



University of Piraeus

Department of International and European Studies

Master of Science in:

“Energy: Strategy, Law and Economics”

Thesis:

“Geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy in the South-East Mediterranean region”.

Aikaterini Manana

AM: MEN 18034

Acknowledgements

This Diploma Thesis is dedicated to my family and especially to my parents, George and Laskarina, for their sacrifices that have done, in order to offer me the best education I could have and for the unconditional love and support all of these years. Also I would like to thank my supervising Professor, Mr Spyridon Roukanas for his scientific guidance, patience and kindness. Thankful to the professors that accepted to compose the three-member committee of my Diploma Thesis presentation, Professor Giannis Maniatis and rProfessor Aggelos Kotios.

Declaration

This dissertation with the title “Geo-economics, geopolitics and Geostrategy in the South-East Mediterranean” is exclusively my own work. Appropriate credit has been given in this diploma thesis regarding any information and material included in it that have been derived from other sources. I am also fully aware that any misrepresentation in connection with this declaration may at any time result in immediate revocation of the degree title.

Contents

<u>Chapter 1: Introduction</u>	10
<u>Chapter 2: Introduction in definitions of Geo-economics, Geopolitics and Geostrategy</u>	
2.1 Introduction	12
2.2 Geo-economics	13
2.3 Geopolitics	16
2.4 Geostrategy	20
2.5 Conclusion	21
<u>Chapter 3: The Energy Landscape of the South-East Mediterranean countries</u>	
3.1 Introduction-General Area Framework	22
3.2 Israel	24
3.3 Lebanon	26
3.4 Syria	28
3.5 Egypt	31
3.6 Greece	34
3.7 Cyprus	37
3.8 Turkey	40
3.9 Chapter Conclusion	44
<u>Chapter 4: Energy Cooperation and rivalries in the context of bilateral and trilateral relations of the Southeast Mediterranean countries</u>	
4.1 Introduction	45
4.2 Greece – Cyprus – Israel	46
4.3 Greece – Cyprus – Egypt	49
4.4 Cyprus – Turkey	51
4.5 Egypt – Turkey	54
4.6 Israel – Egypt	57
4.7 Israel – Turkey	59
4.8 Greece – Turkey	60
4.9 Chapter Conclusion	64

Chapter 5: CONCLUSIONS65

References68

List of Tables

Table 1 Syria's Natural Gas flows,2013	28
Table 2 Syria's Oil Production,2008-2018	29
Table 3 Turkey's crude and condensate supply by source,2015.....	41

List of Figures

Figure 1 The Heartland Theory.....	17
Figure 2 Heartland Theory.....	18
Figure 3 The Rimland Theory	18
Figure 4 Oil & Gas Fields. The demarcated EEZ with Cyprus and Egypt.....	25
Figure 5 The Zhor Field	32
Figure 6 The Egyptian Pipelines.....	33
Figure 7 The Greek pipelines	36
Figure 8 Cyprus’ total energy supply by source, 1990-2018	38
Figure 9 Granted Offshore Exploration licenses.....	39
Figure 10 Turkey’s transit pipelines	43
Figure 11 The EastMed Pipeline	48
Figure12 From A to E points the Greek-Egyptian EE	50
Figure 13 The dashed line points out the Cyprus’ plan for the EEZ delimitation and the continuous line depicts the agreed EEZ border	52
Figure 14 The continental shelf and the EEZ lines according to Turkey and the illegal demarcation with TRNC	52
Figure 15 The proposed EEZ between Turkey and Libya	56
Figure 16 The Greek EEZ according to UNCLOS	61
Figure 17 The Turkish Continental Shelf according to the Greek view (in orange) and the Turkish view (black dash line)	62

CHAPTER 1: Introduction.

Aim.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the theories of geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy and see how these meanings of the theories shape up and interact in the world of International Relations and more specifically in the South-East Mediterranean region. Many distinguished professors from the geology, politics and economy fields gave to the public the definitions of our three theories, in order to be more specific and understandable via paradigms. Our goal is to comprehend the geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy by means of each country in the South-East Mediterranean Area and to identify them through the bilateral and trilateral relations between the countries.

Methodology.

The methodology that we used in order to analyze our study area was information of literature review, relative paper works, scientific articles and official data from each country related also to the theories that we refer above.

Structure.

The chapter that follows examines precisely the theories of geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy based on the meanings and the prescriptions of some great professors of the last era, giving all the information which we need to have in order to move forward. On the third chapter is given the general area framework with the prehistory of the countries and the region and then the true facts of each country separately like energy, economic and land structure facts, the needs and the losses so as to see on the next chapter the reasons behind every action. On the fourth chapter we will have the opportunity to see the interaction between the South-East Mediterranean countries, i.e. the bilateral and trilateral relations that are being developed, based on the interests and the concerns of these states

Contribution.

This dissertation was prepared in order to contribute to the dissemination of the dynamics of the region of the south-eastern Mediterranean as an important energy subsystem which has much potential to attract important energy lobbies. The prehistory that these countries share among themselves makes the energy landscape even more interesting.

CHAPTER 2: Introduction in definitions of Geo-economics, Geopolitics and Geo-strategy.

2.1 Introduction

In International Relations many well-known professors with their theoretical approaches have tried to give specific definitions to the theories of geo-economics, geopolitics and geo-strategy. In the following chapters we are going to examine and clarify these theories in detail as well as the meanings that come along with the theories in order to understand the effect in the lives and aspects of all the involved parties and how they were interpreted from the professors that were specialized in them.

2.2 Geo-economics

The way that states use their power in order to have more control abroad is characterized by economic means. In an analytical approach and at the practice of foreign policy this is called by the term Geo-economics. For many countries, the way that they use their economic power in order to achieve their strategic means is very important in the sphere of International Relations. This form of power politics has been characterized by many scholars too as geo-economics. The term geo-economics is being used not only from the prism of classical geopolitics as means to control exclusively the land in a physical way but also to interfere in the foreign country manipulating its economic bonds and infiltrate on its vulnerabilities that make the country an easy target for economic expansion. The use of the military here is not necessary because the power politics of the states can be fulfilled through geo economics. For example many countries, in order to gain influence and make new alliances use their financial skills like trade and investment. Countries that are rich in oil and gas use them with the aim to bring by their side countries with similar interests.

In International Relations Realism the theory of geo economics focuses on the competitiveness among the countries. The link between the interdependence and the economic features in the foreign policy is very strong and most of the time it relates with International Relations Liberalism. But geo-economics is over the theories of I.R Liberalism and Realism as it underscoring clearly a geographical dimension. For example, the resource rich countries(i.e oil or gas) that are widely known as Net Energy Exporters transmit these resources in a strategic way, depending on their interests, to the countries that express interest in acquiring them (Net Energy Importers, Prospective Net Energy Importer) . In this way, a hegemonic relationship arises among the powerful countries and the not so powerful countries, with the aim to control as many geographical areas as they can.

But let's take the theory from the beginning. It all starts with the theory of Edward Luttwak claiming that the antagonism and rivalry that the states have among them is because of economic rather than military means (Luttwak, 1990). This interdependence between the countries is most of the times asymmetric and affects the trade flows and the global supply chains because the Net Energy Exporter countries

are trying to exploit the impotence of the weak countries that are in need of the resources. For example, for Valerie M. Hudson, geo economics is a territorial control strategy that is being influenced and motivated by economic means like trade and investment (Hudson *et al.*, 1991). Although Luttwak had a specific theory for geo economics, it seems that the military with the economic means exist in the same sphere and they are being used from the states accordingly with the aims and the purposes that each state every time has.

Another approach of geo-economics that differs from Luttwak's theory is the Non Luttwakian notion of geo economics. It is thought from many geographers that the geographical situations of the countries determine and shape the economic outgrowth. Others believe that geo economics is beyond the national scale and it is about new factors that trigger the political and the economic dynamics. J. Mercille believes that the geopolitical factors are these that incite the politicians and subsequently the people that are into business to move according to the geo economics theory.(Mercille, 2008) The emergence of the transnational enterprises that promote global production exemplify the era of geo-economics. Many constructivists from International Relations and Geography have alleged that, based on the theory of geo economics, advocates of liberalization find the opportunity to promote their agendas.

When it comes to International Relations in general and the theory of geo economics as a tool of analysis and foreign policy strategy we notice that nowadays there are no longer exist two “war state camps” that they are detached from each other and they fight about who is going to have on his possession the biggest part of goods. The world today is more interconnected and interdependent than any time before in the past. Everything about data, goods and trade is running around the globe now, making states dependent on these flows. Because of this situation one other thing that is changing too are the strategic objectives of the states. The most of the attention now is on the assertive flows and how to secure them and have, for example, steady access to the commercial or technology networks and of course how to withdraw negative fluid circulations like drugs trade. (Scholvin and Wigell, 2018)

In short, geo-economics has two main means and implications. The first means are the development, the investments in the markets of foreign countries in order to gain a foothold and the production over-investment for Market-share forcing. These means are mostly motivated by private corporations or state enterprises that are supported by private entities. The second main means are the access to economic and technical

intelligence, the national technology programs, the quotas that the state gains from the submission of the tariffs, the discounted export financing and the normative and surreptitious impediments to imports. At these means of geo-economics is being involved only the state. The two dominant implications of geo economics are economic and political. Starting with the economic implications if the firms are not well protected they will meet many hindrances in their way from inefficient and uncooperative bureaucracies of the governments of the states, there is going to be chronic overcapacity in the sectors that State-assisted firms antagonize for market shares beyond profitability limits, and of course the over-investment will lead to chronic waste of generic resources. Moving to the political implications of geo economics, the governing elites that cannot control the common business are being enhanced by the power of the geo economics, the nonparticipation in geo economics for sure will lead in an economic defeat of the state. Also the Power-politics alliances will be undermined in case of geo economic struggles.(Amorosi, 1987)


2.3 Geopolitics

The origins of the word geopolitics have their roots in the Greek words γῆ *gê* "earth, land" and πολιτική *politiké* "politics". The first one that understood and interpreted the phenomenon of geopolitics is Thucydides, who claimed that unequal power splitting is the reason for all the wars. (*Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2010) Close to the 19th century three exceptional men, the Founders of the German School (Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Karl Haushoffer) made the definition of geopolitics more specific. Friedrich Ratzel in *Politische Geographie* (Ratzel, 2019) tried to forward the idea of the Space "Raumsinn" that affects the total psychological situation of the people that live in it. This work was the first text of political Geography that was done with scientific accuracy. The study of Ratzel had great impact on Rudolf Kjellen who embodied the political and geographical dimension in his work analysis and he was the first one who created the definition of Geopolitics and that's why he owns the title of the father of Geopolitics. Karl Haushofer was also affected by Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen and he founded, for the promotion of his theory, "*The Review of Geopolitics*" - Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.

