

**UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STUDIES
GRADUATE PROGRAM ENERGY: STRATEGY, LAW & ECONOMICS**

“THE GREEK EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE”

**KONSTANTINA A. KAPSI
R.N 18027**

Supervisor: Mary Bossi
Three-Member Committee of Inquiry:
Professor Mary Bossi
Assistant Professor Athanasios Dagoumas
Assistant Professor Ioannis Konstantopoulos

PIRAEUS, 15 JULY 2019

This thesis is a diploma thesis within the framework of the postgraduate program “ENERGY: STRATEGY, LAW & ECONOMICS”, which belongs to the department of international and European studies of the university of Piraeus.

Before presenting the results of this diploma thesis, I feel obliged to thank some people. People, who I met, worked with them and played a very important role in the implementation of this diploma thesis.

First of all I want to thank my supervising professor of this diploma thesis, Professor Mary Bossi for her valuable guidance and for the confidence and appreciation she has shown me.

Then I would like to thank the Assistant professors Athanasios Dagoumas and Ioannis Konstantopoulos, who accepted to be members of the three-member evaluation committee.

Finally, I want to thank my parents Alexandros and Maria, as well as my sister Polyvia, who with patience and courage offered me the necessary moral support in order to complete my postgraduate work.

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1. Introduction

Nowadays, Greece is experiencing a very difficult time in terms to its financial, social and sovereign position. This occurs not only due to the economic crisis, which beats the Greek economy but also because of the general turmoil in the Mediterranean region. The significant important of the oil and the gas is the key element in order to reveal why we have turmoil in the region of Mediterranean. The exploitation of oil is the main source of political instability. The population of the planet has tripled within a period of time of half a century or even less. In 1930 the population of the planet was estimated 2 billion. Nowadays, the population of the planet arises the 6 billion.¹ But, when the population of the planet arises, the needs also arise and the reserves are eliminated. The world's leadership deals with the exhaustion of energy resources, their distribution and usually with their acquisition.

Greece has a significant geopolitical position. It unites geopolitically three sub-regions, Africa, Europe and Middle East. Also, it is a region that gathers the largest oil reserves on the planet. Greece also includes important strategic passages and is crossed by many commercial routes, forming a place (a spot in the map) that for a long time is the target of the great powers. The positions of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, as well as the narrow streets of Cythera and Karpathos, east and west of Crete, and Cyprus, opposite the Suez Canal, are areas that have great geostrategic value. NATO bases in Crete confirm the geo-strategic value of Greece.

The large coastline and the extended border with Turkey, Bulgaria and Albania constitute the geostrategic problem of Greece. Greece faces the following dilemma; on the one hand Greece has to defend its islands and its seaports. On the other hand Greece faces the Turkish air attacks in its airspace, which has as a condition the Greek prevalence in the air. So in order to avoid this dilemma, Greece acceded in NATO in 1951 and in European Union in 1981; in order to find security in its allies. But specialized facts have shown us that this security is under discussion. (Ex. IMIA- NATO, economic crisis and its treatments by the EU) .So

¹ Colmer, K., (2006), The oils in Greece: the unspeakable war between Greece and Turkey: the Treaty of Lausanne is included, Libani S.A., Athens, p.11.

Greece has the opportunity due to its location to find other allies in order to keep secure its interests².

The declaration of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a crucial fact in order Greece to keep secure its interests and its existence. There are 137 coastal states that have already declared either their EEZ or their FEZ (Fishing Exclusive Zone), without their action having a bad impact in their relationship with their neighborhood countries. The reason is very simple. When a state declares its EEZ, it does not give any specific geographical coordinates (It does not make up any map that shows the boundaries of its EEZ). The only way to do this is through a delineation of its EEZ after an agreement with its neighborhood coastal states. Maps and geographical coordinates, without catching an agreement, can only be given when the distance of the coastal state from its neighboring coastal states is bigger or equal to 400 nm. The importance of the GREEK EEZ takes a real form with the Convention of United Nations (Law of the sea).³

This thesis is trying to examine why the declaration of a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone is so crucial for the existence of Greece, and also examines the best way to do so. Similar cases will be used in order to understand the importance of the declaration of the EEZ and in order to analyze which is the proper way to complete this settlement. Key study for this research is the international law, especially the law of the sea. Also, in order to understand the concept of the EEZ need be to analyze a general background before we go in depth in our analysis and examine the case of the Greek EEZ.

The first chapter examines the new constitute of the Law of the Sea. The Convention of UN (1982 – UNCLOS) is the milestone for the declaration of the EEZ. Also this chapter examines the other sea regimes. Especially, the continental shelf is examined in order to find the similarities and the differences with the EEZ. And also, in order to understand the importance of a Greek EEZ declaration.

The second chapter examines the Greek declaration of an EEZ. For Greece this declaration secures its national interests. In the case that Greece decide to declare and afterwards to delineate its EEZ then this settlement will has a significant impact in topics like fishing ,

² Colmer, K., (2019), The geopolitical significance of Greece, Libani S.A., Athens, p.9-13.

³ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.17.

exploitation of oil and gas reserves , rising of RES , protection of the environment and mainly in the most crucial topic which is the Greece-Turkey relationship. In this chapter, the oil reserves that are located in the area of Greece will be examined in order to find out how those reserves can help Greece to face the economic crisis. And also, a major topic will be examined in this chapter is how the declaration of a Greek EEZ has a significant impact to the Greek Fishing in the region of Aegean Sea.

The third chapter examines similar cases in accordance with the case of Greece, in order to find the best way to delineate the Greek EEZ. Also a geopolitical perspective will be given. The similar cases are very important to be given in order to obtain a sphere icon on this subject. And also in order to find the proper and more profitable way in order to declare and to establish a Greek EEZ.

The fourth chapter examines the proper way in order to delineate the Greek EEZ. Of course this chapter is the opinion of the writer about the proper way to do such a settlement, in accordance with all the other chapters.

The fourth chapter is a conclusive chapter, which contains some final questions and observations from the above research. After that, the bibliography and the indexes will follow.

2. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND SIMILAR REGIMES

A. The historic perspective of the Exclusive Economic Zone.

On 28 September 1945, USA president Harry Truman signed a declaration, which recognized the exclusive right of USA to exploit the reserves of its Continental Shelf. This declaration did not have an Exclusive Sovereign Character on the USA Continental Shelf; the only right that U.S.A had, it was in accordance to its natural resources. And of course the high seas regime continued to exist. Truman's proclamation was the first challenge for the expansion of the coastal states' rights. Until this time, the coastal states had sovereign rights only in a distance of 3 miles from its territorial sea. This proclamation was the milestone for the creation of Law of the Sea and in further for the creation of the EEZ. After this proclamation Chile and Peru declared a zone of 200 nm from their baselines.

On 18 August 1952, Chile, Peru and the Ecuador signed the declaration of Santiago. Those three states declared their sovereignty rights in a distance of 200 nm from their baselines, in order to protect and to conserve their natural resources.

In 1947, United Nations (UN) authorized the International Law Committee to examine a new Law Sea Regime and also to examine the major problems that would arise with the delineation of coastal states sovereign rights in their territorial sea area. After decades, in 1958 in Genève, the UN General Assembly has decided to convene the First Conference on the Law of the Sea.(UNCLOS I).This convergence created four convention for the law of the sea: a) the convention for the territorial sea and for the contiguous zone, b)The convention for the high sea's regime, c) the convention for the Continental Shelf, d) The convention for a fishing zone and for the conservation of the resources, e) the protocol for the Dispute Resolution. But this convention could not agree in some things. The first one was the length of the territorial sea. The second one was the length of straight line bases; the third one was the notion of the Continental Shelf. And the finally one, was the length of the exclusive fishing zone.

This was the reason why, in Genève, took place the second UN conference. (UNCLOS II) The main topics of this conference were the length of the territorial sea and the recognition of an exclusive fishing zone. But unfortunately also this conference did not have a fruitful result. So, UN decided to create the UNCLOS III⁴.

B. The Exclusive Economic Zone under the prism of International law (UNCLOS III).

On 10 December 1982, in Montego Bay, UNCLOS III was signed. This convention consisted of 320 articles and 9 annexes, and was the «constitution of the oceans». UNCLOS III was signed by 120 countries and it entered into force in 1994.⁵ For the first time, a new *special maritime* zone was referred, known as *Exclusive Economic Zone*. (Articles 55-75, V part)⁶.

The Convention establishes a 200-nautical-mile zone adjacent to the coasts of each coastal State and within it the coastal state has exclusive rights to exploit living and non-living resources ,but the right of free navigation for the third states remains.

This maritime Zone (EEZ) *extends 200 nautical miles seaward from the baselines, from which the territorial sea is measured* (article 57, UNCLOSS III). This specific measurement (200 n.m.) was related to the customary law. When the UN Conference for the establishment of the law of the sea launched, there were already states that had adopted a 200 nautical mile territorial sea. Those states (Latin America's states and Africa's states) would not agree to limit their sovereignty rights in a distance less than 200 nautical miles. Thus, UN Committee decided to propose a 200 nautical- mile maritime zone, within the coastal state would have sovereign rights, in order this proposal would be accepted by the majority of the states.⁷

⁴ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p. 25-26.

⁵ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p.27.

⁶ UNCLOS III (1983): *The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, United Nations, New York, p.43-53.

⁷ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p.56.

The Exclusive Economic Zone cannot exceed the 200 nautical mile line from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. This means that the greater extent of this zone is mandatory for all the coastal states authorized to have this type of maritime zone. In addition, all the coastal states that have choose to adopt a 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, have to subtract this width from the territorial's sea width. For instance U.S.A has adopted a 12 nautical miles territorial sea and also has adopted a 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, the real length of the Exclusive Economic Zone is 188 nautical miles (200-12= 188).(Article 55).⁸

All the duties, the jurisdictions and the obligations of the coastal state in this maritime zone are referred in the Convention. (Article 56). According to this article, the coastal state in the Exclusive Economic Zone has:(a) *sovereign rights* for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; (b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention."⁹ This article grants the coastal states which has adopted an Exclusive Economic Zone with sovereign rights and not with sovereignty.¹⁰ First of all, it is significant to mention that the coastal states do not have the full sovereignty in this maritime zone like they have in their territory or in their territorial sea. The coastal state has specific sovereign rights for specific purposes in its Exclusive Economic Zone¹¹.

⁸ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.41.

⁹ UNCLOS III (1983): The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, p.43.

¹⁰ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.40.

¹¹ Umberto Leanza, Maria Cristina Caracciolo, (2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL],p.5-8.

On the other hand, specific freedom was given to the third states in order to strike a balance alongside the exercise of sovereign rights within the Exclusive Economic Zone. (Equilibrium).¹² The rights of the other states- third states in the Exclusive Economic Zone are defined in article 58 paragraph 1 of the convention as following:" 1. In the Exclusive Economic Zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and over flight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention". So, the coastal state when exercise its sovereign rights should regard the high sea's freedom. On the other hand the flag states (third states) should regard the Exclusive Economic Zone's sovereign rights, which are exercised by the coastal states. The third state's rights, which are provided by the convention, will not be exercised to the detriment of the coastal state¹³.

Based on the rights, duties and jurisdictions, which are provided by UNCLOS III, the Exclusive Economic Zone is a *sui generis Zone*.¹⁴ This zone's regime is something between the regime of the territorial sea and the regime of the high sea. In Exclusive Economic Zone only one state, the coastal state has sovereign rights for economical purposes and jurisdictions for specific activities. The other states have also some specific rights and obligation in this zone. On one hand the Exclusive Economic Zone does not belong to the Territorial Sea's regime because the convention refers that the Exclusive Economic Zone launched after the territorial sea. Also Exclusive Economic Zone does not belong either to the high sea's regime, because the high sea's regime is characterized by the principle of freedom. High sea is a maritime zone

¹² Umberto Leanza, Maria Cristina Caracciolo, (2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL],p.4.

¹³ Umberto Leanza, Maria Cristina Caracciolo, (2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL],p.8-9.

¹⁴ Gemma Andreone, (2015), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford Handbooks Online, p.3.

Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.44.

where there is not either sovereignty or sovereign rights. It's a shared maritime zone, where all the states can use.

Also it is important to mention that Islands have also Exclusive Economic Zone. ¹⁵According to Article 121 of the Convention all the islands, with the exception of rocks, are able to have territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and Continental Shelf. *Island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.*(art. 121 UNCLOS III). Rock considered as a restricted region of ground. This territory can be located either in the sea or next to the coast. The major criterion is that the rocks *cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.* (art. 121, UNCLOS III).

A state in order to acquire an EEZ has to make a specific **declaration**¹⁶. This is a unique action. When a state declares its Exclusive Economic Zone does not present its boundaries on a map. The only way to present its boundaries on a map is by signing conventions with its neighboring states. No one state or team of states has the right to claim that a coastal state cannot declare its Exclusive Economic Zone. A state declares its Exclusive Economic Zone with a unilateral action. And the state starts to have an EEZ when it declares it.

i) The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone

According to the article 57 of the Convention, the Exclusive Economic Zone cannot exceed the 200 nautical mile line from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. This means that the upper limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone is the 200 nautical miles. In order a state to have a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, the distance between the neighborhoods states must be at least 400 nautical miles.¹⁷ But what happened if the two neighborhood states have not a 400 nautical mile distance between them? The delimitation of sea zones, especially in areas where coastal states are extremely close to each other,

¹⁵ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p. 33.

¹⁶ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.64-65.

¹⁷ Cariotis, Th., Kassini, S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens, p.25.

is usually done by bilateral international agreements, between the interested states.

According to Convention there are two main principles which are used for the delimitation of EEZ: a) the principle of equidistance (**INDEX I**) and b) the principle of equity.¹⁸ So far, we have seen that the major of the cases have been solved using the principle of equidistance. However, some states many times accept both of principles in accordance to their interests. For instance U.S.A claims that the better way to resolve such a dispute is the principle of equity and actually wants to apply it in its boundaries with Canada. But it used the principle of equidistance in its boundaries with Mexico.¹⁹

In addition, lack of agreement does not mean necessary an existence of dispute. Likely, the interested members accept a geographical line as a de facto delimitation. In case that the interested states cannot have an agreement, a legal dispute arises. The only way for the dispute to be solved is via the International Court of Justice or the arbitration.

ii) The importance of the delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zone.

