

EXAMINING THE HELLENIC-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS THROUGH THE PRISM OF SHELTER THEORY



*Thesis for the Completion of the Program: 'MSc American Studies: Politics,
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11 April 2024

Abstract

Apart from NATO membership, Greece and the U.S.A. enjoy a long-standing bilateral defense partnership which has benefited both countries. Greece's highly geostrategic location and stabilizing strategic culture are appreciated by the U.S.A., which seeks dependable and honest allies in the boiling-hot region of the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, American military and political power, combined with its advanced defense industry and its influence on revisionist NATO allies, make the U.S.A. Greece's main protector at times of great peril.

This study examines this bilateral partnership from the aspect of shelter theory, highlighting how important these two allies are to each other.

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List of Acronyms

AFRICOM	United States African Command
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSDP	European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy
CTA	Comprehensive Technical Agreement
CTFP	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
CTIWFP	Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program
DASD SO/LTC-CT	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DICA	Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreement
DoD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EastMed Act	Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ERIP	European Recapitalization Investment Program
ERP	European Recovery Program
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIR	Flight Information Region
FMF	Foreign Military Financing Program

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFP	Global Firepower (www.globalfirepower.com)
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
GTE	Global Train and Equip Program
HAF	Hellenic Air Force
HAFGS	Hellenic Air Force General Staff
HAGS	Hellenic Army General Staff
HMoND	Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense
HNDGS	Hellenic National Defense General Staff
HNGS	Hellenic Navy General Staff
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICP	International Counterproliferation Program
IMET	International Military Education & Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IFS	International Financial Statistics
MDCA	Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA	National Defense Authorization Act
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PwrIndx	Global Firepower Power Index
SOFA	NATO Status of Forces Agreement
SRTP	Secure Real-Time Platform

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations Organization
UNGA-C1	United Nations General Assembly 1 st Committee
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US or USA	United States of America
USD	United States dollar
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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INTRODUCTION

Despite its ups and downs, the strategic partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. is long-standing, and it keeps deepening and expanding. This study comes at a time when American officials state that this strategic partnership is currently ‘stronger than ever’ with every opportunity they get (e.g. Athens Bureau, 2023). And they are right; anti-Americanism is decreasing, Washington has begun to understand Greece’s sense of threat regarding Turkey, summits between American and Greek officials have increased, and Washington has been providing Athens with massive military aid to help her make up for the setbacks of her ten-year-long debt crisis. Indeed, the Greek news-feeds are dominated by articles referring to the upgrade of the Greek F-16 jets to the Viper edition, the sale to Greece of F-35 jets, donations of military material and equipment through the EDA program, as well as joint military exercises between the armed forces of the two states.

From a theoretical point of view, new theories and concepts have emerged from the 1970s onwards. The era of Decolonization brought the need for the development of new theoretical frameworks that would help International Relations scholars interpret the behavior of the small states that resulted from this major international event. This need led to the development of small-state theory, which includes shelter theory.

The author of this thesis has been especially intrigued by shelter theory because it highlights that small states ought to bring some tradeoffs to the table and carry some of their own weight when they seek protection from an alliance. Although the theory includes a series of principles, its quintessence is the question of what sacrifices and concessions the protégé is willing to make in order to stay under the protector’s security umbrella. Given the fact that, from the early 2020s onwards, Greece has finally begun to realize that its securitization under the American umbrella requires that it adopts a more active and assertive foreign policy that benefits the Washington interests as well, one should consider that it is about time to study the strategic relationship between Athens and Washington from the aspect of shelter theory. And it is a very interesting and special project indeed, because normally International Relations analysts use traditional theories designed for great powers –most notably realism—to interpret Washington’s decision-making on hard-power issues.

As the title suggests, the purpose of this study is to look into the strategic partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. through the prism of shelter theory. To make things clear, this thesis focuses on the hard-power aspect of the partnership, which is military affairs. In addition, although NATO is a big part of this cooperation and there are a few references to this alliance in the thesis, our study focuses on the bilateral partnership. In particular, the study starts with an analysis of the theoretical concepts of small states and shelter and then moves on to prove that Greece is a small state that encounters multiple threats. In Chapter 4 we describe the bilateral military cooperation between Washington and Athens, and we refer to the reactions that this partnership has provoked in the Greek society. Finally, in Chapter 5, we demonstrate the extent to which the defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. can be seen through the prism of shelter theory. Our general conclusion is that shelter theory in fact can be applied to a great extent to this partnership.

We conducted this study using mixed methods, which helped us overcome the obstacles that the nature of the subject implies. For the purpose of reaching safe conclusions, the use of a wide range of primary and secondary sources was found imperative. As a result, we used a variety of Greek and American official documents, maps, and databases, as well as pieces of Greek and international literature.

Finally, we find that this novel theory only offers a start for the analysis of the strategic relations between Greece and America. We hope that the U.S.-Greek partnership in this field is analyzed through the prisms of more International Relations theories, since each of them can reveal new avenues for its deepening and expansion.

CHAPTER 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

On Small States

Shelter theory is based on small-state theory. Therefore, it is only fair to start this literature review by referring to scholarly works trying to define the small state, discussing the unique qualities of small states, and analyzing the challenges that such countries face as members of the international community.

Why Study Small States

Numerous scholars have expressed complaints about the shortage of theoretical literature on the foreign policy of small states. For instance, Brady and Thorhallsson (2021) claim that, generally, there is a shortage of theoretical frameworks for small states. The problem in their view is that International Relations scholarship does not have enough ‘maps’ (Brady and Thorhallsson, 2021, p. 5)¹ that could ease our understanding of small states. And, given the fact that the thinking behind the behavior of a small state differs from the reasoning behind the attitude of a large state, the mainstream International Relations theories (Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism), which are, in fact, often used to explain the actions of small states, are considered by the authors as ‘too imprecise’ (Brady and Thorhallsson, 2021, p. 5) for the interpretation of the case of such countries. What is more, Knudsen (1996), who makes an extensive report about the bibliography on small states, claims that, although significant works were written on the concept of small states after the two world wars, soon a considerable number of scholars reacted to the existence of this field, claiming that it had no analytical value. In fact, as Long (2017) admits, the concept of small states has caused more splintering than concord.

Given the difficulties of the concept, it is quite tempting to suggest that it is not worthwhile to study small states. However, the literature provides several reasons why small states need to be studied in International Relations.

To begin with, the substantial number of small states in the contemporary world is presented as a fundamental reason why small states should be studied. Baldacchino and Wivel (2020) suggest that the fall of the empires combined with the aggrandizement of nationalism and the bolstering of international institutionalism has resulted in the proliferation of small states. Similarly, Rickli (2008) supports the argument on the proliferation of small states, adding that it has resulted in most of the members of the EU and NATO being small states. Furthermore, Neumann and Gstöhl (2004, p. 2) argue that ‘the great majority of the world’s two hundred plus legally sovereign states are small’.

Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) adopt a nuanced approach to the significance of studying small states, explaining it mostly through the prism of the conduct of the great

¹ Brady and Thorhallsson (2021) refer to the absence of theories that, like maps, could help us understand small states’ actions.

powers. One more reason they suggest that small states should continue being examined is the behavior of the great powers; for some, great powers will inexorably use their potent means, hence only such countries are worth to be examined. However, for Neuman and Gstöhl (2004) this is a debatable presumption, because, in their view, it may only be true in an international system where states do not feel constrained by accountability or by international rules of proper attitude. Although it is not clear why the authors consider this a reason to keep studying small states, we can see that they try to explain that, just because they have major capabilities in their hands, great powers are not the only state actors deserving scholars' attention. A third reason Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) think that the International Relations community should keep studying small states is the latter's faith in international law and international systems. The two scholars suggest that being a great power leads to being able to shape international organizations and reinforce favorable outcomes even in that great power's absence. Yet, despite great powers' privileged position in international institutions, such bodies make resource-based decisions through formal protocols and rules. Although this point does not clearly explain *why* a scholar should study small states, we can say that the authors believe it is worth it because it provides an opportunity to examine international regimes from the view of their small members. Finally, Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) claim that regimes and policies do not exclusively result from great-power bargains, but also from their relations with other actors. By including small states more substantially in International Relations research, the field is enriched empirically with valuable new data.

Knudsen (1996) sees that small-state theory is more valuable as a 'focusing device' than an 'analytical tool' (Knudsen, 1996, p. 4) and suggests that it is particularly useful in security studies. From the aspect of security studies, Knudsen considers the study of small states relevant, since they face security problems more regularly than large states. To explain his point of view, Knudsen (1996) refers specifically to the issue of survival as being of vital importance to a small political unit. Furthermore, he mentions that the study of small-state security involves the study of the power imbalance between a small state and a great power. Based on Knudsen's (1996) perspective, we may assume that it is worth examining Greece as a case study of small-state security; apart from being relatively small in size and capabilities, the Hellenic Republic faces an array of threats directly connected to its survival, such as Turkey's revisionism.

Overall, we should agree with Maass (2009), who suggests that the study of small states is needed both for our understanding of the developments in the international system and for our scientific analysis in the field of International Relations. And although the maintenance of a theoretical field specializing in small states might make International Relations theory more complex, it also enriches it and enhances its capacity to explain the events that shape our world.

Defining Small States

Yet what is a small state? Scholars trying to define small states can be divided into two groups: The first group (that we call here *absolutists*) considers one single measurable factor of power (most often population size). In their effort to be as precise as possible, those scholars set specific cut-off numbers which have rather limited theoretical or empirical basis as well as low analytical value; this is because cut-off points per factor vary among scholars. How was this specific cut-off point decided? Why is this specific factor decisive for a state's smallness and not some other? These questions are

raised when we read the work of those authors. The second group takes multiple measurable factors into account (e.g. population, GDP, and landmass). On the other hand, the second group –that, for this thesis, we call *relativists*- believes that a state's smallness is more relative than absolute. Typically, these scholars take into consideration a combination of quantifiable and qualitative power factors, which they place in an analytical framework of what they call '*asymmetry*' or '*asymmetric relations*', referring to the power deficiencies that affect the actions of small states both in their immediate regional environment and on a global level. The present study is based on the relativist approach.

Regarding the scholars who take into consideration only one specific and measurable characteristic to define smallness, we start with Prasad (2009), who claims that only states with less than 1.5 million population may be considered small. His suggestion is mainly based on a 2000 World Bank report (Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank Task Force on Small States, 2000), yet he admits that this specific cut-off point has no theoretical basis. Therefore, according to Prasad, only forty-five states can be classified as small. Prasad's approach is problematic because it excludes from the small-state category a plethora of states with small-state grand strategy, while he focuses on a small sub-category of small states called 'microstates'; states of this category are simply referred to as 'very small states' (Richards, 1990, p. 40)².

In her paper 'Studying Small States in International Security Affairs: A Quantitative Analysis', Panke (2017) also takes into consideration population size as the sole determining factor of smallness, clearly stating that she intentionally excludes geographic and military factors. To justify her approach, she claims that population affects capabilities and motives, 'both of which are relevant to the dynamics of international security negotiations' (Panke, 2017, p. 238). Yet Panke's approach is problematic too. Yes, population is important; nevertheless, when it comes to security negotiations, we need to take into consideration other factors too, including landmass, geographic position, military culture, alliances, as well as economic variables that normally support the war machine of a state. It is common knowledge that any government needs to know in advance what assets it has at its disposal to win the concessions it wants at the negotiating table. Population alone is not enough to secure any guarantees in the field of security and defense if, for example, it is an aging population.

Regarding relativists, and despite their differences, they all come to the same conclusion: the size of a state is a relative matter, and smallness only makes sense when we compare the state in question to the actors with which it interacts.

An example of the relativist approach is Baldacchino and Wivel's 'Small States: Concepts and Theories' (2020). First, the authors place the definitions of small states that they have found in the literature in three categories based on criteria that are flux and relative: (a) not being a great power; (b) having limited material capacities –'material assessment' (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020, p. 5); (c) preferences of the people and the domestic institutions of the state and 'other states' (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020, p. 6) which the authors do not specify –'political constructs' (Baldacchino and Wivel,

² Examples of microstates that Richards (1990) includes in his study are Malta, the Isle of Man, and Faroe Islands.

2020, p. 6). Finally, the authors provide their own definition, which they characterize as ‘synthetic’ (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020, p. 6). According to this definition, a small state has political, economic, and administrative structures with restricted capacities and is normally the less powerful side of ‘an asymmetric relationship’ (Baldacchino and Wivel, 2020, p. 7) whose operations or nature it cannot change alone. Also, small states are trapped in a specific power distribution on a both regional and global level, which they are unable to change by themselves too.

Rickli (2008) is another supporter of the relativist approach. Rickli has divided the small-state literature into four generations. The first generation, which is influenced by traditional Realism, includes works that define small states based on geographic size, population, or GDP, while the second generation, influenced by Neoliberalism, focuses on the ‘role’ and the ‘influence’ (Rickli, 2008, p. 308) of the state in the international system. According to the third generation, which is influenced by Constructivism, smallness is ‘a matter of self-perception’ (Rickli, 2008, p. 308), while the fourth generation focuses on the power deficit due to the state’s difficulty in mobilizing ‘material’, ‘relational’ or ‘normative’ resources (Rickli, 2008, p. 308). Rickli agrees with the fourth generation, which can indeed effectively define the small state. However, we believe that all four generations complement each other and could contribute to a very accurate definition altogether.

Thorhallsson et al. (2019) also support the relativist approach and see three approaches in the literature regarding the definition of small states: the first approach sets a resolute limit on a specific power factor, such as population, territory, and military; the second approach that they find uses pertinent and non-objective assessments of size, such as the ability to affect developments in the international system; as for the third approach, it concerns ‘multifactorial definitions’ (Thorhallsson, Steinsson and Kristinsson, 2019, p. 14), which take into account both factual and relative criteria of size. The authors conclude that deciding on a definition of small states will be an ‘imprecise’ and ‘subjective’ (Thorhallsson, Steinsson and Kristinsson, 2019, p. 14) task because the concept is used for a variety of periods and includes a wide spectrum of political entities.

Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) are relativists too. They examine smallness through three prisms: capabilities, institutions, and relations. Regarding capabilities, they refer to the capacities that the small state has comparing to those of a large state, while the prism of institutions refers to the high responsibility of great powers within those bodies as compared to small states. Finally, the prism of relationships, according to Neumann and Gstöhl, refers to the fact that great powers and small states need each other to exist.

Knudsen (1996) adopts the relativist approach too, suggesting that smallness is relative and a matter of relationships. According to Knudsen, limiting the term to counties with a specific number of inhabitants is of no interest. He claims that, from a security point of view, what defines a small state is the unfavorable, substantial inequality of power between that state and its neighbors and the way that this nation copes with the resulting imbalance.

Long (2017) also is a relativist who believes in the low value of searching for a definition for small states. Instead, he suggests that we study small states through the prism of asymmetry, which distinguishes their relations with larger states.

The piece by Bjerga and Haaland (2010) also adopts a relativist approach. Bjerga and Haaland claim that a state may be considered small based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria, such as geography, resources, historical background, state of the economy, humanitarian action, diplomatic competence, and residents' living standards. Again, we see here an approach that includes—though is not limited to—factors that have to do with a state's interaction with its environment and the international system; an interaction that is asymmetric by nature.

Vaicekauskaitė (2017) is one more relativist author who believes that small states can be defined based on a combination of measurable factors and asymmetric relations with other states. More specifically, she believes that quantitative factors are important because they determine the influence of the state and its independence regarding its decision-making on security policies, whereas she also takes into consideration 'perceived security capability when the state's elite does not expect to make an impact acting alone or in a small group' (Vaicekauskaitė, 2017, p. 9).

Maass (2009) takes the relativist approach a bit further; he considers it futile and unimportant to develop one single definition for small states, because the lack of consensus on the term has not hindered the study of those countries. In fact, he welcomes this plethora and diversity of definitions, claiming that they have provided the field with 'conceptual flexibility to match different research designs as well as the quite substantial variations among actual small states in the world' (Maass, 2009, p. 65).

Brady and Thorhallsson (2021) support a relative approach too. In their work, the authors define small states as 'those nations that are small in landmass, population, economy, and military capacity' (Brady and Thorhallsson, 2021, p. 2). They also add that, due to hybrid warfare, other factors could be significant as well today, such as maritime and space borders, 'national resilience and unity', as well as 'digital diplomacy capacity' (Brady and Thorhallsson, 2021, p. 2). Simple and inclusive, this is the definition that will be used for this thesis.

Having analyzed some of the literature on small states, let us now proceed with the analysis of shelter theory, which we use in this study to examine the defense relations between Greece and the USA.

On Shelter Theory

The particularities of small states have led to the development of a new alliance theory, called *shelter alliance theory*, or simply *shelter theory*. The concept was established at the Institute of International Affairs of the University of Iceland and its Head of Research Baldur Thorhallsson, yet a few other European scholars have contributed to its development as well. Here we analyze the theory as it has been developed so far, and we discover that it can interpret important aspects of Greece's foreign policy.

According to Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016), the purpose of shelter theory is to interpret the behavior of Western small states regarding their coalition preferences. It is about the combination of strategies that small states follow to mitigate the vulnerabilities resulting from being small. The authors describe it as a 'unique form of alliance relationship' (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 2) established between a small state

and a great power or international organization and entailing relinquishment of control over political decision-making from the small state to the protecting power. In other words, the patron provides the small state with protection in exchange for some substantial and tangible benefits.

According to the literature (e.g. Harb, 2021; Wivel & Ingebritsen, 2018), small states choose to compensate for their vulnerabilities through shelter, taking into account an international system that is anarchic, unstable, unpredictable, and substantially affected by power asymmetries. We understand that this is an international environment that can cause intense insecurity to a state that does not have the means to defend itself on its own against existential threats.

Shelter theorists believe in the significance of their concept for the development of alliance theory for a few reasons. Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) argue that, although traditional alliance theory helps to make sense of international coalitions, there are many areas that it does not cover effectively, including the actions of small states. In Bailes and Thorhallsson's (2016) view, small states are peculiar actors in the international system, hence the use of nuanced theoretical frameworks is essential for their acts to be understood. But traditional theories focus mostly on the behavior of great powers, rather than those of small nations. Although their contribution has been significant, they fail to recognize the distinct 'conditions, challenges, influences and opportunities' that small states encounter (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 2). Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) also argue that, even though some aspects of traditional alliance theory are helpful for the interpretation of small states' effort to persist in a hostile and challenging international system, traditional alliance theory has failed to cover domestic factors such as population characteristics, political culture, and diplomatic expertise, as well as their alignment with larger actors. In addition, traditional alliance theory does not consider the novel ways of securitization, economic advantages, direct financial assistance, and cultural support provided by the international organizations or the modern costs deriving from interfering and legally based 'regional and international integration processes' (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 7).

In another paper, Thorhallsson (2018) adds one more factor that makes shelter theory significant in his view. He argues that shelter is based on three interconnected principles that are related to crises reducing the perils deriving from a crisis, assisting with the absorption of the shock, and providing help with the management of the aftereffects of the crisis.

Shelter theorists argue that shelter alliance theory differs from traditional alliance theories in six ways, which constitute the core principles of the concept and are summarized in the table below by Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016):

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Small states are fundamentally different political, economic, and social units than large states. ii. The foundation of the alliance relationship is distinctly unique for domestic as well as international reasons. iii. Small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation. |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> iv. Small states need political, economic, and societal shelter to thrive. v. Social and cultural relationships with the outside world are especially important for a small society. vi. Shelter may come at a significant cost for the small state. |
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Table 1: How alliance shelter theory differs from traditional alliance theories (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 5).

Next, we proceed with the analysis of those core principles.

Core principle i: small states are fundamentally different political, economic, and social units than large states.

Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) suggest that this is the principal argument of shelter theory. According to Thorhallsson's work (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2016; Thorhallsson, 2018; Thorhallsson et al., 2018), shelter theory dismisses the notion of traditional International Relations theories that all states are practically equal, only differing in terms of capabilities. In the view of shelter theory, small states are completely different from great powers. The differences lay not only in capabilities but also in decision-making reasoning. This different reasoning that drives small states' decision-making derives precisely from their limited capabilities, which cause integral structural weaknesses. For example, such weaknesses can be restricted diplomatic expertise, a small domestic market, or scant defense capacity. As a result of those limitations, a small state is more vulnerable to threats than a large state. To counter their vulnerability, small states enforce diverse solutions focusing on versatility and solidarity. Those options can be split into two: making domestic arrangements and seeking protection from stronger states or international organizations. In terms of seeking protection, establishing partnerships with small neighbors is also an option. However, protection has its costs, as the last principle of shelter theory suggests, which small states are more willing to pay than large states, due to the existential pressure they receive from the international system.

Core principle ii: the foundation of the alliance relationship is distinctly unique for domestic as well as international reasons.

The second core argument of shelter theory –which is relevant to the first one- is that a small state decides on the establishment of an allied relationship based both on its domestic and external circumstances. Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2018) maintain that small states choose their allies not only based on the prospect of their security maximization but also based on their need to secure adequate resources which will help their societies prosper. In fact, according to Gstöhl (2002), Ingebritsen (2000), and Thorhallsson (2015) as cited by Wivel and Ingebritsen (2018), domestic needs play a significant role in shelter-seeking.³ For example, the diversity among the Nordic states regarding their requests for economic shelter in the EU is explicable to a great

³ Shelter-seeking: the term used in small-state theory describing a state's quest for protection.

extent by the diversity among the organization of their industries and the power relations among the various economic cliques that estimate their expected benefits and losses. Similarly, Brianson and McCallion (2018), Gstöhl (2002), and Hansen and Waever (2002), as cited in Wivel and Ingebritsen (2018), suggest that Nordic states' societal shelter-seeking may be interpreted based on national self-conception combined with the role of the member states in European integration.

Core principle iii: small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation.

It is critical for shelter theory that the benefits of the alliance override the costs for the small protégé. In other words, the idea of relative gains is rejected by this theory. In fact, Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2018) insist that this condition is essential for a partnership to be regarded as a shelter. Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) justify this argument based on the restricted capacities of small states, which allow the latter to 'benefit from international cooperation in a manner denied to larger states' (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 5). For example, the United States as a protector cannot expect the same returns from Germany as from Denmark (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016).

Core principle iv: small states need political, economic, and societal shelter to thrive.

As we have mentioned already, shelter theory argues that small states seek protection to balance out the vulnerability that derives from their limited capabilities. Shelter theorists divide shelter into three categories (political, economic, and societal), which are analyzed in the following paragraphs.

Political shelter: Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016, p. 6) define political shelter as 'direct and visible diplomatic or military backing, as well as other strategic coverage at any given time of need provided by another state or an international organization'. Two years later, Thorhallsson (2018, p. 64) adds 'organizational rules and norms' at the end of the definition⁴. One can assume here that, for the relationship to be a political shelter, protection needs to be provided straight and evidently to the protégé, that is, not under the table nor through go-betweens.

There is no substantial disagreement in the literature about why small states seek and are provided with political shelter. Wivel and Ingebritsen (2018) as well as Thorhallsson and Bailes (2017) suggest a small state will seek political shelter as a result of its vulnerabilities in the military, diplomatic, and administrative spheres, while Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) specifically stress that vulnerability against external threats is just as important as domestic challenges; in their view, the political shelter helps a small state overcome its limitations such as shortage in know-how and infrastructure, and helps them 'reach their maximum potential by connecting them socially and

⁴ 'Political shelter takes the form of direct and visible diplomatic or military backing. As well as other strategic coverage at any given time of need provided by another state or an international organization, and/or organizational rules and norms' (Thorhallsson, 2018, p. 64).

diplomatically to the outside world' (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 6). Furthermore, Thorhallsson et al. (2018) focus on limited economic capacities and small populations. In their view, the restrictions in these two figures in the case of small states lead to a frail military and a disadvantaged position at the negotiating table.

To sum up, according to shelter theorists, political shelter is provided to protect the state both from the pressure of the international system and its own structural disadvantages. We also notice that scholars stress the immense influence that the domestic and external spheres have on each other.