After the German School follows the Anglo-Saxon School with Sir Halford Mackinder and Nickolas J. Spykeman. Sir Halford Mackinder was a British academic professor. He was the first Principal of University Extension College, Reading (which became the University of Reading) and Director of the London School of Economics and was also claimed to be one of the founders of geopolitics and geostrategy. In 1904 he publishes "*The Geographical Pivot of History*" where he explains the *Heartland Theory* and in his next work "*Democratic Ideas and Reality: A study in the Politics of Reconstruction*" in 1919, he quote the most important phrase of the book: "*Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.*". (Nichols and Mackinder, 1943) This phrase was said in the Peace Conference in order to convince the participants about the big importance of East Europe and the need of a Security Zone in order to impede a connection between Germany and Russia. (Fig. 1, 2) Nickolas Spykeman was an American-Dutch political scientist, known as the "godfather of containment", and one of the founders of the classical realist school in American foreign policy. His prime duty and concern as a Sterling Professor of


International Relations, teaching as part of the Institute for International Studies at Yale University, was to tutor his students geography because “*geopolitics was impossible without geographic understanding*”. Spykeman believed that Peace can only be achieved through a capable foreign policy that promotes the safety in order to be able to minimize the possibilities of dangerous attacks from other countries.(Frost and Spykman, 1944) Spykeman partially disagreed with the well known quote of Sir Halford Mackinder about Heartland and he modified it as follows : “*Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the destiny of the world.*”.(**Fig. 3**) He advocated that geopolitics is when someone plans the security policy of a country in terms of its geographical factors. (Frost and Spykman, 1944)

Figure 1, The Heartland Theory



Source : John Abbott – Geoscience.

Figure 2,Heartland Theory



Source: ResearchGate.net .

Figure 3, The Rimland Theory



Source: iknow.gr

Moving to later theories, professor Ioannis Mazis quotes that Geopolitical analysis of an imbalanced power distribution geographical system, is called the geographical

method which studies, describes and predicts behaviors and implications of the relations of the opposing and the discrete political distribution actions and ideological ones metaphysics that cover them, in the context of geography complexes to which these policies apply.

Broadly, geopolitics is defined as the study that understands the 'geo' dimension of global, regional and state politics and the study of the changing world political map (O'Sullivan, 1986) or more simply the 'political geography of international relations. (Brown, 1994) By its very nature, the phenomenon of multi disciplinarism characterizes geopolitics. Although the meanings of political geography and geopolitics are related very closely, geopolitics also focuses on the changing role of the State and the dynamic nature of the relationships between States at both global and regional levels (J. George,1994)

2.4 Geostrategy

Geostrategy, as a subfield of geopolitics, studies the interrelations of forces at international level (global or regional) and relates to the concept of foreign policy and political power. Specifically, geostrategy refers to the policy which is concerned with geographical areas of interest to that State and affecting its security or national interests. Advocates the strategy, which is how to use or couple existing instruments to achieve national or political goals. (Strategies, Feasibility and Notions, 2004) (Nations et al., 2001).

The American historian, political scientist and international relations scholar Frederick L. Schuman used for the first time the term geostrategy in his Article “Let us learn our Geopolitics.”, in 1942. The definition was translated from the term “Wehrgeopolitik” of the German geo-strategist Karl Haushofer. Karl Haushofer and his school that was based in Munich ,very specifically, studied the geography as it related to war and signs of empire. (Dorpalen, 1943)

The geostrategy is basically used in empirical and factual analysis. Thus the theory of this definition is being depended on the empirical data. The foreign and international policies of the countries rely on the geostrategic conceptions which are the base of the theory.(Xu Qi, 2004) Most of the times, the history, the culture , the propaganda and the relations between the countries create these geostrategic conceptions (Swee-Hock, Lijun and Wah, 2005)

According to Jakub J. Grygiel ,a state’s foreign policy uses the geostrategy as its geographic direction. More concrete, we can see a clear description of geostrategy when military power and diplomacy of a state targeting in a specific area. Every state, regardless its dynamic, has limited resources and even if it has the will it cannot wage a tous asimuths foreign policy. On the contrary has to focus military and politically on certain areas of the world. Furthermore, many times they are not only the geopolitical and the geographical factors that affect the geostrategy of a state. Interest Groups, ideological reasons or the vagary of the leader can trigger and create the geostrategic plans of a state.(Grygiel, 2006)

2.5 Chapter Conclusion

At this chapter we analyzed precisely the meanings that come out of these theories, based on some great professors. We saw IR Realism and IR Liberalism mixed in the theory of geo-economics and geostrategy being a tool of the theory of geopolitics as it is a method that concludes foreign policy and political power together. We noticed that geopolitics, as a theory interpreted from two different but important schools (German and Anglo-Saxon), plays a major role in the way that states move and react between them. Although there are three different theories, there is no certain choice of theory that the states use for their interaction. Geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy became the pillars of the political economy.

CHAPTER 3: The Energy Landscape of the South-Eastern Mediterranean Countries.

3.1 Introduction - General Area Framework

The history of the region of Eastern Mediterranean countries that include Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey starts from the aspect of the development of hydrocarbons in the early 1960's. The first two countries that began the exploration activities were Israel and Jordan and then Syria followed their example with much more success. Also the commercial development of natural gas started from Syria and Israel between 1980's to 2000's. Syria also benefited from its neighbor countries like Iraq and Saudi Arabia from the fees that these countries were paying in order to qualify the transit of their energy exports through Syria. The country of Jordan depends mostly on imports to cover the internal demand because the level of oil and natural gas production is low. (US Energy Information Administration, 2013)

Countries like Cyprus and Lebanon are in the beginning of this kind of development but it is in their aim to commercially take advantage of the successful offshore exploration in the Levant Basin in order to develop domestic natural gas resources. Nowadays the countries that constitute the South - East Mediterranean region, have put all of their interest into the international transit of energy and its policy, as the region and its countries have turned out into an important energy hub since they are located in the middle of Africa, Asia and Europe. The international market noticed the dynamic of the Eastern Mediterranean region since the large-scale natural gas discoveries in the Israeli Levant Basin in 2009. The first discovery on the Levant Basin was the Tamar Field and the consequent and larger Leviathan Basin discovery created the opportunity for the country to play a significant role in the region and the international gas market too. Israel is becoming from an importer to an exporter country. After the initial findings in the Levant Basin, the Noble Energy firm from the United States discovered the Aphrodite Field in the Cypriot waters and in the end of 2011 the Italian firm Eni discovered the enormous Zhor Field in the Egyptian waters. The Aphrodite field gave Cyprus the potential to be a gas exporter and the Zhor Field helped Egypt to cover its domestic gas needs. As regards to Lebanon, the geological

data have shown that the country is very likely to possess a significant amount of gas resources.(Ratner, 2016)

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) in 2010 announced that the undiscovered natural gas resources in the Levant Basin could reach the amount of 122 trillion cubic feet which underlay a large portion of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. An additional extraction of 1.7 billion barrels of oil in the Levant Basin would meet regional demand for roughly 20 years at current levels of consumption.


These estimations of the U.S.G.S affect evidently the relations between the country of Greece and Turkey as well as the relations between Israel, Cyprus, Egypt and Turkey.

3.2 Israel

Traditionally, the state of Israel, covered all its needs through imports because of the very little domestic production. However, the discoveries of Noah and Mari B in the southeastern part of the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), gave more hope to the Israeli government and started the acceleration of these efforts. The exploration licenses that were given in the oil companies of Delek, Avner and Noble Energy to search for more oil fields went a long way with the discoveries of the Tamar-1, located in 1600 m water depth, 90 km west of the city of Haifa in the northern part of the EEZ. This discovery, of 240 bcm (billion cubic metres) of recoverable gas reserves, ensures that for the next decades the domestic consumption of this country is guaranteed. The Dalit natural gas field was discovered few years ago by the same oil companies and it is estimated with 8 bcm amount of gas that can contribute to the domestic consumption of this country too. (*Exploration History - Ministry of Energy, Israel*, no date)

With the entrance in the first decade of 2000 the largest world-wide discovery was officially found. (Barkat, 2010) The huge Leviathan field structure, 30km west of Tamar field, in the deep Israeli economic water, was found by the Noble Energy, Delek Drillings and Ratio Oil and Gas companies. The very first analysis indicated recoverable reserves of 450 bcm of gas in the Leviathan field, which was later increased to 500 bcm following the drilling of several appraisal wells. (France 24, 2010). This kind of natural gas gives the state of Israel the hope of energy independence and gradually to allow the export to the countries of Europe. The next fifteen years the amount that is going to be extracted from the prosperous Leviathan field is going to reach 60 bcm while the nearby Tamar field will export 25.3 bcm in the same period. The estimate from the value of these exports is about 19.5 billion dollars. (*Israel gets first gas from Leviathan with exports to follow - Oil & Gas 360*, 2019) The country has demarcated its EEZ with Cyprus and Egypt (**Fig. 4**) (average line / equal distance), despite the fact that it does not sign the convention on The Law of the Sea. (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2005)

Figure 4,The demarcated EEZ with Cyprus and Egypt.



Source : Ministry of Energy, History of Oil Gas Exploration and Production in Israel. Oil & Gas Fields.

The reason that contributes to the orientation and demarcation of the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone is the Aphrodite oil field of Cyprus and of course the co-exploitation of the Leviathan oil field between the two countries. As we said above, initially Israel covered all its needs from the energy imports, most of them from Egypt, but according to the International Energy Agency, from 2003 with the discoveries of its natural gas fields the total primary energy supply of natural gas has soared . Except for a decline in 2012 when the index fell at 2103,0 ktoe the index skyrocketed again and surpassed even the oil when it reached the 9010,0 ktoe in 2018. (*Data & Statistics - IEA*, no date)

So, it is very obvious now that the findings in the EEZ of Israel change the role and the dynamic of the country in the region of the south east Mediterranean and create new bonds with the neighboring countries which were triggered from these facts and opened new routes of exporting the wealth of their seabed.