If all the coastal states declare their Exclusive Economic Zone, with an upper limit for some of them the 200 nautical miles, then the sea territory of the ocean owned by those states will cover about 37,7 million cubic meters or as much as 35,8% of the total sea surface. In this region of the rate of 35, 8% of the sea surface is concluded the 90% of fishing, the 87% of known oil reserves and the 10% of multiplatform teeth. So, it is easy to understand that the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone is crucial not only for the economies of those states, but also for the world economy and for the international relationships²⁰.

The profits that can arise from a delimitation of an Exclusive Economic Zone are huge. So, it is important to say that the biggest the Exclusive Economic Zone of a state, the biggest the probability for

¹⁸ Cariotis, Th., Kassini , S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens,p.27.

¹⁹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p..57-58,60.

Cariotis, Th., Kassini , S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens,p. 38.

²⁰ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p. 39.

earnings. It is not apparent that states with the biggest Exclusive Economic Zones are the ones with the biggest economies. **(INDEX II)**. So, if a very small island is located strategically in the middle of an ocean and all the others neighboring states are located in a 400 nm distance, then the island's opportunity to increase its profits arises, as the island's Exclusive Economic Zone is huge. For instance the Kiribati state, an island state, has a 3.441.810s.m.Exclusive Economic Zone.²¹

iii) The relationship between the Exclusive Economic Zone and Fishing

The main reason for the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone was the protection of fishing. The states in their effort to protect their fishing have created a zone, where they would have exclusive right to fish.²² This is the reason why most of the states ratified the agreement (UNCLOS III-1982). Actually, according to the article 61 of the Convention the coastal State determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone, without taking account the opinion of the other states. The coastal State, shall take into account the best scientific evidence available to it, in order to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. The coastal state identifies its capacities for the exploitation of the living resources of its exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State is unable to catch the total allowable catches, the coastal State shall, by specialized agreements, grant third or third States the right of access to the surplus.

The coastal states in their Exclusive Economic Zone have the control of their resources and they can use them in accordance to their national priorities and needs. So, there is not any obligation for the coastal state to allow a third state to fish in its EEZ. The only obligation that has the

²¹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.41.

²² Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.138.

state according to the fishing to thirds states is when there is a surplus in the allowable catch.²³

C. The Maritime Zones under International Law

A maritime boundary is a conceptual division of the Earth's water surface areas using physiographic or geopolitical criteria. Generally, a maritime boundary is delineated at a particular distance from the baselines of a state. Maritime boundaries exist in the context of territorial waters, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones. The delineation of maritime boundaries has strategic, economic and environmental implications. Some maritime boundaries have remained indeterminate despite efforts to clarify them. This is explained by an array of factors, some of which involve regional problems. In continue we will see a brief analysis of those maritime zones and how those are important for the sovereignty of a coastal state. **(INDEX III)**.

The first maritime zone we are going to examine is the *territorial sea*. *Every State has the right to establish its territorial sea, up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.*(art.3 UNCLOS III).In this zone the coastal state has full sovereignty rights. The status of innocent passage is very important for this regime. Vessels flying the flag of foreign countries have the right to use this maritime zone. But the way that this innocent passage will be realized, is something that is determined by the coastal state. (art.17-32 UNCLOSS III).If a passage is prejudicial for the coastal state, then it is considered not to be an innocent passage²⁴.

The second maritime zone, we are going to examine, is the *contiguous zone*. This maritime zone is considered as a sea zone adjacent to territorial sea. In this maritime zone the coastal state exercises limited

²³ UNCLOS III (1983): The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, p.49.

²⁴ Umberto Leanza, Maria Cristina Caracciolo, (2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL],p.9.

“control” rights. Those rights have mostly administrative character. (Ex. customs, financial, sanitary, immigration legislation). The contiguous zone cannot extend beyond the 24 n.m. seaward from the baselines, from which the territorial sea is measured. (With the territorial zone, 24 n.m.-12 n.m. =12 nm). (art.33 UNCLOS III)

The third maritime zone that we have already examined is the Exclusive Economic Zone.

The fourth maritime zone, we are going to examine, is the Continental Shelf. (Article 76-85, UNCLOS III). Continental shelf is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending beyond the territorial sea. The sovereign rights at the Continental Shelf are restrained only to the rights of exploration and exploitation of its natural resources (seabed and subsoil). There are two basic criteria for the delimitation of Continental Shelf: (a) geology and (b) distance. According to the geological criterion, Continental Shelf is the natural prolongation of the land territory of the territorial sea, which extends to the outer edge of the continental margin, with upper limit 350 nm. ; Otherwise it extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines, from which the territorial sea is measured (criterion of distance).²⁵

It is significant to say that the right of the Continental Shelf is *ipso facto and ab initio*, is an inherent right. Because, the Continental Shelf is the natural prolongation of the Coastal State, art 76(1) LOSC.

The coastal state has exclusive sovereignty rights to explore and to exploit the natural resources of its Continental Shelf. *These natural resources are mineral and other non-living resources of the Continental shelf and sedentary species which are either ‘immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant contact with the seabed or subsoil’.* (art.77 (1) LOSC). In this point is important to understand that the sovereign rights of the coastal state are related to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the Continental Shelf. It is significant to mention that this right does not affect the legal status of the

²⁵ Dominic Roughton, Colin Trehearne, (2014), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, The Continental Shelf, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL], p.9.

superjacent waters²⁶ or the airspace above those waters, which controlled by the high seas legal regime.

The fifth maritime zone we are going to examine is the High Sea. (Article 86- 120, UNCLOS III). According to the Convention, this maritime zone is not included either in the exclusive economic zone regime, or in the territorial sea regime or in the internal waters regime, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State regime.(Article 86,UNCLOS III).The high seas are open to all States, whether are coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by the Convention and by other rules of International Law. This maritime zone is characterized by freedom of navigation; freedom of over flight; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under International Law; freedom of fishing; (f) freedom of scientific research.(Article 87, UNCLOS III).This maritime zone serves peaceful purposes. And also, the duties of the flag state are determined in detailed in order to be avoid any dispute.

D. Similarities and Differences between the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf- an overlapping regime

First of all it is important to say that the Continental Shelf is a *geological phenomenon*. On the other hand the Exclusive Economic Zone is a *sui generis zone*, as mentioned earlier; this maritime zone is something between the territorial sea regime and the high seas regime. But both of these regimes belong to maritime zones and are governed by international law, in particular maritime law.

In the case of the Continental Shelf the rights of the state are ipso facto and abinitio (ex officio and from ever).On the other hand the rights in the case of the Exclusive Economic Zone are acquired after its declaration²⁷. Thus the rights of the Exclusive Economic Zone depend on a prior declaration, while those of the Continental Shelf exist without

²⁶ Ted McDorman, (2015), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea: The Continental Shelf, Oxford Handbooks Online, p.2 , 4, 5, 15.

²⁷ Umberto Leanza, Maria Cristina Caracciolo, (2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL],p.5

occupations or declarations required. If there is any doubt about the status quo, an examination for a probable declaration is required.

In the case of the Exclusive Economic Zone, the upper limit is 200 nm; On the other hand, the limit of the Continental Shelf can be up to 200 n.m. The upper limit of Continental Shelf is 350 n.m. if the geological criterion is met. However, we must admit that the sovereign rights of a state over 200 nm are limited. Above 200 n.m., if another state wishes to explore an area, the coastal state cannot deny it. The only case where a State can refuse this investigation is only when the same (coastal State) is investigating the specific area.

Also, an important difference between Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone is the obligation of sharing resources. If the coastal State has an obligation to grant access to its resources to other States (third States) in its Exclusive Economic Zone, such an obligation does not exist for its resources in its Continental Shelf. Also, in the case of Continental Shelf, Liakouras P. points out that under the Convention of the Law of the Sea, even if a coastal state does not exercise its legal rights to research and exploit hydrocarbons on its Continental Shelf, no other state has the right to do so, and therefore the resources of the Continental Shelf do not belong to the logic of the high seas²⁸.

Another major difference is pinpointed in the case of the laying cables and pipelines. In the case of an Exclusive Economic Zone, the consent of the coastal State is not necessary, but consensus within the continental shelf is required.

In the case of the Exclusive Economic Zone, a State may also fish and exploit seawater and air to generate energy. The state has exclusive sovereign rights to control other activities such as the production of energy from water, currents and winds. Whereas, in the case of the Continental Shelf the state has the sovereign right to explore and exploit only the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf.

Also, the delimitation of the two regimes coincides. But the practice of states would encourage the adoption of a single line of delimitation, as long as the same criteria are applied; or prefer the multipurpose line. Others argue that there is no legal obligation for states to automatically

²⁸ Liakouras, P. (2019), Turkey seeks to cancel Cyprus's EEZ exploitation planning, ERT, 21 June, available at: <https://www.ert.gr/eidiseis/diethni/evropi/liakoyras-i-toyrkia-prospathe-i-na-akyrosei-ton-programmatismo-tis-kyproy-se-schesi-me-tin-ekmetalleysi-tis-aoz-audio/>.

extend the Continental Shelf's delimitation line or the Continental Shelf's negotiation line to the Exclusive Economic Zone. In some cases, such as Italy, the negotiation of the Continental Shelf demarcation does not necessarily mean automatic application to the Exclusive Economic Zone. In such a case a new line should be drawn. However, if the States agree on the demarcation of the Continental Shelf, this agreement does not automatically extend to the Exclusive Economic Zone. A separate agreement is required for the Exclusive Economic Zone.

It is important to note that if one of the two maritime zones is delineated, it is customary to believe that the other one maritime zone will be defined in exactly the same way. One maritime zone covers the other maritime zone. It is an overlapping regime. On the one hand, the Continental shelf has exclusive rights on seabed and on subsoil. On the other hand, the Exclusive Economic Zone has Exclusive Economic Sovereign rights in the area above the Continental Shelf.²⁹ Also, the legal status of the Continental Shelf precedes the emergence of the Exclusive Economic Zone and is separate from the Exclusive Economic Zone. If states agree on delimitation of Continental Shelf, this agreement is not automatically extended to EEZ. Concerning EEZ agreement a separate agreement is necessary.

²⁹ Umberto Leanza, Maria Cristina Caracciolo, (2014), The Exclusive Economic Zone, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL],p.16.

3. THE CASE OF GREECE

A. Historic perspective -Under UNCLOSS III

On April 30, 1982, in New York, after nine years of negotiations and eleven meetings, the Convention on the Law of the Sea was voted on. The result of the vote was 130 votes in favor, 4 against and 17 abstentions. The four states that voted against the convention were the United Kingdom, Turkey, Israel and Venezuela. Greece, of course, was one of the states that voted in favor of the Convention.

Greece actively participated in this meeting and supported the need to establish a new system of maritime law rules and also supported most of the secondary provisions adopted by the conciliation. Greece has managed to prevent the adoption of perceptions and rules that were not favorable to it.

The text adopted and signed on 10 December 1982 is quite favorable to Greece. It recognizes the state's right to expand its territorial waters in an upper limit of 12 nautical miles. Also it recognizes that islands have Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. Of course, as I mention before, the rocks does not have this right.³⁰

B. The Aegean Dispute

For more than 30 years, Greece insists that the only conflict between its state and Turkey is the delimitation of the Continental Shelf. But for the past 30 years, the concept of the Continental Shelf has been sidelined by the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone. The International Court of Justice always urges the simultaneous delimitation of both Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone. Of course, it is to Turkey's advantage that Greece seeks only the delimitation of the Continental Shelf and not the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic

³⁰ Cariotis, Th., Kassini, S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens,p.21-23.

Zone³¹. Greece will gain great power in the region by delimiting its Exclusive Economic Zone. (ex. the fishing). So, if that happens then a destabilization of power will appear on the surface. The main reason of this dispute is the existence of oil in the Aegean region.

However, the conflict in the Aegean covers not only the delimitation of the Continental Shelf, but also the delimitation of the territorial sea. There is also a huge question about air and military traffic control zones in the Aegean.

But what does Turkey really claim and what has the Convention established?

First of all we are going to examine the case the Continental Shelf. Turkey has repeatedly and for a long time insisted that some Greek islands do not have a continental shelf and that, therefore, Greece has no Continental Shelf in the eastern half of the Aegean. Turkey also has a fallback position which argues that, in case the islands are entitled to have their own Continental Shelf, this does not apply to the Greek islands which are closed to the Turkish coast because they lie on the Continental Shelf of Turkey, which is simply the ‘natural prolongation’ of the Anatolian coast. In other words, the Greek islands are merely "protrusions" of the Turkish Continental Shelf. Turkey, generally accepts that islands are entitled to have Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea, but the Greek islands are a “specific case” and as result they are not entitled to have those rights.³²

But according to article 121 of the Convention all the islands are entitled to have not only Continental Shelf but also Exclusive Economic Zone and Territorial Sea. Also, Article 121 (2) states that all islands have an Exclusive Economic Zone and that this Zone is recognized in the same way as on the mainland. Thus, in the case of the Greek Declaration of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Turkey cannot use the same arguments it asserts for the Continental Shelf.

As it was mentioned before the 200 nautical miles are the upper limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone. For a state to have 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, it must have a distance of 400 nautical miles with its neighboring coastal state. In our case that distance does not exist.

³¹ Cariotis, Th., Kassini, S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens, p.23-24.

³² Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p. 51.

Common sense claim that in this case the delimitation is designed using the midline method. (equidistance principle). But Turkey does not accept this kind of delimitation. Because Aegean is a semi closed sea so the Aegean islands do not enjoy the Convention's rights. But Turkey is trying to keep secret that it has already delineated its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Black Sea, which is more closed sea than Aegean Sea is, using the middle line method.³³

In addition, Greece has established a six- mile territorial sea in the Aegean Sea because wants to avoid conflicts with Turkey. But according to the Convention every state has the right to establish a 12 mile territorial sea. The same thing is applied also in the case of islands. The paradox with Turkey is that it has established a six- mile territorial sea regime in the Aegean Sea but in Black Sea and along its Mediterranean coast has established a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Greece has declared its right to establish a 12 mile territorial sea in the Aegean Sea but Turkey regards this action as *casus belli*.³⁴ Currently, with this 6-mile delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean, Greece has 43.5% and Turkey 7.5% in the Aegean. So, the remaining 49% of the Aegean Sea belongs to the high seas regime. If both countries establish a 12 mile Territorial Sea then Greece will control the rate of 63.9% and Turkey the 8.3% of the Aegean Sea.³⁵ **(INDEX IV)**.

i) The history of the dispute.

