Η μη αξιόπιστη επικοινωνία στην Θεωρία παιγνίων
KeywordsΘεωρία παιγνίων ; Cheap talk ; Μη αξιόπιστη επικοινωνία ; Παίγνια πλήρους πληροφόρησης ; Στατικά μπεϋζιανά παίγνια ; Ισορροπία Nash ; Παράγωγα χρηματιστηριακά προϊόντα ; Πληροφόρηση ; Ενημερωμένοι παίκτες
This thesis deals with the analysis of game theory in the light of cheap talk (non-cooperative communication) between two or more parties, and analyzes the strategies they adopt in order to distinguish whether to cooperate or not, and how they could achieve optimum results. The thesis starts with a general introduction to the game theory and continues with a historic overview of researchers whose studies were critical in shaping the scientific field of game theory. The second chapter lists and elaborates on relevant literature on cheap talk (non-cooperative communication). This includes observations on how the players can cooperate and follow an optimized strategy, so that they achieve the best possible results for themselves. The third chapter emphasizes that the Securities Derivatives Market can produce insights on the future stock price performance in the Stock Exchange. In the following chapter, a game is presented where two large institutional investors may manipulate stock price returns using non-cooperative communication (cheap talk) by investing in the derivatives market. The subsequent analysis showcases how they can work together and when it is not in their best interest to cooperate. Finally, the conclusions of this thesis are presented and further research areas are identified.