New deals are on their way mostly between Israel ,Cyprus, Greece and Egypt about the construction of a new pipeline with the name EastMed that will connect the area of East Mediterranean with Central Europe transferring natural gas as we are going to study further to the next chapters.

3.3 Lebanon


Another country that belongs traditionally to the Levant Basin is Lebanon. This state can play an important role in the region of East Mediterranean as an energy supplier because of the gas and oil reserves that exist in its seabed.(Schenk *et al.*, 2010) The Lebanese economic waters encompass 25 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of "conditional" natural gas reserves and also hundreds of millions of oil barrels according to a seismological-geophysical survey that was carried out in 2014 by very famous international companies for the Lebanese government. The findings of natural gas in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Israel, Egypt and Cyprus raised the hope at the state of Lebanon that its EEZ could have a profitable soil. This serious situation that could bring the country to the international markets cannot be underestimated. (Mor, 2018) Traditionally Lebanon imported natural gas from Egypt through the Arab Gas Pipeline that crosses Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan because as a state never had the amount of reserves to cover its needs. The continuous conflicts in the political scene of the country , the poor institutional framework, the lack of proper administrative staff , the barren business environment and the wrong treatment concerning the payments of the government eliminated and then stopped this energy route. Also the appearance of Arab Spring in Egypt played a devastating role in the termination of this energy cooperation (El-katiri and Fattouh, 2015) . The government of Lebanon saw the prospect of having economic gains from contingent revenues from gas exports and multiplied its profits and ameliorated its geological status by becoming gas exporter if the explorations start to become reality in its territory. However the dispute between Israel and Lebanon about their maritime area has negatively affected the Lebanese side to proceed with its plans about the offshore development. An outstanding amount of hydrocarbon resources in the disputed region that covers over 300 square miles near the center of the Levant Basin were difficult to ignore . The USGS had stated that from 2010 the latent mean recoverable resources in the Levant Basin could reach the 1.7 billion barrels of oil and the 122 TCF of natural gas . (*International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)*, no date) Nevertheless, both countries have abstained to attempt exploration in these disputed areas but from the side of Lebanon and its need to advance the domestic natural gas sector could push its rights in medium terms and start strategically the operation

(Indeo, 2008) According to many estimations the state of Lebanon will be able to produce natural gas in the year of 2020.

3.4 Syria

While Syria's oil production and exports declined in the 1990's ,oil demand gradually increased, pushed from the part of Damascus' policy of subsidizing oil products. The state of Syria the year between 2008-2010 produced 316 million cubic feet per day (mcf/d) of natural gas (**Table 1**), 383.000 oil barrels per day (b/d) (**Table 2**) and had resources of shale oil that was reaching the 50 billion tones ,but when the conflicts started around the area and the economic sanctions arose from the USA and the European Union the production of the country fallen dramatically at the level of 90% which is around 25.000 b/d in March of 2011 (Kashi, 2013).


Table 1,Syria's Natural Gas flows, 2013



Source: EIA.

Table 2, Syria's Oil Production, 2008-2018.

Syria oil production 2008 - 2018



Source: British Petroleum (BP)

BBC

Source: BP.

These numbers make clear that before the rise of the military conflicts the revenues from the energy sector of the country accounted approximately one fourth. Also before the beginning of the war, the country signed an agreement with Iran and Iraq about its participation in the Islamic Gas Pipeline and the transportation of the Iranian gas through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. From the rise of ISIS in 2014 the production of the oil in the Syrian oil fields almost stopped (**Table 1, 2**). The country's two main refineries began to malfunction with the result, Syria having shortages in supply for refined petroleum products. Although Iran seems to support Syria with crude oil and refined products in about 60.000 b/d, the standing sanctions and the loss of oil export revenues make importing petroleum products very difficult. (*International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2015*)

In January 2015, the proved reserves of natural gas in the country of Syria were about 8,5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) according to Oil and Gas Journal. The fields of natural gas are in the central and eastern parts of the country. The natural gas is also used by the state actors in the oil-recovery efforts, gaining with this way almost 20% of the daily

gross production into the oil fields of the country in the years between 2004-2013. (John Karkazis, I. Vidakis, 2014)

Syria's three export terminals on the sea of Mediterranean are managed by the Syrian Company for Oil and Transport (SCOT) under the General Organization for Refining and Distribution of Petroleum Products but the country never produced the adequate volumes of natural gas to export. Egypt was the country that exported a small amount of natural gas to Syria before the country conflicts but it was not enough to cover the domestic needs of the state and eventually the imports from Egypt through the Arab Gas Pipeline stopped in 2012.


The recent discoveries in the Levant Basin are going to affect the Syrian government and its energy policy because this area is part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Syria, Lebanon and Israel. It seems that the imminent construction of the EastMed Pipeline put Syria in the energy game and presage potential alterations in its future moves.

3.5 Egypt

This country of Africa is the third largest producer of natural gas after Algeria and Nigeria. Although it is a non – OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) country, its Suez Canal and the SUMED (Suez Mediterranean Pipeline) plays a critical role in the energy international markets. Because of these two asset transit points the fees that they are collected give a huge economic lift on the government of Egypt. In 2011 the Oil and Gas Journal estimated that the proven natural gas reserves in the country are about 77.2 Tcf and they will naturally be increased because of the continuous discoveries (*International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2018*)

Although the country had these recent findings, the years between 2012 - 2016 the dry natural gas production decreased by 31% , an outcome that forced Egypt to import from neighboring countries. In 2015 was finally discovered the giant Zhor field (**Fig. 5**) by the Italian firm Eni and announced as the largest natural gas offshore field in the Mediterranean Sea. Its proven reserves reach 30 trillion cubic feet. Eni is also in charge of the operations in the block there as it holds the 50% of the stake. Also in 2019 the Zhor field reached an amount over the 2,7 billion cubic feet b/d in production and this was achieved five months ahead of the development plan (*Eni, Egypt, no date*) , (*Eni, Zohr Operation, no date*). In the west part of the exploration fields Eni also led the way in the first exploration well in the so-called North El Hammad license on the prospect to call it Bashrush (*Eni makes new gas discovery in Mediterranean Sea offshore Egypt | Energy Egypt, 2020*) . Besides Zhor there is the Atoll field too, which is linked together with the Zhor at the West Nile Delta (WND) project that is going to boost the overall supply. The WND development comprises a group of five gas fields across the West Mediterranean Deep Water and the North Alexandria offshore concession blocks (BP, 2019)

Figure 5, The Zhor Field



Source: iene.eu

When it comes to petroleum and other liquids production, the Oil and Gas Journal announced that the estimations about the proven reserves in Egypt have held the number of 4.4 billion barrels since 2011, but passing through the years there is a decline of approximately 1 billion barrels according to the BP 2017 Statistical Review of World Energy, because of the lack of new discoveries in the area and the existent mature fields. The Western Desert area and the Gulf of Suez produce the most of the crude oil and Eastern Desert, Sinai, Mediterranean Sea, Nile Delta, and Upper Egypt produce the remainder.


The pipeline that begins from Egypt and connects the countries of Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, promoting them with natural gas, is the well-known Arab Gas Pipeline. (AGP) (Fig.6) This important for the area pipeline is supported by two LNG export facilities with a combined capacity of 586 Bcf per year, Damietta and

Idku each of one having a capacity of 240 Bcf and 172.8 Bcf of natural gas per year ((Paul Day, 2013)

The recent field discoveries in the neighboring countries of Israel and Cyprus in the Levant Basin have triggered the interest of the Egyptian government which looking for new trade agreements and cooperations

Figure 6, The Egyptian Pipelines.

Figure 1. Map of Egypt



Source : EIA.

3.6 Greece

The country of Greece seems to be an energy cross interconnection between Europe, Asia and Africa. This state, with the last data from the EIA covered its needs in natural gas with 176 bcf/ annual. (*International - U.S. EIA , Greece-DATA, 2017*) It's a country that basically counts on imports but with the perspective to change its role in the region. In Greece there is one main gas pipeline that crosses all over the north part of the country. This pipeline is the TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline). It starts from Kypoi of Evros and is connected with the TANAP (Trans Anatolian Pipeline). Totally the route of TAP is 878 km long (Greece 550 klm, Albania 215 klm, Adriatic Sea 105 klm, Italia 8 klm) and it is expected to to deliver significant energy and economic benefits to our country (*Η διαδρομή του Διαδριατικού Αγωγού φυσικού αερίου, no date*).

Another pipeline in this country ,that is new and very promising, is the IGB Pipeline (Interconnector Greece Bulgaria) . It has 182 klm length and all the necessary support facilities (Metering Stations, Bathhouses ,Operation Center) . Komotini is the starting point of this pipeline and it ends at Stara Zagora with the probability of reverse flow. In addition it is planned to be connected with the TAP pipeline and as the Bulgarian Minister of Energy , Temezunka Petkova, said this project of interconnection will be finalized in a timely manner and in accordance with the TAP timetable (*Διεθνείς Υποδομές - ΔΕΠΙΑ, no date*) (Kalenteridou, 2020)

However the energy landscape of the country changes drastically with the recent gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 2010, a team of experts was commissioned by the Ministry of Energy to investigate the possible existence of stock hydrocarbons in the Greek marine waters. Geological similarities were found between the region south of the Crete island and the one that is located between Cyprus and Israel. In 2011 the State Secretary of Energy and Environment , Giannis Maniatis and the general staff of the ministry, legislated the law 4001/2011 and as Mr Maniatis said *“It was the first time that Greece in Article 156 defined the external limits of the Greek EEZ. This is very important in the current situation with Turkey, because we have legislated that all the islands have an Exclusive Economic Zone and a continental shelf, such as land, in accordance with international law, and then we have drawn up the EEZ map with Italy , Albania and Libya, with the latter being fully*


influenced by Gavdos. This has a specific value for Kastellorizo and Othonos. (Stolakis, 2020) Due to this, the Hellenic Hydrocarbon Company SA was set up after the announcement of a competition for research about possible hydrocarbons in Katakolo, the western gulf of Patras and Ioannina.