It is common known that the Aegean Sea from the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 until 1973 was controlled by Greece. Greece was the dominant economic, military and culture power in the region. Until this period, Turkey had no interest in the region. And also, Turkey had never complained about this regime.

Things changed in 1973. In that time, oil deposits were found in the region of the island Thasos by the oil company Oceanic Exploration of

³³ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p.51-52.

³⁴ Cariotis, Th., (1990), *The case for a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea*, Marine Policy, Butterworth & Co, p.4.

³⁵ Cariotis, Th., (1990), *The case for a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea*, Marine Policy, Butterworth & Co, p.5.

Denver, Colorado. One bad political manner was the reason why Turkey decided to change its policy. At that time Greece was ruled by dictators. Dictators in order to establish their dominance in the country declared that the oil was found in Thasos was marketable and consumable. Turkey saw an opportunity. On 1 November 1973, the Turkish government without any legal right granted mineral exploration rights to the Turkish Petroleum Company in the Eastern Aegean. The area in which Turkey illegally granted exploration and exploitation rights clearly overlap both the Hellenic Controversial Continental Shelf and also areas for which foreign companies had already been granted licenses by the Greek Government.

When democracy returned to Greece on 27 January 1975, the government of Konstantinos Karamanlis suggested that Greece and Turkey bring jointly the dispute for the Aegean Continental Shelf to the International Court of Justice. But this proposal was rejected by the Turkish Government.

On 10 August 1976, the relationship between the Turkey and Greece was agitated. So, the possibility of a war was on the front. Greece decided to appeal simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the ICJ. On 25 August 1976, the Security Council called the two Governments to negotiate in order to found a mutual solution. The Greek request to the International Court of Justice had two objectives: the first one was for Turkey to refrain from exploration and exploitation in the disputed areas and the second one was temporary protection measures to be taken.

On 11 September 1976, the International Court of Justice rejected the Greek request for temporary protection measures, and in December 1978 the International Court of Justice ruled that it lacked jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea continental shelf case. It is important here to mention that Turkey is opposed to any compulsory jurisdiction has relationship with the Law of the Sea.

Following these decisions, the two countries met in Bern on 11 November 1976, where the "Bern Protocol" was signed. The two parties agreed that the negotiations would be sincere, thorough and pursued in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual

consent on the Continental Shelf demarcation between them. But this protocol remained inoperative until 1981.

In 1987, Turkey's government announced that it would conduct an exploration in an Aegean dispute area. The Turks brought the exploration vessel, Seismic, to challenge the Greek government, which a few days later decided to take control of a foreign consortium, planning an oil exploration 10 miles east of Thasos. When the Turks announced their intention to explore the Aegean Sea, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou made a very harsh statement. He said that Greece is ready to meet this Turkish challenge and that this vessel is not allowed to explore the Greek Continental Shelf. The Greek intention of war, in order Greece to protect its sovereign rights, did not become unnoticed by the Turkish. The Turkish government then announced that the vessel would be confined to exploring the Turkish Territorial Sea only.

Following this crisis, the two prime ministers, Andreas Papandreou and Turtzut Ozal, exchanged serious letters to find a way of defining the Aegean Continental Shelf. But all those letters were confidential. Also, this negotiation intended to bring this dispute to the International Court of Justice.³⁶

ii) The position of the European Union in relation to this crisis and generally to this dispute.

The above dispute led the European Parliament on 8 April 1987 to unanimously adopt a resolution with the following characteristics. They said that this dispute about the delimitation of Continental Shelf between Greece and Turkey had a permanent character. They also claimed that the 1987 crisis between these countries was a very dangerous phenomenon for the stability of the region, as it would affect the peace of the region. Thus, the European Parliament called on all countries to settle their differences peacefully and always in accordance with international law. In addition, the European Parliament called on the two parties to come to an agreement immediately with the delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, using the International Court of Justice

³⁶ Cariotis, Th., (1990), The case for a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea, Marine Policy, Butterworth & Co, p.6-9.

in The Hague as a way of resolving this dispute. This is the reason why, the European Parliament called the International Court of Justice to be interested about this particular case in the context of political cooperation and to keep Parliament regularly informed. It, also, instructed its President to forward this resolution to the European Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting on political cooperation, the governments of the Member States and the Government of Turkey.³⁷

Unfortunately, however, the European Union has not helped much in resolving this dispute. On the contrary, the European Union has made some serious strategic mistakes that have a bad impact on the case of Greece. The European Union is the authorized body for tackling fisheries policy, conservation and management of fish stocks. In 1976, European Union tried to create a common fishery policy, which would be accepted by all the member states. This policy had some long term targets. In order to adopt this policy, the European Union, in 1983, adopted Regulation No. 170/83. That regulation provided that all Member States had to adopt a territorial sea zone of 12 nautical miles by 31 December 1992. Consequently, States with territorial waters of less than 12 nautical miles were required to extend this zone to the maximum limit of 12 nautical miles. Of course, Greece did not take any action. However, many states have followed this regulation. Turkey reacted in order to avoid the expansion of the Greek Territorial Sea. Turkey invited all the members of the European Union, except Greece, to a meeting in Ankara. Turkey has asked them not to extend their territorial waters to the Mediterranean Sea. Unfortunately, the European Union has accepted this absurd demand. The Greek Government (Mitsotaki Government) has accepted this request.

That is exactly what happened in 1990, when the European Union decided to expand its Exclusive Economic Zone to the upper limit of the 200 nautical miles. Turkey once again called on the Union not to create such a zone in the Mediterranean countries. European Union for one more time accepted this Turkish request. The explanation given by the

³⁷ Cariotis, Th., (1990), The case for a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea, Marine Policy, Butterworth & Co, p.9.

European Union to other countries was that fishes migrate to this sea, so it was not necessary to create such a zone in the Mediterranean Sea.

We understand that the exclusion of the Mediterranean countries from the establishment of the upper limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone is a move that does not serve the interests of the European Union. In particular, this movement does not serve the interests of the EU members that belong to the Mediterranean States. In fact, it is very important to say that 96% of the fish consumed in the European Union comes from the Mediterranean countries. Thus, a Mediterranean zone protects the European Union's financial interests. And these financial interests are huge if we consider that the EU coastline is about 66,000 kilometers. Thus, the sovereign rights of the European Union could be extended to 7,000,000 square meters if all Member States extended their Exclusive Economic Zone to their upper limit, only Greece has a 14,000 km coastline. These numbers are huge if we consider that the US has a 20,000 km coastline and has the largest economy in the world. (**INDEX V**).

That is why Antonis Samaras, the Prime Minister of Greece in 2013, following the demarcation of the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone, called on the European Union to create a European Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean region, including Italy, Greece, and Cyprus and Malta.³⁸

iii) The position of the U.S.A in this dispute.

In 1975, for the first time, we have heard the notion of the word «co-operation» in the disputed Aegean region. U.S.A Government asked Constantine Karamanli to launch negotiations with the Turkish government in order ‘co- exploit” the Aegean Sea. Of course, the Greek Prime Minister refused to obey this request. Then, the U.S.A Government asked the same thing from the next Greek Prime Minister Andrea Papandreou. But, for one more time the Greek Prime Minister refused to obey in this request. This America's demand is a world original. We've never seen this before. The concept of "co-exploitation"

³⁸ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.67-69.

only appears in border areas where there appears to be an oil field and of course after the delimitation. This request will be legal only in the specific case where there are predetermined frontiers and a subsequent oil discovery is found therein.³⁹

For more than thirty years the US government has adopted the same policy in relation to the Aegean conflict. They argue that the Greek government has no right to declare its Exclusive Economic Zone. The Greek government must first reach an agreement with the Turkish government and afterwards to make a declaration. But, they forget that in 1983, the same Government – U.S. Government made a declaration without an agreement. And they also forget that the declaration of the Exclusive Economic Zone is a unilateral act.⁴⁰

This U.S. policy is a kind of security policy. As, we know U.S alone, and of course with the contribution of NATO, is the only state that tries to “guard the security” in the world. But the truth is that the Mediterranean Sea and actually the Aegean Sea is a chokepoint, very important for the transportation of the Energy through the Middle East, where the Americans have their oil companies. So in order to secure their energy transportation, US try to conserve a balance in the region. Otherwise, if problems with Turkey occur , they will lose not only a NATO ally and a good buyer of weapon, but also they will lose the balance in the region, which is very important in order to control the region for economic and energy reasons.

In 2013, the Greek government, for the first time after 40 years of moderate politics, decided to file a memorandum to U.N. for the Turkish government's intention to conduct an energy exploration on the Greek Continental Shelf. This action shows that the Greek government has overcome the fear of the United States government. And in fact, this was an act that shows that Greece is ready to face any kind of danger in order to protect its sovereign rights.⁴¹

³⁹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.62-63.

⁴⁰ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.79.

⁴¹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.80.

iv) **The IMIA Crisis**

Undoubtedly, the most serious crisis between Greek-Turkish relations occurred in 1996 and is known as the IMIA crisis. It was the first time between those countries that the possibility of a war had arisen.

All started on 25 December 1995, when the Turkish cargo ship "Phoenix Akat" landed in the shallow waters near East Imia and signaled a danger signal. His captain refused assistance from the Greek Coast Guard, claiming that he was in a Turkish area and that the Turkish authorities were solely responsible. The Greek Foreign Ministry informed the Turkish Foreign Ministry that if a Turkish trailer was in Greek waters, this trailer would be in immediate danger. The Turkish Foreign Ministry informed the Greek side that regardless of who would rescue the ship, there was a general issue with the rocky islands. Finally, the ship was towed by the Greek authorities and delivered to a Turkish port. Coincidentally, on the same day, a Turkish aircraft crashed into Greek territorial waters and the pilot was rescued by the Greek authorities.

And then a crisis came to the surface. The Turkish Foreign Ministry took advantage of the situation and gave a verbal note to the Greeks. The Turks claimed that the Imia islands belong to Turkey. But the truth is that IMIA had been attached to the Greek state after the Italian troops withdrew in 1947, at the end of World War II. And it is well known that all American and English maps include these rocky islands in the region of Greece. Unfortunately, the Greek Foreign Ministry rejected this statement belatedly, after 15 days. This period in Greece is characterized by political instability, as Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou resigned because of health problems and was replaced by Costas Simitis. This political instability led the Mayor of Kalymnos to make a tragic strategic mistake. Without a second thought, the mayor of Kalymnos raised the flag of Greece on one of the two IMIA islands. This was the opportunity the Turks were looking for. Two Turkish journalists from the Hurriet newspaper in Izmir helicoptered on the big IMIA rock lifted the Greek flag and raised the Turkish flag. All the action was filmed and aired by the Hurriet TV channel, with the Turks celebrating the Greek failure.

The next day things were very serious. On January 28, 1996, the Greek Navy threw down the Turkish flag and raised the Greek flag. In

the evening, Greek military forces landed on the big rock IMIA, without being perceived by Turks. The political command to the Greek troops was to avoid any escalation of tension. Unfortunately, not only did we have escalation, but also the Greek and Turkish warships were about to get involved in war, when the Turkish government claimed that not only IMIA was doubtful of who it belonged to but also and other Greek islands.

On 31 January 1996, after the death of three Greek Air Force officers, the Americans intervened. The Americans, through US Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, have imposed their will on both sides. They claimed that the IMIA is a grey zone, so "No ships, no troops, no flags» are permitted. Therefore, the status quo ante was applied in this case. Until 31 January 1996, ships, soldiers and flags had withdrawn from IMIA.⁴²

The position of the US and the EU in this crisis is very important to see that Greece is in fact alone in the exercising of its sovereign rights. Let's first say a few things about American behavior afterwards. On October 1996, following the crisis of IMIA, the US Navy Charter no. 5441/5 was published. In this map the word "Brachia Imia (Greece)" was referenced with a note stating that the geographical names and the way they were written on the map do not necessarily mean recognition of their political position by the US. On 1 February 1996, a US State Department spokesman stated that the US did not recognize Turkish or Greek sovereignty in Imia (Kardak), nor in other islands for which there were suspicions of dispute, as in the case of IMIA. It is obvious that the US once again they showed neutrality in their behavior. They did not defend the Greek side, which was actually the legal side. For one more time they preferred to maintain a good relationship with the Turkish side.⁴³

But the frustration didn't stop there with the Americans. The European Union was absent all this time. Following the end of the crisis, the EU adopted a resolution, which characterized Turkey's actions against

⁴² Iefimerida, (2018), The Time of the Imia Crisis: The Flag, the Frogmen and the Helicopter's Fall, newsroom I efimerida gr, 29 Junaury 2018, available at: <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/392439/hroniko-tis-krisis-ton-imion-i-simaia-oi-vatrahanthropoi-kai-i-ptosi-toy-elikopteroy>.

⁴³ Manousogiannakis Sifis, (2014), Political situation and crisis handling, on alert, 28 January 2014, available at: https://www.onalert.gr/ellinotourkika/IMIA_2_Politikh_katastash_kai_xeirismos_ths_krishi/81153/.

Greece - an EU member - as provocative. According to this resolution, "Imia islands belong to the Dodecanese" based on the 1923, 1932 and 1947 conventions⁴⁴. The European Parliament also noted "the dangerous violated actions of Turkey against the Greek sovereign rights» and called on the Turkey "to comply with" the Conventions "and to refrain from hostile actions and threats. We see, however, that the European Union has only vetoed Turkey, while it could have imposed sanctions on Turkey's customs policy, which had been ratified a year ago and had mandated rule the good Turkish relations with the neighboring EU Member States.⁴⁵

v) The strategic importance of the Kastellorizo Islands cluster.