Economic shelter: Thorhallsson (2018) defines economic shelter as protection that 'can take the form of direct economic assistance, a currency union, help from an external financial authority, beneficial loans, favorable market access, a common market, etc., all of which are provided by a more powerful country or by an international organization' (Thorhallsson, 2018, p. 64). From this definition, we conclude that, for an international economic relationship to be considered as an economic shelter, the protector needs to provide assistance straight and evidently to the protégé, like in the case of political shelter.

There is a general agreement among scholars on the major significance of economic shelter for the survival of small states. Due to the small size of their markets and population, small states are financially disadvantaged compared to large states and heavily depend on economic diplomacy and foreign trade to cover their needs. In addition, due to their limited resources, small states often implement unsolid fiscal policies. Consequently, they are more vulnerable to the fluctuations of the world economy. What is more, they are more exposed to international financial crises than large states, as the latter have larger markets, larger populations, and more resources to rely on. Therefore, small states look for opportunities for economic shelter, such as institutions of monetary integration, direct economic assistance, loans, and favorable trade agreements (Alessina and Spolaore, 2003; Thorhallsson, 2018; Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2018; Thorhallsson, Steinsson and Kristinsson, 2018; Wivel and Ingebritsen, 2018).

In sum, economic shelter is the provision of financial assistance to a small state by a more powerful actor directly and visibly. This kind of shelter is crucial, due to the limited economy of the small state, which makes it vulnerable to the fluctuations and shocks of the international economy.

Societal shelter: Citing Rokkan and Urwin (1983), Thorhallsson (2018) refers to societal shelter as a cultural feature of 'centre-periphery relations' (Thorhallsson, 2018, p. 64), which entails the inflow of 'messages, norms, lifestyles, ideologies, myths, and ritual systems' (Thorhallsson, 2018, p. 64).

From the literature, we can safely conclude that societal shelter is as important for small states as the other two categories of shelter. Thorhallsson et al. (2018) argue that thanks to societal shelter such states participate in the cultural and ideological evolution of their areas. They also stress the importance of such involvement in their effort to minimize the peril of technological, educational, and cultural stagnation, while they also refer to the major benefits that Iceland has enjoyed from the societal shelter

provided by the U.S. Thorhallsson and Bailes (2017) add another interesting dimension to societal shelter. In their view, it has to do with opening up to the world and benefiting from the free flow of civilization and know-how as well as with their small states' 'ontological security' (Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2017, p. 54). Besides, Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2018) contend that one quite evident and intertemporal element of small-state behavior is the quest for societal shelter, while they make the bold statement that inadequate societal shelter causes social stagnation and deterioration of living standards. In the same paper, Thorhallsson and Steinsson also highlight the importance of societal shelter from an economic point of view; they suggest that societal shelter facilitates small states' access to innovations that are necessary for the growth of their economies. In addition, Thorhallsson and Steinsson stress the dependence of small states on education from abroad, as they do not have adequate economies of scale to educate their workforce at home.

In conclusion, we see that small states seek societal shelter to promote their cultural development, boost their economic growth, and ensure the survival of their national identity.

Core principle v: Social and cultural relationships with the outside world are especially important for a small society.

As presented in the literature, the fifth core principle of shelter theory seems to be closely connected to societal shelter. Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) refer to 'social and cultural relationships with the outside world' (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016, p. 5) as relations of an abstract nature being essential for the small state in its efforts to avoid isolation, prevent its society from stagnating and compensate for its shortage of know-how. In the same spirit, Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2018) hold the view that one of the purposes of small states' quest for international cooperation is to maintain the vigor of their vulnerable societies. Thus, we see here that pursuing international cooperation on a social and cultural level is crucial for the survival and prosperity of small states according to shelter theory.

Core principle vi: Shelter may come at a significant cost for the small state.

The price that the small state has to pay for its protection is of fundamental significance in shelter theory. Shelter theorists (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2016; Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2017; Thorhallsson, 2018; Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2018; Thorhallsson, Steinsson and Kristinsson, 2018) agree that the provision of shelter may entail substantial costs for the protégé in political, economic, and social terms.

To start with, the shelter may entail deep penetration of the protector into the society of the small state, causing division amongst the citizens. As Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) argue, this kind of association can lead to transformations inside the community that is provided with the shelter, on top of its tangible contributions to the cooperation, such as political alignment and provision of military facilities. Thorhallsson et al. (2018) refer extensively to the example of the shelter relationship between the U.S. and Iceland; the Americans, who provided political, economic, and societal shelter during the Cold War had significantly influenced Iceland's cultural life to an extent

where some saw this influence as a ‘cultural competition’ (Thorhallsson, Steinsson and Kristinsson, 2018, p. 553) against the society. This, combined with the maintenance of a U.S. military base in Keflavik was a cause of frustration for many Icelanders.

Also, the large entity providing the shelter may demand specific returns or concessions from the protégé’s part which are not consistent with the latter’s national identity or desired international profile. In Vital (1967, p. 5), Thorhallsson and Bailes (2017, p. 54), and Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2018, p. 5) this constraint is considered a reduction of the small state’s ‘freedom of manoeuvre and choice’.

Furthermore, the small state risks abandonment if they refuse to agree to such concessions or if the protecting actor no longer sees considerable value in the alliance. For instance, Thorhallsson et al. (2018), refer to the gradual withdrawal of the American troops and supporting personnel from Iceland after the end of the Cold War. This development was a result of the downgrading of Iceland’s strategic value, combined with the failed efforts of two leftist governments⁵ to terminate the U.S.-Icelandic defense agreement.

Nonetheless, making concessions does not mean completely surrendering to the protecting actor or being annexed. Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) explain that a shelter alliance is a relationship that entails hierarchy on the one hand and equality and independence on the other. More specifically, they contend that, while small states have to pay a price in return for their participation in a bilateral alliance with a great power or in a multinational coalition, they still stay in control of their political decision-making on certain topics. Indeed, we can draw a few examples from the decision-making of Greece; despite its increasingly deep bond with the U.S. and its commitment to staying inside the kernel of European integration, Greece maintains its sovereignty in a wide spectrum of areas (e.g. taxation and national elections procedure).

One might think that this core principle collides with the third core principle of shelter theory (small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation). Nevertheless, this is not the case; none of the established shelter-theory scholars suggests that there is any discord between these two principles. In fact, from their papers we can conclude that they see the establishment of an international shelter alliance as a move whose fruits and required sacrifices have been strategically calculated both by the protector and the protégé.

These are the six core principles of shelter theory, which are also the points that make this concept different from traditional International Relations theories. Yet other points have been developed as well within the framework of shelter theory. Here we analyze two of them: the existence of more than one shelter alliances at the same time and the shelter provided by the U.S.

Multiple Shelter Coalitions at the Same Time

⁵ Thorhallsson et al. (2018) refer to the leftist governments that ruled Iceland from 1956 to 1958 and from 1971 to 1974.

Shelter theorists contend that it is feasible for small states to establish multiple shelter relationships. For instance, they can join different coalitions based on the area of cooperation or maintain multiple bilateral hard power cooperations with great powers or be both in bilateral and multilateral alliances. They can even have different shelters for the same area of concern. In Thorhallsson et al. (2018) and Thorhallsson (2018), we read that Iceland has many shelter providers, such as the U.S., the UN, NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, and its fellow Nordic States. Considering the Nordic States specifically, Thorhallsson and Bailes (2017) refer to a multitude of political, economic, and societal shelters that those nations have established among themselves and with other states and organizations from outside their region. Apart from the assistance they receive from the European Union, NATO, and the United States, they have also established the Nordic Council. All these coalitions cover a wide spectrum of areas of cooperation, including cultural and media affairs, finance, education and research, legislative and judicial issues, welfare, and matters of gender equality. Considering the small states of the Arab world, Harb (2021) refers to the smaller GCC states, who have been seeking shelter through cooperation with the U.S. and the application of ‘alternative strategies’ (Harb, 2021, p. 189) to protect themselves from the influence of their larger neighboring states, most notably Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Although the maintenance of multiple shelters at once seems a very complicated policy, it is in fact possible and particularly common. According to Wivel and Ingebritsen (2018), developing a network of multiple shelters on an institutional as well as a bilateral level has become feasible thanks to the spread of international agreements, which has led to a system of multiple actors and overlapping rules and norms for any area of international cooperation.

The principle of multiple shelters can be seen in Greek foreign policy too. Except for the shelter relationship that it enjoys with the U.S. (as we see further in this study), Greece has sought shelter in a bilateral defense partnership with France. Also, Greece is a member of NATO, the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and the 3+1 Initiative, to name just a few.

Washington as a Shelter Provider

The fact that the United States has played the role of the guarantor state in the contemporary international system since the end of World War II has resulted in the establishment of this nation as a shelter provider for a plethora of small states. As a result, the matter of the U.S.A. holding the role of shelter provider is also discussed by shelter theorists.

Tidwell (2021) analyzes the politics of shelter inside the U.S. political system and attempts to explain the shelter-seeking strategies of small states in Washington. To start with, Tidwell (2021) highlights the high complexity of the U.S. decision-making system as a result of the plethora of small states seeking influence. On the other hand –and in the framework of core principle (iii) of shelter theory as analyzed earlier—the U.S. administration often cannot count on full commitment from the part of its small allies.

Furthermore, Tidwell (2021) argues that small states will attempt to influence U.S. politics in their favor through an array of channels, such as diplomatic representatives, lobbying, tangible assistance to organizations (e.g. think tanks and universities), and

direct communication with the administrative and legislative branches of the U.S. administration.

By using Israel, Norway, and New Zealand as case studies, Tidwell (2021) shows that each protégé uses different strategies to achieve desirable outcomes. In specific, Israel uses *beltway hedging*, a strategy entailing the use of the support it enjoys from one branch of government to trigger the support of another. Norway, on the other hand, uses *diversification*, a complex strategy that entails the distribution of costs that the state is willing to pay amongst a wide spectrum of policies simultaneously. In Norway's case, this strategy includes NATO membership, communicating agreement on readiness in terms of defense spending, pursuing international rules that are desirable for the U.S.A., participating in conflict-management efforts in regions of high interest for the U.S., establishing connections inside the domestic U.S. policy-making, and empowering the Norwegian-American diaspora. Finally, New Zealand follows the *niche strategy*. Niche strategy is regarded as an option for small states, taking into account their very limited resources. Niche strategy entails the development of expertise into very specific areas, which then can be used as grounds for communication with the great power, which is the U.S. in this case. To position the Greek practice in this paper, we can say that Greece has mostly followed the first two strategies; through beltway hedging, the Hellenic Republic has managed to keep up with Turkey as regards U.S.-produced defense equipment, whereas through diversification it has managed to build a network of defense cooperations approved by the U.S., on top of the bilateral defense cooperation it maintains with America (e.g. NATO, 3+1 Initiative).

Overall, Tidwell (2021) suggests that small states seeking shelter from the U.S.A. seek enduring economic and security cooperation, yet each of them ends up in a unique relationship with America, based either on fixed determinants (e.g. geographical position) or variable factors (e.g. behavior).

A general observation that should be done here is that Tidwell (2021) refers directly or indirectly to the costs of maintaining the shelter relationship. While the protégé might not be able or willing to fulfill Washington's expectations to the fullest, there are certain trade-offs, such as paying the lobbies, donating to the various organizations, and paying for the costs of participation in the alliances –including the maintenance costs of the permanent diplomatic missions to the headquarters of those alliances.

However, Tidwell's (2021) views are not new. Robert O. Keohane, who is not a shelter theorist, expressed his frustration with the nature of the relations of the U.S.A. with its small allies in his infamous paper 'The Big Influence of Small Allies' (1971). Although it was written during the Cold War, this article has a few elements that are quite relevant to the international system we currently live in.

Keohane (1971), in his effort to explain that small allies influence American politics in a manner disproportionate to their size, begins his paper with the following astute words:

'Like an elephant yoked to a team of lesser animals, the United States is linked to smaller and weaker allies through a series of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements [...]. Alliances have in curious ways increased the leverage of the little in their dealings with the big [...]. These are the badgers, mice and pigeons—if not doves—of international politics, and in many

cases they have been able to lead the elephant. Alliances have in curious ways increased the leverage of the little in their dealings with the big' (Keohane, 1971, p. 161).

Furthermore, Keohane (1971) complains that some small allies' freedom of maneuver in the international arena—which he calls 'qualified independence' (Keohane, 1971, p. 162)—is disproportionate to the benefits that the U.S. gains from its 'partial dependence' (Keohane, 1971, p. 162) on them. He suggests that this strong influence of small partners and their occasional unwillingness to succumb to Washington's wishes can be justified mainly by the nature of the American political system itself and Washington's threat perception as regards Communism. What is more, Keohane (1971) argues that, in the 1960s, US decision-makers were so obsessed with their goals, that they at times appeared prepared to sacrifice anything for their achievement.

Like Tidwell (2021), Keohane (1971) claims that small states use a multi-level system to manipulate the U.S. decision-making system in their favor. In particular, he refers to three levels: official state negotiations, bargains with separate circles of the U.S. administration, and affecting the American public opinion and domestic interest groups. Keohane adds that the small ally may use more than one level simultaneously, provided it stays comparatively independent.

Finally, Keohane (1971) adds the value that alliances have for the great power, which, in essence, is an analysis of the costs for the small state as seen by shelter theory, but this time is done from a great power's point of view. Briefly, Keohane (1971) suggests that, for a great power like the U.S., the purpose of a peacetime alliance is not only resource-pooling but also the promotion of that great power's control over an adjacent or strategically critical area. In addition, he stresses the role of weapons sales in strengthening Washington's political control over the small ally.

So, we see here how an American analyst sees shelter theory's core principles (iii) and (vi). However, Keohane (1971) is not the only scholar whose views are relevant to shelter theory. Bar-Siman-Tov (1980) analyzes the influence of small allies from the aspect of their value to the U.S.

According to Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), one can explain the peculiarity of the great influence of some small allies on U.S. decision-making by trying to see it through the lens of some particular contexts and suggesting that there might be variations among power relations depending on factors such as areas of cooperation and importance. Some small partners have important trade-offs to offer, hence they can exercise influence. Their ability to impact U.S. politics in their favor does not only have to do with their manipulation expertise, but also with their possessing resources that are vital for the U.S. national security and economic power. In that spirit, Bar-Siman-Tov (1980) refers specifically to Greece as a small ally that is important to Washington due to its highly strategic location, which is ideal for the establishment of military facilities, such as bases and electronic intelligence stations.

Furthermore, Bar-Siman-Tov (1980) suggests that when the large partner relies on favorable actions from the part of its small allies for the promotion of its national interests, the result is a shift from a relationship of 'total dependence' (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980, p. 208) of those allies on the U.S. to one of interdependence. This new

relationship, according to Bar-Siman-Tov (1980) might justify the enhancement of small allies' impact on Washington's decision-making.

A valuable contribution by Bar-Siman-Tov (1980) to the American debate on Washington's alliances with small states is a clear reference to what the latter can receive in exchange for their support:

'By establishing and maintaining an alliance with a small ally who possesses important qualities—economic resources (Saudi Arabia, Mexico); suitable forces and readiness to act (Israel); strategic location (Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Greece)—the U.S. may profit thereby. The question is, what are the costs in influence in terms of those allies? Small allies that are important have to enjoy some relative influence. Influence has to reflect the relative contribution or the intrinsic value of the small ally to American interests. A major task for US policy-makers is, therefore, to find a reasoned and reasonable basis for distinguishing between importances and between costs' (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980, p. 212).

Therefore, it is safe to assume that Bar-Siman-Tov's paper (1980) also is relevant to shelter theory through its core principles (iii) and (vi), which refer to costs.

Conclusions

From this literature review we conclude that it is quite worthwhile to study small states, because, most importantly, small states are the vast majority of state actors in the contemporary international system. Furthermore, studying the increased threats that those states face due to their small capabilities in comparison to their larger neighbors gives us important insights into the challenges of the international arena. In addition, the study of those states enriches the field of International Relations with valuable new empirical data.

Yet despite the existence of a debate around the international relations of small states, there is not a universal definition of small states. From our study of the literature, we conclude that scholars who have attempted to define small states can be divided into two groups: the absolutists (who believe that one should take into account only one defining actor, such as population size) and the relativists (who believe in the concurrence of more than one defining factors and the relative nature of the term).

Shelter theory has been established particularly to accommodate the theoretical study of small states and it interprets the behavior of those countries regarding their coalition preferences. In general, through a shelter, small states pursue compensation for their deficiencies under the protection of a larger player and in return for this protection, they surrender to their protector some control over their political decision-making. A small state can be part of more than one shelter coalition simultaneously, which can be either bilateral or multilateral. A good case study of shelter theory is Greece, which has sought protection against the threats that it faces through a wide network of bilateral and multilateral alliances (e.g. bilateral cooperation with the U.S. and France and multilateral partnerships through membership in NATO and the EU).

To end with, the U.S. is considered a major shelter provider and its protection of small states—including Greece—has been discussed for decades. As it emerges from our literature review, it is believed that small allies, within the framework of their shelter-seeking efforts, affect Washington’s decision-making process to an extent that is disanalogous to their limited size. This makes sense in cases where such states have assets that can contribute to the promotion of American interests. One such state is Greece, which enjoys shelter and has an impact on the views of American decision-makers thanks to its geostrategic location, which is ideal for the installation of military facilities. In the chapters that follow we will see what makes the Hellenic Republic a small state that needs shelter and why America is so willing to provide it.

CHAPTER 2: Methodology

Introduction

It is a prerequisite for the understanding of this thesis to refer to the methodology that has been used to reach our findings. A short presentation of the logic and processes that were used for this particular thesis will help the reader make better sense of the findings. Also, this chapter will help the reader have a clear picture of how the sources were used, and therefore he/she is able to assess the reliability and validity of the findings, as well as the argument made on the central question.

The research phase took place between 1 August 2022 and 30 November 2023 and its objective was to answer the following questions:

- ❖ To what extent and in what terms is Greece a small state?
- ❖ What challenges urge Greece to seek external shelter?
- ❖ What does the bilateral defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. include? And finally:
- ❖ To what extent can shelter theory interpret this partnership?

From Chapter 1, the reader must already have concluded that the philosophical underpinnings of this study include small-state theory in general and the placement of Greece in the small-state debate with the use of tangible and measurable evidence.

Chapter 2 refers to the methods and tools that were used in order to answer the research questions of this project. We also refer to some major obstacles that we encountered and, of course, we also write a few words on the ethical aspect of the process, which is of critical importance for a research project examining matters of national defense.

Obstacles Encountered

Given the nature of the topic, a series of challenges had been expected to appear since the beginning of the research. Here we focus on three of them: contradicting theoretical pieces of literature, Greece's lack of regular national security documents, and classified information.

To start with, the theoretical part of the project was extremely difficult, due to the contradicting literature. In specific—as we saw in Chapter 1—there is a strong disagreement among small-state theory scholars on what makes a state small. Given the fact that Greece is not referred to as a small state with the use of solid evidence—with just a few exceptions—and the fact that the Hellenic Republic is not as small as other states that are repeatedly featured in small-state literature as case studies, the author initially thought that Greece should not be considered a small state at all and questioned the purpose of this project. However, she decided to proceed with it and attend a semester's worth of lectures on small states' international relations at the University of Macedonia. Through those lectures, the author had the opportunity to familiarize herself

with small-state theory in general and shelter theory in particular. Also, she learned that the relativist approach is the most popular one regarding the characterization of a state as a small one. Also, Greece was referred to as a case study multiple times in class, hence the author's doubts about the Hellenic Republic's smallness were completely annihilated.

In addition, Greece, unlike the U.S.A., does not publish national security documents on a regular basis. Apart from the negative impact that this has had on its foreign policy, this omission makes it hard for a researcher to have a clear picture of Greece's strategic goals and threat perceptions. In the same spirit, the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacks updated information concerning treaties that Athens has signed on the one hand and its bilateral relations with the rest of the world on the other. In particular, the webpage devoted to the Greece-U.S.A. relations is outdated with some extra paragraphs added to the text sporadically over the years. As a result, a researcher cannot find any details on the partnership between the two countries. To cope with this problem, the author heavily relied on American official websites and documents, which explain in more detail the Hellenic-American relations and in what ways the U.S.A. government expects to benefit from it. To reduce bias, the author also turned to the literature.

Last but not least, conducting any research on issues of national defense is a challenge by nature, as, for national security reasons, an extremely large proportion of data is classified, and this might undermine the validity of the findings. Unfortunately, very little could be done about this obstacle, and the reader should keep in mind that the author used only data that are accessible to the wider public. Regardless, the author made great efforts to reach safe conclusions by combining multiple state sources, including official databases, legal documents from Congress, and treaties.

In sum, there have been several obstacles, but they were overcome through the use of a plethora of sources.

Methodological Approach

As it was mentioned above, the author used a variety of sources. She used mixed methods, including text analysis, statistical analysis, and image analysis. Given the complexity of the project and the restricted accessibility of sources, the use of mixed research methods was imperative, as was the consultation of a wide variety of sources, which the author mainly accessed online.

So, a combination of databases was used, including Global Firepower, CIA World Factbook, and World Bank Open Data. What is more, the author created tables and graphs on her own through the combination of data that she found on the websites of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the HNDGS, and the Hellenic Statistical Authority (former National Statistical Service of Greece). The author also used maps which she retrieved from online sources, including the CIA World Factbook and Mapcarta.com.

Furthermore, this project includes the analysis of a wide array of official documents, such as the bilateral defense treaties signed between Athens and Washington, the 2018

and 2022 Integrated Country Strategies for Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, and the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act of 2021.

To sum up, the topic of this thesis was approached through mixed research methods, whereas a wide array of primary and secondary sources was used.

Software Used

In the modern era, the use of technology is necessary for the execution of research projects, even in Politics and International Relations.

Firstly, our statistical analysis was conducted with the use of Microsoft Excel. No specialized Data Analytics software was used, because our datasets were small enough to manage with the help of mainstream software.

Also, to access the online data, the author used Microsoft Edge, which is a reliable and secure Internet browser.

Therefore, with the use of simple and inexpensive software, a wealth of data was retrieved and analyzed for the purposes of this study.

A Short Statement on Ethics

Conducting research on military issues requires good faith and integrity. *At no stage of this project did the author attempt to access classified information, as she is aware that such a practice could potentially undermine the national security of Greece or the U.S.A.*

Conclusions

This is a research project conducted within the framework of small-state theory. The nature of the project required the use of mixed methods and the consultation of a wide range of primary and secondary sources.

In the chapters that follow, we will discuss why Greece is a small state, what challenges have led it to the practice of external shelter-seeking, what is included in the bilateral relationship between Greece and the U.S.A. in the sector of defense, and, finally, to what extent shelter theory can be used for the examination of this relationship.

In general, Hellenic-American relations is a fascinating, vast, and multi-faceted field, which is worth to be examined further through the prisms of different International Relations theories.

CHAPTER 3: Greece as a Small State in Need of Shelter

Introduction

Although Greece is by no means the smallest state in the contemporary international system, it is considered a classic case of a small state. This is why it is referred to as such in several scholarly works that are mentioned in the literature review of this thesis (i.e. Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980; Keohane, 1971; Knudsen, 1996; Panke, 2017; Thorhallsson et al., 2018). This chapter analyzes Greece's small-state status based on Brady and Thorhallsson's (2021) definition of small states provided in the literature review and examines the country's shelter-seeking efforts as it strives to counter its complex and pressing existential security challenges.

Greece as a Small State

Greece is considered a small state because it has limited capacities in terms of a plethora of variables. Here we analyze its size based on Brady and Thorhallsson's (2021, p. 2) criteria of state smallness, i.e. population, landmass, economy, and military capacity.

Economy

It is common knowledge that the development and maintenance of a capable national defense system is one of the most expensive enterprises of a state, especially when that country has a wide spectrum of threats to combat. Thus, the financial status of a state is a fundamental variable to study when it comes to examining its size and its defense relations with other countries.