The country of Greece started to be concerned about the new findings in Cyprus and Israel, and in 2013 through the Norwegian company , Petroleum Geo – Services (PGS) that won the competition started a seismic research. This research in the area south-east of Crete between the Greek and the Cypriot EZZ showed something very interesting, that it is full of natural gas and has many potentials. Concerning these findings, the same year a serious proposal about a gas pipeline titled as Eastmed, that connects these three countries ,promoting natural gas to Europe, was recommended and joined the catalog of Projects of Common Interests (PCIs) of EE , based on European Regulation 347/2013 .(*Διεθνείς Υποδομές - ΔΕΠΑ*, no date) The Italian company Edison and the subsidiary company of DEPA , IGI Poseidon , since July 2014 started to be the head of the project. The EastMed pipeline project aroused the interest of many countries and as a different road of energy exporter to Europe, its possibilities and prospects appeared very quickly. On January 2 of 2020 the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis ,the President of Cyprus Nikos Anastasiades and the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu attended in Athens in order to sign the agreement for the 1,900 kilometer EastMed pipeline. Kyriakos Mitsotakis said *“Today, we did not just sign an advantageous agreement, but also cemented our decision for strategic engagement in a region that’s in need of cooperation, EastMed is not a threat to anyone.”* (Tugwell, 2020)

Greece also has the LNG Station in Revithousa. Another infrastructure project that is going to level up more the northern Greece is the upcoming Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) in Alexandroupolis that can also be used to supply natural gas to the Balkan countries through the IGB.

Last but not least is the Poseidon pipeline that connects the Greek shores of the Thesprotia region to the vicinity of Otranto in Italy. It is included in the PCIs of European Union and it is designed with an initial capacity of 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually for Italy.

Figure 7, The Greek pipelines.




Source : DEPA

3.7 Cyprus

The first attempts of the country to search for hydrocarbons started at the beginning of the 90's but until 2011 these efforts were not effective. In 2011, the American firm Noble Energy and a part of the Delek group made the first discovery of natural gas in the EEZ of the country at the Block 12, the so-called Aphrodite gas-filled which is estimated to have 4.54 trillion cubic feet of gas. The declaration of this field becoming commercial happened in 2015. (*Cyprus Profile - Energy: Oil & Gas*, 2019) However the geopolitical situations on the island impede the efforts of drilling and exporting the oil and the gas of the country. It is widely known that the island has been separated in two since 1974 and the invasion of the Turkish military (the so-called *Atilla Harekâtı*) in the island of Cyprus. Since then, Turkey and the illegal Turkish government in Occupied Cyprus insist to have a share of the energy findings in the blocks that belong to the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus, as an energy dependent island, before the discovery of the hydrocarbons used to import energy products mostly from Europe. From 1990 until 2018 the imports of oil products on the island are clearly on a rising path with the year of 2008 reaching the 3065.0 ktoe (**Fig.8**) as the International Energy Agency notified us. (*Data & Statistics - IEA*, 2018) In order to eliminate this kind of dependency, the National Gas Public Company of Cyprus came to an agreement with the China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering Corporation (CPPEC) to build an LNG import terminal in Vasilikos Port. (*China-Led Consortium Chosen to Build LNG Terminal in Cyprus - World Maritime News*, 2019) This consortium with these two countries includes a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) with the aim to be an “export” bridge between Europe and Asia and the countries of the Middle East and Egypt.

Figure 8, Cyprus' total energy supply by source, 1990-2018



Source : IEA


With the discovery of the Aphrodite gas field, the country was lucky to unearth another three fields. Oneisphoros (Block 11), Calypso (Block 6) and Glaucus (Block 10) . These findings (**Fig.9**), with dominant one the Block 12 as a discovery of the Noble Energy and the Delek Group, have attracted other oil companies too like ENI, TOTAL, ExxonMobil and the Qatar Petroleum so as to invest on the island of Cyprus, prepare it for big changes and convert the Greek Cypriot government into the main dominant player of the area. The newly added Blocks were discovered with similar geological methods like the Zohr in Egypt and this makes the oil companies hope that the Cypriot gas province will be prosperous and rich in the upcoming years.

With all these discoveries in Cyprus, Israel and Egypt the landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean region changes drastically and the alliances are going to become

effective in a very short time. The EastMed Pipeline project between Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Italy proves this hypothesis right, with the countries reaching an agreement and signing officially the construction of the pipeline.

The island of Cyprus is at the forefront of the evolution of the area again and seems willing to exploit all its capabilities as the southernmost country of the European Union and promote its interests as the interests of the EU too.

Figure 9, Granted Offshore Exploration licenses.




3.8 Turkey

Turkey, due to its position, has become a significant and important energy hub for natural gas and oil. The country has constructed many pipelines that supply the European Union and other countries of the Atlantic from Russia, the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. Turkey is a huge transit point and it is obvious that “ *this state serves many Western interests*” and its advantage is the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits which place Turkey on the “ *sixth largest geographic point of oil transit in the world*”. (Evaghorou, 2019) (p.4) .The energy growing demands of the country have left a little percentage for exporting oil and natural gas. The BP Company affirms this clearly as they refer to us that “ *Turkey's growth rate per annum in primary energy consumption from 2005 to 2015 stood at 4.4%, the fastest in Europe.*”. (BP, 2017) Turkey “ *must import some 3/4 of its total energy needs including more than half of the coal it uses, and almost all of its oil and natural gas.*” (Austvik and Rzayeva, 2017)

Specifically ,at the oil sector ,the exploration and the production of the petroleum has been assigned to the state-owned company, Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO), which has the biggest part of the share and most of the privileges in the limited foreign investments that are held in the country .Although the preferential rights are on the state-owned company, the barrels per day that were produced in the year of 2015 were 62.000 which accounting the 7% of the total crude oil production in the country. These numbers indicate to us once again the needs of imports (**Table 3**) . The verified information shows us that Iraq, Iran and Russia are some of the biggest suppliers of Turkey in the crude oil. (*International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2017*)

Table 3, Turkey’s crude and condensate supply by source, 2015

Turkey crude and condensate supply by source, 2015



 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Data Service

Source : EIA


The country of Turkey has steady and constant growth of consumption in the sector of natural gas. The large quantities that exist in the subsoil motivate the government of the country to accelerate the minings. “As of January 1, 2016, the O&G estimates Turkish natural gas reserves at 177 billion cubic feet (Bcf) Turkey produces only a small amount of natural gas, and total production amounted to 14 Bcf in 2015.” (International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2017) These numbers have inspired the state to develop and construct pipelines (**Fig. 10**) that pass through the country and promote natural gas not only for itself but abroad too. The sector of power generation consumes almost half of total natural gas and the other percentages are divided most in the industrial and in the buildings sector. The increasing demand and the big needs on the inside of the country, especially in the winter months , render Turkey as the second biggest market for Russia and its Energy firm– Gazprom, “with a yearly export of 27 BCM, which represents a 55% share of the Turkish market”. (Austvik and Rzayeva, 2017) . As with the oil so with the natural gas we see the same pattern repeated again : the government controls the biggest part of the industry. The natural gas sale prices are being defined by the government . Only BOTAŞ , the

state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation , is importing the LNG and accounts for almost 80% of it.

Moving to the pipelines we can clearly notice that Turkey, as a transit country, has a lot of infrastructure projects that going on .Starting from the oil pipelines we first have the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (BTC) oil Pipeline which operation started at 2007 and the transport of the oil via the pipeline starts from the offshore Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field, passes through Georgia and connects with Turkey reaching the Ceyhan port for the export. Then we have the Iraq – Turkey (Kirkuk – Ceyhan) oil Pipeline which is a 970 km pipeline and the operation started in 1977 making this pipeline the oldest one .Oil is being transferred from Northern Iraq to the Ceyhan port of Turkey too. The natural gas pipelines are more, in comparison with the oil pipelines. First, the Baku –Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) gas Pipeline , that started delivering NG from 2006, has its starting point in Sangachal terminal in Baku and then via Georgia ends up in Turkey. Except for BTE, it is also being called South Caucasus gas pipeline. Iran – Turkey Gas Pipeline is the oldest one, with year operation in 2001. It transfers gas from Tabriz to Erzurum. Next is the Blue Stream Gas subsea Pipeline that transfers gas from Stavropol Krai in Russia, under the Black Sea, to the Durusu terminal in Turkey. It started working in 2005 and it has 1,213 km length , with a full capacity of 16 billion m3 of Russian gas per year. (IENE) The last one is the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). In December of 2011, the two governments, Turkey and Azerbaijan, signed a Memorandum of Understanding between the State – owned Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and the Natural Gas Transmission Company TANAP. It is a 1,850 km pipeline and transfers natural gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz-2 gas field, and other areas of the Caspian Sea first to Turkey and then with TAP to Europe.

The recent findings in the Levant Basin and the ongoing minings from the Total, ExxonMobil and the other firms in the oil fields of Cyprus and Israel have triggered the attention of Turkey, making the government of the country wanting to be part of these actions. The state of Turkey insists that it should have an active role on the drillings and the country cooperations, due to its position in the North of the island of Cyprus, after the military invasion, “*Atilla Harekâtı*”,in 1974 . So it is obvious that the Turkish Cypriots and the government of Turkey will push the limits in order to be not just regional observers ,but the main players in the region.

Figure 10, Turkey's transit pipelines



Source: EIA

3.9 Chapter Conclusion.

In these chapters we studied extensively the Energy Profiles of each country of the South- East Mediterranean separately. The European countries like Greece and Cyprus become an energy link with their important location and the new findings that came to the spotlight, and countries like Israel and Egypt start a new energy era and they also have the ability to strengthen and multiply their power through the possibilities that their energy products give to them . Turkey, as a transmission country in the wider area of the Middle East, is an appreciable power too because it controls the cargos that are led to Europe and the West. Lebanon and Syria may not have yet the progress that they want but future alliances could level up their energy status. We realized the importance of emerging the area into an energy hub that will lead the way in the upcoming years. The cooperation between the countries will be more necessary than ever.

CHAPTER 4 : Energy Cooperation and rivalries in the context of bilateral and trilateral relations of the East Mediterranean countries.