Kastellorizo, Ro and Stroggli are the Greek islands that have a decisive position in the declaration of the EEZ of Greece in the Aegean Sea. The location of Kastellorizo, Ro and Strogguli islands has topo-strategic importance. The existence of those three islands is very important for two reasons. The first reason is that the existence of these three islands in this location extends the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone. Thanks to these islands the Greek Economic Exclusive Zone acquires borders with Cyprus and Egypt. The second reason is that this position is critical for linking the Greek and Cypriot FIRs.⁴⁶

And it is important to say that the delimitation of the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (with Israel, Lebanon and Egypt) creates coherence that is of great importance for the typology and delimitation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone. This means that Cyprus has stabilized its southern part and has set the EU's external borders in this area. So, the European area has expanded in this area. The result of this action is that if there is a European exclusive economic zone then cohesion is a necessity. In other words, Greece in such a framework can make a deal with Cyprus and Italy in order to delineate its Exclusive

⁴⁴ San simera, IMIA Crisis, available at: <https://www.sansimera.gr/articles/209>.

⁴⁵ Manousogiannakis Sifis, (2014), Political situation and crisis handling, on alert, 28 January 2014, available at: https://www.onalert.gr/ellinotourkika/IMIA_2_Politikh_katastash_kai_xeirismos_ths_krishi/81153/.

⁴⁶ Cariotis, Th., Kassini, S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens, p 107.

Economic Zone. So, those three islands are very important in order to be accomplice the existence of a European Exclusive Economic Zone.

Therefore, the position of these three islands is very important not only for the delimitation of a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone but it is also very important for the delimitation of a European Exclusive Economic Zone, which is very important for the realization of some very crucial for the European PCI. (ex. the pipeline between Cyprus, Greece and Italy.)⁴⁷

On the other hand Turkey claims that these islands do not have a Continental Shelf in order to expand its continental Shelf. By not recognizing the Continental Shelf of these islands, Turkish government seeks to establish maritime boundaries with Egypt. (**INDEX VI**). But after the IMIA crisis, the problem is not that Turkey does not recognize a Continental Shelf in those islands but that Turkey wants to raise doubts about who these islands belong to. – Turkey claims that those islands are the natural prolongation of Turkish Continental Shelf. However, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, all the islands, located 3 nautical miles off the Turkish main lines, belong to Greece. The same regulation is written in the decision of the six powers.⁴⁸

Unfortunately, Greece has weakened the position of Kastellorizo, Rodos and Strogguli. Distance is considered to be the key element of this decline, but the truth is that this weakness is a matter of political will. We must admit that in a strategic situation space is not the problem, time and management is the real problem. This cluster of islands has almost been cut off from Greek territory. It is an additional barren line for the Greek territory. This political negligence also drives Turkey into these behaviors.⁴⁹

As we have seen before, Turkey claims that the Greek islands are a specific case, because they are located in a semi closed sea. In our case, Turkey interprets the UNCLOS Convention with a prototype way. However, Turkey was one of the four countries that voted against the Convention and does not respect article 121 on the status of islands, Turkey relies on article 3 of the Convention “Every State has the right to

⁴⁷ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.65-71.

⁴⁸ The Treaty of Lausanne, (1924), B' Section, article 16.

Cariotis, Th., Kassini, S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens, p 106.

⁴⁹ Cariotis, Th., Kassini, S., Lugerou, N., Kikilia, B., (2011), EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone From the Strategic Movement to Financial Solution, Kastaniotis S.A, Athens, p 146.

establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention” and interprets it like this: “Each Member State shall perform its duties in good faith, which it has undertaken under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdictions and freedoms recognized by this Convention in a manner not characterized as an abuse of rights. Therefore, an island offshore of more than 6 nautical miles is contrary to customary law and in fact abuses Turkish rights because it violates the principle of equity.”⁵⁰

On the one hand, we have the Turkish side trying to find a way to disarm the Greek islands from their geostrategic position, especially the Kastellorizo islands cluster. On the other hand, we have the Greek side that has a passive position, without trying to exploit its geostrategic advantages.

vi) Turkey’s arguments about the Aegean dispute.

First of all, Turkey believes that the Greek islands do not have the rights granted by UNCLOS, as they are "special cases". The Greek islands do not have the right to have territorial waters of up to 6 nautical miles or to have a Continental Shelf or an Exclusive Economic Zone.

The paradox, as I said earlier, is that Turkey, one of the states that voted against the UNCLOS Convention and does not respect Article 121 of the Convention, interprets Article 3 in a way that is convenient for its State. It uses the principles of good faith and the principles of “abuse power” and the principle of equity in order to secure its position. In fact, Turkey claims that Greece's territorial waters should not extend beyond the 6 nautical mile limit.

Turkey's figures indicate that 43.5% of the Aegean is owned by the Greek state and only 7.5% belongs to the Turkish state. The remaining rate of 49% belongs to the high seas regime. If the territorial waters attract the upper limit of 12 nautical miles for both states then Greece will hold the 71.5% of the Aegean Sea and Turkey the 8.8%. The remaining 19.7% will be owned by the high sea’s regime.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.189.

⁵¹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.189.

Also Turkey claims that if the territorial Sea expands to the upper limit of 12 n.m. then Turkey will lose portion of its Continental Shelf. And its Continental Shelf will also drop from 16.3% (28,126 square meters) to 8.27% (14,240 square meters).⁵²

In addition Turkey claims that many Greek islands have not a Continental Shelf, because in the Aegean dispute is not applied the median line principle. As a result, many islands in the Eastern Aegean can easily be ignored, so that the middle Aegean belongs to the Turkish state. So, the principle of equity must be applied, of course in favor of Turkey. On the other hand Greece believes that according to the Convention the principle of the middle line must be applied.

Also Turkish claims that the Aegean Sea is a semi-closed sea, with many Greek islands to be so close to the Turkish mainland, only 3 nautical miles from its coastlines that substantially diminish the Turkish Continental Shelf.⁵³

Fisheries and all fishing activities must be taken into account for delimitation. And as a result, Turkey's interests must be protected because Turkey is fishing in the Aegean. And of course the reserves are not an important indicator for the delimitation, except of delimitating provokes calamitous effect in the society.

The notion of the Continental Shelf is not overlapped by the notion of the Exclusive Economic Zone, so Turkey claims that a different demarcation could be made for these two zones, because there are specific cases that maybe are not so similar to those notions.

The delimitation of the islands is a very different case. And in most cases the decision to delimit them gives either a limited delimitation or a non-existent delimitation. The location of the islands is a very important factor for their delimitation. The delimitation of an island is determined by its location, its size and of course the specific cases. Therefore, even if an island is large in size and has a very strong socio-economic life, it is possible to be given a limited demarcation.

In fact, the delimitation between Greece and Turkey is not only a matter for the eastern Greek islands, but a matter for the whole Aegean Sea. Because the principle of proportionality, which is established by the Convention (part V) , indicates that the delimitation of the Aegean Sea is

⁵² Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p.189.

⁵³ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p.190.

something relevant and not determined. Thus, when calculating the length of the Greek coasts, we should not calculate the length of the islands, as they will not be taken into account for the delimitation between Greece and Turkey. So for a delimitation of Greece-Turkey only the territories of the land should be taken into account, even ignoring the island of Euboea. After that maybe some islands would be taken into account.

In order to be a fair demarcation, the Aegean must be divided into three sectors. The first sector is the North Aegean region, where the Greek coastline is larger than Turkish. Thus, in this region the Greece would have a larger Continental Shelf than Turkey. The second sector is region of the central Aegean Sea. In this area, no Greek island, not even the island of Euboea, will be taken into account for the delimitation of the Continental Shelf. So in this area, since the two states are opposite each other, the principle of the middle line between the two states will be taken into account. The third sector is unique. The coast of Greece in this area turns west and the Turkish coastline turns east. As a result, these geographical features create the greatest distance between the two states. Also a very important feature is that the two states stop being opposite each other in the 37th geographical area. The principle of middle line also would be taken into account in this delimitation. The only problem is the island of Crete. Because Crete is located opposite to Egypt and Libya, and both of these countries have the right to delineate their EEZ with Greece and not with Turkey. Of course no island will be considered for this delimitation. Turkey claims that this demarcation is in favor of Greece, as Greece will hold the 68% of the Aegean Sea.⁵⁴

vii) The Greek agreement for the Aegean dispute

First of all, Greek presence in the Aegean Sea is indisputable, as Greece has 3.100 islands of which 2.443 are in the Aegean Sea, in contrast to Turkey, which has only three islands in the Aegean Sea.

The second most important factor is the economic importance of the Aegean, which is greater for Greece than Turkey. There is a large

⁵⁴ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p 190-193.

percentage of the Greek population who base their income on fishing. The productivity of Greek fisheries has also declined in recent decades. The declaration of the Greek EEZ would be an incentive for the fishermen. But for the moment Turkey is fishing more than Greece. Turkey fishes 200.000 tons per year. And also Turkey has a socio-economic program "Vision 2023" which foresees that Turkey will be the largest producer of fisheries in the European Union by 2023. Its target is to fish almost 300.000 tons per year in the next decade. On the other hand Greece is a state that tries to equip its fishing fleet.

Greek islands are very important for Greek economy, as the 40% of tourists that visit Greece are attracted by the Aegean Islands. The Greek islands are also a very important factor for the existence and development of the Greek merchant navy. Of the total cargo unloaded in the Greek ports, 80% is unloaded in the Aegean ports.

Also a very important factor for the delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone is the length of the coastlines. The Greek coastline is three times larger than the Turkish coast. The total length of the Greek coastline is 15. 020 km. The Aegean coastline is 10. 942 km, or 72.8% of the total coastline. Also the population of the Greek islands is 1.5 million, when the total population of Greece is 10 million.

More than 90 states have possessed an EEZ or an EFZ. Also there are not restrictions for states that have islands in their territory. In addition, as we have seen earlier, the European Union has tried to create fishing zones in order to gain financial health. Combined with the fact that most Greek fishermen use to fish in areas which characterized by the High seas regime but most of those areas were designated as Exclusive Economic zones of the coastal states, makes the declaration of a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone more prominent. In order, fishermen have the incentive to fish.

Also Greece claims that there is a «res judicata». In 1983, the US established an Exclusive Economic Zone that stretched 200 nautical miles from the US coastline. This establishment gave an Exclusive Economic Zone to all the islands of the USA. It is also important to mention that Cuba, which is an island and has a distance of 90 miles from U.S.A, established its own Exclusive Economic Zone using the

principle of «middle line». The above contradicts Turkey's claim that the Greek islands do not have an Exclusive Economic Zone. Turkey has also used the middle line principle to demarcate its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Bosphorus Sea, while refusing to sign the UNCLOS treaty. It makes an effort to differentiate the delimitation of its maritime zones, adopting a "double standard" position.⁵⁵

viii) It's all about oil

It is common known that the Mediterranean Sea is a new resource for oil and gas reserves. In particular, Greece has been under surveillance for the last 70 years, because research has shown that Greece has a significant oil and gas reserve. The first exploration began in 1970, in an area west of Crete, by an American exploration ship named "Glomar Challenger". This ship made two drills at two different points. This two drillings were enough to shown that in this region of Greece there are sediment and salt percentages in the subsoil of those areas which are the main feature for the possible occurrence of oil deposits. Also, the rocks beneath the seabed are similar to those in the Gulf of Mexico, where large oil deposits have already been discovered.⁵⁶

As mentioned earlier, the immediate announcement of the "Prinos 1" in Thasos by the Greek government in 1974, in conjunction with the 1977 US Ocean map, which depicted the potential areas of oil reserves in Greece, led the Turkish government to claim rights in the Aegean Sea. Americans speculated that there was a large portion of oil and gas reserves in the Aegean Sea. **(INDEX VII).**⁵⁷

According to a research of an oil company, the Aegean holds about 1 billion barrels of oil and 70 billion cubic feet of reserves. In relationship to others regions of Greece those reserves are large but not the largest one. Because the largest Greek oil reserves are located in Crete. It is estimated that there are about 4.4 trillion cubic meters of reserves in this region and 5.7 billion barrels of oil (80,000 square kilometers). There are

⁵⁵ Cariotis, Th., (1990), The case for a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea, Marine Policy, Butterworth & Co, p.10-12.

⁵⁶ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p .93.

⁵⁷ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p 94.

also 1.5 billion barrels of oil and 71 billion cubic meters of reserves in the Ionian Sea.⁵⁸

The Turkish government, seeing that the Aegean oil reserves were not so large in relation to Crete, and even in relation to those of Herodotus's field, turned its attention to the area near Kastellorizo. Turkey wants to explore these fields because researchers claim that the region between Kastellorizo and Southern Rhodes is the second largest oil field in the world.⁵⁹

Also the Herodotus field, which is located southeast of Crete, is estimated to have 2 trillion cubic meters of reserves and 1.3 billion barrels of oil. And there are indications for this argument. The Eastern Mediterranean is believed to contain more than 50 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.⁶⁰ And that amounts to 5 trillion of dollars. But what make us to be so sure about the existence of those reserves? First of all, the 20% of giant hydrocarbon deposits are located at the convergence points of the lithospheric plates. Secondly, the accretionary prisms all over the world are indicators for the existence of giant hydrocarbon deposits. Thirdly, the active mud volcanoes all over the world are indicators for the existence of giant hydrocarbon deposits. In addition, geochemical analyzes of methane bubbles emitted by active volcanic mud, located in the bottom of Crete, show that their origin is not biogenic but thermo genic. Also from the mud samples taken from this area, the presence of liquid hydrocarbons is verified. Finally, the Norwegian company "Petroleum Geo-Service" confirmed that this region has great similarities with the Leviathan basin, which has 3, 45 cubic meters of natural gas and 1, 7 billion barrels of oil.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Conofagos, Il. , (2013) , our mineral wealth lies within the Hellenic EEZ, The Lavreotiki, map.(Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.100.)

⁵⁹ Vardelis, St. , 5 trillion worth of oil was found between Rhodes and Kastellorizo, available at:<https://www.verena.gr/content/%CE%B2%CF%81%CE%AD%CE%B8%CE%B7%CE%BA%CE%B5-%CF%80%CE%B5%CF%84%CF%81%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BF-%CE%B1%CE%BE%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82-5-%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B9%CF%83-%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AF%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%BC%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BE%CF%8D%CF%81%CF%8C%CE%B4%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CF%8C%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B6%CE%BF%CF%85>

⁶⁰ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.108.

⁶¹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p108-110.

