrorism are indeed acts committed by one or a few individuals, however they are not alone. So, perhaps acting in small or individual units for various reasons, such as avoiding detection easier, is a trend but the attackers are not truly acting alone, and should not be labeled “lone wolves”. They are supported in various manners by terrorist groups and are therefore a part of the group, even if in an extended and decentralized form.

## ***2. What seems to facilitate the emergence and/or recurrence of trends in terrorism?***

The 9/11 attacks apart from being tragic events that cost the lives of thousands, are benchmark events of history, politics International Relations, such as the benchmark events of 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, 1919 and 1945 the ending of WWI and WWII accordingly, 1989 which marked the end of the Cold War era and the emerge of a uni-polar world. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were successful and their impact is strongly present and imprinted on today's society. The thesis indicates a few factors seem to facilitate the emergence and/or recurrence of trends in terrorism. To begin with, *successful attacks* and *strategies* are often adopted by other groups and are even able to

contribute to its development and advancement. For example the use of media by al-Qaeda, that as a predecessor of ISIS, already had understood the value of media and audio-visual material, and uploaded videos online, communicated through chat rooms and forums. These successful methods were then adopted by other groups as ISIS that also widely uses audio-visual material, however upgraded and more sophisticated than al-Qaeda before them, of course due to the technical advancement since then. Al-Qaeda first published Inspire Magazine in 2010, which contained good graphics however ISIS's Dabiq magazine first published in 2014 contained even higher quality graphics, editing and enriched content. When something is seen as successful, it is rational for it to be adopted and further developed and adjust according to each terrorist group's needs.

Yet, a successful technique, method, strategy is not always adopted by other terrorist groups, which brings us to another factor that facilitates trends emerging and/or reappearing from the past, *adaptability*. Terrorist groups seem immune to changes. They are able to adapt and find ways to carry out their plans. Even if a successful attack takes place its operational methods are not always adopted and widely used as to create a trend. The reason is that for an attack to be successful, means that some aspect was neglected, overlooked, however, was not detected and/or was unable to be stopped, and considered to be a failure. After failing in preventing attacks, such as 9/11, there is an effort to take up new measures to prevent similar ones from ever happening again, meaning that if another such attack ever was attempted again, it would most likely be detected in time and prevented. Hence, terrorists although acknowledging the success of an attack might not be able to recreate it, and must adapt to the measures created post the successful attack.

History has shown that terrorists find new and surprising ways to conduct their brutalities, adapting to changes, and the options are not even limited by imagination. Moreover, terrorists never fall short of surprising when choosing their type of attack. As seen in ISIS videos, beheadings by swords and knives of even a single individual recorded and posted online could have a strong impact and generate a significant response, meaning that terrorists organization around the world understand the impact of even a single life lost in a brutal manner and distributing it online for all to view, even on-demand is strong and it might be unnecessary to resort to mass casualties and attacks needing years of preparation, training and funds and risk involved as in the 9/11 attacks.

Moreover, adaptability is not only applied to new measures created, but adaptability to all changes, such as shortage of funding, loss of territory, allies and manpower, shifts in the International system, governments, the group's leadership, and in face of any change a group may be up against. After the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda decentralized, mainly due to the US invasion of Afghanistan, shortly after, and perhaps even more so after the death of its founder and leader, Osama Bin Laden which may have provided a window of opportunity for other groups, such as ISIS

to take on a more active role and leadership of the jihad movement. However, al-Qaeda, although seemingly out of the spotlight is still powerful and has created alliances with other terrorist groups, it too adapted to survive. Terrorists are resourceful and innovative and most likely will keep adapting to changes in order to survive and continue their cause.

In addition, the advancements in *technology* and *information and communication technology* generate change. Media and cyberspace provide unlimited opportunities at a minimal cost are exploited by terrorists, they are given their own uncensored which can reach global audiences to promote uncensored material and publicize their acts. Societies today highly rely on technology and therefore create new trends along with the ever evolving nature of technology. Therefor as long as technology in all its forms evolve, terrorists will attempt to exploit them and thus generate new trends. Also, *competitiveness* between terrorist groups, especially if of the same ideology could lead to the emerge of new trends in order to stand out from its rivals. As products, compete to become the consumer's choice, terrorist groups also compete for publicity, media attention, recruits, donations, and leadership of the movement (if sharing like-minded ideology such as ISIS and al-Qaeda) and allies. Competition between dangerous and deadly groups can have devastating consequences, since their desire to surpass the other could leave result to the loss of many lives, since terrorists do not hesitate using violence on a daily basis, and especially when competing with another group that also does not hesitate the competing groups will probably become even more brutal and deadly.

Additionally, new trends are created to keep up to the special-effect environment society has grown accustomed to. Society today is to a point immune to images of death and torture, due to TV, movies, video games that show gruesome images. Therefor terrorists must come up with new trends in order to attract media attention and create an strong impact such as the images of 9/11. Terrorism relies and feeds off media attention and must produce an image with strong impact to become marketable enough for images to be produced and constantly reproduced by the media. The attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Jewish supermarket, followed by a manhunt of the attackers in January of 2015, gained significant attention accompanied by social media hashtags showing unity and uncountable images in honor of the victims as did the attacks of November 2015, outside a soccer match, at cafés and restaurants and at the Bataclan theater.

## 7.2 Future Research

There is a lot of room and material for future research to be conducted both on terrorism and the new trends it presents and will continue on doing so in the future. The thesis attempted to present and examine certain trends, however to an extent due to the nature of the thesis. However, each chapter and the trends within, are significant and deserve to be researched separately in order to achieve a further and more in depth understanding. Moreover, the material on these topics continues to be enriched daily, a fact that is important for a researcher, however deeply saddening cause it involves not statistics of victims, but people, each having a unique story and background and family left behind. Hopefully, this thesis will serve as a spark for others interested in the field to research and examine the trends mentioned and the bibliography sources provided may perhaps assist in the initial steps of the research and inspire the examination of other trends in terrorism.

\* \* \*

Perhaps the ability to innovate and create new trends to adapt and survive against changes in the environment and threatening existence of enemies and competitors, are deeply rooted in human nature itself and state, non-state actors and individuals all compete to survive, and must invent to ways to adapt to changes. It may seem to have some similarities to realism, in the way that war is inevitable and states are always competing with one another and security never truly exists, however it could also be Darwinism, or constructivism since actors influence the environment and the environment the actors, or perhaps human nature is hostile such as in K. Waltz's *Man, the State and War*<sup>426</sup>. However it may be explained, terrorism will probably exist as long as humanity does, and will keep on creating new forms and trends in order to adapt and continue to exist. Future trends that will emerge or reappear from the past are not able to be predicted, but undoubtedly will exist, and even though everything should and could be expected, the level of innovation and use of creativity and imagination applied to reality to cause harm, is still a surprising characteristic of humankind.

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