4.1 Introduction

It is true that there is a rivalry in the history of International Relations between its two main theories, IR Realism and IR Liberalism. But the results that come up in reality, show that geo-economics encompasses the theory of geopolitics and geostrategy. The East Mediterranean countries have an interrelationship that unites them. The energy findings in the area created multiple bonds between them which do not leave them the choice to act unilaterally. This progress however gives these countries the opportunity to expand their power, competency and more secure sense of protection of their interests. In this chapter we will see the three theories taking flesh and bones in our study area.

4.2 Greece – Cyprus – Israel.


The energy findings on the Levant Basin in Cyprus's sea fields in 2011 and then the Israeli discoveries of the Leviathan and Tamar fields have touched off a new alliance era between the three countries. The economic and political privileges that derive from these outcomes are many and can serve lots of interests from external factors. Israel also sees Greece as conjunction country which can help the state transfer its gas to many European countries and also can improve more their relationships (Cohen, 2018) .These important political and energy approaches between the three countries have unsettled for sure the neighbor country-Turkey , which probably has the ambition to be also a part of this versatile and interesting deals. If Turkey could make an energy agreement with Israel, this would cause problems on the energy security policies of Cyprus and Greece. This scenario though is more likely not to happen as the time passes. In the first month of 2020 the Prime Ministers of the three countries, Israel Greece and Cyprus, meet again in Athens in order to sign an energy agreement about a construction called “EastMed Pipeline”.

This pipeline is going to play a major role for the area and Europe too. Energy is at the forefront as a catalyst in regional stability, cooperation and profits for all. This project diversifies sources and routes and creates a strategic gas supply corridor for the Member States of the European Union. Concerning the economic part of the agreement, the countries and their civilians will be benefited from the production, transmission and distribution of the natural gas (especially Greece). The energy costs will be lower and the countries are also going to have gains on the environmental policy as EastMed will facilitate the transition to a low emission economy with the transitional gas and fuel. According to the starter of this “idea”, Professor and ex Minister of Energy and Environment Mr. Maniatis about the technical features of the project, it is well known that *«At the beginning of 2011, Greece and Israel signed a Joint Declaration for the implementation of the energy corridor from the Mediterranean to Europe. In the two years 2011-12, we designed with DEPA the initial route, for a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters (bcm). In 2013, on the initiative of the Ministry of Energy, joined the PCIs Projects of European Interest .In July 2014, the development of the project passed to the DEPA - EDISON consortium. The studies carried out confirmed the financial competitiveness of the project and its*

technical feasibility. In 2017 the European Commission approved the co-financing in the amount of € 34,500.00 of the studies that remain to be implemented. This amount covers 50% of the cost of the remaining environmental studies, the implementation study (Front End Engineering Design - FEED), as well as the detailed underwater mapping, which are expected to be completed late 2021 - early 2022. All the studies so far document that the project can work in parallel with alternative export proposals, such as Egypt's LNG. Its construction is expected to start in mid-2022 and its completion and operation in 2025. Of the total 1,900 km long, 1340km is underwater and 560km is on land. The initial capacity is 10 billion cubic meters per year and the expansion to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm). The budget for the initial capacity is € 5.2 billion and together with the POSEIDON submarine pipeline, which will connect Thesprotia with Italy under the sea, amounts to a total of € 6.1 billion. However, with the continuous technological development, it is expected to improve its capacity, a fact that will significantly reduce the final cost per unit » (Maniatis, 2019).

The geostrategic importance of EastMed (**Fig.11**) is also recognized by the United States of America, which adopted the idea of “EastMed Act” and this also played an important role and affected the E.E to finance the technical studies of the Pipeline. All the three Prime Ministers Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Nikos Anastasiades and Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized on the pipeline project as a motive for cooperation between different countries and cultures and not as a cause of disagreement and conflict.

Figure 11, The EastMed Pipeline.



Source igi-poseidon.com

Also N. Anastasiades stressed that “Every country that wishes to be part of this project is welcomed, meaning, of course, that has to adopt the basic principles of international law, with full respect for the exercise of the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of independent states” (HuffingtonPost, 2020). The message that was given is clear. All of the three PMs make an open proposal to the next, according to their interests, countries which are Italy and then Egypt to invest in this consortium that will boost even more the power of the region. Also, the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum was a good sign for the EastMed agreement because most of the countries of the region except Turkey and Lebanon. Information that derives from the inside of the Italian embassy conveys that the project leaders of IGI Poseidon and Edison have confirmed to the Israeli Energy Minister that the case about signing the EastMed construction agreement by Italy has now been finalized. The environmental issues that concerned the Italian government belong to the past and the oncoming cooperation with the neighboring state is on the rise (Theocharidis, 2020). Strategic moves like these create a win-win situation for all the participants.


4.3 Greece – Cyprus – Egypt.

Greece and Cyprus are claimed to be fraternal countries and with Egypt both of them have very strong relations that derive from the past .The Aegean area unites them with economic, energy and political bonds. In 2003 Cyprus and Egypt signed an agreement delimitation of their E.E.Z (*Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 2003*) which made the two countries even more supportive to each other. Although Turkey rejects this maritime border demarcation deal, the two countries, united, have expressed their worries and their limits in the United Nations regarding this expansive and threatening policy. The rise of the General, Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, exhales the feeling of the constancy between the three countries. In 2015, after the exploration of the Zhor field, the Egyptian government gave Cyprus the opportunity to expand its dynamic in the energy markets by proposing to be part of its regional projects (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Greece welcomes all these important moves that set the bar high and create big expectations from now on. From 2018 a new dispute begins again between Turkey and the Cyprus government.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu , inveighed against ,for one more time, in the maritime demarcation of 2003 between Egypt and Cyprus, declaring that the Turkish government does not recognizes it and with this announcement blocked the drill ship of Eni that was exploring gas in the Cypriot oil fields. In order to calm down this aggressiveness, Egypt warned the Turkish government to stay back, stop creating more tension in the region and not to contest the economic interests between the two countries.(Reuters, 2018) The strong bonds that unite Cyprus and Egypt are definite. In September the same year was set an energy agreement about an underwater pipeline that will connect Cyprus's Aphrodite natural gas field to liquefaction plants in Egypt for re-export to Europe in the LNG form. This agreement was also supported by the European Union. (Offshore-Energy, 2018) After the EZZ Agreement with Italy, Greece also seeks to find an ideal solution with Egypt too. On 6th August of 2021, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikos Dendias, traveled to Cairo to meet the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Sameh Shoukry in order to prepare the Agreement on the demarcation of the maritime

zones between Egypt and Greece. This agreement (**Fig. 12**) about the EEZ will strengthen their bilateral relations and coordinate other issues of common interest too.

Figure 12, From A to E points the Greek-Egyptian EEZ.




Source: Polls and Politics

According to the Agreement on the Article 1, Paragraph 1 it is declared that *“This agreement establishes a partial delimitation of the maritime boundaries between the two parties .The completion of this delimitation shall be conducted, where appropriate, through consultations between the two parties beyond point (A) and point (E), in accordance with the international law.”* In the Paragraph 4 and 5 at the same Article it is notified that if either Party enters into negotiations for the delimitation of the EEZ with another State that shares its maritime zones with the two Parties, that Party before reaching an agreement with the third State shall consult and inform the other. (United Nations, 2020) Both of the Foreign Ministers are optimistic for this outcome. Furthermore, with this action, the Greece-Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement is now registered at the United Nations and should be also noted that this post is the first that it is made, after forty years, in terms of agreements for the delimitation of maritime zones according to UNCLOS.

4.4 Cyprus – Turkey.


After the invasion of the Turkish military on the island of Cyprus in 1974 and the conquest of the North part of the island, Cyprus was separated into two parts. Over 40.000 Turkish soldiers are still living on the island and Turkey violently pushes its people to inhabit Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus possesses beyond half of the island which makes its part more powerful on the land level. The Cypriot government proclaimed its EEZ with Lebanon, Israel and Egypt according to the Law of the Sea and of course became accepted from the United Nations (United Nations, no date) (**Fig. 13**). On the other hand the Turkish government does not recognize the Cypriot Republic and obviously the legal EEZ that has been incised and for this reason they proceeded on an illegal demarcation of its continental shelf with the Occupied Cyprus (Daloglu, 2014) in order to legitimize its illegal surveys in the area (**Fig. 14**). After the Aphrodite field and the cooperation of Israel with the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey felt that it was left behind. Without losing any time, tried to block the Cypriot energy drilling efforts, involving its military power in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus and started to drill even on the oil fields where it was given license from the multinational companies on behalf of the RoC. However, the illegal military exercises and the violation of the sovereign rights of the Cypriot EEZ by Turkey create de facto situations that lead this country to play a key actor role in the energy development on the Eastern Mediterranean, or at least this is what the Turkish government wants. (Filis, 2019)

Figure 13, The dashed line points out Cyprus' plan for the EEZ delimitation and the continuous line depicts the agreed EEZ border.



Source: GlobalSecurity.org

Figure 14, The continental shelf and the EEZ lines according to Turkey and the illegal demarcation with Occupied Cyprus .



Source: ResearchGate.net

The Republic of Cyprus has the full support of the European Union and of course this support was established with the signing of the Energy Agreement of the EastMed

and this is the main reason that the Turkish aggression is permanent in the area. Turkey is afraid of the change of the status quo in the sea of the Eastern Mediterranean, as Nicosia tried to exploit its natural gas and oil discoveries from the very first time. The energy findings in the Cypriot oil fields provide and increase the power of the island in all dimensions, which makes Turkey nervous about the outcome of the signing agreement. As a small country, Cyprus needs to have its allies and to move in the legal ways as an answer to the Turkish claimings about the EEZ and the continental shelf. The energy security gains for the Republic of Cyprus are enormous and its President N. Anastasiades, called for the extension of EU sanctions against natural and legal persons involved in Turkey's illegal drilling program in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. (naftemporiki.gr, 2020) The provocative moves of the Turkish government are against the unanimous and serious decisions that European Union has made about the two countries.