Regarding its economic state, Greece, although it is not in the direst place globally, it is in an unfavorable position. There are a few variables that help measure a national economy; yet here we assume that Brady and Thorhallsson (2021) refer to GDP in their definition of small states, because it is considered the most prominent and the most habitually traced measurement of national economic growth (Ross, 2023).

Based on IMF's International Financial Statistics for 2021 (International Monetary Fund, 2023), Greece's annual GDP stands in the 50th place worldwide, which is higher than that of a few small states, including Bahrain, Cyprus, and Iceland. On the other hand, the Greek GDP stands lower than that of many others, such as Sweden, Israel, and Norway⁶.

⁶ See Annex 1: List of countries' annual GDP for 2021 in current USD value –highest to lowest (International Monetary Fund, 2023)

To conclude, Greece might not be in the worst financial situation globally; however, the economy of the Hellenic Republic is behind that of a few states that are referred to as small in the sources of our literature review. Therefore, we can say that Greece is a small country in economic terms.

Population Size

As we mentioned in the literature review, the size of the population is a prevalent defining factor of smallness. Especially Panke's (2017) work suggests that population size is an important variable in determining the size of a state because it implies major consequences on that country's capabilities and motives, which can influence the 'dynamics of international security negotiations' (Panke, 2017, p. 238). Although we have explained that taking into consideration population size alone to determine the size of a state is problematic, Panke's suggestion is reasonable, given that a large population creates potential for a large army, as the following table demonstrates:

Ranking (highest to lowest)	Population ranking (no. of persons)	Available manpower ranking⁷ (no. of persons)	Population fit-for-service ranking⁸ (no. of persons)
1	China (1,413,142,846)	China (761,691,469)	China (624,869,113)
2	India (1,399,179,585)	India (653,129,600)	India (515,555,492)
3	USA (339,665,118)	USA (148,430,460)	USA (123,129,813)
4	Indonesia (279,476,346)	Indonesia (135,891,290)	Indonesia (112,872,969)
5	Pakistan (247,653,551)	Nigeria (119,293,504)	Brazil (87,547,744)
6	Nigeria (230,842,743)	Brazil (110,792,431)	Nigeria (85,981,356)
7	Brazil (218,689,757)	Pakistan (104,457,253)	Pakistan (82,574,107)
8	Bangladesh (167,184,465)	Bangladesh (81,168,733)	Bangladesh (64,934,986)

⁷ Global Firepower considers available manpower associated with a state's "ability to commit 'souls to the fight' in the form of combat personnel, labor force, and the like" (Global Firepower team, 2023d)

⁸ Global Firepower considers population fit-for-service to represent 'the portion of a given population that is (theoretically) available to assist in a war effort' (Global Firepower team, 2023c).

Ranking (highest to lowest)	Population ranking (no. of persons)	Available manpower ranking ⁷ (no. of persons)	Population fit-for-service ranking ⁸ (no. of persons)
9	Russia (141,698,923)	Russia (69,590,771)	Mexico (43,206,520)
10	Mexico (129,875,529)	Mexico (60,700,956)	Russia (46,583,210)

Table 2: Top 10 countries in population, available manpower and fit-for-service individuals. All three lists include the same countries, leading to the conclusion that a state with a large population has a potential to develop a large army (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023b; Global Firepower team, 2023c, 2023d).

Greece appears small in terms of this variable too. According to CIA’s World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023b), Greece’s population is estimated to be 10,706,744 residents in 2023, placing the country in the 89th place on the almanac’s list. According to that list, Greece is more populous than many small states (e.g. Israel, Denmark, and Finland), whereas it is less populated than many others (e.g. Egypt, the Philippines, and Sweden)⁹.

To make things worse, Greece has a negative population growth rate, meaning that its population is decreasing through the years. On the list of countries’ population growth rate of CIA’s World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023c), Greece is in the 218th place with -0.35 percent for 2023¹⁰. This places the Hellenic Republic higher than numerous small states—including Armenia, Lithuania, and Latvia—but lower than most countries, including Israel, Cyprus, and Iceland¹¹. Since total available manpower depends directly on population size, it is reasonable to suggest that declining population leads to declining total available manpower. Consequently, a negative population growth is a bad sign for the potential of Greece’s military power.

In sum, Greece is indeed a small state in terms of population size, which has a direct impact on its defense. Next, we analyze Greece’s smallness in terms of military capabilities.

Military Capacity

⁹ See **Annex 2: Country Comparisons –Population Size** (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023b)

¹⁰ CIA World Factbook defines population growth rate as a variable that ‘compares the average annual percent change in populations, resulting from a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths and the balance of migrants entering and leaving a country’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023c).

¹¹ See **Annex 3: Country Comparisons –Population Growth Rate** (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023c) Annex 3: Country Comparisons –Population Growth Rate (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023c)

This thesis is about defense cooperation; therefore, it is crucial to compare the defense capabilities of Greece to those of other countries which are considered small.

Greece is in a relatively good standing in terms of military capacity according to the data provided by Global Firepower (Global Firepower team, 2023b, 2023a). According to Power Index (PwrIndx)¹² (Global Firepower team, 2023b, 2023a), Greece is in the 30th place globally, with a score of 0.4621. This places Greece higher than most small states referred to in our literature review—including Sweden, Denmark, U.A.E., and Iceland. However, the Hellenic Republic appears lower than a few other small states—including Egypt, Israel, and Singapore (Global Firepower team, 2023b)¹³.

So, although Greece is ahead of most small states as a military power, it is behind a number of others. Therefore, we can conclude that Greece is a small state in terms of military strength as well. Next, we examine Greece's smallness in view of landmass.

Landmass

Although landmass is not the only determining factor of a country's smallness, it is a fundamental one. Small territory eventually means small strategic depth and little available area for military bases. In agreement with other variables, Greece can be considered a small state from a landmass point of view, even though its territory is bigger than that of many other countries.

According to CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023d), Greece occupies an area of 131,957 square kilometers in total, which makes it a little smaller than the U.S. state of Alabama. This places Greece in the 97th place on the respective country-comparison list of the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023a). Based on that list, Greece's landmass is larger than that of many countries considered small, including Iceland, Denmark, and Israel. However, it is smaller than that of plenty of other small states, including Finland, Norway, and Oman (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023a)¹⁴. Therefore, we conclude that Greece is a small state in terms of landmass.

¹² Global Firepower's PwrIndx score is determined with the use of 'over 60 individual factors [...] with categories ranging from quantity of military units and financial standing to logistical capabilities and geography' (Global Firepower team, 2023b). According to the database, the perfect PwrIndx score is 0.0000, which is considered unfeasible. That said, the lower the PwrIndx value, the stronger the state's conventional military (Global Firepower team, 2023b).

¹³ See **Annex 4: 2023 World Military Strength Ranking** (Global Firepower team, 2023b)

¹⁴ See **Annex 5: Country Comparisons –Size of Territory** (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023a)



Figure 1: The Hellenic territory as compared to the massive U.S. one (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023d).



Figure 2: Locator map of Greece, which provides a visual impression of the country's territorial size comparing to other small states (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023d).



Figure 3: The map of Greece (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023d).

In sum, each variable above leads us to the conclusion that, although Greece is not the world's smallest country, it is indeed a small state, given its limited resources and capabilities. Next, we analyze the most pressing threats that the Hellenic Republic encounters.

Greece's Contemporary Security Challenges

Global and domestic affairs unfold remarkably fast nowadays. Consequently, the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense (2015) considers long-term assessment of strategic challenges and opportunities an increasingly tough and tricky task. Here we focus on challenges with which the Hellenic armed forces are mostly associated with.

Geographical Position and Geomorphology

First of all, most of Greece's traditional threats derive from the country's highly strategic position and complex geomorphology. Being both a part of the Balkans and the

Eastern Mediterranean, sitting among the crucial chokepoints of the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles and Gibraltar and being inside a rectangle consisting of North Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2015), in combination with having a territory which includes long coastlines and a large number of islands and islets (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015) and being at the external borderline of the EU (Tsakonas and Karatrantos, 2023), make Greece's position on the map both a blessing and a curse; a blessing due to the fact that the area is hydrocarbon-rich and in the middle of vital international energy and trade corridors, and a curse because of the competition and instability which result from these charms (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015).

In fact, as Admiral Alexandros Diakopoulos stressed in an interview, 'Greece is surrounded by different hotspots of instability' (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023b). The Hellenic Republic is in the middle of an area undergoing numerous militarized crises which are either results of long-standing conflicts or consequences of the Arab Spring; the violence in Syria, Libya, Kosovo, Palestine, Yemen and the Black Sea have had an enormous humanitarian impact, have empowered religious and national fundamentalism and have caused the climax of the great-power competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and north-eastern Europe (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015; Tziampiris, 2021; HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023b). Given this hostile and tumultuous environment, we can safely assume that Greece is under extreme and constant pressure to maintain highly effective diplomatic and military capacities.

Turkish Revisionism

Another militarized security problem for Greece is Turkish revisionism. Indeed, as Admiral Alexandros Diakopoulos stressed during an interview with Thanos Davelis, 'Turkey remains the biggest security challenge' for the Hellenic Republic (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023b). In her attempt to become a regional power and to de facto change legal the status quo of the Aegean in its favor, Ankara has challenged Athens' sovereign rights and territorial integrity since the early 1970s through a wide spectrum of demands, provocations and acts of violence, including manipulating international law at will, provoking militarized crises some of which have claimed human lives (e.g. Cyprus invasion and Imia crisis,) and violating Hellenic territorial waters and national airspace on a daily basis (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no date). Ankara, since the 1970s, has kept rising more and more claims, with no end at sight, each claim being built on the last one each time (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023b). The international interest in the hydrocarbons of the Eastern Mediterranean has aggravated the situation, as Turkey provokingly conducts seismic surveys on the Greek continental shelf and its military seacraft harass Greek vessels that legally conduct surveys in the area (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). To increase the pressure of insecurity on Athens, Turkey takes advantage of the grave geopolitical instability surrounding Greece in such a way, as to present herself as a victim (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023a). Furthermore, she also seeks opportunities to present Greece as a predator in the area in its attempt to justify its illegal actions against Athens and other states in the region. Annex 6 at the end of this thesis depicts a typical Turkish official statement against Greece, issued when Ankara opened its Evros border and forced asylum-seekers to enter the Greek soil violently and en masse. The statement clearly shows that, on top its revisionist policies against Athens, Ankara twists the

events conveniently aiming at presenting itself to the international community as the victim and stabilizer of the area, hence a rightful receiver of special treatment¹⁵.

Despite Greece's systematic efforts for rapprochement, Turkey only increases its threats and provocations (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Turkish officials have often called Athens for dialogue, but for them, such a dialogue shall only occur based on the Ankara's agenda and solely on Ankara's terms (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023b). As Platias and Botsiou (2023) accurately suggest, Ankara's threatening attitude against Athens is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, despite the rather moving earthquake diplomacy between the two states; the necessity to geopolitically exterminate Greece for Turkey to fulfil its own ambitions is deeply rooted in the Turkish strategic culture and very popular in the mindset of the Turkish voting population. And, since Ankara has repeatedly reminded Greece for the past fifty years that it considers military action as a suitable measure to put Greece in its place (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023a, 2023b), then Greece's need to keep its armed forces ready and capable at all times to counter this existential threat (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015) is quite sensible. However, Greece's demographic problem is an obstacle to Greece's effective defense against Turkey, leading Athens to consider it a threat too.




Figure 4: Violations of Greek territorial waters by the Turkish navy and coast guard between 2019-2022 (Data retrieved from Hellenic National Defence General Staff, n.d.-b). To see the data in an aggregate table, see Annex 7: Violations of Greek territorial waters by the Turkish navy and coast guard between 2019-2022 (Data retrieved from Hellenic National Defence General Staff, n.d.-b).

¹⁵ See **Annex 6: An indicative Turkish official statement on the Hellenic-Turkish relations** (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020).




Figure 5: Aggregate graph of Turkey's violations of Greece's national airspace and Turkish infringements of ICAO regulations on ATHINAI FIR between 2009-2022. (Data collected from: Hellenic National Defence General Staff, n.d.-a). For the aggregate table, see **Annex 8: Aggregate table of Turkey's violations of Greece's national airspace and Turkish infringements of ICAO regulations on ATHINAI FIR between 2009-2022** (Data retrieved from: Hellenic National Defence General Staff, n.d.-a).

The Demographic Issue

The demographic issue is a big obstacle to Greece's efforts to keep its military capacity competent enough to repel armed attacks coming from outside actors. The Greek national defense authorities are concerned that Greece's population is shrinking and aging, hence making allocation of resources to defense and staffing the country's armed forces a challenge (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2015; Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015). It is safe to say that Greece's demographic problem places the country under a grave existential threat against its main and particularly hostile state rival, Turkey, whose population might be aging, but keeps growing at a fast rate.




Figure 6: Greece's de facto population between 1951 and 2021 (National Statistical Service of Greece, 1955, 1964, 1972, 1994b, 1994a, 2003; Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2023, no date). For the aggregate table see **Annex 9: Greece's de facto population between 1951 and 2021** (Data collected from: Hellenic Statistical Authority, n.d., 2023; National Statistical Service of Greece, 1955, 1964, 1972, 1994b, 1994a, 2003).




Figure 7: Comparison of Greece and Turkey's de facto population for the years 1960-2021. This graph is evidence of the disadvantaged position of Greece in comparison to Turkey regarding population, which is a concern for Greece regarding manpower (World Bank, no date b).




Figure 8: Comparison of population growth between Greece and Turkey for the years 1960-2021. The graph shows that, although Turkey's population growth has started to decline, it is still positive, while Greece's is negative (World Bank, no date a).

Overwhelming Technological Progress

Greece, like all states, finds the task of keeping up with technological advances quite challenging. Although novel technologies aim to improve our daily routines and welfare in the civilian sphere, they also target the maximization of lethality in the scope of military affairs. A large part of such technological progress is the advancement in military countermeasures, developed to compromise a country's defense assets. All these technologies are often produced by private companies and can be accessed by non-state actors who can afford them, hence aggravating the threat of illicit weapons trafficking and lethal terrorist attacks. Moreover, such advancements in defense technology make warfare cheaper and a much easier decision for small and unpredictable states, leading to the shifting of military-power balance against more capable and stable countries (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2015; Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015). From the above we conclude that, given its position in an unstable region and the fact that it is under constant war threat by Turkey, it is not wise for Greece to stay behind in defense technologies or keep itself vulnerable against other actors who pursue progress in this field.

Cyberwarfare

Finally, Greece shares the international concern about cyberwarfare. Cyberspace has allowed global interconnection of persons and states, leading to a wide array of benefits. However, the side effect of this new way of connection has made states' fundamental functions and infrastructure extremely vulnerable to cyberattacks from other states or non-state actors. Such attacks can affect civilian and military systems with often lethal results, whereas their source is normally hard to trace (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2015; Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015). While the HNDGS has already established its own department for cyberdefense – whose purpose is to protect the systems of the Hellenic Republic from acts of cyberwarfare (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2023)—it is impossible to think that Greece or any other small country can counter such threats on its own, given the fact that cyberwarfare is a threat that needs the functioning of the global communication networks.

These are some of the most pressing security problems that the Hellenic Armed Forces encounter on a daily basis, and Athens is not in a position to tackle all those issues without assistance. The following section analyzes some reasons why Greece needs help with its militarized security challenges.

Why Greece Needs Shelter

It has already been suggested that small states face a wide range of deficiencies which undermine their efforts for survival in today's chaotic international arena. Here we analyze a few major such difficulties that Greece encounters.

First of all, the most restricting factor that Athens faces regarding defense planning is its limited financial capacities, aggravated by the recent debt crisis. This crisis in particular has negatively affected spending through the whole spectrum of the Hellenic defense sector, including procurements and participation in international joint

military operations, both of which are incremental factors for Greece's political influence in its near environment (Bellou, 2017). Yet, despite the dire conditions of the financial crisis, Greece has remained a top defense spender among NATO members, as shown on the 2022 list of defense expenditures of NATO member states (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022); but such a policy makes a lot of sense, given the extremely unstable and insecure area surrounding Greece and the daily direct war threats addressed to Athens by Ankara. Furthermore, the Hellenic Armed Forces have stretched their resources by assisting with challenging civil protection issues, such as the daily en masse illegal crossings of migrants and refugees from the Turkish soil (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015; Bellou, 2017). In effect, the Hellenic Armed Forces everyday encounter the need to solve the equation 'security versus proper allocation of resources'. In fact, there have been considerable efforts to rationalize defense spending, but the fruits of those efforts are still debatable (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015; Bellou, 2017).

Another factor obstructing Greece's efforts to rely on itself to counter its own security challenges is the lack of structure and stability in its foreign policy. To start with, there are no national strategy documents defining the country's challenges and long-term objectives. There are some such publications issued –such as 'White Paper' (Hellenic Republic Ministry of National Defense *et al.*, 2015) and 'Strategic Analysis of Developments After 2030' (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2015)—but such documents are published only occasionally. As Tziampiris (2013) astutely suggests, Athens' decision-making on foreign policy stands on short-sighted and superficial criteria, such as personal preferences, the public opinion, partisan calculations, and populist aims. Therefore, the Greek diplomacy shows 'elements of dysfunction' (Tziampiris, 2013, p. 27). With such a problematic foreign policy, it is needless to say that it is particularly challenging for Greece to form solid and long-standing alliances that can ensure its national security at times of urgent need.

Last but not least, the global scale of today's security challenges is simply too overwhelming for Greece, a country with limited resources and a territory of high geostrategic value. As we said earlier, apart from being inside an area of international geostrategic concern, Greece also has to face modern international security issues—including cyberthreats and the acquisition of high-end warfare technology by private hands (Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 2015). Furthermore, the world is increasingly witnessing polycrises, defined by experts as times of historical value 'characterized by multiple global crises unfolding at the same time on an almost unprecedented scale' (Derbyshire, 2023). Given the above, it is safe to suggest that no state—let alone a small state—has enough resources to tackle all those challenges simultaneously. In today's heavily interconnected world, one's security means everyone's security, which calls for the formation of interstate relations based on interdependence and give-and-take arrangements. Greece and the USA have formed such relations in the defense sector interpretable through the prism of shelter theory.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to prove that Greece is a small state facing pressing threats which it cannot combat alone given its restricted resources and its challenging

geographical position. Measurable evidence suggests that, albeit Greece is not the smallest or weakest country in the world, it is indeed a small state.

Athens faces a plethora of security issues, yet this study focuses on regional instability, Turkish revisionism, the demographic problem, and technological advancements. It is hard for Greece to cope with its security challenges, due to structural challenges in its foreign policy, its diachronic financial problems, and the global impact of some of the challenges themselves, the latter requiring the foundation of security relations with other states.

The US and Greece have had close bilateral defense relations to cope with such pressing problems. The next chapter looks into the foundations and arrangements of this partnership.

CHAPTER 4: The Status of the Hellenic-American Defense Partnership

Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 3, Greece is a small state facing a wide spectrum of threats, including traditional threats. To deal with these challenges, Athens relies on its network of partnerships, which includes bilateral partnerships—such as the alliance with the U.S.A.—and memberships in international security organizations—such as NATO. In parallel, the United States is a top great power maintaining a global outreach and having a wide range of national interests, including great-power competition in multiple strategically important regions of the globe. In order to keep those areas of high interest stable and secure and keep competitors away, Washington relies on its own network of allied states, which includes Greece. However, Washington seems to acknowledge that the best way to retain support from the part of a partner is to offer them the assistance they need. In this spirit, the U.S. has been continuously providing Greece with security, social, and economic support since the era of the Marshall Plan (or ERP).

Apart from their economic, societal, and political cooperation and their cooperation in the framework of multiple international organizations, Greece and the U.S.A. maintain a strong bilateral defense partnership, which was recently institutionalized in Washington through the Eastern Mediterranean Energy and Security Partnership Act of 2019 and the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021. U.S. official documents and Congressional press releases (e.g. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Press, 2021) in Washington stress that this defense partnership enjoys bipartisan support, which is rather notable given the extreme extent of polarization in the American political system.

Of course, the Hellenic Republic puts a few contributions to the table, including allowing the U.S. forces to use its strategic facilities. In addition, Athens' diplomatic efforts in the field of regional security have resulted in its characterization in several U.S. official documents (e.g. 116th Congress, 2019, p. 20; 117th Congress, 2021, p. 6) as 'a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean'.

However, any claim that the partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. has been smooth and without complexities would be inaccurate. Greek anti-Americanism was born during the first year of the Marshall Plan and mobilized reactions to the American culture and politics both from the part of the people and the political elite.

This chapter begins with an analysis of the way in which the U.S.A. sees its allies, followed by a description of the multifaceted defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. and analyzes the negative reactions that this alliance has caused inside the Greek society, which have begun to fade as a result of the support that Greece received from the Washington during its debt crisis and also through committed societal work from the part of the U.S.A. resident diplomatic mission to Greece. The chapter concludes that the partnership can be interpreted through the prism of shelter theory.

How Washington Perceives Her Coalitions with Other Actors

A look into U.S.A.'s national security and military strategy documents leads to the conclusion that alliances and partnerships are fundamental in America's quest for the maintenance of its great-power status and its national security. To be exact, allies and partners are referred to as assets that need to be safeguarded and as friends who need to be assisted and protected in order to remain loyal to the U.S.A. and useful to the American strategic goals. For instance, in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022) the phrase 'Allies and partners' appears 118 times; the document calls for the development of joint deterrence capabilities against conventional, hybrid, and WMD attacks, development of joint operational capabilities, as well as cooperation and coordination on the development of campaigning elements. It also highlights the importance of protecting 'Allies and partners' from the influence of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran and collaborating with them towards the achievement of regional goals and the interception of the strategic activities of adversaries in areas of high geostrategic interest. The 2022 National Security Strategy (The White House, 2022) also highlights the great importance of allied states, in a way that the U.S.A. shall guarantee them security while expecting them to build their own capabilities and contribute to the partnership as well:

'...Our NATO and bilateral treaty allies should never doubt our will and capacity to stand with them against aggression and intimidation. As we modernize our military and work to strengthen our democracy at home, we will call on our allies to do the same, including by investing in the type of capabilities and undertaking the planning necessary to bolster deterrence in an increasingly confrontational world.

America's alliances and partnerships have played a critical role in our national security policy for eight decades, and must be deepened and modernized to do so into the future' (The White House, 2022, p. 17).

According to the same document, the U.S. Administration incorporates allied states into a special tactic of its National Defense Strategy which is called 'Integrated Deterrence' and is defined as 'the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits' (The White House, 2022, p. 22). Moreover, the document stresses the importance of collaboration with allies and partners in defense planning, as well as sharing military know-how with them:

'Incorporating allies and partners at every stage of defense planning is crucial to meaningful collaboration. We also seek to remove barriers to deeper collaboration with allies and partners to include issues related to joint capability development and production to safeguard our shared military-technological edge' (The White House, 2022, p. 21).

In his electoral article in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, U.S. President Joe R. Biden (2020) pertinently explains that it is important to safeguard alliances both for the sake of the allies themselves and for the sake of the American interests:

‘The Biden foreign policy agenda will place the United States back at the head of the table, in a position to work with its allies and partners to mobilize collective action on global threats. The world does not organize itself. For 70 years, the United States, under Democratic and Republican presidents, played a leading role in writing the rules, forging the agreements, and animating the institutions that guide relations among nations and advance collective security and prosperity—until Trump. If we continue his abdication of that responsibility, then one of two things will happen: either someone else will take the United States’ place, but not in a way that advances our interests and values, or no one will, and chaos will ensue. Either way, that’s not good for America’ (Biden, 2020, p. 71).

In a nutshell, it is safe to assume that, for the U.S.A., building and supporting a network of alliances is not only a matter of ensuring the national interests of the allies themselves, but most importantly a matter of safeguarding the American national interests.