So, we understand that it's a very serious geostrategic and economic incentive for Turkey to claim that those sea zones belong to its state. For the economic point of view, Turkish report rates have arisen the last September in the rate of 24%. The exchange rate of the Turkish Lira against the dollar stabilized at the rate of 6. The depreciation of the Turkish currency is estimated at 25% and the inflation at 25% of GDP in 2018. The outcome is that Turkey has a very big deficit in the current account balance, approximately 50 billion dollars, approximately 6% of its GDP.⁶² However, Turkey has a very important strategic position, because it is located between the Asia and the Europe, but it has lost a very important geostrategic ally, Israel. Turkey controls the Caspian pipelines, the Bosphorus Strait and also is a member of NATO. Also Turkey used to be the second military power after U.S. But in recent decades, Turkey has faced the war of Israel and Kurdistan. In order to regain its geopolitical position, Turkey is trying to work with Russia on a nuclear program. But Turkey is losing its place in Europe. Turkey makes jerking moves to offset its geopolitical position. Turkey attacks Israel and Cyprus, increasing its distance with Europe and the US.⁶³

On the other hand, those discoveries are a very strong economic and geostrategic incentive for Greece. The latest decades Greece faces an economic and geopolitical degradation. From an economic point of view, Greece has a very strict oversight by external organizations. Greece receives capital controls for the first time. Unfortunately, its banks lack capital and the stock market crashes. All these factors cause Greece to lose its attractiveness in international investment markets. The Greek public debt exceeds the rate of the 180% of Greek GDP.⁶⁴ Greece is also littered with illegal immigrants, while demographically the country is following a descending path. All these factors create bad prospects for the country. But Greece is upgrading geostrategically. The Gulf of Souda, Rhodes, and Syros are used by the United States as strategic bases for information and visits to the sixth American fleet. North American LNG exports are also being made through a Greek city, Kavala, in order to stop the Russian gas monopoly. Also, the gradual removal of Turkey from NATO, which supplies S-400 from Russia,

⁶² Colmer, Kon., (2019), the geopolitical surplus of Greece, libanis S.A, p.163-165.

⁶³ Colmer, Kon., (2019), the geopolitical surplus of Greece, libanis S.A, p134-140.

⁶⁴ Colmer, Kon., (2019), the geopolitical surplus of Greece, libanis S.A, p.20.

leaves a gap that Greece is expected to fill.⁶⁵ Greece's geopolitical position has also been upgraded due to the delimitation of the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone and the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline. Cyprus gives the opportunity to Greece to create relationships for the delimitation of a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone with Egypt and Libya. Cyprus is also forming a very strong alliance with Israel and Greece to build the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline. Thus, Greece's position is being upgraded because this state along with the other two states will supply Europe with oil and gas, helping Europe to cut off its energy trade with Russia and Turkey. Reserves located in Israel, Cyprus and Greece are enough to feed Europe for the next 20 years. For Greece, therefore, cooperation between Cyprus and Israel is vital.

But in addition to the financial value of reserves, a very important indicator is also the jobs that will be created, which also have economic value. It is estimated that 500.000-700.000 men will be employed in this PCI- "East Med Pipeline". So when we think about the jobs created in a possible exploration of a field, we understand that employment is also vital to the Greek economy.

As we continue to see, oil deposits in the seas of Crete, the Aegean and Kastellorizo are of vital importance to both Greece and Turkey. Because, there are huge oil and gas deposits in these areas. And the oil has an economic value. But not only that, oil also has a geostrategic power, as it is an energy weapon. Thus, the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone or the continental shelf is very important for each state to safeguard its economic and geopolitical interests. Of course, each of the two states wants the delineation to be in its favor. There are fields, like the Herodotus Field, that have major economic interests.

Of course, economically and geostrategically, the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone is also vital. The state secures the fishing and the production of energy by RES⁶⁶.

⁶⁵ Colmer, Kon., (2019), the geopolitical surplus of Greece, libanis S.A, p.21-22.

⁶⁶ Colmer, Kon., (2019), the geopolitical surplus of Greece, libanis S.A, p.94-107.

ix) The «facts» are running

The facts of recent years are dynamically increasing, with their peak take parts the recent months. The demarcation of the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone, which was completed in 2010, creates a relatively stable ground for Greece to begin strategically collaborating with its neighboring countries and not only, in order to declare its Exclusive Economic Zone. Following the Cyprus- Egypt Agreement for the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones, in 2003⁶⁷, a Greek mission visited Egypt in order to be accomplished an agreement for the delimitation of the Greek – Egyptian Exclusive Economic Zone, in 2004⁶⁸. After three years, in 2007⁶⁹, Turkey learned about the Greek-Egypt negotiations about the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and wanted to get into the game by starting its own negotiations with Egypt. The Greek negotiations with the Egypt restarted in 2009⁷⁰.

At the same time, Greece was also facing problems with Libya, which insisted on a reduced Greek Exclusive Economic Zone. Amid all this tension, a positive step was taken by the Deputy Minister of Energy, Yiannis Maniatis, who harmonized the legislation of the Greek continental shelf with the most favorable provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopting the principle of the middle line. He enforced the 4001/2011 law, which amended the 1995 Law on "Exploration, Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons and Other

⁶⁷ Faslis, Chr., (2018), The declaration and the demarcation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Foreign Affairs the Greek Edition, 8 March 2018, available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/71679/xristos-faslis/i-anakiryksi-kai-oriothetisi-tis-ellinikis-aoz?page=2>.

⁶⁸ Meletis, Ni., (2018), The EEZ delimitation with Egypt: Will we see spectacular and real results?, Hellas Journal, 24 October 2018, available at: <https://hellasjournal.com/2018/10/i-oriothetisi-tis-aoz-me-tin-aigpto-tha-doyme-arage-theamatika-kai-oysiastika-apotelesmata/>.

⁶⁹ Mytilinaios, Stef., (2018), A bomb on the foundations of Turkey because of the Greek – Egyptian EEZ, neaselida.gr, 15 October 2018, available at: <https://neaselida.gr/efimerida/vomva-sta-themelia-tis-toyrkias-i-aoz-elladas-aigpytoy/>.

⁷⁰ Cariotis, The., (2018), Are you finally saying that we should delineate our EEZ with Egypt?, Anoixto Parathyro, 29 October 2018, available at: <https://www.anoixtoparathyro.gr/%CE%BB%CE%AD%CF%84%CE%B5-%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%BD%CE%B1-%CE%BA%CE%AC%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BC%CE%B5-%CE%BF%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82/>.

Provisions". In particular the Article 156 (1)⁷¹ of that law designates that in the absence of a demarcation agreement with neighboring states, whose coasts are adjacent or oppose to Greek coasts, the outer boundary of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, once it declared, is designated using the principle of the middle line. Each point of this middle line is equal to the closest points of the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured⁷².

In 2016, and after five years, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias began secret negotiations with Egypt and Libya, trying to find innovative means such as the "trilateral agreements" in order to achieve a trilateral delineation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone., between Greece, Libya and Egypt. He made great efforts to unite the friendship between the three states.

The demarcation of the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone has greatly helped Greece's external relations, which developed a strong bond not only with Cyprus, but also with Israel and Egypt. The enormous energy resources found in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Israel, Cyprus and Egypt, and possibly in the area of Greece, have caused great interest in the region. It is estimated that Cyprus, Israel and Greece hold 6,000-7,000 billion cubic meters.⁷³ Also, we recently had a Greece-Cyprus-Israel agreement on the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, in Jerusalem, in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.⁷⁴ The states agreed to increase regional cooperation; to support active regional cooperation and security, and to defend against external bad influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East. Thus, Greece establishes trilateral relations in order to strengthen its position. And in this trilateral partnership, US also want to participate. Greece is also trying to strengthen ties with its neighboring states, Jordan, Lebanon,

⁷¹ Energy press, (2012), Maniatis: The Greek EEZ policy has been and continues to be consistent, energypress.gr, 8 March 2012, available at: <https://energypress.gr/news/maniatis-ehei-syneheia-kai-synepeia-i-elliniki-politiki-gia-tin-aoz>.

⁷² Maniatis, Gian., (2019), Book Presentation: Our National Energy Strategy, IENE, available at: <http://www.maniatisy.gr/park-blog/11642-i-ethniki-energeiaki-stratigiki-mas-ekdosi-iene-iolylios-2019>.

⁷³ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.102.

⁷⁴ Cabouris, Nic., (2019), US Secretary of State Pompeo inaugurates EastMed pipeline at trilateral summit, Greek Greece Reporter, 21 March 2019, available at: <https://greece.greekreporter.com/2019/03/21/us-secretary-of-state-pompeo-hails-eastmed-pipeline-at-trilateral-summit/>.

Egypt, Israel and Libya. Greece participates in military exercises involving both Cyprus and Israel. A great example is the large-scale multinational exercise of "Iniohos"⁷⁵, which includes a large number of air forces from our country, but also from the US (F-35), the United Arab Emirates, Italy and Israel, as well as forces of the Army of the Earth and the Navy. Greece also participates in the Greece-Egypt-Cyprus exercise "Medusa 8"⁷⁶, which is being held in the Egyptian region, with observers from Bulgaria, France, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan and the US. On the other hand, Greece has been discussing political and social issues with Jordan and Lebanon, such as refugee, Cypriot, Syrian war, and is trying to establish economic cooperation with these countries on infrastructure issues. In fact, Greece is also trying to establish commercial, tourist and educational links with Lebanon.⁷⁷

On the other hand, Turkey loses its friendship with the US and tries to find other allies such as Libya and Russia. Turkey is also making provocative moves to show its strength. In March 2019, Turkey sends two divers to raise the Turkish flag to the bottom of Crete, in the Souda region⁷⁸. At the same time, the Turkish government published a map of the Aegean Sea in a Turkish newspaper, indicating that half of the Aegean islands and the $\frac{3}{4}$ part of Crete belong to Turkey⁷⁹. In April 2019, Turkey submitted a letter to the United Nations and published it as an official document⁸⁰, designating the entire Eastern Greek and Cypriot

⁷⁵ Capoutsi, Chr., (2019) The energy security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the exercise "INIOCHOS 2019", militaire, 3 April 2019, available at: <https://www.militaire.gr/i-energeiaki-asfaleia-tis-an-mesogeioy-kai-i-askisi-iniochos-2019/>.

⁷⁶ Hydrogiousnews, (2019), "Medusa 8 ": Military exercise-message from Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, Hydrogiousnews, April 2019, available at: <https://www.1069.gr/hellas/medoysa-8-stratiotiki-askisi-minyma-apo-ellada-kypro-kai-aigypto/>.

⁷⁷ Papadopoulos, Mic., (2016), The Tripartite with Lebanon is based, Sigmalivenetwork, 16 February 2016, available at: <https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2016/2/16/themelionetai-e-trimeres-me-ton-libano/>.

⁷⁸ Flashnews.gr, (2019), Incredible! The Turkish flag at the bottom of Souda during a NATO exercise!, Flashnews.gr, 20 March 2019, available at: <https://flashnews.gr/post/383691/apisteyto-h-toyrkikh-shmaia-ston-bytho-ths-soydas-sthn-diarkeia-askhshs-toy-nato-fwto>.

⁷⁹ Iefimerida.gr, (2019), New Turkish map-challenge: Turkish territory on 3/4 of Crete!, Iefimerida.gr, 22 March 2019, available at: <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/486869/neos-toyrkikos-hartis-proklisi-toyrkiko-edafos-ta-34-tis-kritis-eikona-vinteo>.

⁸⁰ Meletis, Nic., (2019), Turkey claims from Greece, Crete to Cyprus, Liberal, 12 April 2019, available at: <https://www.liberal.gr/diplomacy/i-tourkia-diekdikeyi-apo-ellada-kriti-mechri-kupro/24728>.

Exclusive Economic Zone as the Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone. **(INDEX VIII)**. And of course that was not enough for Turkey; afterwards Turkey is asking Greece to remove all its troops from the Aegean islands.⁸¹ This Turkish request was ignored by Greece. Greece, in a letter sent by UN Deputy Permanent Representative, Ambassador Dionysus Kalavrezos, on April 25, responded to Turkey via the UN⁸². Greece rejected the claim contained in this Turkish letter as legally unfounded, erroneous and arbitrary and called on Turkey to respect the sovereign rights of neighboring states.

Turkey's intense behavior continues. Cyprus is the next target. On May 2, a Turkish research vessel invaded the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus. The following day, the Turkish drilling rig "Fatih"⁸³ began drilling, 60 miles from the Paphos area. Cyprus has asked Turkey to withdraw the vessel; otherwise, Cyprus has said it would seek an international arrest warrant for those involved in Turkey's illegal activity. But instead of complying with international law, Turkey sent another drilling rig to continue its investigation.

Europe and the US, seeing all these illegal activities of Turkey that were obviously obstructing their plans, decided to do something. The European Union has decided to cut off funding to Turkey. Specifically, the EU has decided to cut off funds received by Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. The European Investment Bank has said it will review its operations in Turkey, which means it will also reduce its investment funds in the country.⁸⁴ At the same time, the United States continues to believe that Cyprus's oil and gas reserves, and all the other sources of wealth, should be shared equally between Cyprus and Turkey

⁸¹ Hydrogiousnews, (2019), Here's the Ankara plan: Why they demilitarize islands & what Erdogan fears - The Lausanne Treaty targets, Hydrogiousnews, April 2019, available at: <https://www.1069.gr/latest-news/idoy-to-schedio-tis-agkyras-giati-apaitoyn-apostratikopoiisi-nision-amp-ti-fovatai-o-erntogan-sto-stochastro-i-synthiki-tis-lozanis/>.

⁸² Meletis, Nic., (2019), Athens letter to UN: Rejects Turkish claims on Continental shelf, Liberal, 8 May 2019, available at: <https://www.liberal.gr/diplomacy/epistoli-tis-athinas-ston-oie-aporriptei-tous-tourkikous-ischurismous-gia-tin-ufalokripida/250874>.

⁸³ Meletis, Nic., (2019), New Turkish 'invasion' with Barbaros in Cypriot EEZ, south of Lemesso, Liberal, 2 May 2019, available at: <https://www.liberal.gr/diplomacy/nea-tourkiki-isonisbolisin-me-to-Barbaros-stin-kupriaki-aosz-notia-tis-lemesou/250173>.