4.5 Egypt – Turkey.

These two countries used to have friendly relations from the past. The rivalry between them began with the rise of the Arab Spring which gave the opportunity to Turkey to expand its dynamic through the Muslim Brotherhood and their influence to the governor Mohamed Morsi. In 2013, the general Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, with a military coup, dethroned Mohamed Morsi and undertook the governance of Egypt. The general El-Sisi tried to alienate every inch of the Morsi's residue and of course this new situation made Turkey to lose a peripheral and possible ally in the energy matrix of the region. The findings of the Zhor in 2015 and Nooros fields and the cooperation of Egypt with countries like Israel, Cyprus and Greece made Turkey feel that it was losing its power in the region. For this reason, in order to control the East Mediterranean Sea in another way, Erdogan decides to send military and technology help to, the divided from the civil war, Libya. Turkey of course supports the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord, Fayeze Al-Sarraj, who has also close relations to the Muslim Brotherhood. With the ultimate goal of becoming a major regional power, Turkey, through its stay in Libya, seeks to cover the problems created by the expulsion of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt after the rise of Sisi in charge. Turkey's involvement in the Libyan government's civil war against General Haftar poses a huge risk to Turkey. (Ioannis Th. Mazis, 2020) On the one hand, Erdogan seeks to show his practical support to Sarraj and the internationally recognized Libyan government at this crucial time for its survival in order to achieve a Turk-Libyan cooperation after the political crisis and a stable presence in the energy field in the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, Turkey is getting involved in a systemic power rivalry as it enters a rivalry with states like Egypt, which finance and support the Haftar camp. These arrogant moves from the side of Turkey seem to have a desirable outcome for Erdogan's government as the two countries (Libya and Turkey) in 2019, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). MoU is a legal document that was sent to the UN, in which Turkey submitted joint coordinates with Libya. It is called a Memorandum of Understanding as, while demarcation is not a final agreement, Turkey and the internationally recognized Libyan government, underlined their common interests and projected the message of a future common cooperation in the

Southeast Mediterranean power competition. The agreement defines the boundaries and coordinates of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone between the two states (Fig. 15), while stressing that any disagreement between the two sides over the interpretation or implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding should be settled through diplomatic channels, understanding and cooperation. Cairo, after all these groundless efforts of Turkey trying to empower its dynamic, does not remain uninvolved. (Nikos Meletis, 2020) Egypt is one of the most powerful countries of the Mediterranean and intermediate country between the West and the East Mediterranean countries and this element declares the force and the influence this country has in energy, trade and shipping. Losing no time, the General Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, shows right away his support to the country of Greece, as it is a country that is directly affected too by the MoU decision of Turkey and Libya. Egypt knows its huge and important interests about natural gas and oil that it shares with Greece, Cyprus and Israel and for this reason submitted a letter with the government of Greece at the United Nations, stating that they both do not recognize this Agreement or its ability to produce legal effects. Any action in this maritime area remains illegal if it affects the sovereign rights and the interests of other states. In the antipode of the Turkish – Libyan MoU, in order Egypt make its presence ever more powerful, signed (as it is being referred to in chapter 4.3) a legal Demarcation Agreement with Greece which overlaps the MoU and makes it more weak. After all these happenings Egypt and Turkey obviously have a lot of differences going between them, which makes it more difficult for a future cooperation.

Figure 15, The proposed EEZ between Turkey and Libya



Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

4.6 Israel - Egypt.

The prehistory between Israel and Egypt travels back in time. These countries share many common interests in the area, a fact that led to tensed conflicts through the years. The first Peace Treaty of Egypt and Israel in 1979 had shipping interests most. Egypt decided to supply oil to Israel after the Israeli military withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields. Egypt, as one of the biggest Arab countries, had a lot of needs inside of the country. For this reason, gradually, stopped the oil export to Israel in order to use it for domestic needs. Because of the big demand Egypt also started to use natural gas too, after the rising domestic demand of the country. (Reis, 2014) On July 1st 2005, the two countries signed a gas trade agreement and Egypt committed that it will provide for 15 years, 1.7bcm of natural gas annually. However a pipeline from Sinai is not the safest way to supply gas due to the attacks from Islamic extremists and for this reason an underwater pipeline is the best solution. (Ioannis Th. Mazis, 2020) So the pipeline that goes underwater from Al-Arish to Ashkelon provided the requisite quantity to Israel. The huge exploration and production of gas from Egypt made Israel become dependent on it by about 40%. Gradually, with the political instability on the inside of the country of Egypt, and the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011 the energy relationship between the two countries stopped. Under these circumstances Israel decided to change its power supply, discovering some years later the Leviathan oil field.

The ongoing situation created a reverse energy deal as Israel now is the major exporter of natural gas in Egypt. Professor Ioannis Th. Mazis says that *“the consortium that controls the "Leviathan" and "Tamar" deposits has conclude \$ 15 billion contract to export gas to Egypt through counterparty Dolphinus Holdings " of Egyptian interests for the next decade.”* (Ioannis Th. Mazis, 2020) The Egypt – Israel cooperation is also allowed by the Regulatory Authority of Egypt and the 196/2017 Law of the Egyptian Legislation. In February of 2021 the Egyptian Minister Tarek al-Molla along with his Israeli counterpart Yuval Steiniz announced the agreement for the construction of an offshore pipeline from Leviathan to the coast of Egypt. Mr. Steiniz even announced that the process of concluding a formal agreement that will lead to an increase in Israeli gas exports to Europe has already begun. (Nikos Meletis, 2020) Under this agreement the EastMed Pipeline, which has more geopolitical

significance, may be weakened. Although, every country that is a member of the Energy Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) that was held in Cairo, supported the EastMed project except Turkey. In the end, Israel and Egypt have a lot of common interests which hold them in an energy diplomacy relationship for the energy security of the region.

4.7 Israel – Turkey.

The recent discoveries in Israel's offshore plots have placed the country on the spotlight and made it the apple of contention for the neighboring countries. Turkey is one of the countries that have tried to approach Israel many times. As one of the most important players on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, Israel plays a significant role. Turkey was among the first countries that recognized Israel as a state and on 1993, after some disputes between them about the Palestinian territories they both fully restored their ambassadorial relationships. (*Wayback Machine*, no date) Nonetheless, the Turkish state as a Muslim Majority country, wants to represent and defend weaker Muslim countries and for this reason kept on supporting the Palestinians on their war on Gaza with Israel. This decision that Turkey made aggravated and enraged even more the Israeli state and as a culmination of the dissolution of bilateral relations happened the Mavi Marmara, incident where at least nine Turkish and Palestinian activists were killed from the organized Israeli navy that tried to block the aid of the Turkish flotilla to the Gaza. (*The Guardian*, no date) Since then, Turkish and Israeli politicians have exchanged very intense statements.

Also the EEZ agreement between Cyprus and Israel put aside Turkey and its aspirations to expand its dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean and the exploration of hydrocarbons. Keeping on the same pattern of energy relations the next few years, Turkey continued the rivalry among Israel when Israel signed with Greece and Cyprus the agreement for the construction of EastMed Pipeline which will transfer natural gas from Israel and Cyprus to Greece and then to Europe . Under these circumstances the Turkish President Erdogan, with the competent ministers of his state seek for new alliances in the area, as he believes that Turkey should be the country which has the role of the energy transmitter lying in nodal point on the energy map.

In another perspective, Turkey and Israel share many common interests. Turkey with its energy pipelines has the capability to transit the Israeli natural gas to Europe as a cheaper solution because of its existing pipeline network and the perspective of new energy markets in Asia. This option may be tempting but Erdogan's party and its aggressive expansionist policy create fears for the feature of the area and its rich subsoil.

4.8 Greece – Turkey.


The rivalry between these two countries derives from the past. It is known that Greece and Turkey have a dispute over their sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. In the late 20th century, for the first time, Turkey sets on the table its questions and its depreciation about the Greek Continental shelf. The Turkish identification drastically changed when in 2002 the AKP Party with Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power. The terms of hegemony and new-Ottomanism appeared on the forefront. The foreign policy that they followed at regional level was to strife with the important and steady principles of International Law in many fields like the change of their borders and the revision of old agreements that legally cannot be counted anymore. The aim of Erdogan is to maximize the Turkish power in the wider Central Asia. The academic Ahmet Davutoglou, evolved the vision of a regional ruler within the Turkish-speaking world and the wider Islamic world which was consistent with the neo-Ottoman ideology and also connected this theory with the foreign regional policy of Turkey. (Ioannis Th. Mazis, 2011)

Turkey's foreign policy seems to have been directed by Ahmet Davutoglu since the very first day of the AKP's election to power and being the ideological driving force behind Erdogan's decisions. The doctrine of the "Blue Homeland" is part of the Turkish revision foreign policy. It came as a vision in 2006, and joined the unofficial Turkish revision maps in 2011. Turkey challenges the Law of the Sea and draws up its own maps, presenting the arc from Cyprus to the Black Sea across the Aegean in a strategic regional scale. The maritime zones claimed by Ankara in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, have a total area of 462,000 square kilometers and include the Greek sovereign sea area south of Rhodes, Karpathos and eastern Crete. (Baltos, 2019) The existence of huge oil wells and gas fields in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean, as well as Turkey's desire to ensure free access to international waters through the Aegean port, testify Ankara's goals to expand in the West, but also for participation and control of the profitable energy reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean, always within the framework of the doctrine of the "Blue Homeland". (Skafidas, 2019)

The signing of the agreement for the construction of the EastMed pipeline that gives the privilege in Greece to play the major role between Middle East and Europe seems

to make Turkey distance from the vision of the regional power and this is the reason that the Turkish government signed with Libya the illegal Memorandum of Understanding. It is obvious that Turkey with the MoU violates the sovereign rights and the oil and gas blocks of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's dangerous expansionist policy also endangers the continental shelf of Kastelorizo, as well as the sovereign rights deriving from Crete. According to the International Law and the UNCLOS, Greece with the law 4001/2011 (Maniati's Law) established its sovereignty rights about its EEZ, exploration and exploitation of the hydrocarbons of its area (**Fig. 16**) and also claims the right to expand its territorial waters from 6 nm to 12 nm, which legally, place Turkey on the marge.

Figure 16, The Greek EEZ according to UNCLOS.



Source: marineregions.org

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two are the points of the continental shelf that raise the issue of the delimitation. The first is the sea extension of the border line in Thrace and the other is the islands of the north and east Aegean which are close to the Turkish coast where Turkey gave permission for exploration on hydrocarbons in Turkish companies. In order to resolve the dispute, Turkey bases its theory in the principle of equity. In this theory the country with the largest coastline (in this example Turkey) in the Aegean has the right to possess the largest continental shelf and EEZ. (Fig. 17) In addition, according with the International Law and the related case law (Geneva Convention 1958, International Court of Justice ruling on the North Sea continental shelf 1969, 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) the islands have all the rights of continental shelf and EEZ like a continental state.