Principles of the U.S.A.-Greece Defense Partnership

America’s approach to its defense partnership with Greece is also in accordance with the mindset above. Indeed, the fundamental strategic significance of the Hellenic Republic to the U.S.A. is highlighted in the 2022 Integrated Country Strategy (U.S. Department of State, 2022), a document which defines the goals of the U.S. resident diplomatic missions to Greece. It is not accidental that defense and security cooperation with Greece appears as the first Mission Goal on the document (U.S. Department of State, 2022)¹⁶, which could be summarized in four main points.

Firstly, Greece is appreciated as a partner promoting stability in a complex environment that America’s opponents strive to take advantage of. A full, loyal member of both the EU and NATO, Greece safeguards the ‘southeastern flank’ (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 1) of the two blocs, hence the American national interests as well. However, it is considered necessary to maintain ‘high-level engagement’ (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 1) for Greece to keep this status. In other words, Greece is considered a vital partner for the U.S., yet it is considered important that both sides contribute to this relationship in an active, consistent, and pre-eminent manner.

Secondly, the document recognizes Greece’s role in the MENA region and the Western Balkans as very valuable both for the U.S. and Euroatlanticism and plans to further bolster this role. In particular, the U.S.A. ‘will seek to leverage Athens’ enhanced military and diplomatic outreach into the Middle East and North Africa as a force multiplier; at the same time, Greece’s more robust leadership in the western Balkans will help stabilize a region that is still struggling to move forward toward Euro-Atlantic integration’ (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 1). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that America considers Greece a partner to rely on for the enhancement of the former’s

¹⁶ ‘Mission Goal 1: Greece further enhances its capability and support of regional security and stability, which protects the United States and its interests’ (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 1).

leverage in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans and seeks to strengthen this role even more.

Thirdly, according to the document, Greece's strategic location is vital to the American activities in the field of defense and security, and Athens' willingness to promote its close partnership with Washington on these matters is considered valuable. As the operational needs in the Eastern Mediterranean are increasingly expanding, so is the American interest in maintaining and upgrading the Hellenic-American defense partnership. Greece's position on the map is considered pivotal for the needs of AFRICOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM and critical in America's standing regarding strategic competition with other powers in the region. The document makes a special reference to the port of Alexandroupolis and the Naval Support Activity of Souda Bay as facilities that provide 'unique capabilities to the U.S. military' (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 9). So, we see here the fundamental importance that the location of Greece has for the U.S. strategic goals and operational requirements.

Fourthly—and as a consequence of the above—the 2022 Integrated Country Strategy (U.S. Department of State, 2022) calls for strengthening of the Greek defense capacities, which is considered to serve the U.S. vital national interests. For this purpose, the document calls for enhancement of the military capacities of the Hellenic Republic through 'political advocacy, training and exercises, and implementation of the updated MDCA [...] and ensuring continued, expanded access to sites for exercises, training, and other needs' (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 9). So, we see here that, thanks to the geopolitically advantageous position of Greece, maintaining a robust alliance with Athens that augments its defense capabilities is considered vital to the promotion of the U.S. national security objectives.

It is notable that the document sees any potential negligence of the Hellenic-American defense partnership as an act of great risk:

'Failing to expand our defense and security relationship risks contributing to a less stable region, inhibits our effectiveness vis-a-vis strategic competition, and potentially limits U.S. capability to respond to regional threats' (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 9).

'A loss of strategic access in Greece would also significantly impact the U.S. military's ability to meet operational and contingency requirements in the region and beyond' (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 11).

To sum up, the United States opts for a U.S.-Greece defense partnership that will keep expanding and deepening. This is because Greece's strong commitment to regional security and greatly strategic location have turned it into a necessary asset for Washington's interests in the area. Next, we describe the multiple dimensions of this crucial partnership.

Fields of Cooperation

From the above we have concluded that the stakes of the defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. are extremely high, hence it has come to be increasingly deep

and multidimensional. Here we focus on the defense agreements, military aid, military purchases, access by the U.S. Armed Forces to Greek military bases and other strategic facilities, joint exercises, intelligence cooperation, the American support for Athens' strategic dialogue with other states, and U.S.A.'s position on the tensions between Greece and Turkey. For the needs of this study, we also refer to the fact that Greece similarly has mutually beneficial relations with other states apart from the U.S.A., mentioning France in particular.

Notable Defense Agreements

The U.S.A. and Greece have established their defense partnership through a series of agreements, most notably the 1986 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the 1986 Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreement (DICA), the 1951 NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the 2001 Comprehensive Technical Agreement (CTA), and the 1990 Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), which was amended in 2019 and 2021, aiming at the improvement of flexibility and access of the American Armed Forces to Greek facilities, interoperability, and the guarding of NATO's southeastern flank. Furthermore, in 2018, the two states established an annual Strategic Dialogue, which is held on a ministerial level and focuses on security and defense matters (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2022). All this work has led to the establishment of a deep bilateral and fruitful partnership, which both countries contribute to and benefit from through the use of a wide spectrum of means.

General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
Regulation of secure exchange of military information between Greece and the U.S.A.
Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreement (DICA)
Establishment of industrial collaboration in defense.
NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
Regulation of rights and obligations of NATO military and civilian personnel as well as their dependents during their service in foreign NATO member states.
Comprehensive Technical Agreement (CTA)
Establishment of the status of U.S. forces in Greece and that of Greek forces in the U.S.A. on official duty.
Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA)
Enhancement interoperability between U.S. and Greek armed forces, and improvement of the access of U.S. forces to Greek military facilities.
Strategic Dialogue

Discussions on security and defense issues on a ministerial level.

Table 3: General context of agreements covering the status of the bilateral relations between Greece and the U.S.A. on defense and security matters (NATO Member States, 1951; Hellenic Republic and United States of America, 1986, 1997, 2019, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2001; 117th Congress, 2021; Congress Approves Menendez Legislation to Bolster U.S. Defense Partnership with Greece as Part of National Defense Bill, 2021; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2022).

Military Aid

America's engagement with contemporary Greece as a provider of military aid can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II, when Greece was literally in ruins and in the midst of a bloody civil war that risked losing the country—and hence its neuralgic territory—to Communism. So, starting from the Marshall Plan, Greece has become a top receiver of American military aid (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Greece, no date a). More specifically, according to the spokesperson of the U.S.A. Embassy and Consulate to Greece (2023) and the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2021), American assistance nowadays promotes 'strong bilateral military-to-military relations and contributes toward the interoperability of Greek forces within NATO'. This assistance is granted through various channels which are described below.

(i) Funding

According to the 2018 Integrated Country Strategy (U.S. Department of State, 2022), despite devoting 2% of its GDP to defense, the austerity measures resulting from the debt crisis led Athens to a dramatic reduction of its defense capacities. Consequently, the Greek government requested financial assistance from Washington in order to cover outstanding procurement debts and to maintain and modernize its current equipment (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Up until now, the U.S.A. has donated massive funds to Greece to help Athens develop its military power. And there is more to come, as Washington worryingly looks at the increasing destabilizing influence of Moscow and Beijing in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as Turkey's revisionism, including the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia (116th Congress, 2019; 117th Congress, 2021). For instance, the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act of 2021 (117th Congress, 2021) authorizes \$1,8 million per year for the IMET program for the years 2020-2026, whereas the EastMed Act (2019) authorized for the fiscal year 2020 the appropriation of \$3 million in FMF assistance for Athens to materialize its NATO commitment to allocate 20 percent of its defense budget towards the strengthening of research and development. According to the latest updates of the U.S. Agency for International Development (2023), over \$260 million were disbursed between the years 2001-2022 towards Greece for defense and security purposes through various managing agencies, such as the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, as well as the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.




Figure 9: Military aid disbursed to Greece from the U.S.A. Administrations between 2001-2022. See the full table in Annex 10. (Data gathered from: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2023).

Apart from donating funds, Washington has diachronically issued to Athens a multitude of loans for military procurement, and it seems that it will continue to do so in the future. Strong evidence of this is Section 5 of the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act of 2021, which authorizes the provision of ‘direct loans to Greece for the procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and control services [...] to support the further development of Greece’s military forces’ (117th Congress, 2021, p. 3). Apart from these loans, referred to as ‘Loan Programs’, Greece is among the select states to be included in the ERIP; under ERIP, the Department of State shall authorize the provision of \$25 million yearly between 2022 and 2026 to support the transition of the Greek armed forces away from Russian equipment –hence Russian influence (116th Congress, 2019; 117th Congress, 2021). According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2021), the articles and services purchased within the framework of ERIP have to be American, while the recipient states have to commit to abstain from future defense procurements from the Russian Federation:

‘The availability of these funds is contingent upon partner country investments, demonstrated will to divest of Russian and Soviet-legacy equipment, and a commitment to cease future purchases of Russian military equipment. The Department will reallocate these funds if these conditions are not met’ (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2021).

Country	Amount	FMF FY Source	Platform
Albania	\$30 million	(FY17-OCO)	Helicopters
Bosnia (BiH)	\$30.7 million	(FY17-OCO)	Helicopters
Slovakia	\$50 million	(FY17-OCO)	Helicopters
Croatia	\$25 million	(FY17-OCO)	Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Greece	\$25 million	(FY17-OCO)	Infantry Fighting Vehicles
North Macedonia	\$30 million	(FY17-OCO)	Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Bulgaria	\$56.2 million	(FY18-OCO)	Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Lithuania	\$30 million	(FY19-OCO)	Helicopters
Bulgaria	\$22 million	(FY21/FY21-OCO)	Air Surveillance Radars

Figure 10: Receiving states of ERIP assistance as of December 2021 (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2021).

(ii) Equipment donations

Another, critical part of the military aid that Greece receives from the U.S.A. is the allocation of a wide spectrum of military equipment, which in the 21st century occurs within the framework of EDA. According to Section 2, par. 15 of the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021, ‘Greece is eligible for the delivery of excess defense articles’ (117th Congress, 2021, p. 5), while Section 7, called ‘Report on Expedited Excess Defense Articles Transfer Program’, establishes the yearly assessment of Greece’s needs in defense equipment, so that the U.S. provides relevant assistance for the Hellenic armed forces:

‘During each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall report not later than

October 31 to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on Greece's defense needs and how the United States will seek to address such needs through transfers of excess defense equipment to Greece for that fiscal year' (117th Congress, 2021, p. 10).

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2022) reports that since 2017 over \$250 million worth of defense equipment has been donated to Greece through the EDA program, including armored security vehicles, helicopters, and patrol boats.

Also in the framework of providing military aid to Greece and enhancing its prospects as a guarantor of security in its immediate environment, Washington has committed herself to invest in strategic infrastructure projects in Greek territory. We can see this in the legislation, most notably in the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act of 2021:

'[It is in the sense of the Congress that] in accordance with its legal authorities and project selection criteria, the United States Development Finance Corporation should consider supporting private investment in strategic infrastructure projects in Greece, to include shipyards and ports that contribute to the security of the region and Greece's prosperity' (117th Congress, 2021, pp. 7–8).

(iii) Training the Greek personnel

Apart from the above, the U.S.A. has been providing Greece with training as well. According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2022), 9,751 Greek troops have formally been provided with training from the U.S., 2,459 of whom have been trained through the IMET program. According to the same source, the State Department provided \$4,3 million for the needs of Greece's IMET training between the years 2017 and 2022. And this trend is expected to continue taking into consideration the EastMed Act (116th Congress, 2019) and the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act (117th Congress, 2021); the EastMed Act allocated \$4 million in total for the program (116th Congress, 2019), whereas the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act has authorized the allocation of \$1,8 million yearly from 2022 to 2026, which totals in \$9 million (117th Congress, 2021). The IMET program has several purposes. According to the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act, these include 'training of future leaders', 'fostering a better understanding of the United States', 'establishing a rapport between the United States Armed Forces and Greece's military to build partnerships for the future', 'enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for joint operations', and 'focusing on professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights' (117th Congress, 2021, pp. 10–11). The 2019 EastMed Act adds more: 'establishing a rapport between the United States military and the country's military to build alliances for the future', 'enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for joint operations', and 'enabling countries [i.e. both Greece and Cyprus] to use their national funds to receive a reduced cost for other Department of Defense education and training' (116th Congress, 2019, pp. 32–33). It is interesting that, according to Section 2, paragraph 13 of the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act (117th Congress, 2021), Athens has

committed to invest \$3 for every \$1 that she receives for the purposes of IMET. In these terms, we have evidence supporting the argument that IMET also functions as a motive for Greece to work harder on the training of its own armed forces, hence taking responsibility for its own defense.

The Hellenic armed forces also benefit from specific counterterrorism training programs, notably the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and the Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program (CTIWFP). Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program is a means of security cooperation managed by the Department of Defense and provides 'education and training to international security personnel as part of the U.S. global effort to combat terrorism' (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, no date b). According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (2023), over \$1,3 million were disbursed for the training of Greek officers within the framework of CTFP between 2001 and 2022. On the other hand, CTIWFP is a program mostly targeting allied officials of mid- and senior levels, whereas the purpose that distinguishes it from CTFP is the establishment and strengthening of 'a global network of Combating Terrorism (CbT) and Irregular Warfare (IW) experts and practitioners at the operational and strategic levels' (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, no date a). This program is overseen and prioritized by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (DASD SO/LTC-CT), while it is managed by DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, no date a). Based on the data provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (2023), over \$260,000 were disbursed for the training of Greek officers within the framework of this program between 2001 and 2022¹⁷.

So, what we see here is that the United States thinks of Greece as an ally whose loyalty should be treasured for reasons of national security; hence she provides Athens with rich military aid to assist her with the enhancement of her defense capabilities. On the other hand, Greece does not only depend on American military aid to maintain and upgrade its arsenal; it also spends considerable funds from its own budget on military equipment.

Military Sales

Greece is a major weapons importer for the U.S.A., especially now that the former is in the process of a major upgrade of the equipment of all the branches of its armed forces. In fact, the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2021) highlights that defense items remain 'the top U.S. exports to Greece'. In the framework of this ongoing, massive defense upgrade, Greece's military procurement from the U.S.A. covers a wide array of items. These include helicopters of diverse types, Special Operations Craft, and the upgrade of the existing F-16 fighters to the F-16 Viper edition (117th Congress, 2021; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Furthermore, according to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2022), the U.S.A. has approved the export of over \$465 million in military equipment to Greece via DCS between 2019 and 2021. Most of this equipment was 'military electronics', 'gas turbine engines and associated equipment', as well as 'aircraft and related articles' (Bureau of

¹⁷ **Annex 10: Disbursed financial aid from the U.S.A. to Greece for defense and security between 2001 and 2022** (Data gathered from: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2023)

Political-Military Affairs, 2022). Also, the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act (2021) has authorized the U.S. President to prioritize the delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Greece upon request from Athens, which occurred the next year with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis requesting the urgent procurement of twenty such aircraft amidst rising tensions with Turkey (Maltezoou and Papadimas, 2022). With the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act (117th Congress, 2021), the Congress also encourages the U.S.A to keep deepening the defense partnership with Greece and seek co-production and co-development opportunities with the Hellenic armed forces, especially with the Hellenic Navy:

‘[It is in the sense of the Congress that] the United States Government should continue to deepen strong partnerships with the Greek military, especially in co-development and co-production opportunities with the Greek Navy’ (117th Congress, 2021, p. 7).

In order to foster bilateral cooperation in the field of military procurement, ODC, whose mission is to administer and carry out security cooperation programs by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, secures the access of the American defense industry to the defense market of the Hellenic Republic (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Greece, no date b).

It is evident then that the two countries have a very strong and mutually beneficial partnership regarding the procurement of military equipment, which is expected to be maintained for many years to come.

U.S.A. Access to Greek Military Bases and Other Strategic Facilities

The U.S.A. has repeatedly recognized the geostrategic importance of Greece’s location in the Eastern Mediterranean, situated on the southern flank of NATO. Therefore, it only makes sense that the U.S.A. military and government would like to have access to Greek strategic facilities for training and other operations. The MDCA, which is considered the ‘backbone’ of the Hellenic-American defense partnership (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2021; Office of the Spokesperson - U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Greece, 2023), has allowed access to the U.S. forces for training and operational purposes since 1990 (Blinken, 2021). This agreement was updated in 2019 and 2021 to expand and deepen the cooperation and further facilitate U.S. access to the Hellenic military facilities. So, according to the status implied by the MDCA, Greece provides access to the places appearing in the following table:

- (i) Larissa Air Base
- (ii) Stefanovikio Army Aviation Base
- (iii) Camp Georgoulas (Volos)
- (iv) Litochoro Range
- (v) Camp Giannoulis (Alexandroupolis)
- (vi) Souda Naval Base
- (vii) Souda Air Base
- (viii) ‘Other Hellenic Armed installations, as mutually agreed by the Parties or their designated representatives in accordance with their respective internal procedures’ (Hellenic Republic and United States of America, 2019)

Table 4: Strategic facilities to which the U.S. Armed Forces are granted access under the current status of the MDCA (Hellenic Republic and United States of America, 2019, 2021).

Furthermore, the 2019 Protocol of Amendment to the MDCA grants the U.S.A. access to non-military facilities that can be used for scheduled or emergency activities. These facilities include the port of Alexandroupolis and ‘other locations as mutually agreed by the Parties of their designated representatives, in accordance with their respective internal procedures’ (Hellenic Republic and United States of America, 2019). This clause has been extensively used and highly appreciated by Washington lately, mainly because of the war in Ukraine.

Among all the places above, it seems that the U.S.A. administration appreciates Souda Bay and Alexandroupolis the most. Regarding Souda Bay, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2022) stresses that Greece’s continuous backing for the Naval Support Activity – Souda Bay ‘ensures reliable U.S. access to one of the largest deep-water ports in the Mediterranean’. The U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act (117th Congress, 2021) extensively refers to the pivotal role that Souda Bay plays in the promotion of the American interests and America’s ability to protect NATO Allies. According to Section 2, par. 9, ‘Naval Support Activity Souda Bay serves as a critical hub for the United States Navy’s 6th Fleet’ (117th Congress, 2021, p. 3). The document goes on by referring to the following statement by former U.S. Ambassador to Athens Geoffrey Pyatt characterizing Souda Bay as:

‘the most important platform for the projection of American power into a strategically dynamic Eastern Mediterranean region. From Syria to Libya to the chokepoint of the Black Sea, this is a critically important asset for the United States, as our air force, naval, and other resources are applied to support our Alliance obligations and to help bring peace and stability’ (117th Congress, 2021, pp. 3–4).



Figure 11: Map indicating the position of Souda Bay. The pivotal strategic importance of the facility is obvious, as it provides access to as far as the neuralgic places of the western Pacific Ocean through the Suez Canal.

Alexandroupolis is a place whose geostrategic value has been underestimated until recently (Ruhe and Cicurel, 2022); yet the critical role it has played in the Western response to the war in Ukraine has led to its recognition as a vital transit locus that the U.S. and Allied forces can use to secure the American and NATO interests. Indeed, the port of Alexandroupolis has already been used to provide the Ukrainians with much-needed military aid (Sitiides, 2023). Situated less than 100 miles away from the Dardanelles, it provides easy access to the Black Sea through the Sea of Marmara and Bosphorus (Lopez, 2022). Also, the port is connected with railways that reach as far as Poland through Bulgaria and Romania. As a result, access to the Black Sea and other parts of Eastern Europe will not be disrupted by Turkey's gradual detachment from the status quo and the values of the Western bloc (Ruhe and Cicurel, 2022).

The second amendment of the MDCA (2021) authorizes prioritized access for the U.S. Armed Forces for a variety of 'scheduled and emergent requirements, including reception, staging, and onward movement, and other logistics and support activities as mutually determined', while 'emergent access shall be provided following 48 hours of notice'—leading us to the assumption that the American side commits itself to respecting the scheduled functions of that port.

Therefore, we see that the U.S.A. has enhanced access rights to critical Greek strategic infrastructure.




Figure 12: Map marking the location of the Alexandroupolis port ('Alexandroupoli' in modern Greek). The port offers access to the neuralgic ports of the Black Sea and all of Eastern Europe without having to use the Dardanelles. Unlike Souda Bay, the port of Alexandroupolis is directly connected to a railway network, which ensures the speedy transportation of supplies and troops.

Joint Exercises

This long-standing alliance between Greece and the United States includes a plethora of joint military exercises, either bilateral or multilateral. On average, the two countries conduct fifteen joint exercises yearly. Some of them are 'Thracian Cooperation', 'Alexander the Great', 'Poseidon's Rage', 'Iniochos', 'Defender Europe', 'Orion', 'Trojan Footprint', and 'Stolen Cerberus' (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2022). According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2022), thousands of American officers from all branches of the U.S.A. Armed Forces have participated in such exercises since

2018, in an effort to increase the two countries' 'combined interoperability, adaptability, warfighting capability, and resilience' (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2022). These activities 'have helped make Greece a more capable Ally and increased regional defense cooperation' (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2022). So, we see here the rigid, mutual commitment of Washington and Athens to the development of the capacity and interoperability of their armed forces.

Intelligence Cooperation

Due to the highly sensitive nature of this field, access to substantial information about the military intelligence cooperation between Greece and the U.S.A. is rather limited. However, it is common sense that a close bilateral defense partnership must include close cooperation on intelligence as well.

For sure, the 1986 General Security of Military Information Agreement (Hellenic Republic and United States of America, 1986) is still in force today, as our extensive research returned no public official document suggesting the withdrawal of either country or the replacement of this agreement with another one. In short, the 1986 General Security of Military Information Agreement has to do with the protection of classified military information. The information must be exchanged strictly at a government-to-government level through officials holding the appropriate security clearance. The agents accessing the information must be only Greek or U.S.A. citizens, except if the government releasing the information decides otherwise. The information must be stored in establishments that hold specific registry of the personnel authorized to access it. Such establishments shall be inspected regularly, while authorized personnel from both countries can visit them for inspection purposes. Additionally, each receiving government is in charge of covering the storage costs of the information it receives (Hellenic Republic and United States of America, 1986).

It is also clear that the two countries cooperate in intelligence beyond the field of defense. Most notably, Athens and Washington exchange intelligence to combat global terrorism and organized crime. According to the 2018 Integrated Country Strategy for Greece (U.S. Department of State, 2018), the Hellenic Republic achieved a significant milestone in 2017 by becoming the first EU member state to introduce the Department of Homeland Security's Secure Real Time Platform (SRTP). This implementation enables Greek authorities to screen migrants and refugees more effectively by cross-checking U.S. security databases. Additionally, Greek authorities have integrated the FBI's and Terrorist Screening Information-sharing tools to enhance their screening capacities (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Four years later, the 2022 Integrated Country Strategy (U.S. Department of State, 2022) would set the goal that 'Greece identifies, investigates, and prosecutes terrorism and other transnational crimes and deploys robust screening measures, sharing relevant information with the United States' (U.S. Department of State, 2022, p. 6), demonstrating that both countries benefit from information exchange for security purposes. According to the 2018 Integrated Country Strategy (U.S. Department of State, 2018), Washington believes that intelligence cooperation in the field of terrorism and transnational crime is for the benefit of both countries, especially Greece, in this domain:

'Building on the strength of this information-sharing, Embassy Athens will seek to expand Greek law enforcement capabilities and develop long-lasting cooperation to conduct joint investigations and collaborate on

enforcement to together confront domestic and global terrorism and transnational crime. Encouraging Greece to ratify and adopt international tools, particularly with regard to judicial measures, and enhance border security screening in the longer term will help advance Greece's ability to detect and disrupt criminal and terrorist activity' (U.S. Department of State, 2018, p. 3).

So, Greece and the United States maintain a tightly regulated relationship in intelligence sharing in the military sector based on a quite explicit bilateral agreement, while they also exchange information to deal with security issues that are mostly in the sphere of the Hellenic Police, namely terrorism and transnational crime. It is obvious that both countries benefit from this cooperation, as it works for the national security of both of them.