⁸⁴ CNN Greece, (2019), These are the EU measures against Turkey for illegal actions in the Cyprus EEZ, Newsroom CNN Greece, 15 July 2019, available at: <https://www.cnn.gr/news/ellada/story/184509/ayta-einai-ta-metra-tis-ee-kata-tis-toyrkias-gia-tis-paranomes-energeies-stin-kypriaki-aosz>.

as part of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. According to Professor Liakouras P., the reason why Turkey shows such aggressive behavior towards Cyprus is because it is seeking a solution to the Cyprus issue. “The Turks, in order to resume talks on the Cyprus issue, may stop drilling, leave the Cypriot EEZ or postpone the whole process. They want the solution to the Cyprus problem. And the fact that they are ahead is like saying, “We have a plan the next day, even if you don't want a solution.”⁸⁵

After the Cyprus EEZ invasion, Turkey has chosen to open another front with Greece. Yeni Safak, a pro-government newspaper, argues in a first article that Turkey will declare its EEZ, while promoting an agreement with Libya.⁸⁶ Turkey is also threatening to start drilling in Kastellorizo through the state-owned Turkish Oil Company (TRAO).⁸⁷ At the same time, Turkey does not stop violating Greek airspace. Greece responds to Turkey that it must respect international law and stop the challenges. According to Professor Liakouras P., Turkey wants to conduct seismological surveys in the area between Kastellorizo and Rhodes because "in this way Turkey wants to prevent Greece from delimiting its EEZ with other states or even forcing Greece to delimit it first with Turkey".⁸⁸

And while tensions between Turks, Cypriots and Greeks are escalating, Turkey has not yet faced the big American front. A major upheaval ensued between Turkey and the US, as the US refused to give Turkey its S-400 defense missile. That is why Turkey is looking for other military markets, such as Russia. US-Turkish relations are experiencing a rupture.⁸⁹ But that also has an effect on Turkish Libyan

⁸⁵ Liakouras, P., (2019), Turkey wants a solution to the Cyprus problem, The Vima, 12 August 2019, available at: <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/08/12/politics/p-liakouras-sto-one-channel-i-tourkia-epithyme-lysi-sto-kypriako/>.

⁸⁶ SofokleousIn., (2019), Turkey is preparing to declare EEZ, in cooperation with Libya, SofokleousIn, 11 July 2019, available at: <https://www.sofokleousin.gr/etoimazetai-na-anakiryksei-aoz-i-tourkia-se-synergasia-kai-me-ti->

⁸⁷ In.gr, (2019), Turkey Pulls Rope: Plans Investigations Within Greek Shelf, in.gr, 27 July 2019, available at : <https://www.in.gr/2019/07/27/politics/travaei-sxoini-tourkia-sxediazai-ereynes-entos-ellinikis-yfalokripidas/>.

⁸⁸ 34. Liakouras, P., (2019), Turkey wants a solution to the Cyprus problem, The Vima, 12 August 2019, available at: <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/08/12/politics/p-liakouras-sto-one-channel-i-tourkia-epithyme-lysi-sto-kypriako/>.

⁸⁹ Gondaresko, Roman, (2019), What does the Russian S-400 market mean by Turkey?, DW, 1 July 2019, available at: <https://www.dw.com/el/t%CE%B9-%CF%83%CE%B7%CE%BC>

relations.⁹⁰ New Libyan rebel, trying to scrounge the power from Libya's legitimate state power, is considered as a friend of Americans⁹¹. Also, he is supported by the Egyptian Government.⁹² All these parameters weaken Turkey's position. This results in the strengthening of imperialism in Turkey. But Turkey has acquired a very important friend, Russia. Russia responds to EU, claims Turkish sanctions should stop immediately.⁹³

On the other hand, the US Secretary of State stated that Greece is a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans and an important ally in NATO⁹⁴. But according to Professor Liakouras P. “There is chemistry between Trump and Erdogan. Erdogan is pretty tough. This is what Trump likes. And through good chemistry they are trying to solve institutional problems, such as the reactions of the US Senate and its demand for sanctions in Ankara.”⁹⁵

<https://www.thepressroom.gr/arthrografia/pos-i-toyrkia-thelei-na-exafanisei-tin-elliniki-kai-kypriaki-aoz-meso-libyis>

⁹⁰ Meletis, Nic., (2019), How Turkey wants to eradicate Greek and Cypriot EEZ through ... Libya, Pressroom, 23 June 2019, available at: <https://www.thepressroom.gr/arthrografia/pos-i-toyrkia-thelei-na-exafanisei-tin-elliniki-kai-kypriaki-aoz-meso-libyis>.

⁹¹ Logotheti Eleni, (2019), US citizen and former Gaddafi officer behind new crisis in Libya, The Kathimerini, 10 April 2019, available at: https://www.kathimerini.gr/1018745/_gallery/epikairothta/_kosmos/enas-amerikanos-poliths-kai-prwhn-a3iwmatikos-toy-kantafi-pisw-apo-thn-nea-krish-sth-livyh.

⁹² Newsbeast, (2019), The time of chaos in Libya, newsbeast, 6 April 2019, available at: <https://www.newsbeast.gr/world/arthro/4728528/to-chroniko-toy-chaos-sti-livyh>.

⁹³ Iefimerida, (2019), Russia condemns EU sanctions against Turkey, Iefimerida, 17 July 2019, available at: <https://www.iefimerida.gr/kosmos/rosia-katadikazei-kyroseis-ee-kata-tis-toyrkias>.

⁹⁴ World Energy News, (2019), Pompeo (US Foreign Minister): Greece is a pillar of stability and an important ally in NATO, WorldEnergyNews, 17 July 2019, available at: <http://worldenergynews.gr/index.php?id=35877>.

⁹⁵ Liakouras, P., (2019), Turkey wants a solution to the Cyprus problem, The Vima, 12 -08-2019, available at: <https://www.tovima.gr/2019/08/12/politics/p-liakouras-sto-one-channel-i-tourkia-epithyme-lysi-sto-kypriako/>.

C. The historic Background with Albania

The situation between Greece and Albania is a bit complicated. In April 2009, the first Greek – Albanian Exclusive Economic Zone was delineated. There was a need for precise delimitation of territorial waters in the Corfu region, where groups of islands and rocks exist. As an impact the issue of full rights to them was raised. Negotiations were not easy because differences of opinion were significant. There have been many technical and political engagements at many points in this dialogue. Suspicion was probably fueled by extrinsic factors such as Turkey that sought to undermine the generally good relations between the governments of the two states. At the final stage of negotiations, the Albanian government backtracked, so the Greek government, in order to enforce this agreement, linked the exclusive economic zones negotiations to the ratification of this agreement by the Greek parliament. This movement prompted the Albanian government to accept also this agreement. The delimitation was done using the middle line principle. This agreement was innovative as for the first time a 'multi-purpose boundary' introduced, which incorporated both traditional zones (territorial waters-shelf) and new jurisdictions such as the Exclusive Economic Zone.⁹⁶

While the agreement was ready to ratify by the parliaments of the two countries, after the Greek elections of October 2009, the Albanian opposition appealed this agreement to Albanian Constitutional Court, arguing that the Greek rocky islands north of Corfu, that are mentioned in the agreement, are not entitled to have Exclusive Economic Zone and, because of this fact, Greece has taken more maritime space than it was entitled to. Also another argument of the Albanian opposition for this agreement was that in order to enter into negotiations the Albanian delegation had firstly formally to obtain the permission of the President of the Republic. At the end of January 2010, the Constitutional Court of Albania judged that the agreement was invalid, invoking procedural and substantive violations, which contradicted to Albanian Constitution and to UNCLOS. However, the court did not specify what these violations were. This decision raises serious suspicions of foreign interference in

⁹⁶ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), *The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone*, Libani S.A., Athens, p.209.

that decision. In fact, there are suspicions of intervention by foreign powers that would be disturbed by the ratification of this agreement, such as Turkey. This position of Albania is not only a violation of what has been agreed, which goes against the good neighborly rules, but at the same time it also violates European Union rules.⁹⁷

In 2014, things seemed to be even harder for the delimitation of the Greece-Albania Exclusive Economic Zone. Because the Prime Minister of Albania ordered the Prosecutor's Office to launch an investigation in order to find those who played a significant role in delimiting Albania's maritime zones in the April 2009, undermining the country's integrity. Indeed, relations between Albania and Greece got worse when the Albanian government embarked on a local government reform that limited rights and representation of minorities in the region.⁹⁸

In 2015, Greece launched a bidding for the Ionian plots. Then the Albanian Government in a verbal memo to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it challenged the Exclusive Economic Zone's demarcation at our maritime borders. The Albanian government has asked not to allow Plot 1 to be investigated, claiming it occupies part of the Albanian Continental Shelf. Thus, the two plots, 1 and 2, did not take part in the bidding for the 20 marine plots, (the package of 20 plots) which is ended in July 2015. Specifically, for plot 2 in the North Ionian Sea, the contract for the concession of the plot was signed last year. The land was given to TOTAL, ELPE and EDISON. Plot 1 in the Northwest Ionian Sea remains in the air, as the bid submitted by ELPE is reassessed. It is worth noting that for Plot 2 only ELPE had bid in the 2015 competition in order to retain Greek sovereign rights, as this plot was not so promising.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Valinakis, Gian., (2012), The "Greece by Four" project, Foreign Affairs the Hellenic Edition, 12 June 2012, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/68831/giannis-balinakis/to-sxedio-%C2%ABellas-epi-tessera%C2%BB?page=show>.

⁹⁸ Galiatsatos, P., (2014), Albania pulls furthermore the rope for the delineation of the EEZ, Kathimerini, 8 August, available at: <https://www.kathimerini.gr/779216/article/epikairothta/politikh/h-alvania-trava-ki-allo-to-sxoini-gia-thn-aoz>.

⁹⁹ Koilakos, D., (2018), The Agreement with Albania about the delimitation of the EEZ was locked – marine plots 1 and 2 released, energypress.gr, 9 February 2018, available at : <https://energypress.gr/news/kleidose-i-symfonia-me-tin-alvania-gia-ton-kathorismo-tis-aoz-apeleytheronetai-i-axiopoisi-gia>

In February 2018, the Greek government seems to resume negotiations with the Albanian government.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the pursuit of an agreement seems to be very close. The Greek side recognizes that the earlier agreement (since 2009) and the non-implemented EEZ have been partially misapplied, a view so far supported by Albania. Therefore, the current agreement recognizes that marine bays should be considered "closed" in order to apply the relevant provision of the Law of the Sea. At the same time, however, the agreement concludes that the Albanian side cannot raise objections to the Otto and Eritrean Continental Shelf, which is of particular importance and favors the Greek position in relation to the Greek-Turkish conflict over Kastellorizo.

D. Fishing is the problem with Italy

The delimitation of the Greece-Italy Exclusive Economic Zone is the easiest of the five other Greek delimitations. Because the Continental Shelf between those two states has already delineated. Thus, as we have already mentioned, the Exclusive Economic Zone follows the delimitation of the Continental Shelf.¹⁰¹

The problem with this delineation is the fishing. Although the two countries have already agreed on the geographical coordinates, the Italian Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries argues that Italian fishermen have for decades traditional fishing rights in the Ionian Sea, which reach 6 miles from Greek territorial waters.

Most problematic in this argument is that the Italian Minister also reacts to the declaration of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Greek Aegean Sea, arguing that the Italians also have traditional fishing rights in Rhodes and Crete. In addition, it appears to have put its hand in the

¹⁰⁰ Nedos, Vasil., (2018), Athens is close to an agreement with Albania, ikathimerini, 22 June 2018, available at : <https://www.kathimerini.gr/970922/article/epikairothta/politikh/konta-se-symfwnia-me-thn-alvania-vrisketai-h-a8hna>.

¹⁰¹ Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p.208.

delimitation between Greece and Albania, stating that in that region Italians also has traditional fishing rights.¹⁰²

It is important to note that in 2016, Greece auctioned off plot 10¹⁰³, located in the Peloponnese region. This plot was auctioned by ELPE but also by ENERGEAN.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the Greek government is trying to pressure the situation so as to achieve the Greek-Italian demarcation.

E. The problems with Libya

Greece has already declared its Exclusive Economic Zone with Libya. Greece did it unilaterally. In 2011, the Greek Minister of Energy enforced the Law 4001/2011 on hydrocarbon exploration, thus safeguarding Greek sovereign rights. In particular, Greece unilaterally declared its Continental Shelf and its Exclusive Economic Zone with Libya, giving full rights to the island of Gavdos. In particular, Article 156 (1) contains the following ingenious wording: “in the absence of a demarcation agreement with neighboring states, whose coasts are adjacent or oppose to Greek coasts, the outer boundary of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, once it declared, is designated using the principle of the middle line. Each point of this middle line is equal to the closest points of the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.”

It is important to say that Libya insists that in order to proceed with its demarcation with Greece, first of all Greece must acknowledge that Syrtis gulf is a closed gulf in the delimitation and also to accept that the Gavdos Island cannot be taken into account in such delimitation. Greece has tried several times to demarcate the continental shelf / EEZ in the Libyan Sea, but the two countries' approaches have remained diametrically opposed. In fact, Libya is not a member of UNCLOS III.

¹⁰² Chariotis, Th., (2017), The Greek-Italian tragedy of the EEZ, Mikrometoxos.gr, 22 October, available at : <https://www.mikrometoxos.gr/H-ελληνο-ιταλική-τραγωδία-της-AOZ/>.

¹⁰³ Lygeros, N., (2016), The marine land 10, Lygeros organization, 6 December, available at : <http://www.lygeros.org/articles.php?n=29545&l=gr>.

¹⁰⁴ Colonas, Ch., (2017), On which "plots" is Greece looking for oil?, Euro2day, 30 October, <https://www.euro2day.gr/news/economy/article/1574795/se-poia-oikopeda-psahnei-petrelaio-h-ellada.html>.

This raises the problem that this delimitation needs to be considered by Customary Law. Because Libya does not recognize full rights of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in the case of islands such as Gavdos Island.

Since 1980, Greece has argued that the method of declaring the Exclusive Economic Zone and delimiting the Continental Shelf should be the middle line method, while Libya prefers the equity method, insisting that the Syrtis gulf should be considered legally as a closed gulf.