Figure 17, The Turkish Continental Shelf according to the Greek view (in orange) and the Turkish view (black dash line).



Source: ResearchGate.com

Nevertheless, Greece follows the International Law for the delimitation of the continental shelf where the rule of the middle line is the prevailing principle of the Law of delimitation. The bilateral relations of these two countries are difficult to be solved because of their prehistory that, most of the time, directly affects the present and the future.

4.9 Chapter Conclusion.

After the analysis of the bilateral and trilateral relations of the countries of the South-East Mediterranean, it is obvious that it's difficult to say that every country moves directly with one theory. Most of them seek not only their own interests but the interests of the region too. We saw that weaker countries like Cyprus and Greece got more power by uniting their interests with other countries like Egypt and Israel. This is exactly what the theory of geo-economics stands for. It includes the geostrategy and geopolitics, playing in the lines between the International Relations Realism and International Relations Liberalism. The only country that may diverge because it does not try to cooperate in the terms and conditions that the other countries of the region want, in order to grow their alliances, is Turkey. In the study, it turned out that Turkey has the will to play the role of the monarch of SE Mediterranean and less the cooperative ally although the other countries have tried to find a solution according to the law. So, it is obvious that the theory of IR Realism is more opposite for the country of Turkey.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS.

Nowadays, it is very interesting to understand the way that the world moves. Great professors, after years of studies on how the countries act and react among themselves, created their theories and decode the meanings behind these actions. Some years after, a pattern seemed to be created and the theories of geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy appeared on the forefront. In the thesis, after the analysis of these theories from the spectrum of some very famous professors, we understood that the intentions of the countries for power and control are more complicated than we thought. The dominance in the study area is one of the countries' concerns, but it is obvious that without the requisite cooperation between them, their scenario about power and sovereignty cannot be fulfilled.

The two main schools of geopolitics, German and Anglo-Saxon, described the theory from their point of view. Ruddolf Kjellen and the influence that Friedrich Ratzel exercised on him, made him be the first who created and defined the theory of geopolitics. From the Anglo-Saxon School, Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman, with the theories of Heartland and Rimland, wanted to declare the importance of Eurasia in this theory. Both of these two Schools of geopolitics, with their representatives, were unequivocal that the location and the space are the substantial elements to determine the power of the countries. But before going any further, it is good to remember that the most ancient comprehension of the geopolitics theory came from Thucydides, the first man that understood the significance of space, when he wrote the Peloponnesian War. Geostrategy from the other side, apparent to be a theoretic tool based on the diplomacy and the military power that is being performed from a country to a certain place.

These two theories came to be part of the geo-economics, which include not only the theory of realists but the theory of liberals too in the sphere of International Relations. In a few words, it turned out that the states not only seek for their own balance in sovereignty, economic prosperity and political stability, but also that they cannot thrive without the cooperation and the compromise with their neighbors in order to create a stronger power chain.

All of these studies come to take flesh and bones with the findings of oil and gas fields in the South-East Mediterranean region. The rich subsoil of the area creates

common or conflicting interests between the states. The geographical factor, the economic needs of each country and the history of the past that they share, bond them in a circle of interdependence. This subsystem of the South-East Mediterranean is becoming a frontier of big interests between East and West. The rise of the area gave birth to big opportunities in many fields and mostly in the sector of the energy economy. We could say that the countries that constitute the body of the SE Mediterranean region are Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt and Turkey. The bilateral and trilateral relations that have been created based on the needs and the interests each country has, signify that the theory of geo-economics exists and works.

The new alliances between Greece, Cyprus and Israel and Greece, Cyprus and Egypt also fix the bridge between Europe and the Arabic world. Although in Greece they do not have found any huge exploitable amounts of oil and gas yet, the fact that this country is part of Europe and European Union and it is going to be a transit point because of the EastMed pipeline make the Greek land and energy gate. Greece needs this energy cooperation not only for its sovereignty enhance in the region and the title of the appreciable ally but for its domestic boost of economy. Cyprus, as a fraternal country with Greece has the same interests, plus it has already exploitable oil and gas fields. These two states share the same concerns about Turkey too. Building even mighty relations due to the EastMed construction they want to validate their position against the interests and the expansive policy of Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Israel, as a friendly country to European Union and the West declared its support to the Greek and Cypriot governments about the continental shelf issue with Turkey, and as a result of this dynamic trio, Turkey irrationally delimitate an Exclusive Economic Zone with Libya. This counterfeiting of the maritime zones in the area did not leave the state of Egypt uninvolved, as the line of the Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and Libya trespassed its EEZ too. Egypt, as a prominent country in the Mediterranean Sea, wants to pass to an era of new alliances and opportunities, first for its own profits (as every country does) and then because it is being understood the power that common interests provide and the countries with which can share them.

At the end, everything is judged by the moves at this “game” of geo-economics. The powerful foreign policy and the sovereignty of the states do not only come from the geographical position and the landmass of the countries but from the right alliance decisions and the domestic circumstances that every country faces – economic,

political and social. These are the factors that determine the countries' position on the world map of systems and subsystems.

References.

- Amorosi, T. O. M. (1987) 'the Theory and Practice of', *Benchmarking: An International Journal*, 9(2), pp. 217–243.
- Austvik, O. G. and Rzayeva, G. (2017) 'Turkey in the geopolitics of energy', *Energy Policy*. Elsevier Ltd, 107(May), pp. 539–547. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.008.
- Baltos, G. Ch. (2019) *To stratigima kai i stratigiki tis Toyrkias gia mia «galazia patrida».* (*The strategy and the strategic of Turkey for a “blue homeland”*)
Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/72562/georgios-x-mpaltos/to-stratigima-kai-i-stratigiki-tis-toyrkias-gia-mia-«galazia-pat> (Accessed: 17 April 2021).
- Barkat, A. (2010) *Noble CEO: Leviathan is largest gas find in our history - The Jerusalem Post*. Available at: <https://www.jpost.com/National-News/Noble-CEO-Leviathan-is-largest-gas-find-in-our-history>.
- BP (2017) *New energy supplies for Turkey and Europe: a visual guide to the Southern Gas Corridor | News and insights | Home*. Available at: <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/reimagining-energy/visual-guide-to-europe-southern-gas-corridor-tanap-turkey.html> (Accessed: 20 November 2020).
- BP (2019) *BP starts gas production from the second stage of Egypt's West Nile Delta development*. Available at: <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-starts-gas-production-from-the-second-stage-of-egypts-west-nile-delta-development.html> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).
- Brown, N. (1994) 'The political geography of conflict and peace edited by Nurit Kliot and Stanley Waterman Belhaven, London, 1991', *Global Environmental Change*. doi: 10.1016/0959-3780(94)90054-x.
- China-Led Consortium Chosen to Build LNG Terminal in Cyprus - World Maritime*

News (2019) *Offshore Energy*. Available at: <https://www.offshore-energy.biz/china-led-consortium-chosen-to-build-lng-terminal-in-cyprus/> (Accessed: 16 October 2020).

Cohen, E. (2018) 'Development of Israel's natural gas resources_ Political, security, and economic dimensions | Enhanced Reader', *ELSEVIER*. Available at: <chrome-extension://dagcmkpagjlhakfdhnbomgmjdpkdklff/enhanced-reader.html?openApp&pdf=https%3A%2F%2Fpdf.sciencedirectassets.com%2F271807%2F1-s2.0-S0301420718X0004X%2F1-s2.0-S0301420717303100%2Fmain.pdf%3FX-Amz-Security-Token%3DIQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEM7%252F%252F> (Accessed: 12 February 2021).

Cyprus Profile - Energy: Oil & Gas (2019). Available at: <https://www.cyprusprofile.com/sectors/energy-and-environment> (Accessed: 18 September 2020).

Daloglu, T. (2014) *Why do Greek Cypriots call Turkey the aggressor? - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East*. Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/turkey-greece-cypriots-agressor-peace-talks.html> (Accessed: 10 March 2021).

Deutsche Welle (2018) *Gas, pipeline dreams and gunboat diplomacy in Mediterranean | News | DEUTSCHE WELLE | 02.04.2018*. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/gas-pipeline-dreams-and-gunboat-diplomacy-in-mediterranean/a-43228234> (Accessed: 20 February 2021).

El-katiri, L. and Fattouh, B. (2015) 'Foreign and Security Policy Paper Series 2015 Lebanon : the Next Eastern Mediterranean Gas Producer ?'

Eni, Egypt (no date). Available at: <https://www.eni.com/en-IT/global-presence/africa/egypt.html> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Eni, Zohr Operation (no date). Available at: <https://www.eni.com/en-IT/operations/egypt-zohr.html> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Eni makes new gas discovery in Mediterranean Sea offshore Egypt | *Energy Egypt* (2020) *Energy Egypt.net*. Available at: <https://energyegypt.net/eni-makes-new-gas-discovery-in-mediterranean-sea-offshore-egypt/> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Exploration History - Ministry of Energy, Israel (no date). Available at: [http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Oil And Gas in Israel/History-of-Oil--Gas-Exploration-and-Production-in-Israel.aspx](http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Oil%20And%20Gas%20in%20Israel/History-of-Oil--Gas-Exploration-and-Production-in-Israel.aspx) (Accessed: 5 September 2020)

Filis, K. (2019) *Tourkikes epidiokseis kai adieksoda (Turkish aspirations and impasses)* | *in.gr*. Available at: <https://www.in.gr/2019/06/24/apopsi/tourkikes-epidiokseis-kai-adiexsoda/> (Accessed: 16 March 2021).

France 24, I. N. 24/7 (2010) *Israel has enough gas 'to become exporter' - FRANCE 24*. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20111016175544/http://www.france24.com/en/20101229-israel-has-enough-gas-become-exporter> (Accessed: 5 September 2020)

Frost, R. B. and Spykman, N. J. (1944) 'The Geography of Peace.', *The American Journal of International Law*. doi: 10.2307/2192825.

Hudson, V. M. *et al.* (1991) 'Why the Third World Matters, Why Europe Probably Won't: The Geoeconomics of Circumscribed Engagement', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 14(3), pp. 255–298. doi: 10.1080/01402399108437453.