American Support for Greece's Strategic Dialogue with Other Countries

The U.S.A. strongly supports Greece's strategic dialogue with other countries in its environment, seeing them as a means of ensuring American security. This is because, as we have seen already, the U.S. considers Greece's diplomatic and military involvement in the MENA region as a power multiplier, while its robust footing in the Western Balkans fosters security and stability in that area, as well as the latter's future in NATO and the EU (U.S. Department of State, 2022). One vibrant example is the American involvement in the 3+1 partnership, called 'Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group', which would function as 'a legislative component to the 3+1 process launched in Jerusalem in March 2019' (117th Congress, 2021, p. 11). In the framework of America's involvement in this group, the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021 (117th Congress, 2021) recommends U.S.A. support for joint military exercises among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. In the same spirit, the EastMed Act of 2019 (116th Congress, 2019) authorizes the U.S.A. government 'to continue to actively participate in the trilateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure conducted among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus' (116th Congress, 2019, p. 25) and 'to support joint military exercises among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus' (116th Congress, 2019, p. 27).

So, we see here that Washington fosters the establishment of Greece as a pillar of security and stability by supporting the latter's strategic cooperation with other players, regarding such a policy as a vehicle for pursuing the U.S. national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

U.S.A.'s Stance on Turkey's Revisionism against Greece

America's position regarding the differences between Greece and Turkey has been difficult for many decades. On the one hand, the two countries have been warring rivals since the Middle Ages (Stearns, 1992), and, on the other hand, they are both valuable NATO members. On the one side, Greece and Turkey are found next to each other in a highly geostrategic place which is nowadays vital for the containment of Russia and China, whereas in the Cold War it was fundamental for the containment of Communism; and on the other side, these two countries are fundamentally different at all levels, with different strategic and political cultures (Stearns, 1992). This chronic friction has caused bitterness on both sides (Stearns, 1992). And, as Turkish leaders have diachronically capitalized on challenging Greece's sovereign rights and threatening the

latter with war (*casus belli*), the Greeks also have the feeling of existential threat to worry about on a daily basis. On top of these feelings of bitterness and existential insecurity, taking into account the equal distances policy that NATO and the U.S.A. have adopted, the Greek nation feels that Turkey is ‘America’s favorite child’ (Katsoulas, 2023, p. 23).

Indeed, the U.S.A. has adopted the equal distances policy as the most feasible approach. Back in the years of the Cold War, keeping the two rivals safely attached to the Western block and protecting them from the Soviet influence—and military threat—was considered more important than resolving their own long-standing problems. Yet there were a few bureaucratic reasons as well; for example, ignoring the need to understand the dynamics of the rivalry and the way that each nation thinks, the State Department would send a resident ambassador to the one capital but never to the other, thus it had to rely on the biased opinions of each of those diplomats (Stearns, 1992). Katsoulas (2023) will also add the popular opinion that Washington’s hesitation has been caused by its desire to avoid entrapment in complex situations and its unwillingness to alienate either side, since satisfying the one’s wishes and ambitions means hurting the other’s feelings and interests.

A number of U.S. official documents from 2019 onwards show that Washington has now come to consider the normalization of the situation more urgent; currently she sees it as a factor of stabilizing the eastern Mediterranean, keeping Russia and China as far as possible from the region, and ensuring that the American interests will not be undermined in case that Ankara distances herself from the West, which she is perceived to be gradually doing in principle and in practice. For example, the 2018 and 2022 Integrated Country Strategies for the U.S.A. Embassy to Greece (U.S. Department of State, 2018, 2022) acknowledge the deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations and instruct the U.S. resident mission to Athens to encourage de-escalation, although neither of these documents provide clear instructions on how such an outcome shall be achieved. Other indications that the U.S.A. has begun to take seriously the problems that the Turkish revisionism has caused to Greece can be found in the American legislation. For instance, the Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 (116th Congress, 2019) has a whole section devoted to the violation of the Greek airspace by Turkish fighters, calling for the submission of a report on events of such nature:

‘Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report listing incidents since January 1, 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be violations of the airspace of the sovereign territory of Greece by its neighbors’ (116th Congress, 2019, p. 39).

As a result of proceeding to the purchase of Russian S-400 anti-missile system despite Washington’s warnings, Ankara was permanently expelled from its F-35 program and the F-35 fighters that she would receive are to be sold to Greece. Although this move is claimed to be a consequence of Ankara’s procurement of Russian weapons, it is interesting that Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program is mentioned in Acts that focus on the strategic relations of the U.S.A. with Greece. In Section 8 of the Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, we read:

‘(a) IN GENERAL – Except as provided under subsection (b), no funds may be obligated or expended -

- (1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or authorize the transfer of an F-35 aircraft to the Republic of Turkey;
- (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical data necessary for or related to any maintenance or support of the F-35; or
- (3) to construct a storage facility for, or otherwise facilitate the storage in Turkey of an F-35 aircraft transferred to Turkey.

(b) EXCEPTION – The President may waive the limitation under subsection (a) upon a written certification to Congress that the Government of Turkey does not plan or intend to accept delivery of the S-400 air defense system’ (116th Congress, 2019, pp. 33–34).

Section (2), par. (20) of the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act of 2021 reads:

‘The United States ejected Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program in July 2019 as a result of its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Eight F-35 Joint Strike Fighters were produced for Turkey but never delivered as a result of its ejection from the program’ (117th Congress, 2021, p. 6).

In Section (3) par. (7) of the same document we read:

‘[It is in the sense of Congress that] the United States should, as appropriate, support the sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece to include those F-35 aircraft produced for but never delivered to Turkey as a result of Turkey’s exclusion from the program due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system’ (117th Congress, 2021, p. 6).

From the above, we may conclude that Turkey’s revisionism against Greece as well as her opening towards America’s rivals in the field of defense have contributed to the cancellation of her F-35 program.

But this is not the only indication that the stakes are high enough for Athens to maintain hope that she may count on Washington for protection against Ankara’s revisionism. In an interview with Thanos Davelis (HALC and KATHIMERINI, 2023a), Professor Ryan Gingeras explains that the escalation of the Greco-Turkish tensions is against the U.S.A. and NATO interests. Firstly, he believes that, since Washington is defending the sovereignty of Ukraine against Russia, it makes sense that she will also opt for defending the sovereignty of Greece against Turkey. Speaking of Ukraine, given the pivotal role that the port of Alexandroupolis has played in the maintenance of the function of the supply chain of aid towards Kiev, Gingeras claims that Washington considers a potential all-out war between Greece and Turkey a disruption to the American interests and the unity of NATO. Furthermore, responding to a direct question on what Washington will do if Turkey attacks Greece, Gingeras makes it clear that Washington will act in order to protect her interests in the area, which include free navigation, energy

security, protection of American citizens and military officers and safeguarding the unity of NATO.

So, despite the fact that many in Washington believe that Ankara's rhetoric against Greece is for the media only, and in spite of their hopes that the next Turkish president will be more cooperative, our primary and secondary sources overall demonstrate that Washington has taken notice of the Turkish destabilizing ambitions, and part of her reaction is to reassure Greece that she is committed to act if an escalation occurs.

The Hellenic-American Defense Partnership as One of the Multiple Shelters of Greece

As we see, Greece and the U.S.A. have a very deep and long-standing defense partnership where the latter sees itself as the protector state. Nevertheless, Greece has such relations with other actors as well –whose in-depth analysis is out of the scope of this thesis. For example, Greece enjoys a close defense partnership with France, which deepened through the France-Greece Defense and Security Agreement of 28 September 2021. An important part of this agreement is its mutual assistance clause. As reported on GreekReporter,

“The Agreement contains (in Article 2) a mutual defense assistance clause in the event of an attack against one of the two countries on its territory. In this way, Greece is shielded against threats, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union on the mutual defense clause is given substance through the agreement’ (Wichmann, 2021).

In fact, it is common knowledge that Greece has developed for herself a network of such defense partnerships and her bilateral cooperation with the U.S.A. is part of that network—albeit a very important one. The 3+1 cooperation, NATO, and CSDP, are all seen by the Greek experts and the general public as collective security mechanisms that Greece can turn to at times of need, and Greece makes sure to contribute to their activities, such as joint military exercises, peacekeeping operations, and, certainly, coverage of financial costs.

Not a Rosy Path: Greek Anti-Americanism and Reactions to the Defense Partnership

As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the shelter partnership might have a strong negative impact on the society of the protégé, which might include divisions over the values and intentions of the protector, as well as disapproval of the small state's alignment with that protector. In the case of the U.S.A., this phenomenon is called anti-Americanism, after the noun ‘anti-American’, meaning ‘opposed or hostile to the people or the government policies of the U.S.’ (Merriam-Webster, 2023). In the words of Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos (2010), whose work focuses on anti-Americanism through conversations among the Greek locals:

‘Often in these conversations, the United States is the prime suspect for all kinds of injustice and malfunction in the world system: it is blamed for

abusing its power, for intervening unilaterally in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states, and for harming Greece, among other small nations' (Kirtsoglou and Theodosopoulos, 2010, p. 106).

Furthermore, Kirtsoglou and Theodosopoulos's findings from their research on Greek local's conversations about the U.S.A. show that the Greek citizens' perception of the American people is not very honorable either:

“‘The Americans’ might be the citizens of a powerful nation, but they are, in many respects, and especially in terms of their political awareness, lesser than the peripheral actors of less privileged nations. ‘Out of touch’ and ‘apathetic’ about what is happening in the world, they are easily ‘misled’ (paraplanounte) by their ‘unscrupulous’ (adistaktoi) politicians” (Kirtsoglou and Theodosopoulos, 2010, p. 109).

Anti-Americanism in Greece is a rather multidimensional phenomenon which has existed in the Hellenic society since 1947, the year when the Truman Doctrine was declared and Greece began to receive aid in the framework of the Marshall Plan. In her article ‘Greek Cold War Anti-Americanism in Perspective, 1947-1989’, Lialiouti (2015) suggests that (a) Cold War anti-Americanism in Greece should be considered a ‘historical entity which in its general evolution is characterized by continuity, and acquires its full meaning only if the dimension of the Cold War is taken into consideration’ (Lialiouti, 2015, p. 41); (b) anti-Americanism in Greece during the Cold War must be considered the rule rather than the exception in Western Europe amidst the establishment of the concept of the ‘Free World’ and the institutions enforcing transatlanticism, including NATO; (c) it has both cultural and political characteristics, and (d) it offers ground for ‘bipartisan convergence and ideological consensus’ (Lialiouti, 2015, p. 41).

Although an extensive analysis of the dimensions of Greek anti-Americanism given by Lialiouti (2015) is not within the scope of this thesis, a few words should be said about the cultural and political aspects of the phenomenon.

In terms of culture, Americanism has been linked to a lack of spiritualism, utmost commercialization, cultural mediocrity, inhumanity, proneness to violence, and moral decline. Nonetheless, the Greek cultural anti-Americanism differed from that of other Western European countries in the aspect that there has been no consistent converse by the rightwing actors of the Greek society against Americanism in defense of the Hellenic national identity and cultural purity, which might be explained by the importance to preserve a favorable American profile as part of countering Communism (Lialiouti, 2015). Therefore, we understand that, although strong concerns have been voiced regarding the negative effects of America's cultural penetration into the Greek society, the fear of Communism was too big for the creation of a solid resistance against it by those who represented the country's Right.

The political aspect of Greek anti-Americanism has undergone a few phases from 1947 onwards depending on the domestic and international circumstances. From the establishment of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Greece, due to its geostrategic position, became valuable in the American struggle to counter Communism, a cause that was often considered higher than an ally's individual national interests on Washington's priority list. As a patron state, the U.S.A. established a status of authority over Greece's decision-making which would change in intensity and form over time, thus affecting

domestic reactions against Washington accordingly (Lialiouti, 2015). Indeed, the ground on which Greek anti-Americanism has been built includes a wide spectrum of matters, including control over Greece's administration and foreign policy, reluctance to clearly support Greece against Turkey, failure to prevent the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and willingness to cooperate with the colonels during the 1967-1974 junta. Furthermore, the U.S.A. is the protagonist of multiple conspiracy theories whose theme is the corrosion and termination of Hellenism altogether (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos, 2010; Lialiouti, 2015). Yet the biggest disappointment of all for the Greek people and their political elite was that, although they had expected that alignment with the United States and membership in NATO would mean a cordial partnership among equals, they found themselves in a situation where they needed to obey to the wishes of more powerful nations—most notably the Americans (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos, 2010).

As a result, it is not surprising that populist leaders would use anti-Americanist rhetoric to their benefit. The most prominent example is Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of Greece and leader of PASOK. Papandreou's anti-American rhetoric involved blaming the U.S.A. for all domestic problems of Greece and would present Washington as an actor who intentionally blocked his efforts for what he called 'Change' (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos, 2010; Lialiouti, 2015). He would also participate in anti-American rallies voicing slogans such as 'Greece belongs to the Greeks' (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos, 2010, p. 116). The paradox of this all was that, while he was rigidly engaging in anti-American rhetoric, at the same time Papandreou was negotiating the status of the U.S. bases on the Greek territory and was going to great extents to get the most favorable concessions possible from Washington and other NATO allies on the matter (Karamouzi, 2022).

The issue of the military bases involves considerable drama on its own due to anti-Americanism and in fact, it has affected Greek politics to a great extent. The operation of U.S. bases in Greece has been a significant matter in the country's political life, causing public protests, obstructing the development of a smooth Hellenic-American partnership, and deteriorating Greco-Turkish relations. This has substantially affected U.S. security policy in NATO's southern flank. In particular, the complexity—and in some cases secrecy—characterizing the status of those bases have laid a solid ground for controversy and friction inside the Greek society. From Washington's side, the bases work for the benefit of both the U.S.A. and the Hellenic Republic. Regardless, for a big part of the population and the political elite in Greece, they inspired rage, terror, political mobilization, and grave concerns about Greece's national sovereignty (Karamouzi, 2022). Karamouzi (2022) exposes the real dilemma of the U.S. bases in Greece in its exact terms: for Greek citizens of all political beliefs, the intentions of NATO and the value of a close partnership with the U.S.A. was debatable; regardless, they also wished to take advantage of both to stand against Turkey, Greece's most 'immediate and tangible threat' (Karamouzi, 2022, p. 100). But while they were seeking assistance, they did not want to risk signing up for anything that would give the impression that Greece was an American protectorate.

Of course, Washington has been fully aware of the anti-American movement in Greece, as she has had to cope with it outside the U.S. embassy and at the negotiating table. Further, the 2018 Integrated Country Strategy on Greece (U.S. Department of State, 2018) mentions that anti-Americanism is also nurtured by misinformation coming from state-sponsored media. However, both 2018 and 2022 Integrated Country

Strategies (U.S. Department of State, 2018, 2022) find that the ‘public and private’ (U.S. Department of State, 2018, p. 2) support that the U.S.A. has provided to Greece throughout her debt crisis and beyond has led to a dramatic decrease of anti-Americanism in the country, to which Washington plans to commit through further engagements in all aspects of political, economic, and societal life, including investments, and women’s empowerment:

‘Greece has largely moved past populism and a reflexive skepticism about U.S. policies and intentions. [...] Thus far the Greek public generally favors U.S. values and sees the United States as its primary partner, but this requires our constant engagement’ (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

So, from the above, we can assume that, although Greece and the U.S.A. have enjoyed a very fruitful defense partnership so far, this cooperation has caused bitter debates and distrust of the intentions of Washington. Nevertheless, we see that this skepticism has begun to diminish thanks to the political, economic, and societal support that Greece has received from Washington since the beginning of the Greek debt crisis.

Conclusions

The U.S.A. has a vast network of defense partnerships, which it considers critical for its national security as well as for the maintenance of its great-power status. Thus, Washington makes sure to treasure those partnerships. Its defense cooperation with Greece in particular is considered of utmost importance from this perspective.

The Hellenic-American defense partnership is quite strong as well as manifold and is set to keep expanding and deepening with time. This is because of the high geostrategic value of the Greek territory on the one hand and, on the other hand, due to the country’s stabilizing attitude in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. The characterization of Greece in multiple U.S. official documents as a pillar of stability is certainly neither an accident nor a superficial political communication trick.

Yet, despite the great depth of this partnership, one should not assume that it has been absolutely smooth. Like in most Western European states, there has been a strong anti-American movement in Greece involving both cultural and political elements. And, although Greek anti-Americanism has started to diminish, one cannot claim that it has not created problems for the defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A.

But still, this is certainly a deep, mutually beneficial partnership and, while there are costs involved for Greece, they exceed the benefits by far. The partnership is publicly communicated and does not include hidden cards or middlemen, while there is solid evidence that both parties desire its continuation in the long term. So, this cooperation can be seen through the prism of shelter theory to a great extent, as Chapter 5 demonstrates.

CHAPTER 5: Applying Shelter Theory on the Hellenic-American Defense Partnership

Introduction

From what has been said so far, we have concluded that Greece is a small state which faces grave security challenges and is situated in a rather neuralgic location. Both of these facts have led to the establishment of a close military partnership with the U.S.A. Now it is time to see to what extent the principles of shelter theory apply to this cooperation. The chapter concludes that shelter theory in fact can be used for the analysis of this subject.

The Hellenic-American Defense Partnership Seen through the Prism of Shelter Theory

Small States are Fundamentally Different Political, Economic, and Social Units than Large States

The basic principle of shelter theory is the claim that small states fundamentally differ from large states in terms of capabilities and decision-making, in which small states face significant restrictions. Those restrictions lead to several integral structural weaknesses, including limitations in defense capabilities and difficulties in staffing the diplomatic service with appropriately trained professionals. As a result, small states are more vulnerable to threats than large states. To compensate for these vulnerabilities, small states resort to measures characterized by versatility and solidarity. In their efforts to enforce such measures, they resort to domestic arrangements on the one hand, and, on the other hand, they turn to other states and international organizations for protection, or they seek protection through the establishment of partnerships with other small states.

We can apply this principle to the bilateral defense partnership between the U.S.A. and Greece in three ways. Firstly, concerning the pursuit of a partnership that will ensure protection from a stronger state, it is obvious that the stronger partner here is the U.S.A. Furthermore, Greece seeks assistance from the U.S.A. and willingly cooperates with the latter for the expansion and deepening of the partnership. And, given the massive military aid that Washington has granted Athens since the days of the Marshall Plan, we can argue that Greece sees the U.S. as a protector state.

Secondly, Greece is always open to joining or forming new strategic coalitions to ensure its own national security and promote regional stability. In the U.S.A. official documents that this thesis has referred to, these efforts are enthusiastically supported and characterized by Washington as a force multiplier.

The third piece of evidence suggesting that this principle applies to the U.S.-Greece defense partnership is the fact that the U.S. takes into account Greece's individual needs when it comes to the assistance that the latter receives. For instance, as we saw

in Chapter 4, there is a particular clause in the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act (117th Congress, 2021) that, from 2022 to 2026, the Secretary of Defense, coordinating with the Secretary of State, would present to the Congress a yearly report on Greece's needs in the field on defense and ways in which Washington can help Athens cope with such needs. Additionally, we saw that in the 2019 EastMed Act there is a clause establishing that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report that lists incidents of violations of the Greek airspace by its neighboring states (116th Congress, 2019). This clause may also stand as evidence of attending to Greece's individual needs as a small state that encounters threats.

In conclusion, it is safe to suggest that the core principle of shelter theory suggesting that small states are different from large ones applies to the bilateral defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A.

The Foundation of the Alliance Relationship Is Distinctly Unique for Domestic as well as International Reasons

According to the second core principle of shelter theory that was discussed in Chapter 1, small states select their alliances based on both external and domestic needs. In particular, it is suggested that security maximization and access to resources are two principal factors affecting a small state's decision on whom to be allied with.

Indeed, according to the evidence, Greece has benefited from its partnership with the U.S.A. both in military and development terms. For example, the Marshall Plan included both development and military assistance. Also, we referred to Section 3 par. 10 of the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act of 2021, which calls the encouragement of American private investments in Greek infrastructure projects, including shipyards and ports, that would foster regional security and 'Greece's prosperity' (117th Congress, 2021, p. 8).

In conclusion, the U.S.A. and Greece have tightly connected development assistance to military aid regarding their partnership over the years. So, the second core principle of shelter theory also applies to the Hellenic-American defense partnership.

Small States Benefit Disproportionately from International Cooperation

The third core principle of shelter theory as we examined it in this study suggests that a shelter alliance does not rely on relative gains. Instead, shelter theorists contend that the benefits that the small protégé enjoys in a shelter partnership tend to override the sacrifices it has to make in order to maintain itself under the protector's umbrella. This notion derives from the fact that a small state has restricted capabilities and, hence little to offer in return for the support it receives.

In this context, our research has shown that the U.S.A. does not expect to receive relative gains from Greece. In fact, as the world's top military power, the U.S.A. does not need and has not received any military aid from the Hellenic Republic. Of course, Greece is bound by the terms of the treaties it has signed with the United States. For instance, the U.S. Armed Forces can use Greek military bases and other strategic facilities. However, what Greece contributes to the partnership is not comparable to the massive help she has received from the U.S.A.

So, our data suggest that the Hellenic Republic has benefited disproportionately from its bilateral defense partnership with the U.S.A. and thus this partnership is in absolute accordance with the third core principle of shelter theory.

Small States Need Political, Economic, and Societal Shelter to Thrive

The fourth core principle of shelter theory as we presented it in Chapter 1 is that shelter is divided into three categories: political, economic, and societal. To start with, political shelter is defined as diplomatic, military, or any other support enhancing the protégé's strategic leverage. This support must be visible and direct, in the context that it is available to the public eye and without the involvement of third parties. In addition, shelter theorists contend that the purpose of political shelter is to ease the impact that international pressure and endemic structural shortcomings have on the protégé.

Regarding the concept of economic shelter, it obviously covers the spectrum of financial opportunities with which the protector provides the protégé, including direct economic assistance, loans with advantageous terms, privileged access to the protector's market, a currency union, and a common market. As in political shelter, these forms of support have to be public and direct for an economic shelter to occur.

Finally, societal shelter, which is no less important than the other two categories of shelter, refers to assistance that the protégé receives in the sphere of sectors that are vital for the evolution of its domestic society, including norms, lifestyles, education, and technology. Just as with the other two categories of shelter, the acts of assistance in the spectrum of societal shelter must be direct and public.

This thesis focuses on the bilateral defense partnership between the United States and the Hellenic Republic, and, as a result, here we only investigate the application of political shelter. Washington provides Athens with a wide range of tangible strategic assets, including defense articles, loans for defense spending, intelligence, and training. What is more, all this support is publicized and is direct without the involvement of non-American or non-Greek actors. Therefore, we conclude that, at least in terms of political shelter, shelter theory applies to the cooperation between Greece and the U.S.A. in the field of defense.

Social and Cultural Relationships with the Outside World Are Especially Important for a Small Society

The fifth core principle of shelter theory suggests that social and cultural ties with the rest of the world are vital for small states, as they prevent isolation and stagnation and help such countries cope with their disadvantages in expertise. In short, the maintenance of social and cultural relations with outside actors is necessary for the survival of a small state.

As we said in Chapter 1, this principle is tightly connected to societal shelter, which refers to assistance relevant to the social and cultural aspects of the small state acting as a protégé. On the other side, this thesis focuses on the defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. and not on their soft-power relations. Therefore, this core principle of shelter theory is also out of the scope of this study.

Shelter May Come at a Significant Cost for the Small State

The sixth and one of the most important core principles of shelter theory suggests that shelter comes with costs for the protégé in political, economic, and social terms. To begin with, the interaction between the protector and the protégé might result in social divisions and resentment against the protector. Also, the protégé is expected to contribute to the partnership in tangible terms, such as granting access to military facilities. Furthermore, the costs might come in the form of policy concessions that are not necessarily aligned with the protégé's identity, hence restricting its space for maneuvering. In addition, the small state is at risk of abandonment if it does not commit to the terms of the alliance, as the protector will see no benefit from their sheltering role. On the other hand, accepting the tradeoffs does not mean complete submission or annexation to the protecting power. On the contrary, the partnership is characterized by hierarchy but also equality and independence. In this context, although the small state has to suffer some form of cost in order to maintain the shelter, it also keeps its sovereignty.

