Καθολικά παίγνια και εφαρμογές στα χρηματοοικονομικά
KeywordsΚαθολικά παίγνια ; Επιλογή ισορροπίας ; Πληροφόρηση ; Θόρυβος ; Νομισματικές επιθέσεις ; Τιμολόγηση χρέους ; Μαζικές τραπεζικές αναλήψεις ; Global games ; Equilibrium selection ; Information ; Noise ; Currency attacks ; Debt pricing and bank runs
Many economic problems are naturally modelled as a game of incomplete information, where a player's payoff depends on his own action, the actions of others, and some unknown economic fundamentals. Other players' actions in such situations are motivated by their beliefs about economic fundamentals. But players' actions also depend on beliefs of higher order. These problems of incomplete information can be approached and solved by Global Games. Global Games are games of incomplete information whose type space is determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. They have particular practi-cal interest because economists after John Nash stopped thinking exclusively about unrealistic models of competitive markets and started focus on cases that economic agents take into consideration other’s agents’ actions. In this thesis, we focus exclusively on financial applications such as currency attacks, bank runs and liquidity crises. On previous cases, players' uncertainty plays central role as far as other players' actions are concerned. Despite the uncertainty, using a specific methodology we have a unique dominance solvable equilibrium.