HuffingtonPost (2020) *East Med: Ipeyrafi i symfonia Elladas-Kyprou-Israel yia ton ayoyo (East Med: The agreement between Greece, Cyprus, Israel for the pipeline was signed)* | *HuffPost Greece*. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/east-med-epeyrafe-e-semfonia-elladas-keproe-israel-yia-ton-ayoyo_gr_5e0e1f6bc5b6b5a713b72022 (Accessed: 12 February 2021).

IEA, Data & Statistics (2018). Available at: <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics?country=CYPUS&fuel=Imports%2Fexports&indicator=SecondaryOilImportsExports> (Accessed: 15 October 2020).

IEA, Data & Statistics (no date). Available at: <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics?country=ISRAEL&fuel=Energy supply&indicator=Coal production by type> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

IENE (no date) *The East Mediterranean Geopolitical Puzzle and the Risks to Regional Energy Security*, Institute of Energy of South East Europe. Available at: <https://www.iene.eu/the-east-mediterranean-geopolitical-puzzle-and-the-risks-to-regional-energy-security-p20.html> (Accessed: 27 November 2020).

Indeo, F. (2008) ‘Working Paper The Levant Energy Basin: a geopolitical game changer in the E. Mediterranean ?’, *中国软科学*, (09), pp. 46–53.

International Infrastructures - DEPA (no date). Available at: <https://www.depa.gr/diethnis-ypodomes/> Accessed: 9 September 2020).

International - U.S. EIA , Greece-DATA (2017). Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/international/data/country/GRC/natural-gas/dry-natural-gas-imports?pd=3002&p=0000000000001&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=none&l=249--91&s=315532800000&e=1483228800000&> (Accessed: 8 September 2020).

International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2015). Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/SYR> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2017). Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/TUR> (Accessed: 16 September 2020).

International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2018). Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/EGY> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

2020).

International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (no date). Available at: <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/LBN> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Israel gets first gas from Leviathan with exports to follow - Oil & Gas 360 (2019). Available at: <https://www.oilandgas360.com/israel-gets-first-gas-from-leviathan-with-exports-to-follow/> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Kalenteridou, K. (2020) Temenzouka Petkova: “*O IGB dimiourgi nees efkeries gia energiaki sindesi mazi me TAP-TANAP-EASTMED kai LNG stin Alexandroupoli*” (Temenzouka Petkova: “*IGB creates new energy connection opportunities with TAP, TANAP, EastMed and LNG in Alexandroupolis*”) *Via Diplomacy*. Available at: <https://www.viadiplomacy.gr/76temenzouka-petkova-o-igb-dimiourgi-nees-efkeries-gia-energiaki-sindesi-mazi-me-tap-tanap-eastmed-ke-lng-stin-alexandroupoli/> . (Accessed: 9 September 2020).

Karkazis John, I. Vidakis, G. B. (2014) *O energeiakos ploutos tis Syrias (The energy wealth of Syria)| Foreign Affairs - Hellenic Edition*. Available at: <https://foreignaffairs.gr/articles/69688/giannis-karkazis-ibidakis-kai-g-mpaltos/o-energeiakos-ploytos-tis-syrias?page=show> (Accessed: 5 September 2020)

Kashi, D. (2013) *Syrian Oil And Gas: Little-Known Facts on Syria’s Energy Resources And Russia’s Help*. Available at: <https://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-oil-gas-little-known-facts-syrias-energy-resources-russias-help-1402405> (Accessed: 22 October 2020).

Luttwak, E. (1990) ‘From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics’, in *National Interest*, pp. 17–24.

Maniatis, Y. (2019)Arthro Gianni Maniati stin efimerida “*FILELEFTHEROS*” : Agogos EastMed: Pos i patrida kerdizei otan oramatizetai tekmirionei kai maxetai!

(23-12-2019)- Maniatis Giannis (*Article by G. Maniatis in the newspaper "FILELEFTHEROS": "EastMed pipeline: how the homeland wins when it envisions, documents and fights!" (23.12.2019) - Maniatis Giannis*), ΦΙΛΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ. Available at: <http://www.maniatisy.gr/park-blog/11650-arthro-g-maniati-stin-efimerida-fileleftheros-agogos-eastmed-pos-i-patrida-kerdizei-otan-oramatizetai-tekmirionei-kai-maxetai-23-12-2019> (Accessed: 12 February 2021).

Mazis Th.Ioannis (2011) *Davoutogliani proseggisi kai geopolitiki analysi: Kritiki prosegkisi (Davutoglu approach and Geopolitical Analysis: A critical presentation)*. Available at: <http://www.skai.gr/news/articles/article/164954/davoutogliani-proseggisi-kai-geopolitiki-analusi-> (Accessed: 17 April 2021).

Mazis Th. Ioannis (2020) '*Geopolitiki Analysi sto Energeiako Symploko tis Anatolikis Mesogeiou*' ('*Geopolitical Analysis in the Energy Complex of the Eastern Mediterranean*').

Meletis Nikos (2020) *Tourkolyviko Symfono: Dimosieuthike ston OIE - Ti simainei? Poia ta epomena vimata (Turkish-Libyan MoU: Published at the UN - What does it mean? What are the next steps?)*| *Liberal.gr*. Available at: <https://www.liberal.gr/diplomacy/dimosieuthike-ston-oie-ti-simainei-poia-ta-epomena-bimata/290436> (Accessed: 4 April 2021).

Mercille, J. (2008) 'The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: Geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of power', *Political Geography*, 27(5), pp. 570–586. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.06.002.

Mor, A. (2018) 'Lebanon ' s first offshore oil & gas exploration round : Challenges & Opportunities', (March), pp. 1–6.

naftemporiki.gr (2020) *Tin epektasi ton kyroseon tis EE stin Tourkia zita i Kypros (Cyprus demands extension of EU sanctions on Turkey)*. Available at: <https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1620211/tin-epektasi-ton-kuroseon-tis-ee-stin-tourkia-zita-i-kupros> (Accessed: 22 March 2021).

Nichols, J. P. and Mackinder, H. J. (1943) 'Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction', *The American Historical Review*. doi: 10.2307/1840493.

O'Sullivan, P. (1986) 'Geopolitics.', *Geopolitics*. doi: 10.4337/9781788112093.00010.

Offshore-Energy (2018) *Cyprus, Egypt ink deal for subsea gas pipeline - Offshore Energy*. Available at: <https://www.offshore-energy.biz/cyprus-egypt-ink-deal-for-subsea-gas-pipeline/> (Accessed: 23 February 2021).

Paul Day, O. V. (2013) *Damietta LNG plant idled as Egypt keeps its gas at home - Reuters, Reuters*. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/gas-natural-egypt/update-1-damietta-lng-plant-idled-as-egypt-keeps-its-gas-at-home-idUSL5N0B7HKW20130207> (Accessed: 5 September 2020).

Petrikkos Petros (2019) 'Energy and security in the Eastern Mediterranean', *Global Risk Insights*, (35). Available at: <https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/03/energy-and-security-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/>.

Ratner, M. (2016) 'Natural Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean', *Congressional Research Service*.

Ratzel, F. (2019) *Politische Geographie, Politische Geographie*. doi: 10.1515/9783486749274.

Reis, D. (2014) 'Israeli-Egyptian Gas Diplomacy Cooperation , Rejection and Possible Reversal', *University of Haifa*, (June).

Reuters (2018) *Egypt warns Turkey over eastern Mediterranean economic interests | Reuters*. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-energy-zohr-turkey/egypt-warns-turkey-over-eastern-mediterranean-economic-interests-idUKL8N1PX248?edition-redirect=uk> (Accessed: 23 February 2021).

Schenk, C. *et al.* (2010) ‘Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province , Eastern Mediterranean’, *U.S. Department of the Interior*.

Scholvin, S. and Wigell, M. (2018) ‘Geo-Economics As Concept and Practice in International Relations’

Skafidas, G. (2019) *Ayti einai i Toyrkiki “Galazia Patrida”*: Pos xekinise (*This is the Turkish "Blue Homeland": How it started*) *ETHNOS*. Available at:

https://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/58474_ayti-einai-i-toyrkiki-galazia-patrida-pos-xekinise (Accessed: 17 April 2021).

Stolakis, V. (2020) *Giannis Maniatis: Otan schediazame ton EastMed mas elegan treloys kai grafikoys* (*Giannis Maniatis: When we were designing EastMed we were called crazy and graphic*), *MAKEDONIA*. Available at:

<https://www.makthes.gr/giannis-maniatis-otan-schediazame-ton-eastmed-mas-elegan-treloys-kai-grafikoys-253419> (Accessed: 9 September 2020).

TAP route and infrastructure (no date). Available at: <https://www.tap-ag.gr/O-Αγωγός/Χάρτης-διαδρομής> (Accessed: 8 September 2020).

The Guardian (no date) *Israeli attack on Gaza flotilla sparks international outrage*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/israeli-attacks-gaza-flotilla-activists> (Accessed: 14 April 2021).

Theocharidis, P. (2020) *Etoimazetai kai i Italia na ypograpsei ton EastMed* (*Italy is getting prepared to sign Eastmed.*), *Energy Press*. Available at:

<https://energypress.gr/news/etoimazetai-kai-i-italia-na-ypograpsei-ton-eastmed> (Accessed: 18 February 2021).

Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (2010) *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511697883.

Tugwell, P. (2020) *Leaders From Israel, Cyprus, Greece Sign EastMed Gas Pipe Deal - Bloomberg*, *Bloomberg*. Available at:

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-02/leaders-from-israel-to-greece->

[set-to-sign-eastmed-gas-pipe-deal](#)(Accessed: 9 September 2020).

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (2005) ‘TEXT ’, 308(August 1981).

United Nations (2003), *Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone*, Available at: <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/EGY-CYP2003EZ.pdf>

United Nations (2020) *The Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between Greece and Egypt*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/GRCEGY.pdf> (Accessed: 27 February 2021).

United Nations (no date) *UNCLOS, Cyprus*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CYP.htm> (Accessed: 10 March 2021).

US Energy Information Administration (2013) ‘Overview of oil and natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean region Geology’, *Eenergy Information Administration (EIA)*, 2013, p. 29. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/regions_of_interest/Eastern_Mediterranean/eastern-mediterranean.pdf.

Wayback Machine (no date). Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20090319134207/http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/documents/44edf1a5d337f.pdf> (Accessed: 14 April 2021).