This principle greatly applies to the defense relations between Greece and the U.S.A. Indeed, American support towards Greece in this context has not come without some sort of tangible reciprocation. For example, Greece is expected to grant access to the U.S. Armed Forces to its military facilities and other infrastructure of strategic importance, including the facilities of Souda Bay and the port of Alexandroupolis. Also, according to GSOMIA, Greece has to cover the costs of the maintenance of the facilities it uses for the storage of intelligence obtained from the U.S. under GSOMIA. Also, in the framework of ERIP, Greece has to refrain from military procurement from Russia or it risks being expelled from the program. Despite the benefits of ERIP, one should consider that, under the terms of this program, Greece is limiting its options regarding defense procurement and becomes heavily dependent on Western defense manufacturers to keep up with the developments in the military defense industry, given the current inadequacies of its own domestic defense industry. One last example of the tangible trade-offs for Greece in its defense partnership with the U.S.A. is that the former has to contribute \$3 for every \$1 it receives from the latter for the purposes of the IMET program. So, in accordance with shelter theory, Greece has made significant material sacrifices to maintain its defense partnership with the U.S.A.

Furthermore, in accordance with shelter theory, the political and cultural penetration of the U.S.A. into the Greek society has caused reactions and divisions both in the circles of the Greek political elite and the Greek citizens. In terms of politics, there have been strong reactions and suspicions against the U.S.A. with the anti-American discourse focusing on Greece's national sovereignty, America's support for Turkey and its failure to prevent the 1974 Cyprus invasion, as well as the doubts on the utility of an alliance with the U.S.A. either on the bilateral level or in the framework of NATO. From a cultural point of view, a large proportion of Greeks have associated America with multiple flaws, including moral decline, inhumanity, tendency to violence, and hyper-commercialization. Although anti-Americanism in Greece has undergone a dramatic decline, one cannot overlook the State Department's (2018) ascertainment that anti-Americanism was supported by Greek state-sponsored media until recently. Therefore, we see that the U.S.A.'s cultural and political interaction with Greece—despite the benefits that the latter has enjoyed—is not approved by all Greeks, who need the Americans just as the Americans need them.

Despite what anti-American voices claim, the maintenance of such a close partnership with the U.S.A. in the field of defense does not mean that Greece has completely surrendered its national sovereignty to Washington. On the contrary, despite the concessions it needs to make as an ally, Greece has its own decision-making procedures that are independent of the American ones. Despite their desire to keep Greece under American influence due to its geostrategic position, there is no data suggesting that the U.S. administrations have ever aimed at turning Greece into an American protectorate or pressuring Greece into making choices that demonstrate complete submission to the U.S., and we certainly have no data suggesting that any U.S. government has ever planned to keep the whole territory of Greece under American military occupation or annex it into the U.S.A. territory. Instead, our research has shown that, since 1947, Greece has been seen more like a partner than a servant. To provide a tangible and precise example which we saw earlier in this thesis, the U.S.-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Act (117th Congress, 2021) authorizes the U.S.A. government to sell F-35 jets to Greece when the latter requests those jets, which is an indication that the U.S.A. respects Greece's sovereignty. What is more, Greece has not been forced to join the training and procurement programs run by the U.S.A. Although its strategic position and its smallness make it necessary to participate in them and stay committed to the terms that they include, Greece has chosen to participate in these programs and stay committed to the Western camp in general and the partnership with the U.S.A. in particular. This is undoubtedly an indication that Greece is in control of its own national sovereignty.

So, we see here that Greece's defense partnership with the U.S.A. has come at some substantial cost, which leads us to see the application of one more aspect of shelter theory on this particular topic.

Multiple Shelter Coalitions at the Same Time

According to shelter theory, a small state can establish multiple partnerships that work as shelters. Such partnerships differ based on the state and the issues of concern, but they can be bilateral, or multilateral, or they can come in the form of membership in a regional organization.

In the same spirit, the bilateral defense partnership with the United States is not the only shelter alliance that Greece has. For instance, Greece maintains a bilateral defense cooperation with France and is a full member of NATO, the EU, and the 3+1 partnership. These are all partnerships that work in parallel with the Greek-U.S. one and in fact, Washington sees them as assets rather than obstacles to its defense cooperation with Athens. Therefore, we see that shelter theory applies to this aspect of the Hellenic-American defense partnership as well.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to see to what extent the principles of shelter theory apply to the bilateral defense cooperation between Greece and the U.S.A. In fact, even though some of its core principles are not relevant to the analysis of a defense coalition, shelter theory can be used as a theoretical framework for the analysis of the partnership between the Hellenic Republic and the United States of America.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, we used mixed methods to examine the long-standing bilateral defense partnership between Greece and the United States through the prism of shelter theory. More specifically, we analyzed principles of shelter theory, demonstrated Greece's smallness, referred to some pressing threats urging Athens to seek external shelter, described the status of its defense partnership with Washington, and showed the extent to which it can be explained through shelter theory.

Key Findings

Concerning the main question of our study—that is the extent to which one can use shelter theory to examine the bilateral defense partnership between the United States and Greece—our analysis has revealed that shelter theory is greatly applicable to this case. Nevertheless, this theory includes principles that do not apply to such partnerships. In specific, the fourth core principle ('small states need political, economic, and societal shelter to thrive') only partially applies, because a military partnership is considered part of the political shelter. Also, the fifth core principle of shelter theory ('social and cultural relationships with the outside world are especially important for a small society') does not seem to apply at all to the military partnership between Greece and the U.S.A.

Furthermore, to place Greece in the small-state theory debate, we needed to show that it is a small state. For that purpose, we used the relativist approach and, among the plethora of criteria that are used to determine a state's smallness, we used population, size of territory, economy, and military capacity. Our analysis showed that, although the Hellenic Republic is not among the smallest states in the world, it is, in fact, a small state, because in all of these variables, it is behind many states that are most often referred to in the literature as small-state cases.

In addition, our study found that Greece encounters severe security challenges. Those threats are both of traditional and non-traditional nature and Greece's restricted capacities press Athens to seek external shelter. From the plethora of security challenges that Greece faces, we analyzed the following:

- ❖ Greece's own geostrategic position and complex geomorphology, which presses Greece hard to maintain very effective diplomatic and military capabilities;
- ❖ Turkish revisionism, which is a real factor of instability within NATO and the Eastern Mediterranean, whereas it forces Greece to keep the maintenance of maximum possible deterrence capacity high on its priority list;
- ❖ The demographic issue, which puts pressure on the national economy and armed forces;
- ❖ The difficulties in keeping up with technological advances, which impacts Greece's capacities in military technology and, for that reason, Greece receives help from the U.S.A. and other NATO allies to ensure interoperability; and

- ❖ Cyberwarfare, which is a proven threat to civil and military infrastructure and requires coordinated action amongst allies.

Our study naturally sheds light on the status and principles of the longstanding bilateral cooperation between Athens and Washington in the field of defense. We analyzed Washington's view that the maintenance of Greece as a loyal ally is a matter of national security and great-power status, given the latter's greatly geostrategic location on the one hand and stabilizing strategic culture on the other.

Contributions and Recommendations

Although this study analyzes a niche theory, its theoretical contribution is not at all minor. In terms of theoretical advancement, we used explicit evidence to prove that Greece deserves a place in the debate on small-state theory. In addition, we highlighted the utility of shelter theory in the interpretation of the American strategic culture in general and the choices that Washington makes regarding its strategic partnerships with small states in particular.

In terms of policy implications, this study should help policymakers that, for a shelter partnership to work, especially in the field of defense, it is important that the protected state pulls off some of its own weight and offers tangible trade-offs to its protector so that the latter finds the partnership beneficial. A protector who finds the shelter cooperation beneficial will be motivated to keep investing in it in the long term. This way, the survival of the protégé is ensured.

The Hellenic-American partnership is an immense and multidimensional field. Given the weight that Athens has placed on this cooperation, it would be beneficial to see it through the prism of as many theories of International Relations as possible. From such an extensive exploration, we will have a set of principles that will help us discover issues that are not currently evident, hence we will be able to find and suggest new fields of cooperation and new avenues towards the resolution of the issues obstructing the partnership.

Final Thoughts

The defense partnership between Greece and the U.S.A. is long-lived, deep, and extensive. The use of shelter theory as a denominator in its examination brought to light the fundamental importance of this relationship for both states, as well as Greece's significant contribution to the U.S. strategic ambitions. For the sake of the security and prosperity of both nations, we should keep researching their strategic cooperation in the future.

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Annex

Annex 1: List of countries' annual GDP for 2021 in current USD value –highest to lowest (International Monetary Fund, 2023)

Position (2021 only)	Country Name	Annual GDP (Current USD Value)
1	United States	23315080560000
2	China	17734062645371,4
3	Japan	4940877780755,33
4	Germany	4259934911821,64
5	India	3176295065497,24
6	United Kingdom	3131377762925,95
7	France	2957879759263,52
8	Italy	2107702842669,73
9	Canada	1988336331717,42
10	Korea, Rep.	1810955871380,98
11	Russian Federation	1778782625793,74
12	Brazil	1608981456325,08
13	Australia	1552667363236,06
14	Spain	1427380681294,55
15	Mexico	1272839334119,3
16	Indonesia	1186092991320,04
17	Netherlands	1012846760976,73
18	Saudi Arabia	833541236569,315
19	Turkiye	819035182929,585
20	Switzerland	800640155387,26
21	Poland	679444832854,295
22	Sweden	635663801201,765
23	Belgium	594104177539,525

24	Thailand	505947037098,424
25	Ireland	504182603275,542
26	Israel	488526545878,891
27	Argentina	487227339102,67
28	Norway	482174854481,956
29	Austria	480368403893,364
30	Nigeria	440833583992,485
31	South Africa	419015018371,887
32	Bangladesh	416264942893,326
33	United Arab Emirates	415021590683,006
34	Egypt, Arab Rep.	404142766093,053
35	Denmark	398303272764,46
36	Singapore	396986899888,351
37	Philippines	394086401171,168
38	Malaysia	372980957208,023
39	Vietnam	366137590600,699
40	Iran, Islamic Rep.	359713152725,062
Position (2021 only)	Country Name	Annual GDP (Current USD Value)
41	Pakistan	348262544719,178
42	Chile	317058508651,76
43	Colombia	314464137241,33
44	Finland	297301883523,251
45	Romania	284087563695,798
46	Czechia	281777887121,451
47	Portugal	253663144586,019
48	New Zealand	249885687029,634

49	Peru	223249497500,387
50	Greece	214873879833,648
51	Iraq	207889333724,138
52	Ukraine	200085537744,354
53	Kazakhstan	197112255360,612
54	Hungary	181848022233,89
55	Qatar	179677211793,938
56	Algeria	163044443983,759
57	Morocco	142866329198,42
58	Slovak Republic	116527101097,7
59	Ethiopia	111271112329,975
60	Kenya	110347079517,356
61	Puerto Rico	106525700000
62	Ecuador	106165866000
63	Dominican Republic	94243453937,4462
64	Sri Lanka	88927263724,8592
65	Oman	88191977373,212
66	Guatemala	85985752107,4679
67	Luxembourg	85506243833,7816
68	Bulgaria	84056312734,3089
69	Ghana	77594279054,8795
70	Cote d'Ivoire	70043191477,0454
71	Uzbekistan	69238903106,1738
72	Croatia	68955083280,1922
73	Belarus	68205380706,6609
74	Tanzania	67841049193,3855

75	Angola	67404287260,3199
76	Lithuania	66445256585,3671
77	Myanmar	65091751273,2879
78	Costa Rica	64282438666,739
79	Panama	63605100000
80	Serbia	63082047649,8528
81	Slovenia	61748586534,8672
82	Uruguay	59319484710,6527
83	Congo, Dem. Rep.	55350968593,0597
84	Azerbaijan	54622176470,5882
Position (2021 only)	Country Name	Annual GDP (Current USD Value)
85	Tunisia	46686741814,278
86	Jordan	45744271658,9141
87	Cameroon	45338283344,8175
88	Libya	42817472975,3677
89	Uganda	40529789025,5702
90	Bolivia	40408208528,1599
91	Latvia	39853501579,8211
92	Paraguay	39495431574,1782
93	Bahrain	38868663031,9149
94	Estonia	37191166151,98
95	Nepal	36288830373,4106
96	Sudan	34326058557,4418
97	El Salvador	28736940000
98	Honduras	28488668301,6401
99	Cyprus	28407867534,0035

100	Zimbabwe	28371238665,5116
101	Senegal	27625388352,1688
102	Cambodia	26961061119,7957
103	Papua New Guinea	26594305745,554
104	Iceland	25602419210,3374
105	Trinidad and Tobago	24460196270,6866
106	Bosnia and Herzegovina	23365361635,2201
107	Lebanon	23131940280,7316
108	Zambia	22147634727,3584
109	Haiti	20944392615,0803
110	Gabon	20216843173,9702
111	Burkina Faso	19737615114,3661
112	Mali	19140461605,8227
113	Lao PDR	18827148509,5798
114	Georgia	18629365597,0017
115	Albania	18255787479,1846
116	West Bank and Gaza	18036800000
117	Botswana	17614791265,6824
118	Malta	17364044943,8202
119	Benin	17144918952,4682
120	Guinea	16091817842,2342
121	Mozambique	15776758632,8573
122	Mongolia	15286441818,1437
123	Niger	14915001426,9724
124	Afghanistan	14786861638,4535
125	Jamaica	14657586937,0735

126	Madagascar	14472603322,5571
127	Nicaragua	14013022092,0645
128	Brunei Darussalam	14006569575,68
Position (2021 only)	Country Name	Annual GDP (Current USD Value)
129	Armenia	13861409968,835
130	North Macedonia	13825049831,7959
131	Moldova	13679221333,2052
132	Congo, Rep.	13366230219,5352
133	Malawi	12626717491,8941
134	Namibia	12310595843,9353
135	Equatorial Guinea	12269392839,7472
136	Chad	11779980801,7843
137	Mauritius	11529042672,3528
138	Bahamas, The	11208600000
139	Rwanda	11070356519,4804
140	New Caledonia	10071351960,0477
141	Mauritania	9996249658,23982
142	Kosovo	9412034299,23122
143	Tajikistan	8746270636,40142
144	Monaco	8596096984,03312
145	Kyrgyz Republic	8543423502,6134
146	Togo	8413200567,6151
147	Guyana	8044498800,95923
148	Somalia	7628000011,46184
149	Bermuda	7286607000
150	Guam	6123000000

151	French Polynesia	6054676735,37523
152	Cayman Islands	5898449687,97711
153	Montenegro	5861268038,7982
154	Maldives	5405576235,79462
155	Barbados	4843800000
156	Eswatini	4743335152,94181
157	Fiji	4296304590,01135
158	Sierra Leone	4042237864,28942
159	Faroe Islands	3649886275,07118
160	Timor-Leste	3621222382,15929
161	Liberia	3509000000
162	Djibouti	3482987379,0942
163	Andorra	3330281523,53915
164	Aruba	3126019399,06492
165	Suriname	2984706243,65482
166	Burundi	2779813489,02447
167	Curacao	2699612458,10056
168	Bhutan	2539552984,67797
169	Central African Republic	2516498299,01212
170	Lesotho	2496134680,31694
171	Belize	2491500000
172	Gambia, The	2038417462,37695
Position (2021 only)	Country Name	Annual GDP (Current USD Value)
173	Cabo Verde	1936174043,45293
174	St. Lucia	1691275156,6002
175	Guinea-Bissau	1638517533,16504

176	Solomon Islands	1631486531,92364
177	Antigua and Barbuda	1471125925,92593
178	Seychelles	1454458183,85981
179	Comoros	1296089632,60039
180	Grenada	1122807407,40741
181	Vanuatu	956332655,718234
182	Turks and Caicos Islands	943269800
183	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	904181492,766708
184	St. Kitts and Nevis	860840740,740741
185	Samoa	843842416,462442
186	American Samoa	709000000
187	Dominica	554181481,481481
188	Sao Tome and Principe	526653790,670814
189	Tonga	469231309,539488
190	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	404028900
191	Marshall Islands	259538700
192	Palau	217800000
193	Kiribati	207031250
194	Nauru	133218896,932607
195	Tuvalu	63100961,5384615

Annex 2: Country Comparisons –Population Size (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023b)

Rank	Country		Date of Information
1	<u>China</u>	1,413,142,846	2023 est.
2	<u>India</u>	1,399,179,585	2023 est.
3	<u>United States</u>	339,665,118	2023 est.
4	<u>Indonesia</u>	279,476,346	2023 est.
5	<u>Pakistan</u>	247,653,551	2023 est.
6	<u>Nigeria</u>	230,842,743	2023 est.
7	<u>Brazil</u>	218,689,757	2023 est.
8	<u>Bangladesh</u>	167,184,465	2023 est.
9	<u>Russia</u>	141,698,923	2023 est.
10	<u>Mexico</u>	129,875,529	2023 est.
11	<u>Japan</u>	123,719,238	2023 est.
12	<u>Ethiopia</u>	116,462,712	2023 est.
13	<u>Philippines</u>	116,434,200	2023 est.
14	<u>Congo, Democratic Republic of the</u>	111,859,928	2023 est.
15	<u>Egypt</u>	109,546,720	2023 est.
16	<u>Vietnam</u>	104,799,174	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
17	<u>Iran</u>	87,590,873	2023 est.
18	<u>Germany</u>	84,220,184	2023 est.
19	<u>Turkey (Turkiye)</u>	83,593,483	2023 est.
20	<u>Thailand</u>	69,794,997	2023 est.
21	<u>France</u>	68,521,974	2023 est.
22	<u>United Kingdom</u>	68,138,484	2023 est.
23	<u>Tanzania</u>	65,642,682	2023 est.
24	<u>Italy</u>	61,021,855	2023 est.
25	<u>South Africa</u>	58,048,332	2023 est.
26	<u>Burma</u>	57,970,293	2023 est.
27	<u>Kenya</u>	57,052,004	2023 est.
28	<u>Korea, South</u>	51,966,948	2023 est.
29	<u>Colombia</u>	49,336,454	2023 est.
30	<u>Sudan</u>	49,197,555	2023 est.
31	<u>Uganda</u>	47,729,952	2023 est.
32	<u>Spain</u>	47,222,613	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
33	<u>Argentina</u>	46,621,847	2023 est.
34	<u>Algeria</u>	44,758,398	2023 est.
35	<u>Ukraine</u>	43,306,477	2023 est.
36	<u>Iraq</u>	41,266,109	2023 est.
37	<u>Afghanistan</u>	39,232,003	2023 est.
38	<u>Canada</u>	38,516,736	2023 est.
39	<u>Poland</u>	37,991,766	2023 est.
40	<u>Morocco</u>	37,067,420	2023 est.
41	<u>Angola</u>	35,981,281	2023 est.
42	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	35,939,806	2023 est.
43	<u>Malaysia</u>	34,219,975	2023 est.
44	<u>Ghana</u>	33,846,114	2023 est.
45	<u>Mozambique</u>	32,513,805	2023 est.
46	<u>Peru</u>	32,440,172	2023 est.
47	<u>Yemen</u>	31,565,602	2023 est.
48	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	31,360,836	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
49	Nepal	30,899,443	2023 est.
50	Venezuela	30,518,260	2023 est.
51	Cameroon	30,135,732	2023 est.
52	Cote d'Ivoire	29,344,847	2023 est.
53	Madagascar	28,812,195	2023 est.
54	Australia	26,461,166	2023 est.
55	Korea, North	26,072,217	2023 est.
56	Niger	25,396,840	2023 est.
57	Taiwan	23,588,613	2023 est.
58	Sri Lanka	23,326,272	2023 est.
59	Syria	22,933,531	2023 est.
60	Burkina Faso	22,489,126	2023 est.
61	Mali	21,359,722	2023 est.
62	Malawi	21,279,597	2023 est.
63	Zambia	20,216,029	2023 est.
64	Kazakhstan	19,543,464	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
65	<u>Chile</u>	18,549,457	2023 est.
66	<u>Chad</u>	18,523,165	2023 est.
67	<u>Senegal</u>	18,384,660	2023 est.
68	<u>Romania</u>	18,326,327	2023 est.
69	<u>Guatemala</u>	17,980,803	2023 est.
70	<u>Ecuador</u>	17,483,326	2023 est.
71	<u>Netherlands</u>	17,463,930	2023 est.
72	<u>Cambodia</u>	16,891,245	2023 est.
73	<u>Zimbabwe</u>	15,418,674	2023 est.
74	<u>Benin</u>	14,219,908	2023 est.
75	<u>Guinea</u>	13,607,249	2023 est.
76	<u>Rwanda</u>	13,400,541	2023 est.
77	<u>Burundi</u>	13,162,952	2023 est.
78	<u>Somalia</u>	12,693,796	2023 est.
79	<u>Bolivia</u>	12,186,079	2023 est.
80	<u>South Sudan</u>	12,118,379	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
81	<u>Tunisia</u>	11,976,182	2023 est.
82	<u>Belgium</u>	11,913,633	2023 est.
83	<u>Haiti</u>	11,470,261	2023 est.
84	<u>Jordan</u>	11,086,716	2023 est.
85	<u>Cuba</u>	10,985,974	2023 est.
86	<u>Dominican Republic</u>	10,790,744	2023 est.
87	<u>Czechia</u>	10,706,242	2023 est.
88	<u>Sweden</u>	10,536,338	2023 est.
89	<u>Greece</u>	10,497,595	2023 est.
90	<u>Azerbaijan</u>	10,420,515	2023 est.
91	<u>Portugal</u>	10,223,150	2023 est.
92	<u>United Arab Emirates</u>	9,973,449	2023 est.
93	<u>Papua New Guinea</u>	9,819,350	2023 est.
94	<u>Hungary</u>	9,670,009	2023 est.
95	<u>Honduras</u>	9,571,352	2023 est.
96	<u>Belarus</u>	9,383,853	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
97	<u>Tajikistan</u>	9,245,937	2023 est.
98	<u>Israel</u>	9,043,387	2023 est.
99	<u>Austria</u>	8,940,860	2023 est.
100	<u>Sierra Leone</u>	8,908,040	2023 est.
101	<u>Togo</u>	8,703,961	2023 est.
102	<u>Switzerland</u>	8,563,760	2023 est.
103	<u>Laos</u>	7,852,377	2023 est.
104	<u>Paraguay</u>	7,439,863	2023 est.
105	<u>Hong Kong</u>	7,288,167	2023 est.
106	<u>Libya</u>	7,252,573	2023 est.
107	<u>Bulgaria</u>	6,827,736	2023 est.
108	<u>Serbia</u>	6,693,375	2023 est.
109	<u>El Salvador</u>	6,602,370	2023 est.
110	<u>Nicaragua</u>	6,359,689	2023 est.
111	<u>Eritrea</u>	6,274,796	2023 est.
112	<u>Kyrgyzstan</u>	6,122,781	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
113	<u>Singapore</u>	5,975,383	2023 est.
114	<u>Denmark</u>	5,946,984	2023 est.
115	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	5,690,818	2023 est.
116	<u>Congo, Republic of the</u>	5,677,493	2023 est.
117	<u>Finland</u>	5,614,571	2023 est.
118	<u>Norway</u>	5,597,924	2023 est.
119	<u>Central African Republic</u>	5,552,228	2023 est.
120	<u>Liberia</u>	5,506,280	2023 est.
121	<u>Slovakia</u>	5,425,319	2023 est.
122	<u>Lebanon</u>	5,331,203	2023 est.
123	<u>Ireland</u>	5,323,991	2023 est.
124	<u>Costa Rica</u>	5,256,612	2023 est.
125	<u>New Zealand</u>	5,109,702	2023 est.
126	<u>Georgia</u>	4,936,390	2023 est.
127	<u>Panama</u>	4,404,108	2023 est.
128	<u>Mauritania</u>	4,244,878	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
129	<u>Croatia</u>	4,169,239	2023 est.
130	<u>Oman</u>	3,833,465	2023 est.
131	<u>Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>	3,807,764	2023 est.
132	<u>Uruguay</u>	3,416,264	2023 est.
133	<u>Mongolia</u>	3,255,468	2023 est.
134	<u>Moldova</u>	3,250,532	2023 est.
135	<u>Kuwait</u>	3,103,580	2023 est.
136	<u>Albania</u>	3,101,621	2023 est.
137	<u>Puerto Rico</u>	3,057,311	2023 est.
138	<u>West Bank</u>	3,050,760	2023 est.
139	<u>Armenia</u>	2,989,091	2023 est.
140	<u>Jamaica</u>	2,820,982	2023 est.
141	<u>Namibia</u>	2,777,232	2023 est.
142	<u>Lithuania</u>	2,655,755	2023 est.
143	<u>Qatar</u>	2,532,104	2023 est.
144	<u>Gambia, The</u>	2,468,569	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
145	<u>Botswana</u>	2,417,596	2023 est.
146	<u>Gabon</u>	2,397,368	2023 est.
147	<u>Lesotho</u>	2,210,646	2023 est.
148	<u>North Macedonia</u>	2,133,410	2023 est.
149	<u>Slovenia</u>	2,099,790	2023 est.
150	<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	2,078,820	2023 est.
151	<u>Gaza Strip</u>	2,037,744	2023 est.
152	<u>Kosovo</u>	1,964,327	2023 est.
153	<u>Latvia</u>	1,821,750	2023 est.
154	<u>Equatorial Guinea</u>	1,737,695	2023 est.
155	<u>Bahrain</u>	1,553,886	2023 est.
156	<u>Timor-Leste</u>	1,476,042	2023 est.
157	<u>Trinidad and Tobago</u>	1,407,460	2023 est.
158	<u>Mauritius</u>	1,309,448	2023 est.
159	<u>Cyprus</u>	1,308,120	2023 est.
160	<u>Estonia</u>	1,202,762	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
161	<u>Eswatini</u>	1,130,043	2023 est.
162	<u>Djibouti</u>	976,143	2023 est.
163	<u>Fiji</u>	947,760	2023 est.
164	<u>Comoros</u>	888,378	2023 est.
165	<u>Bhutan</u>	876,181	2023 est.
166	<u>Guyana</u>	791,739	2023 est.
167	<u>Solomon Islands</u>	714,766	2023 est.
168	<u>Luxembourg</u>	660,924	2023 est.
169	<u>Macau</u>	639,971	2023 est.
170	<u>Suriname</u>	639,759	2023 est.
171	<u>Cabo Verde</u>	603,901	2023 est.
172	<u>Montenegro</u>	602,445	2023 est.
173	<u>Brunei</u>	484,991	2023 est.
174	<u>Malta</u>	467,138	2023 est.
175	<u>Belize</u>	419,137	2023 est.
176	<u>Maldives</u>	389,568	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
177	<u>Iceland</u>	360,872	2023 est.
178	<u>Bahamas, The</u>	358,508	2023 est.
179	<u>Vanuatu</u>	313,046	2023 est.
180	<u>Barbados</u>	303,431	2023 est.
181	<u>French Polynesia</u>	301,488	2023 est.
182	<u>New Caledonia</u>	300,682	2023 est.
183	<u>Sao Tome and Principe</u>	220,372	2023 est.
184	<u>Samoa</u>	207,501	2023 est.
185	<u>Guam</u>	169,330	2023 est.
186	<u>Saint Lucia</u>	167,591	2023 est.
187	<u>Curacao</u>	152,849	2023 est.
188	<u>Aruba</u>	123,702	2023 est.
189	<u>Kiribati</u>	115,372	2023 est.
190	<u>Grenada</u>	114,299	2023 est.
191	<u>Tonga</u>	105,221	2023 est.
192	<u>Virgin Islands</u>	104,917	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
193	<u>Jersey</u>	102,785	2023 est.
194	<u>Antigua and Barbuda</u>	101,489	2023 est.
195	<u>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</u>	100,804	2023 est.
196	<u>Micronesia, Federated States of</u>	100,319	2023 est.
197	<u>Seychelles</u>	97,617	2023 est.
198	<u>Isle of Man</u>	91,840	2023 est.
199	<u>Andorra</u>	85,468	2023 est.
200	<u>Marshall Islands</u>	80,966	2023 est.
201	<u>Dominica</u>	74,656	2023 est.
202	<u>Bermuda</u>	72,576	2023 est.
203	<u>Guernsey</u>	67,642	2023 est.
204	<u>Cayman Islands</u>	65,483	2023 est.
205	<u>Turks and Caicos Islands</u>	59,367	2023 est.
206	<u>Greenland</u>	57,777	2023 est.
207	<u>Saint Kitts and Nevis</u>	54,817	2023 est.
208	<u>Faroe Islands</u>	52,600	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
209	<u>Northern Mariana Islands</u>	51,295	2023 est.
210	<u>Sint Maarten</u>	45,677	2023 est.
211	<u>American Samoa</u>	44,620	2023 est.
212	<u>Liechtenstein</u>	39,993	2023 est.
213	<u>British Virgin Islands</u>	39,369	2023 est.
214	<u>San Marino</u>	34,892	2023 est.
215	<u>Saint Martin</u>	32,897	2023 est.
216	<u>Monaco</u>	31,597	2023 est.
217	<u>Gibraltar</u>	29,629	2023 est.
218	<u>Palau</u>	21,779	2023 est.
219	<u>Anguilla</u>	19,079	2023 est.
220	<u>Wallis and Futuna</u>	15,929	2023 est.
221	<u>Tuvalu</u>	11,639	2023 est.
222	<u>Nauru</u>	9,852	2023 est.
223	<u>Cook Islands</u>	7,939	2023 est.
224	<u>Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha</u>	7,935	2023 est.