In the south side of Crete, Greece has created nine marine plots. Among these nine plots, plots 16 and 17, adjacent to Libya's exclusive economic zone, have already been assigned for exploration to ExxonMobil, Total and ELPE. According to Elias Conofagos and Theresa Foucianoy, ION and Spectrum have already conducted studies in this area and the results are very encouraging. According to these companies in the southwestern part of Crete, in the area between Crete and the Gulf of Syrtis there is a huge oil deposit that extends to the Ionian Sea. So there are two huge "copies" of the "ZOR" deposit. According to Spectrum, this deposit (between Greece and Libya) appears to be 10 times larger than the one located in "Northern Cyprus" (ZOR), covering an area of 5,000 square kilometers.

Of course, the biggest problem in Greece is bureaucracy. These companies have been trying for many years to obtain the necessary documents to begin their exploration, but the Greek government always finds a way to delay them. The result of all this is that there is a strong likelihood that these companies will abandon their plots and Greece will lose investors once again.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, Libya does not see the whole situation with a good eye. At the end of 2018, when Turkey contacted Libya in order to reach an agreement on their maritime zones, Libya did not reject the proposal. Thus, Turkey claims that it has maritime borders with Libya.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Cariotis, Th., (2019), The Greek EEZ and Libya, Anoixto Parathyro online newsletter, 20 February 2019, available at :<https://www.anoixtoparathyro.gr/%CE%B7-%CE%B1%CE%BF%CE%B6-%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82-%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1%CF%82-%CE%BC%CE%B5-%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%B2%CF%8D%CE%B7/>.

¹⁰⁶ Syriggos, A., (2019), Determination Turkey-Libya? A strategic movement, The Kathimerini, 22 July 2019, available at: <https://www.kathimerini.gr/1034923/article/epikairothta/politikh/orio8ethsh-toyrkias---livyhs-mia-strathgikh-kinhsh>.

Turkey's rebel, the Khaftar, who is trying hard to seize power from the extremist pro-Muslim government, is an enemy of the Turks. Because Libya is in the midst of a civil war and the Turks are trying to help the legitimate side, which is also convenient for them, not the Khaftar side. As a result, this situation in Libya is convenient for Greece. The chances of a favorable deal for Greece increase, if Khaftar assumes power. Also, Khaftar has very good relations with the US and Egypt, which encourages the deal.¹⁰⁷

F. The negotiations with Egypt and Cyprus

Negotiations with Egypt have already begun in 2004. But things get complicated when there is Turkey's aggressive backlash. Egyptian President Al Sissi is positive to be achieved a solution to the Greece-Egypt Exclusive Economic Zone issue. He also has deep hostility to President Erdogan. Last year there was a positive reaction from Athens to reach an agreement. At the same time, the Greek governments wanted to help promote Egypt's relations with the EU. But despite Athens' positive actions, the Greek-Egyptian EEZ issue has once again stuck due to bureaucratic problems at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense.

There was also a problem when Egypt tried to bid for the plot 12. The demarcation of this plot is a continuation of the line that Turkey unilaterally presents as the outer boundary of its Continental Shelf. A line, which separates the Greek and Cypriot shelf, deleting a track. Thus, this Continental Shelf is divided between Egypt and Turkey, deleting the Greek and Cypriot Continental Shelf. Thus, according to all these Turkish claims, we find out (that the islands do not have a Continental Shelf - Kastellorizo) that the tripartite note between Egypt - Greece and Cyprus is deleted. That is why Ankara is annoyed when, in the latest trilateral dialogues of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt in a joint statement,

¹⁰⁷ Lykokapis, Geo. (2019), Khalifa Haftar, the commander who "flew" the Turks from Libya, akeiratos of Delphi, 10 April 2019, available at : http://nikos13galanis.blogspot.com/2019/04/blog-post_52.html.

reference is made to the three countries' willingness to "delimit their maritime zones".

But we see that Egypt has withdrawn from plot 12 because it does not want to challenge Turkey. But also there is another fact. If Egypt accepts that Kastellorizo has a Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone, it will lose 19,400 square meters from its Exclusive Economic Zone. On the other hand, in order to get Egypt's favor, Turkey argues that Egypt has the right to a larger Exclusive Economic Zone in the Leviathan region.

In addition, it is important to note that the Egyptian government is not ready to challenge the Turkish government. Such a challenge could trigger a Turkey-Egypt war or at least a hot episode. On the other hand, some confidential information suggests that Egypt is working with Greece to demarcate part of their Exclusive Economic Zone. In fact, this is a partial delimitation of their maritime zones (between Greece and Egypt), with the aim of essentially not disturbing Turkey. Demarcate an area in which Ankara has no claims. Of course, such a specific delimitation runs the risk that Greece and Egypt will accept de facto the Turkish way of delimitation.¹⁰⁸

In 2003, Cyprus and Egypt delineated their Exclusive Economic Zone. This demarcation played a very important role in the economic growth of Cyprus. Cyprus has delineated its maritime plots and started bidding. The companies that auctioned its plots brought fresh air to the area. Cyprus together with Israel considered to be EU's new oil and gas producers. To transport their fuels need the help of Greece. Therefore, for this very reason and for commercial reasons, there must be a triple point. Egypt also has the opportunity to penetrate this new partnership.

Confidential information indicates that Egypt, Cyprus and Greece are in talks to find a solution to the demarcation of their Exclusive Economic Zones. The biggest problem in this delineation for one more time is Turkey. Thus, Greece wants to avoid any challenge for the Turkish side and that is why it has not declared its Exclusive Economic Zone either

¹⁰⁸ Meletis, N., (2018), The EEZ's delimitation with Egypt: will we see spectacular and substantial results?, Hellas journal by Mignatiou.com , 24 October 2018, available at : <https://hellasjournal.com/2018/10/i-oriothetisi-tis-aoz-me-tin-aigypto-tha-doyme-arage-theamatika-kai-oysiastikaapotelesmata/>.

with Egypt or with Cyprus. But if the three states agree, the Turkish side will certainly act aggressively, but certainly not effectively.

4. SPECIFIC CASES ARE MENTIONED IN ORDER TO FIND WHICH THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS WHEN A DISPUTE ARISES.

In cases where states cannot reach an agreement, the Court must do so for them. It is the common recognized principle of equality that applies in these cases. But as we see in the next paragraph, when a state goes to court to find a fair solution, first of all it must understand that it is certain that it will lose something. No Court has given to a single state full influence over a disputed area.

i) Romania VS Ukraine (2014)

The problem between those two states was the Serpents Island, which belong to Ukraine. According to Romania this island had only territorial sea and neither Exclusive Economic Zone nor Continental Shelf. Thus, Romania wanted to apply the principle of the middle line without taking into account the island. On the other hand, Ukraine claimed that the island had all the rights granted by UNCLOS III. The result was somewhere in the middle. **(INDEX IX)**

According to the Court “first established a provisional equidistance line. In order to do so, it was obliged to determine appropriate base points. After examining at length the characteristics of each base point chosen by the Parties for the establishment of the provisional equidistance line, the Court decided to use the Sacalin Peninsula and the landward end of the Sulina dyke on the Romanian coast, and Tsyganka Island, Cape Tarkhankut and Cape Khersones on the Ukrainian coast. It considered it inappropriate to select any base points on Serpents’ Island (belonging to Ukraine).”

The Court examine this case, considering six potential factors : “(1) the possible disproportion between coastal lengths ; (2) the enclosed nature of the Black Sea and the delimitations already effected in the region ; (3) the presence of Serpents’ Island in the area of delimitation ; (4) the conduct of the Parties (oil and gas concessions, fishing activities and naval patrols) ; (5) any potential curtailment of the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone entitlement of one of the Parties ; and (6) certain security considerations of the Parties. The Court did not see in

these various factors any reason that would justify the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. In particular with respect to Serpents' Island, it considered that it should have no effect on the delimitation other than that stemming from the role of the 12-nautical-mile arc of its territorial sea.”

In this case we find that the island was not taken into account when defining the EEZ of the two neighboring states. Also it is significant to mention that the request of those two states submitted in 2004 and the decision of the court issued in 2014. Therefore, it took ten years for this dispute to be resolved.¹⁰⁹

ii) Nicaragua VS Colombia (2012)

Nicaragua has argued that the Colombian islands are "in the Nicaraguan Continental Shelf", so the waters and seas surrounding these islands are a natural extension of Nicaragua. In other words, Nicaragua claimed that these islands belong to its state. However, Nicaragua has failed to say that these islands are legally subject to Colombia, in accordance with the Nicaraguan-Colombian Convention of 1928. Nicaragua also argued that one of the most important principles of international law for the delimitation of maritime zones is that, as far as possible, the sovereignty of the state in the sea that is right in front of its coast should neither be interrupted nor limited, especially by the influence of small islands in front of its coast. Nicaragua also added that Colombia in this case treats the western coasts of its islands as a wall preventing any access of Nicaragua to the important area between the east coast and the 200 nautical mile line from the Nicaraguan baselines, from which the territorial Sea is measured.

The Court ruled that Colombia, not Nicaragua, had sovereign rights over the islands of Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla. The Court also ruled that it would not be able to settle the widespread Continental Shelf claimed to have Nicaragua, a Continental Shelf that reached 200 nm. (UNCLOS III). However, the Court delineated the 200-nautical-mile area off the

¹⁰⁹ International Court of Justice, (2009), Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), available at : <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/132>.

coast of Nicaragua, where there was a conflict of rights between Colombia and Nicaragua. On the East Side of the Colombian Islands, where the Santa Andreas cluster of islands are located, granted the right to have an Exclusive Economic Zone and a Continental Shelf. On the other side of this cluster of islands (western), which is located opposite to the Nicaragua's mainland, the only right that was granted it was to have territorial waters. All the other islands that belonged to Colombia and were located opposite to Nicaragua's mainland the only right they preserved was that of the territorial waters. And in the case of these islands, the principle of the middle line came into force. **(INDEX X)**

It is also important to note that the request of these two States was made in 2001 and the Court ruling was issued in 2012. Therefore, it took nine years for this dispute to be resolved.¹¹⁰

iii) Qatar VS Bahrain (1991)

In this chapter it is very important to say that the Court takes into account any convention and any regime and any custom signed or created by a state in order its decision to be sufficiently substantiated and reasoned. In 1991, for the first time, in the Qatar vs Bahrain case, the court used the principle of equidistance to delimit the maritime borders of those two states. **(INDEX XI)**

In 1991, Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah and the delimitation of their maritime areas.

The historical background has shown that Bahrain and Qatar had concluded exclusive protection agreements with Great Britain in 1892 and 1916 respectively and that the status of protected states had expired in 1971.

¹¹⁰International Court of Justice, (2001), Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), available at : <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/124>.

The Court first examined the parties' claims for Zubarah. The court stated that, in the period after 1868, the power of Qatar's sheikh over Zubarah had been gradually consolidated, recognized in the Anglo-Ottoman convention of July 29, 1913, and definitively established in 1937. In addition, there was no evidence that members of the Naim tribe had exercised sovereign power on behalf of the Sheikh of Bahrain in Zubarah. Thus, Qatar dominated Zubarah.

The Court secondly considered the Qatar's Claim about the Hawar Islands. In 1939, Bahrain and Qatar had consented to Great Britain to settle their dispute about those islands. The Great Britain had decided that those islands belonged to Bahrain. The Court therefore upheld that judgment and concluded that Bahrain had sovereignty over the Hawar islands.

In this 1939 British decision, the island of Janan was not included in the islands of the Hawar group. Accordingly, Qatar had sovereignty over Janan Island, including Hadd Janan.

As previously stated, the Court used the principle of equidistance to delimit the maritime borders of those two States. As we can see in the index, neither Bahrain's claim nor Qatar's claim was taken into account by the Court in order to be achieved the right demarcation.¹¹¹

iv) Malta VS Libya(1985)

This case, submitted to the Court in 1982. There was a special argument between Libya and Malta about the delimitation of their Continental Shelf. In support of its arguments, Libya relied on the principle of physical extension and the concept of proportionality. Malta argued that States' rights to Continental Shelf areas are now governed by the principle of middle line, especially if this delimitation referred to states that are opposite.

The court decided that the Syrtis Gulf is a closed Gulf. But in general the middle line principle was used. Court took into account the main characteristics of the shores, the difference in their length and the distance between them. It took care to avoid any excessive disproportion between the continental shelf appertaining to a State and the length of its

¹¹¹ International Court of Justice, (1991), Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), available at : <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/87>.

coastline, and adopted the solution of a median line transposed northwards over a certain distance. (INDEX XII)¹¹²

v) North sea Continental Shelf (1969)

Very important is the article 91 of the North Sea's Continental Shelf decision. Justice does not mean necessarily equality. There can never be a request for a complete reshaping of nature, and justice does not require the state not to have access to the sea in order to grant it a piece of the Continental Shelf of another state. Therefore, it is important to understand that each case. Therefore, a case in which a state has a long coastline cannot be treated in the same way, with another case in which the state has no coastline at all.¹¹³

¹¹²International Court of Justice, (1985), Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), available at : <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/68>.

¹¹³ International Court of Justice, (1968), North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark), available at : <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/51>.

Cariotis, Th., Ignatiou, M., (2014), The Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, Libani S.A., Athens, p. 54.

5. DELINEATING A POTENTIAL GREEK EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

As mentioned earlier, there are two ways in which a State delimits its Exclusive Economic Zone, either through bilateral Conventions-Agreements or through the International Court of Justice, in cases where no agreement can be reached.

For Greece, these two options are possible because of Turkey's position. Turkey is a neighboring state that claims all potential rights that could belong to it and not only. Turkey is acting in an expansive way. So an agreement with its state is the most difficult part in our case. For Greece to resolve this problem, it must act strategically. Greece must move strategically to safeguard its sovereign rights.