Rank	Country		Date of Information
225	<u>Saint Barthelemy</u>	7,093	2023 est.
226	<u>Montserrat</u>	5,440	2023 est.
227	<u>Saint Pierre and Miquelon</u>	5,195	2023 est.
228	<u>Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)</u>	3,198	2016 est.
229	<u>Svalbard</u>	2,926	January 2021 est.
230	<u>Christmas Island</u>	2,205	2016 est.
231	<u>Niue</u>	2,000	July 2022 est.
232	<u>Norfolk Island</u>	1,748	2016 est.
233	<u>Tokelau</u>	1,647	2019 est.
234	<u>Paracel Islands</u>	1,440	July 2014 est.
235	<u>Holy See (Vatican City)</u>	1,000	2022 est.
236	<u>Cocos (Keeling) Islands</u>	596	July 2014 est.
237	<u>Pitcairn Islands</u>	50	2021 est.

Annex 3: Country Comparisons –Population Growth Rate (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023c)

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
1	<u>Syria</u>	6.39	2023 est.
2	<u>South Sudan</u>	4.78	2023 est.
3	<u>Niger</u>	3.66	2023 est.
4	<u>Burundi</u>	3.59	2023 est.
5	<u>Equatorial Guinea</u>	3.36	2023 est.
6	<u>Angola</u>	3.34	2023 est.
7	<u>Benin</u>	3.31	2023 est.
8	<u>Uganda</u>	3.22	2023 est.
9	<u>Congo, Democratic Republic of the</u>	3.13	2023 est.
10	<u>Chad</u>	3.05	2023 est.
11	<u>Mali</u>	2.93	2023 est.
12	<u>Zambia</u>	2.86	2023 est.
13	<u>Guinea</u>	2.75	2023 est.
14	<u>Tanzania</u>	2.75	2023 est.
15	<u>Cameroon</u>	2.73	2023 est.
16	<u>Liberia</u>	2.71	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
17	<u>Sudan</u>	2.55	2023 est.
18	<u>Mozambique</u>	2.55	2023 est.
19	<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	2.54	2023 est.
20	<u>Nigeria</u>	2.53	2023 est.
21	<u>Senegal</u>	2.52	2023 est.
22	<u>Somalia</u>	2.49	2023 est.
23	<u>Burkina Faso</u>	2.46	2023 est.
24	<u>Togo</u>	2.45	2023 est.
25	<u>Ethiopia</u>	2.42	2023 est.
26	<u>Sierra Leone</u>	2.41	2023 est.
27	<u>Venezuela</u>	2.40	2023 est.
28	<u>Gabon</u>	2.39	2023 est.
29	<u>Congo, Republic of the</u>	2.33	2023 est.
30	<u>Papua New Guinea</u>	2.31	2023 est.
31	<u>Malawi</u>	2.28	2023 est.
32	<u>Afghanistan</u>	2.26	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
33	<u>Gambia, The</u>	2.23	2023 est.
34	<u>Madagascar</u>	2.22	2023 est.
35	<u>Ghana</u>	2.19	2023 est.
36	<u>Cote d'Ivoire</u>	2.16	2023 est.
37	<u>Timor-Leste</u>	2.10	2023 est.
38	<u>Kenya</u>	2.09	2023 est.
39	<u>Gaza Strip</u>	1.99	2023 est.
40	<u>Mauritania</u>	1.96	2023 est.
41	<u>Zimbabwe</u>	1.95	2023 est.
42	<u>Iraq</u>	1.94	2023 est.
43	<u>Djibouti</u>	1.93	2023 est.
44	<u>Pakistan</u>	1.91	2023 est.
45	<u>British Virgin Islands</u>	1.87	2023 est.
46	<u>Yemen</u>	1.83	2023 est.
47	<u>Turks and Caicos Islands</u>	1.81	2023 est.
48	<u>Namibia</u>	1.80	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
49	<u>Oman</u>	1.80	2023 est.
50	<u>Cayman Islands</u>	1.79	2023 est.
51	<u>Central African Republic</u>	1.77	2023 est.
52	<u>Anguilla</u>	1.77	2023 est.
53	<u>Solomon Islands</u>	1.69	2023 est.
54	<u>Rwanda</u>	1.68	2023 est.
55	<u>West Bank</u>	1.66	2023 est.
56	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	1.65	2023 est.
57	<u>Belize</u>	1.61	2023 est.
58	<u>Vanuatu</u>	1.59	2023 est.
59	<u>Egypt</u>	1.59	2023 est.
60	<u>Luxembourg</u>	1.58	2023 est.
61	<u>Philippines</u>	1.58	2023 est.
62	<u>Libya</u>	1.54	2023 est.
63	<u>Guatemala</u>	1.54	2023 est.
64	<u>Panama</u>	1.51	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
65	<u>Sao Tome and Principe</u>	1.45	2023 est.
66	<u>Brunei</u>	1.43	2023 est.
67	<u>Israel</u>	1.43	2023 est.
68	<u>Botswana</u>	1.37	2023 est.
69	<u>Tajikistan</u>	1.36	2023 est.
70	<u>Comoros</u>	1.34	2023 est.
71	<u>Marshall Islands</u>	1.30	2023 est.
72	<u>Laos</u>	1.30	2023 est.
73	<u>Algeria</u>	1.27	2023 est.
74	<u>Sint Maarten</u>	1.19	2023 est.
75	<u>Australia</u>	1.19	2023 est.
76	<u>Cabo Verde</u>	1.19	2023 est.
77	<u>Haiti</u>	1.18	2023 est.
78	<u>New Caledonia</u>	1.17	2023 est.
79	<u>Honduras</u>	1.16	2023 est.
80	<u>Antigua and Barbuda</u>	1.13	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
81	<u>Kuwait</u>	1.13	2023 est.
82	<u>Paraguay</u>	1.12	2023 est.
83	<u>Christmas Island</u>	1.11	2014 est.
84	<u>Aruba</u>	1.11	2023 est.
85	<u>Suriname</u>	1.11	2023 est.
86	<u>Ecuador</u>	1.10	2023 est.
87	<u>Eritrea</u>	1.08	2023 est.
88	<u>New Zealand</u>	1.06	2023 est.
89	<u>Bolivia</u>	1.06	2023 est.
90	<u>Cambodia</u>	1.04	2023 est.
91	<u>Kiribati</u>	1.02	2023 est.
92	<u>Malaysia</u>	1.01	2023 est.
93	<u>Cyprus</u>	1.00	2023 est.
94	<u>Costa Rica</u>	0.98	2023 est.
95	<u>Bhutan</u>	0.96	2023 est.
96	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	0.95	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
97	<u>Vietnam</u>	0.93	2023 est.
98	<u>Iran</u>	0.93	2023 est.
99	<u>Bangladesh</u>	0.91	2023 est.
100	<u>Ireland</u>	0.91	2023 est.
101	<u>South Africa</u>	0.91	2023 est.
102	<u>Nicaragua</u>	0.91	2023 est.
103	<u>Singapore</u>	0.90	2023 est.
104	<u>Iceland</u>	0.89	2023 est.
105	<u>Dominican Republic</u>	0.88	2023 est.
106	<u>Morocco</u>	0.88	2023 est.
107	<u>Qatar</u>	0.86	2023 est.
108	<u>Bahrain</u>	0.85	2023 est.
109	<u>Mongolia</u>	0.83	2023 est.
110	<u>Kyrgyzstan</u>	0.82	2023 est.
111	<u>Tuvalu</u>	0.81	2023 est.
112	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	0.81	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
113	<u>Argentina</u>	0.80	2023 est.
114	<u>Bahamas, The</u>	0.80	2023 est.
115	<u>Jordan</u>	0.79	2023 est.
116	<u>Norway</u>	0.79	2023 est.
117	<u>Lesotho</u>	0.76	2023 est.
118	<u>Indonesia</u>	0.76	2023 est.
119	<u>Burma</u>	0.75	2023 est.
120	<u>Paracel Islands</u>	0.75	2021 est.
121	<u>Nepal</u>	0.74	2023 est.
122	<u>Canada</u>	0.73	2023 est.
123	<u>Kazakhstan</u>	0.73	2023 est.
124	<u>Eswatini</u>	0.72	2023 est.
125	<u>Macau</u>	0.71	2023 est.
126	<u>Liechtenstein</u>	0.70	2023 est.
127	<u>India</u>	0.70	2023 est.
128	<u>French Polynesia</u>	0.70	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
129	<u>United States</u>	0.68	2023 est.
130	<u>Monaco</u>	0.66	2023 est.
131	<u>Samoa</u>	0.65	2023 est.
132	<u>Switzerland</u>	0.64	2023 est.
133	<u>Turkey (Turkiye)</u>	0.64	2023 est.
134	<u>Brazil</u>	0.64	2023 est.
135	<u>Lebanon</u>	0.64	2023 est.
136	<u>Tunisia</u>	0.63	2023 est.
137	<u>Faroe Islands</u>	0.63	2023 est.
138	<u>Chile</u>	0.63	2023 est.
139	<u>Azerbaijan</u>	0.63	2023 est.
140	<u>Kosovo</u>	0.62	2023 est.
141	<u>Mexico</u>	0.61	2023 est.
142	<u>Jersey</u>	0.61	2023 est.
143	<u>Seychelles</u>	0.60	2023 est.
144	<u>Malta</u>	0.59	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
145	<u>San Marino</u>	0.59	2023 est.
146	<u>Saint Kitts and Nevis</u>	0.59	2023 est.
147	<u>Sri Lanka</u>	0.59	2023 est.
148	<u>United Arab Emirates</u>	0.58	2023 est.
149	<u>Belgium</u>	0.55	2023 est.
150	<u>Colombia</u>	0.54	2023 est.
151	<u>Sweden</u>	0.51	2023 est.
152	<u>Peru</u>	0.50	2023 est.
153	<u>United Kingdom</u>	0.49	2023 est.
154	<u>Isle of Man</u>	0.48	2023 est.
155	<u>Montserrat</u>	0.46	2023 est.
156	<u>El Salvador</u>	0.46	2023 est.
157	<u>Denmark</u>	0.44	2023 est.
158	<u>Korea, North</u>	0.44	2023 est.
159	<u>Fiji</u>	0.42	2023 est.
160	<u>Nauru</u>	0.42	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
161	<u>Palau</u>	0.39	2023 est.
162	<u>Netherlands</u>	0.36	2023 est.
163	<u>Ashmore and Cartier Islands</u>	0.32	2021 est.
164	<u>Bermuda</u>	0.32	2023 est.
165	<u>France</u>	0.31	2023 est.
166	<u>Austria</u>	0.31	2023 est.
167	<u>Saint Martin</u>	0.31	2023 est.
168	<u>Curacao</u>	0.30	2023 est.
169	<u>Grenada</u>	0.29	2023 est.
170	<u>Guyana</u>	0.28	2023 est.
171	<u>Saint Lucia</u>	0.27	2023 est.
172	<u>Uruguay</u>	0.27	2023 est.
173	<u>Barbados</u>	0.24	2023 est.
174	<u>Wallis and Futuna</u>	0.23	2023 est.
175	<u>Korea, South</u>	0.23	2023 est.
176	<u>Finland</u>	0.22	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
177	<u>Guernsey</u>	0.22	2023 est.
178	<u>Thailand</u>	0.20	2023 est.
179	<u>Albania</u>	0.19	2023 est.
180	<u>Gibraltar</u>	0.19	2023 est.
181	<u>China</u>	0.18	2023 est.
182	<u>Hong Kong</u>	0.15	2023 est.
183	<u>Guam</u>	0.13	2023 est.
184	<u>Spain</u>	0.12	2023 est.
185	<u>Trinidad and Tobago</u>	0.12	2023 est.
186	<u>Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha</u>	0.11	2023 est.
187	<u>North Macedonia</u>	0.11	2023 est.
188	<u>Jamaica</u>	0.09	2023 est.
189	<u>Mauritius</u>	0.09	2023 est.
190	<u>Taiwan</u>	0.03	2023 est.
191	<u>Dominica</u>	0.02	2023 est.
192	<u>Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)</u>	0.01	2014 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
193	<u>Georgia</u>	0.01	2023 est.
194	<u>Norfolk Island</u>	0.01	2014 est.
195	<u>Holy See (Vatican City)</u>	0.00	2014 est.
196	<u>Pitcairn Islands</u>	0.00	2014 est.
197	<u>Czechia</u>	0.00	2023 est.
198	<u>Tokelau</u>	-0.01	2019 est.
199	<u>Niue</u>	-0.03	2021 est.
200	<u>Svalbard</u>	-0.03	2019 est.
201	<u>Greenland</u>	-0.04	2023 est.
202	<u>Slovenia</u>	-0.08	2023 est.
203	<u>Italy</u>	-0.11	2023 est.
204	<u>Andorra</u>	-0.11	2023 est.
205	<u>Saint Barthelemy</u>	-0.11	2023 est.
206	<u>Germany</u>	-0.12	2023 est.
207	<u>Slovakia</u>	-0.12	2023 est.
208	<u>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</u>	-0.16	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
209	<u>Maldives</u>	-0.17	2023 est.
210	<u>Portugal</u>	-0.17	2023 est.
211	<u>Cuba</u>	-0.19	2023 est.
212	<u>Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>	-0.23	2023 est.
213	<u>Russia</u>	-0.24	2023 est.
214	<u>Poland</u>	-0.28	2023 est.
215	<u>Tonga</u>	-0.30	2023 est.
216	<u>Hungary</u>	-0.31	2023 est.
217	<u>Belarus</u>	-0.32	2023 est.
218	<u>Greece</u>	-0.35	2023 est.
219	<u>Northern Mariana Islands</u>	-0.35	2023 est.
220	<u>Armenia</u>	-0.40	2023 est.
221	<u>Japan</u>	-0.41	2023 est.
222	<u>Montenegro</u>	-0.43	2023 est.
223	<u>Croatia</u>	-0.47	2023 est.
224	<u>Virgin Islands</u>	-0.49	2023 est.

Rank	Country	%	Date of Information
225	<u>Ukraine</u>	-0.52	2023 est.
226	<u>Serbia</u>	-0.63	2023 est.
227	<u>Bulgaria</u>	-0.66	2023 est.
228	<u>Micronesia, Federated States of</u>	-0.70	2023 est.
229	<u>Estonia</u>	-0.74	2023 est.
230	<u>Romania</u>	-1.01	2023 est.
231	<u>Lithuania</u>	-1.04	2023 est.
232	<u>Latvia</u>	-1.13	2023 est.
233	<u>Moldova</u>	-1.14	2023 est.
234	<u>Saint Pierre and Miquelon</u>	-1.19	2023 est.
235	<u>Puerto Rico</u>	-1.29	2023 est.
236	<u>American Samoa</u>	-1.74	2023 est.
237	<u>Cook Islands</u>	-2.31	2023 est.