For Greece and Europe the most important point that needs to be safeguarded is the point where the EEZs of Cyprus, Egypt and Greece meet. As we have seen before this spot helps Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Egypt to gain stability in the region. This point is very important for Europe, as the European Parliament is planning to implement a project of common interest, which will help Europe become energy independent. This project will be either the creation of a pipeline that will pass through the Exclusive Economic Zone of Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Italy or a liquefied natural gas terminal to be installed in Israel with a view to supplying natural gas and oil to Europe. This work is very important for Europe for two reasons. The first reason is because Europe wants to diversify its energy suppliers. The second reason is that Europe wants to find suppliers with political stability, in order not to be in danger of a sudden outage. So Israel is a supplier with good recommendations for Europe. But to achieve this cooperation, Europe needs to ensure that oil and gas are transported without interruption. Thus, the road from Israel to Cyprus is a safe route, because Israel and Cyprus have defined their EEZ. The two neighboring states had concluded an agreement. For gas and oil to be delivered to Europe from Cyprus, the only safe route is through Greece. Always provided that the EEZ of Greece and Cyprus intersects. If this condition is not fulfilled, then the safety of transport will collapse. As Turkey is a state that always creates problems. On the other hand, Egypt wants political stability in

the region. And as we have already mentioned, Egypt is an enemy of Turkey. Egypt's population is also growing dramatically. As a result, Egypt is starting to use its gas and oil reserves to meet its needs. But a small piece of its oil and gas is looking for a buyer. So Egypt wants to sell its surplus stocks on the European market. As we can see, Europe, Israel, Egypt and Greece want Greece, Israel and Cyprus to catch an agreement. The conditions are therefore favorable to Greece. Of course, there is always the fear of Turkey. So the best that Greece can do is to agree with Cyprus and Egypt in a secret way. And even when this agreement is reached, it will have to remain secret.

The second step for Greece, which needs to be done alongside the first one, is to reach an agreement with Italy. As Italy is a member of the European Union and benefits from the establishment of the East-Med pipeline. It will also be an easy deal not only because the conditions are in favor of Greece, but also because Italy and Greece have already defined their Continental Shelf. The EEZ delineation usually follows the demarcation of the Continental Shelf. So as long as the Continental Shelf is already defined, the delimitation of the EEZ is the easiest part to accomplish. If a delineation with Italy is reached, the deal should remain secret.

The third and most important step is the agreement with Libya. Also, the situation is in favor of Greece, because the rebel Khaftar, who is trying hard to take the power in Libya, is a friend of the Americans and an enemy of Turkey. The civil war in Libya seems to favor Greece's interests. Turkey physically assists Libya's legitimate government, which by chance is extremist Muslim. On the other hand, Washington is in the midst of turmoil with Turkey because of Turkey's new cooperation with Russia. Turkey seems to be ignoring the US and trying to find new sources to buy military weapons. Therefore, it is time for Greece to conclude an agreement with Libya. Of course, if an agreement with Libya is reached, of course with the US blessings, then it should be kept secret once again.

The fourth step should be with Albania. Albania, of course, is an ally of the Turkish side. Thus, in this neighboring state, none of the other agreements should be disclosed. However, in recent years, we can see

that Albania wants an agreement because it wants to exploit its oil reserves. So, by completing this agreement, we reach our ultimate goal.

At this level, we have defined our EEZ with 5 of the 6 neighboring states. The last and most difficult step is the demarcation with Turkey.

In this step, we must declare our EEZ and the Continental Shelf in the Aegean. Of course for Turkey this statement means *casus belli*. There are two moves we can make: either we reveal to Turkey all the other secret delimitations we have made with our neighboring states or we can conceal this information and urge Turkey to apply to the International Court of Justice for a friendly solution. But, as we know, Turkey does not accept any institutional body dealing with the Law of the Sea. In my opinion, Greece simply has to annul its EEZ without looking for any other solution. In this case there are two possibilities; the first and most likely is Turkey to launch illegal drilling in the Aegean, as in the case of Cyprus. And the second least likely is to appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Of course in the first case, Turkey will become quite provocative, and there is no sure solution. The two most likely solutions in my opinion is either the intervention of UN, forcing Turkey to appeal to the International Court of Justice or to the International Arbitration, or the intervention of America by banning drilling in the Aegean. With the exception of the second part of the first probability, in all other cases the result is the same. The procedure will be settled by the international court.

When the International Court of Justice examines the case, it will take into account the bilateral agreement Greece has already made with its neighboring states, as well as the treaties signed by Greece and Turkey. Let's remember some things from the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey officially renounced "in favor of Italy all right over the islands occupied by Italy ... and its subordinate islands". With the Treaty of Sevres, Italy gave Greece full sovereignty over the Dodecanese: Astypalean, Rhodes, Halkin, Karpathon, Kasson, Tilon, Nisyron, Kalimnon, Leron, Patmon, Lipson, Symi, Kos, and Kastellorizon as well as the adjacent islands. The Greek side stated, at the time of signature, that the term "adjacent" meant "under Italian sovereignty". Thus, the Greek sovereign rights in the Dodecanese are not disputed.

The problem with the International Court of Justice is that in order to win something, must lose something else. Greece will surely lose something from its EEZ. But the tri-national mark will remain intact. The most logical scenario is that Greece will going to conserve the 6 nm territorial water around of every island. Also, the Aegean islands cluster and also the Sporades islands will retain their right to EEZ. Because, these islands are a group of islands that are very close to each other. They are also a group of islands with similar characteristics. They are also interdependent, both economically and politically. But the main reason is that they are very close to mainland Greece. Also the island Euboea will retain its right to EEZ.

The main problem with this demarcation arises with the Dodecanese and especially with the cluster of Kastellorizos islands. There, the International Court of Justice will probably grant the inside maritime region of those islands with all the rights of the EEZ and the Continental shelf. Outside the cluster the Court will only grant them 6 nm of territorial waters. Because, dominated is the principle that the rights of a small island recede when it is located in front of a state with huge territory. Thus, the Turkish EEZ will extend up to half of distance in relation to Crete, but without breaking the trinity spot.

Of course, Crete will preserve its right (UNCLOS III) to have EEZ and Continental Shelf, as it is a very big island. ex. Malta. The same thing will be with Rhodes, Karpathos and Kasson. So the principle of equidistance will be under force. But the International Court of Justice in order not to change the Conventions between Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and Libya will give to Turkey only a piece of the sea from the Greek EEZ, not affecting our borders with our neighbors. The only change that will take place will be our border with Turkey in the Kastellorizo region.

As for the rest of the Dodecanese, the Dodecanese from Rhodes to Samos, due to their geopolitical, economic and political cohesion will gain the right to have EEZ and Continental Shelf. Thus the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of these islands will unite with the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of Crete and the Aegean islands.

All the other Dodecanese islands will preserve only their right to have a 6 nm territorial sea. (Mytilene, Chios, Psara, Anti- Psara, Limnos, Santa Eustratios). The principle of equidistance between the Turkish

coast and the Greek coast will come into force. The coasts of Euboea will also be taken into account. On the other hand, the Turkish islands of Imbros and Tenedos will only retain their right to have 6 nm territorial waters.

Of course this progress will take years, approximately 10 years. And in those 10 years the behavior of Turkey will be aggressive and provocative. But this behavior is something that Turkey use to do. So, a Greek delineation is something not so easy, but is something that we have to do in order to conserve our sovereignty.

6. Conclusion

The delimitation of an EEZ in Greece is a matter that most Greek governments have deliberately neglected. Because it is an issue so difficult to solve and it is also an issue that has high political costs. Also, the real facts are something different than speculation. So in my research we looked at the legal background and the proper way to delineate Greece's EEZ in the light of past and present conditions. But conditions are changing and we cannot be sure of the outcome and the difficulties that could arise. Because we don't know what the reaction of Turkey will be if Greece declare its Exclusive Economic Zone. And also we do not know what the reaction of the other state will be. (UN, EU, US). Because we cannot guarantee that these states will force Turkey to deal with its dispute legally and not through war. Also, if Turkey is forced to deal with this legal dispute, we do not know what the final ruling of the Court will be. Also, a judgment of the International Court of Justice is fluid and depends on many factors that we could not consider in an investigation. Therefore, the judgment of the International Court of Justice is multifaceted and cannot be predicted with certainty. Because the International Court of Justice does not follow any specific rules to make a decision. Instead, it creates rules. Therefore, the last part of my analysis is very fluid to make it a reality, because we are not sure about the court decision. And also we do not know with certainty if there are secrets agreements between the states that we have not taken into account.

Also as we can see, generally, a decision of the International Court of Justice about the Greek delineation is likely to harm the Greek interests.

Many questions are arisen after this thesis. The first one and the more serious is if the delineation of the Greek EEZ is really more lucrative for Greece than to maintaining the current status quo. As lucrative we mean a situation in accordance to its political, social, financial, geopolitical and geographical position. Other relevant questions that may arise after this thesis are the following: Would things be different if Greece decided to reclaim its EEZ alone and not its Continental shelf? Is the decision of the ICJ in favor of Greece? In the future this delineation will really help the Greece side? After such a decision of Greece to delineate its EEZ,

investors will be attracted by the Greece? Are there enough oil and gas reserves in the region in order Greece to gain something from this situation or the Greece will just lose time and money? If enough reserves be found in the Greek EEZ, the Greece will gain enough money in order to ensure economic growth? Will there be an environmental disaster after such an operation?

All these question arisen needs further research in order to be answered. So we understand that a Greek delineation of The EEZ is a complicated issue, with lots of parameters that must be answered. Planning and the legal framework seem easy, but the general framework around this demarcation has many difficulties that need to be addressed to see if it is profitable.

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

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INDEX I

DELIMITATION OF EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE *EQUIDISTANCE PRINCIPLE*



Source: K. Ioannou and A. Strati, The Law of the Sea , Athens, 2000.

INDEX II

States with the biggest in cubic meters Exclusive Economic Zone

Table I

State	Totalsurface (c.m.)
1. U.s	11.350.000
2. France	11.350.000
3. Australia	8.505.348
4. Russia	7.566.673
5. U.K	6.805.586
6. New Zealand	6.682.503
7. Indonesia	6.159.032
8. Canada	5.599.077
9. Japan	4.479.388
10. Chile	3.681.989
11. Brazil	3.660.955
12. Kiribati	3.441.810
13. Mexico	3.177.593
14. Marconian	2.996.419
15. Denmark	2.551.238

Source: David Attard , The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law , Oxford University Press, 1987, p. XXXIV , and Law the Sea Bulletin.

Table II

States with the biggest coasts


State	Length (clm.)
1. Canada	90.908
2. Indonesia	54.716
3. Russia	37.653

4. Philippines	36.280
5. Japan	29.751
6. Australia	25.760
7. Norway	25.148
8. U.S.	19.924
9. New Zealand	15.134
10. Greece	13.676

*Source: World
Resources, 1996.*

INDEX III

The delineation of sea zones



Source: Norwegian Polar Institute: Maritime Zones. The right to regulate navigation of ships varies between the maritime zones, as defined in the UN Law of the Sea Convention.


INDEX IV

The delimitation of Greek Territorial Sea.

In the left we see how is now with 6 nautical miles territorial sea, and the right how could be if expand its territorial sea in the upper limit of 12 nautical miles.

6 nautical miles


12 nautical miles



Source: mononews business stories of a new generation, (2018), article about the what is the territorial Sea and how the Turkish Sea the visit of Kotzia , 22/10/2018.

INDEX V

Map of the EU's EEZ




Source: Cariotis, Th., (2013), *The Exclusive Economic Zone of EU*, *Hellas Journal*,
Available at : <https://hellasjournal.com/2013/04/η-αοζ-της-ευρώπης/>, 26 April.

INDEX VI


The importance of Kastelorizo's Cluster for the delimitation of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone.

a) The Turkish side of delimitation



Source: website research Gate, *The Turkish view with regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitations in the Eastern Mediterranean -The Turkish view with regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitations in the Eastern Mediterranean*, uploaded by Georgios Chrysochou

b) The Greek side of delimitation



Source: website, *the Cyprus Mail, Long-term Plan B needed to face EEZ crisis, government warned*, EliaHazou, 12 may 2019

INDEX VII

a) The expected oil reserves in Greece- 50% possibility



Source: Konofagos, H., (2013), *Our mineral wealth lies within the Greek EEZ, The Lavreotiki*.

b) Table with the probability of finding hydrocarbons in the Mediterranean region

STATE	VERIFIED	HIGH PROPABILITY	50% PROPABILITY
EGYPT	1,8		6,31
ISRAEL	0,9		0,7
CYPRUS	0,2	1,7-1,8	

SYRIA-LIBANON			1,51
GREECE-CRETE			3,52-5,53
TOTAL	2.9	1,6-1,7	12,00-14,00

Source: Foscolos, Ant., (2014), The geopolitical and geoeconomical importance of Hydrocarbon Exploitation in Offshore Eastern Mediterranean and Greece in Meeting the Forthcoming European Energy Crisis The Geostrategic Location of Greece. Unpublished Analysis, May 2014, p.14.

INDEX VIII

The published map of Turkey images the 3/4 Crete as a Turkish island.



Source: Andreopoulos, Th., (2018), Ankara 'puts it': It publishes maps where the 75% of Crete is Turkish, pronews, 16 December, available at : https://www.pronews.gr/amyna-asfaleia/ellinotoyrkika/735194_hartes-proklisi-gia-tis-epidioxeis-tis-toyrkias-i-kriti-einai.

INDEX IX


The delineation of the EEZ between Ukraine and Romania



Source: Parsifal, (2011), The snakes of Hague and the Greek EEZ in Kastelorizo, Antinews, 12 April, Available at: <http://www.antinews.gr/action.read/Πολιτική/Οι-Οφεις-της-Χάγης-και-η-ελληνική-ΑΟΖ-στο-Καστελόριζο/2.59646>.

INDEX X


Maritime boundaries between Nicaragua and Colombia



Source: International Court of Justice, (2012), Colombia- Nicaragua, Sovereign Limits, available at: <https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/colombia-nicaragua>.

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
Maritime boundaries between Bahrain and Qatar



Source: Amerileb, (2006), Lebanon to become an oil and gas producing country, scyscaper city, available at: https://www.google.com/search?q=QATAR+BAHRAIN+EEZ&rlz=1C1CHBD_enGR768GR770&source=lnms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiitrXj1qrkAhVB6aOKHejjDKcQ_AUIESgB&biw=1366&bih=657#imgcr=geospXZPQ7_YM:

INDEX XII

Maritime Boundaries between Malta and Libya



Source: Gatt, P., (2012), *Oil concession maps*, *Times Malta*, 16 November, available at: <https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/Oil-concession-maps.445565>.

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