Annex 4: 2023 World Military Strength Ranking (Global Firepower team, 2023b)

Rank	Country	PwrIndx
1	USA	0.0712
2	Russia	0.0714
3	China	0.0722
4	India	0.1025
5	UK	0.1435
6	South Korea	0.15.5
7	Pakistan	0.1694
8	Japan	0.1711
9	France	0.1848
10	Italy	0.1973
11	Turkey	0.2016
12	Brazil	0.2151
13	Indonesia	0.2221
14	Egypt	0.2224
15	Ukraine	0.2516
16	Australia	0.2567
17	Iran	0.2712
18	Israel	0.2757
19	Vietnam	0.2855
20	Poland	0.3406
21	Spain	0.3556
22	Saudi Arabia	0.3626
23	Taiwan	0.3639
24	Thailand	0.3738

Rank	Country	PwrIndx
25	Germany	0.3881
26	Algeria	0.3911
27	Canada	0.3956
28	Argentina	0.4243
29	Singapore	0.4613
30	Greece	0.4621
31	Mexico	0.4687
32	Philippines	0.4811
33	South Africa	0.4885
34	North Korea	0.5118
35	Norway	0.5289
36	Nigeria	0.5587
37	Sweden	0.5679
38	Myanmar	0.5768
39	Netherlands	0.5801
40	Bangladesh	0.5871
41	Portugal	0.6116
42	Malaysia	0.6189
43	Colombia	0.7011
44	Switzerland	0.7191
45	Iraq	0.7365
46	Chile	0.7712
47	Romania	0.7735
48	Czech Republic (Chechia)	0.7849
49	Ethiopia	0.7979
50	Denmark	0.8011

Rank	Country	PwrIndx
51	Finland	0.8099
52	Venezuela	0.8228
53	Peru	0.8466
54	Hungary	0.8643
55	Angola	0.8732
56	UAE	0.8978
57	Azerbaijan	0.9391
58	Serbia	0.9571
59	Bulgaria	0.9757
60	Belarus	1.0485
61	Morocco	1.0524
62	Uzbekistan	1.0692
63	Kazakhstan	1.0873
64	Syria	1.1095
65	Qatar	1.1296
66	Cuba	1.1523
67	Slovakia	1.1789
68	Belgium	1.1836
69	Croatia	1.2141
70	Ecuador	1.2181
71	Sri Lanka	1.2478
72	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1.3055
73	Tunisia	1.3243
74	Yemen	1.3985
75	Sudan	1.4079
76	Oman	1.4081

Rank	Country	PwrIndx
77	Bolivia	1.4339
78	Kuwait	1.4441
79	Bahrain	1.4511
80	Libya	1.4718
81	Jordan	1.5098
82	Turkmenistan	1.5986
83	Uganda	1.6264
84	Austria	1.6543
85	Georgia	1.7181
86	Slovenia	1.7261
87	Kenya	1.7701
88	Paraguay	1.7863
89	Zambia	1.7896
90	Ireland	1.8161
91	Albania	1.8466
92	Honduras	1.8851
93	Lithuania	1.9026
94	Armenia	1.9137
95	Latvia	1.9161
96	Uruguay	1.9269
97	Chad	1.9751
98	Zimbabwe	1.9787
99	Mongolia	2.0263
100	Cameroon	2.0296
101	Tanzania	2.0387
102	Guatemala	2.0419

Rank	Country	PwrIndx
103	New Zealand	2.0617
104	Estonia	2.0686
105	Ivory Coast	2.0881
106	Cambodia	2.1321
107	Kyrgyzstan	2.1703
108	North Macedonia	2.1717
109	Ghana	2.1741
110	Mali	2.1992
111	Lebanon	2.2381
112	Mozambique	2.2895
113	Eritrea	2.2956
114	Afghanistan	2.3118
115	Laos	2.3168
116	South Sudan	2.5261
117	Nicaragua	2.5685
118	Dominican Republic	2.5742
119	Niger	2.6327
120	Tajikistan	2.6403
121	Burkina Faso	2.6607
122	Republic of the Congo	2.6648
123	Namibia	2.7081
124	Botswana	2.7851
125	Senegal	2.7961
126	Luxembourg	2.8202
127	El Salvador	2.8583
128	Montenegro	2.8704

Rank	Country	PwrIndx
129	Nepal	2.8728
130	Madagascar	2.9078
131	Gabon	2.9235
132	Mauritania	3.0398
133	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.0788
134	Kosovo	3.2863
135	Panama	3.2877
136	Central African Republic	3.2931
137	Iceland	3.4845
138	Sierra Leone	3.5241
139	Belize	3.7178
140	Suriname	4.0003
141	Liberia	4.0006
142	Somalia	4.0196
143	Moldova	4.0861
144	Benin	4.1269
145	Bhutan	6.2017

Annex 5: Country Comparisons –Size of Territory (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023a)

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
1	<u>Russia</u>	17,098,242	
2	<u>Antarctica</u>	14,200,000	
3	<u>Canada</u>	9,984,670	
4	<u>United States</u>	9,833,517	
5	<u>China</u>	9,596,960	
6	<u>Brazil</u>	8,515,770	
7	<u>Australia</u>	7,741,220	
8	<u>India</u>	3,287,263	
9	<u>Argentina</u>	2,780,400	
10	<u>Kazakhstan</u>	2,724,900	
11	<u>Algeria</u>	2,381,740	
12	<u>Congo, Democratic Republic of the</u>	2,344,858	
13	<u>Greenland</u>	2,166,086	
14	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	2,149,690	
15	<u>Mexico</u>	1,964,375	
16	<u>Indonesia</u>	1,904,569	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
17	<u>Sudan</u>	1,861,484	
18	<u>Libya</u>	1,759,540	
19	<u>Iran</u>	1,648,195	
20	<u>Mongolia</u>	1,564,116	
21	<u>Peru</u>	1,285,216	
22	<u>Chad</u>	1,284,000	
23	<u>Niger</u>	1,267,000	
24	<u>Angola</u>	1,246,700	
25	<u>Mali</u>	1,240,192	
26	<u>South Africa</u>	1,219,090	
27	<u>Colombia</u>	1,138,910	
28	<u>Ethiopia</u>	1,104,300	
29	<u>Bolivia</u>	1,098,581	
30	<u>Mauritania</u>	1,030,700	
31	<u>Egypt</u>	1,001,450	
32	<u>Tanzania</u>	947,300	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
33	<u>Nigeria</u>	923,768	
34	<u>Venezuela</u>	912,050	
35	<u>Namibia</u>	824,292	
36	<u>Mozambique</u>	799,380	
37	<u>Pakistan</u>	796,095	
38	<u>Turkey (Turkiye)</u>	783,562	
39	<u>Chile</u>	756,102	
40	<u>Zambia</u>	752,618	
41	<u>Morocco</u>	716,550	
42	<u>Burma</u>	676,578	
43	<u>Afghanistan</u>	652,230	
44	<u>South Sudan</u>	644,329	
45	<u>France</u>	643,801	
46	<u>Somalia</u>	637,657	
47	<u>Central African Republic</u>	622,984	
48	<u>Ukraine</u>	603,550	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
49	<u>Madagascar</u>	587,041	
50	<u>Botswana</u>	581,730	
51	<u>Kenya</u>	580,367	
52	<u>Yemen</u>	527,968	
53	<u>Thailand</u>	513,120	
54	<u>Spain</u>	505,370	
55	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	488,100	
56	<u>Cameroon</u>	475,440	
57	<u>Papua New Guinea</u>	462,840	
58	<u>Sweden</u>	450,295	
59	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	447,400	
60	<u>Iraq</u>	438,317	
61	<u>Paraguay</u>	406,752	
62	<u>Zimbabwe</u>	390,757	
63	<u>Japan</u>	377,915	
64	<u>Germany</u>	357,022	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
65	<u>Congo, Republic of the</u>	342,000	
66	<u>Finland</u>	338,145	
67	<u>Vietnam</u>	331,210	
68	<u>Malaysia</u>	329,847	
69	<u>Norway</u>	323,802	
70	<u>Cote d'Ivoire</u>	322,463	
71	<u>Poland</u>	312,685	
72	<u>Oman</u>	309,500	
73	<u>Italy</u>	301,340	
74	<u>Philippines</u>	300,000	
75	<u>Ecuador</u>	283,561	
76	<u>Burkina Faso</u>	274,200	
77	<u>New Zealand</u>	268,838	
78	<u>Gabon</u>	267,667	
79	<u>Guinea</u>	245,857	
80	<u>United Kingdom</u>	243,610	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
81	<u>Uganda</u>	241,038	
82	<u>Ghana</u>	238,533	
83	<u>Romania</u>	238,391	
84	<u>Laos</u>	236,800	
85	<u>Guyana</u>	214,969	
86	<u>Belarus</u>	207,600	
87	<u>Kyrgyzstan</u>	199,951	
88	<u>Senegal</u>	196,722	
89	<u>Syria</u>	187,437	
90	<u>Cambodia</u>	181,035	
91	<u>Uruguay</u>	176,215	
92	<u>Suriname</u>	163,820	
93	<u>Tunisia</u>	163,610	
94	<u>Bangladesh</u>	148,460	
95	<u>Nepal</u>	147,181	
96	<u>Tajikistan</u>	144,100	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
97	<u>Greece</u>	131,957	
98	<u>Nicaragua</u>	130,370	
99	<u>Korea, North</u>	120,538	
100	<u>Malawi</u>	118,484	
101	<u>Eritrea</u>	117,600	
102	<u>Benin</u>	112,622	
103	<u>Honduras</u>	112,090	
104	<u>Liberia</u>	111,369	
105	<u>Bulgaria</u>	110,879	
106	<u>Cuba</u>	110,860	
107	<u>Guatemala</u>	108,889	
108	<u>Iceland</u>	103,000	
109	<u>Korea, South</u>	99,720	
110	<u>Hungary</u>	93,028	
111	<u>Portugal</u>	92,090	
112	<u>Jordan</u>	89,342	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
113	<u>Azerbaijan</u>	86,600	
114	<u>Austria</u>	83,871	
115	<u>United Arab Emirates</u>	83,600	
116	<u>Czechia</u>	78,867	
117	<u>Serbia</u>	77,474	
118	<u>Panama</u>	75,420	
119	<u>Sierra Leone</u>	71,740	
120	<u>Ireland</u>	70,273	
121	<u>Georgia</u>	69,700	
122	<u>Sri Lanka</u>	65,610	
123	<u>Lithuania</u>	65,300	
124	<u>Latvia</u>	64,589	
125	<u>Svalbard</u>	62,045	
126	<u>Togo</u>	56,785	
127	<u>Croatia</u>	56,594	
128	<u>Bosnia and Herzegovina</u>	51,197	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
129	<u>Costa Rica</u>	51,100	
130	<u>Slovakia</u>	49,035	
131	<u>Dominican Republic</u>	48,670	
132	<u>Estonia</u>	45,228	
133	<u>Denmark</u>	43,094	
134	<u>Netherlands</u>	41,543	
135	<u>Switzerland</u>	41,277	
136	<u>Bhutan</u>	38,394	
137	<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	36,125	
138	<u>Taiwan</u>	35,980	
139	<u>Moldova</u>	33,851	
140	<u>Belgium</u>	30,528	
141	<u>Lesotho</u>	30,355	
142	<u>Armenia</u>	29,743	
143	<u>Solomon Islands</u>	28,896	
144	<u>Albania</u>	28,748	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
145	<u>Equatorial Guinea</u>	28,051	
146	<u>Burundi</u>	27,830	
147	<u>Haiti</u>	27,750	
148	<u>Rwanda</u>	26,338	
149	<u>North Macedonia</u>	25,713	
150	<u>Djibouti</u>	23,200	
151	<u>Belize</u>	22,966	
152	<u>Israel</u>	21,937	
153	<u>El Salvador</u>	21,041	
154	<u>Slovenia</u>	20,273	
155	<u>New Caledonia</u>	18,575	
156	<u>Fiji</u>	18,274	
157	<u>Kuwait</u>	17,818	
158	<u>Eswatini</u>	17,364	
159	<u>Timor-Leste</u>	14,874	
160	<u>Bahamas, The</u>	13,880	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
161	<u>Montenegro</u>	13,812	
162	<u>Vanuatu</u>	12,189	
163	<u>Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)</u>	12,173	
164	<u>Qatar</u>	11,586	
165	<u>Gambia, The</u>	11,300	
166	<u>Jamaica</u>	10,991	
167	<u>Kosovo</u>	10,887	
168	<u>Lebanon</u>	10,400	
169	<u>Cyprus</u>	9,251	
170	<u>Puerto Rico</u>	9,104	
171	<u>West Bank</u>	5,860	
172	<u>Brunei</u>	5,765	
173	<u>Trinidad and Tobago</u>	5,128	
174	<u>French Polynesia</u>	4,167	
175	<u>Cabo Verde</u>	4,033	
176	<u>South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands</u>	3,903	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
177	<u>Samoa</u>	2,831	
178	<u>Luxembourg</u>	2,586	
179	<u>Comoros</u>	2,235	
180	<u>Mauritius</u>	2,040	
181	<u>Virgin Islands</u>	1,910	
182	<u>Faroe Islands</u>	1,393	
183	<u>Hong Kong</u>	1,108	
184	<u>Sao Tome and Principe</u>	964	
185	<u>Turks and Caicos Islands</u>	948	
186	<u>Kiribati</u>	811	
187	<u>Bahrain</u>	760	
188	<u>Dominica</u>	751	
189	<u>Tonga</u>	747	
190	<u>Singapore</u>	719	
191	<u>Micronesia, Federated States of</u>	702	
192	<u>Saint Lucia</u>	616	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
193	<u>Isle of Man</u>	572	
194	<u>Guam</u>	544	
195	<u>Andorra</u>	468	
196	<u>Northern Mariana Islands</u>	464	
197	<u>Palau</u>	459	
198	<u>Seychelles</u>	455	
199	<u>Curacao</u>	444	
200	<u>Antigua and Barbuda</u>	443	
201	<u>Barbados</u>	430	
202	<u>Heard Island and McDonald Islands</u>	412	
203	<u>Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha</u>	394	
204	<u>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</u>	389	
205	<u>Jan Mayen</u>	377	
206	<u>Gaza Strip</u>	360	
207	<u>Grenada</u>	344	
208	<u>Malta</u>	316	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
209	<u>Maldives</u>	298	
210	<u>Cayman Islands</u>	264	
211	<u>Saint Kitts and Nevis</u>	261	
212	<u>Niue</u>	260	
213	<u>Saint Pierre and Miquelon</u>	242	
214	<u>Cook Islands</u>	236	
215	<u>American Samoa</u>	224	
216	<u>Marshall Islands</u>	181	
217	<u>Aruba</u>	180	
218	<u>Liechtenstein</u>	160	
219	<u>British Virgin Islands</u>	151	
220	<u>Wallis and Futuna</u>	142	
221	<u>Christmas Island</u>	135	
222	<u>Dhekelia</u>	131	
223	<u>Akrotiri</u>	123	
224	<u>Jersey</u>	116	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
225	<u>Montserrat</u>	102	
226	<u>Anguilla</u>	91	
227	<u>Guernsey</u>	78	
228	<u>San Marino</u>	61	
229	<u>British Indian Ocean Territory</u>	60	
230	<u>Bermuda</u>	54	
231	<u>Saint Martin</u>	50	
232	<u>Bouvet Island</u>	49	
233	<u>Pitcairn Islands</u>	47	
234	<u>Norfolk Island</u>	36	
235	<u>Sint Maarten</u>	34	
236	<u>Macau</u>	28	
237	<u>Tuvalu</u>	26	
238	<u>Saint Barthelemy</u>	25	
239	<u>Nauru</u>	21	
240	<u>Cocos (Keeling) Islands</u>	14	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
241	<u>Tokelau</u>	12	
242	<u>Palmyra Atoll</u>	12	
243	<u>Paracel Islands</u>	8	
244	<u>Gibraltar</u>	7	
245	<u>Wake Island</u>	7	
246	<u>Midway Islands</u>	6	
247	<u>Clipperton Island</u>	6	
248	<u>Navassa Island</u>	5	
249	<u>Ashmore and Cartier Islands</u>	5	
250	<u>Spratly Islands</u>	5	
251	<u>Jarvis Island</u>	5	
252	<u>Coral Sea Islands</u>	3	
253	<u>Johnston Atoll</u>	3	
254	<u>Monaco</u>	2	
255	<u>Howland Island</u>	2	
256	<u>Kingman Reef</u>	1	

Rank	Country	sq km	Date of Information
257	<u>Holy See (Vatican City)</u>	0	

Annex 6: An indicative Turkish official statement on the Hellenic-Turkish relations (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020).



QA-17, 14 March 2020, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Nikos Dendias on Social Media

The statements of 14 March by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Dendias on the social media are concrete evidences of the inconsistent, double-standard, illegal and inhumane policies pursued by this country.

Greece does not protect the borders of the European Union, to the contrary, disgracefully tramples on the very principles and values this Union was built upon, by treating the asylum seekers coming to its gates as enemies instead of human beings, by using gas, bullets and pesticides on them without sparing women and children, by forcing the refugees who entered the Greek territory back to Turkey half-naked, taking their money and belongings which remind the practices of Nazis.

Greece is violating all of the legal instruments such as European Convention on Human Rights, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and UN Convention Against Torture simultaneously, disregarding international law, human rights and European values, on which it keeps harping on. The basic principles regarding the protection of refugees and asylum seekers should not differ according to daily needs of our neighbor. None of what takes place at Meriç befits humanity and neighbourliness.

Besides, Minister Dendias seems to have completely forgotten the acts and statements of his country when North Macedonia closed its borders to asylum seekers four years ago.

The attempts of Greece, who does not seem to be able to approach problems with a comprehensive and humanitarian point of view, to abuse the EU and asylum seekers as tools for its short-term political interests are the main source of the problems in our region.

On the other hand, Minister Dendias errs also on the Libya issue. Because Greece, with its maximalist maritime jurisdiction area claims that are contrary to international law, did not only violate Turkey's rights, but also those of Libya. The memoranda of understanding that we reached with Libya's legitimate Government do not represent merely the interests of a certain group, but of all Libyan people. If Greece would like to bring up a point, she should do so around a table with Turkey and Libya's legitimate Government, instead of bad-mouthing.

While identifying the Greek minority in Albania as the Greek National Minority, it is also hypocritical that Greece does not call the Turkish minority in Greece, Turkish. Minister Dendias seems to have forgotten that the European Court of Human Rights has found multiple violations by Greece in this regard.

Our desire is to be able to find rationalist and common solutions to all the challenges in our region within a framework of good neighbourly relations and cooperation, without resorting to blame-games.

Annex 7: Violations of Greek territorial waters by the Turkish navy and coast guard between 2019-2022 (Data retrieved from Hellenic National Defence General Staff, n.d.-b).

Year	No. of violations
2009	90
2010	133
2011	206
2012	389
2013	341
2014	371
2015	299
2016	414
2017	1998
2018	1479
2019	2032
2020	3215
2021	2085
2022	1581

Annex 8: Aggregate table of Turkey's violations of Greece's national airspace and Turkish infringements of ICAO regulations on ATHINAI FIR between 2009-2022 (Data retrieved from: Hellenic National Defence General Staff, n.d.-a).

Year	In-fringe-ments of air traffic regula-tions (ICAO)	National airspace violations	Armed violating formatio ns	Engage-ment with HAF inter-ception fighters	Overflights of national territory	Total violating aircraft
2009	703	1678	395	237	51	3078
2010	729	1239	367	13	20	3030
2011	620	962	307	13	4	2441
2012	667	646	176	1	3	1405
2013	577	636	129	0	11	1084
2014	801	2244	145	8	14	1269
2015	826	1779	133	80	36	1384
2016	902	1671	86	68	57	1016
2017	1103	3317	257	176	39	1330
2018	1401	3705	196	128	47	1775
2019	1783	4811	344	384	124	2118
2020	1785	4605	324	423	376	2068
2021	1137	2744	126	145	48	1314
2022	2286	11256	282	333	234	2758

Annex 9: Greece's de facto population between 1951 and 2021
(Data collected from: Hellenic Statistical Authority, n.d., 2023; National Statistical Service of Greece, 1955, 1964, 1972, 1994b, 1994a, 2003).

Year	De Facto Population
1951	7.632.801
1961	8.388.553
1971	8.768.641
1981	9.740.417
1991	10.259.900
2001	10.964.020
2011	10.816.286
2021	10.482.487

Annex 10: Disbursed financial aid from the U.S.A. to Greece for defense and security between 2001 and 2022 (Data gathered from: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2023)¹⁸

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
2001	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$2.541.800,00	\$5.216.500,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$2.464.700,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$25.000,00	
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$185.000,00	
2002	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$499.000,00	\$719.000,00
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$220.000,00	
2003	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$3.917.504,00	\$7.557.639,00
	Dod-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$878.225,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$775.627,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$594.000,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$457.155,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$349.651,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$322.762,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$119.198,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$118.384,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Air Force	\$25.133,00	

¹⁸ According to the source, 2022 is only partially reported. Likewise with 2023.

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
2004	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$568.000,00	\$568.000,00
2005	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$1.026.000,00	\$1.163.000,00
	Anti-Terrorism Assistance: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training	Department of State	\$137.000,00	
2006	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$31.182.600,00	\$31.755.600,00
	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$573.000,00	
2007	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$556.000,00	\$829.600,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$273.600,00	
2008	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$442.000,00	\$717.050,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$190.750,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$76.300,00	
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$8.000,00	
2009	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$250.000,00	\$1.493.937,00
	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$100,00	
	International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation	Department of Energy	\$908.420,00	
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$250.000,00	
	International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation	Department of Energy	\$85.331,00	
	ATF eTrace Program/Basic Firearms and Explosives Identification and Tracing Course	Department of Justice	\$86,00	
2010	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$105.000,00	\$320.031,00

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$41.000,00	
	Lab Lead Funds. Program Management and Event Participation, Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and International Security	Department of Energy	\$128.506,00	
	Second Line of Defense Megaports. Radiation detection equipment to key international seaports. International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation	Department of Energy	\$21.630,00	
	International Radiological Threat Reduction. Install security upgrades on vulnerable nuclear & radiological materials located at civilian sites	Department of Energy	\$20.317,00	
	U.S. Origin Nuclear Material Removal. Remove and dispose U.S.-origin HEU and LEU from TRIGA and MTR research reactors.	Department of Energy	\$2.349,00	
	Second Line of Defense Core. Radiation detection equipment at border crossings and key transit areas. International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation	Department of Energy	\$1.229,00	
2011	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$10.952.883,00	\$39.538.193,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$9.372.162,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$8.647.364,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$8.605.837,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1.710.000,00	
	CTFP	Department of Defense	\$107.622,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of Defense	\$98.000,00	

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$44.325,00	
2012	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$44.325,00	\$471.345,00
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$101.700,00	
	CTFP	Department of Defense	\$28.600,00	
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$4.000,00	
	Protect International Nuclear Material. Department of Energy, Office of Global Nuclear Material Threat Reduction (NA-212)	Department of Energy	\$182.310,00	
	Commodity Identification Training Workshop. Department of Energy, Non-proliferation and International Security	Department of Energy	\$90.000,00	
	Protect International Material; Deter, detect, & interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear/radioactive materials. Department of Energy, International Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)	Department of Energy	\$20.410,00	
2013	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$144.000,00	\$548.466,00
	CTFP	Department of Defense	\$94.093,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$93.000,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$17.408,00	
	Protect International Material; Deter, detect, & interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear/radioactive materials. Department of Energy, International Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)	Department of Energy	\$103.209,00	

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
	Protect International Nuclear Material. Department of Energy, Office of Global Nuclear Material Threat Reduction (NA-212)	Department of Energy	\$96.756,00	
2014	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$175.000,00	\$346.143,00
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$97.000,00	
	Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request - Counternarcotics Training, Greece	Department of Justice	\$15.871,00	
	Second Line of Defense Core. Deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation	Department of Energy	\$29.428,00	
	Protect International Nuclear Material. Department of Energy, Office of Global Nuclear Material Threat Reduction (NA-212)	Department of Energy	\$28.844,00	
2015	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$85.591.800,00	\$87.197.064,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$600.000,00	
	CTFP	Department of Justice	\$273.197,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$268.000,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$199.000,00	
	In-Country Counternarcotics Program	Department of Defense	\$140.000,00	
	DEA Counternarcotics training via U.S. EUCOM, Greece	Department of Justice	\$68.360,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$21.528,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$10.788,00	

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$9.667,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$6.448,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$2.625,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1.800,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1.184,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1.134,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$903,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$385,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$235,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$9,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1,00	
	2016	Global Train and Equip Program - Domestic Maritime Counterterrorism Force Enhancement	Department of Defense	
DoD-EDA		Department of the Air Force	\$3.592.849,00	
DoD-EDA		Department of the Army	\$750.000,00	
DoD-IMET		Department of State	\$200.000,00	
DoD-EDA		Department of the Navy	\$136.307,00	
ICP		Department of Defense	\$98.133,00	
CTFP		Department of Defense	\$35.528,00	
DEA Counternarcotics training via U.S. EUCOM, Greece		Department of Justice	\$16.082,00	

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
2017	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$379.239,00	\$1.083.822,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$266.044,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$193.200,00	
	ICP	Department of Defense	\$106.805,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Navy	\$72.767,00	
	Inter-European Air Forces Academy Mobile Training Team - Greece	Department of the Air Force	\$40.000,00	
	DEA Counternarcotics training via U.S. EUCOM, Greece	Department of Justice	\$25.751,00	
	Regional Strategic Initiative Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training	Department of State	\$16,00	
2018	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$9.498.811,00	\$27.266.401,00
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$3.007.096,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$2.999.624,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$2.614.866,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1.947.917,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$1.937.305,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$999.313,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$943.284,00	
	CTFP	Department of Defense	\$794.117,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$696.144,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$565.970,00	

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$362.764,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$254.909,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$203.768,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$184.196,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$134.508,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$75.154,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$36.558,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$9.392,00	
	DoD-EDA	Department of the Army	\$705,00	
2019	Global Train and Equip Program - Greece - Anti-Submarine Warfare	Department of Defense	\$4.285.000,00	\$5.874.430,00
	Global Train and Equip Program - Counter Maritime Terrorism Capability	Department of Defense	\$703.808,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$621.265,00	
	CTIWF	Department of Defense	\$219.238,00	
	CTFP	Department of Defense	\$43.435,00	
	U.S. Department of Defense, Institutional Capacity Building Programs: Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies	Department of Defense	\$1.684,00	
2020	Global Train and Equip Program - Global Train and Equip (NTE) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 333	Department of Defense	\$9.585.000,00	\$10.005.411,00

Fiscal year	Program	Managing agency	Funds (Current \$)	Sum of year (Current \$)
	Global Train and Equip Program - Global Train and Equip (NTE) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 334	Department of Defense	\$315.246,00	
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$64.304,00	
	CTIWFP	Department of Defense	\$34.210,00	
	CTIWFP	Department of Defense	\$4.258,00	
	CTIWFP	Department of Defense	\$2.393,00	
2021	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$187.054,00	\$187.054,00
2022	DoD-FMF	Department of State	\$30.000.000,00	\$30.545.553,00
	DoD-IMET	Department of State	\$545.553,00	
Σ				\$262.706.563,00